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HEADQUARTERS 351ST INFANTRY
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 88

10 June 1944

HISTORY OF THE 351ST INFANTRY REGIMENT FOR THE MONTH OF MAY 1944.

Preparations for the inevitable 5th Army offensive to the North were continued by the 351st Infantry Regiment in its concentration area in the vicinity of Carinola, Italy. The extensive and rigorous training program for all troops was accelerated. Physical conditioning and realistic combat problems for all units up to include the battalion were stressed. Proposed plans were discussed by all leaders for an attack in a zone indicated by the Division Commander. The entire command's morale was high and all enthusiastically awaited the time for the offensive to be ordered.

The 3d Battalion, 351st Infantry still occupied front line positions near SAN LORENZO, Italy in the 350th Infantry sector. This battalion engaged in considerable patrol activity and mortar dueling; otherwise operations were of a static defensive character.

On 3 May 1944, all troops of the Division not actually engaged in tactical operations were ordered to assemble to hear an address by LIEUTENANT GENERAL MARK W. CLARK, Commanding General, 5th Army. In a natural amphitheater near CARINOLA, Italy, on this warm afternoon, the troops of the Division awaited the arrival of their Army Commander. An honor guard of two platoons from Company "A", 351st Infantry, commanded by CAPTAIN JOHN C. REID, stood before the speakers stand. BRIGADIER GENERAL PAUL W. KENDALL, Assistant Division Commander, Acting Commander of Troops, and the 88th Division Staff, resplendent in their characteristic blue scarfs, also were before the platform.

At 1330 hours the well-known "three-star" jeep of GENERAL CLARK drove into the amphitheater as the 5th Army band played the General's March.

MAJOR GENERAL SLOAN introduced GENERAL CLARK and in his introductory remarks, praised the successful career of GENERAL CLARK, stating his personal interest in the General's success because of having once been his tactics instructor at the Command and General School.

Speaking in a natural, informal manner, GENERAL CLARK welcomed the 88th Division into the 5th Army and expressed his confidence in the combat ability of the Division. The operations of the 5th Army in Italy, all characterized by indescribable hardships imposed by the mountainous terrain, severe weather, and insufficient troops were described by the General. A promise to the Division of an important role in imminent offensive operations was made, a mission on which the General confidently believed this division would be successful.

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The address was brief, yet eloquent. The quiet, powerful, ingratiating manner of the General filled all the soldiers seated on this Italian hillside with confidence in the intelligence and leadership of their Army Commander.

GENERAL CLARK ended his address by calling attention to the gallant action of 2D LIEUTENANT JOHN T. LAMB, of Company "K", 351st Infantry, in close combat with the enemy during the operations of this regiment in the vicinity of TUFO, Italy. In recognition of LT. LAMB'S heroism, the General awarded him the Distinguished Service Cross, the first award of this high decoration to any member of the 88th Infantry Division.

After all troops except the 351st Infantry had left the area, COLONEL ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY, Commanding Officer, 351st Infantry Regiment, addressed the regiment. The Regimental Commander praised the regiment for its excellent showing during the period in the MINTURNO sector and expressed confidence in the regiment to do outstanding work in the coming offensive.

A sandtable reproduction of the MINTURNO-TUFO-SANTA MARIA INFANTE-PULCHERINI-MOUNT BRACCHI sector was prepared and studied by all officers of the command in preparation for the return of the regiment to this area.

The regiment received orders to relieve the 337th Infantry, less one battalion, 85th Infantry Division, from positions in the MINTURNO-TUFO sector under cover of darkness the nights of May 5-6 and May 6-7, 1944. Plans were immediately made for the relief.

COLONEL CHAMPENY and MAJOR HOBSON, S-3, attended a conference with the Commanding General at Division headquarters concerning plans for future operations.

A conference of all battalion commanders and special unit commanders, 351st Infantry, the regimental staff, MAJOR ROWELL, Commanding Officer, 804 Tank Destroyer Battalion, LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVIS, Commanding Officer 760th Tank Battalion, and MAJOR CHEEK, S-3, 760th Tank Battalion, was called at 1400 hours on 5 May 1944 by COLONEL ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY, the Commanding Officer, 351st Infantry, to outline and discuss plans for future operations.

May 5, 1944: Beginning at 2000 hours the night of May 5-6, the 1st Battalion, 351st Infantry, relieved the 2d Battalion, 337th Infantry; Company "H", 351st Infantry relieved Company "D", 337th Infantry; the Anti-Tank and Cannon companies, 351st Infantry relieved the same organizations of the 337th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 351st Infantry was relieved from front line positions in the 350th Infantry

sector near SAN LORENZO by the 2d Battalion, 349th Infantry, and moved into a dispersal area in the rear of that sector.

COLONEL CHAMPENY, MAJOR HOBSON, S-3, MAJOR SADLER, S-2, MAJOR FRANKEL, Regimental Surgeon, and CAPTAIN BLANCHE, Communications Officer moved forward to the quarry near MINTURNO to supervise the relief.

The remaining organizations of the regiment, the 2d Battalion, and Regimental Headquarters Company, moved forward on the night of May 6-7. The Regimental Headquarters was established in the shell-battered town of MINTURNO.

On the walls of the Regimental Commander's mess in a vacated building in MINTURNO were inscribed murals of a number of life-size nude lovelies painted by various soldiers in this area. The daring murals so attracted MAJOR SOL I. FRANKEL, Regimental Surgeon, (for years an inveterate "no-breakfast" eater), that he abandoned this life-long practice and regularly attended the breakfast meal.

The 3d Battalion, 351st Infantry, moved from the dispersal area in the 350th Infantry sector, to relieve the 1st Battalion, 337th Infantry from positions near MINTURNO.

May 7, 1944: The 351st Infantry was again occupying front line positions in the familiar MINTURNO-TUFO sector. During the morning, BRIGADIER GENERAL KENDALL visited the regimental sector and inspected the dispositions of the troops with COLONEL CHAMPENY. Five war correspondents, Mr. John McTigue, United Nations Radio; Mr. Graham Hovey, International News Service; Mr. Sid Feder, Associated Press; Mr. Larry Newman, International News Service; and Mr. Bill Hurst, International News Service, visited the Regimental Command Post, remained for lunch, and observed the enemy territory from the "Castle" observation post.

At 1945 hours a secret conference with the staff and battalion and special unit commanders was held pertaining to plans for the attack operation to be executed in a short time by the 5th Army. Tentative plans that had been outlined by the Division Commander were discussed and plans were made for the regimental attack.

May 8, 1944: A sandtable reproduction of the MINTURNO-TUFO-SANTA MARIA-PULCHERINI-MOUNT BRACCHI area was made and all troops were given orientation lectures on the peculiarities of this terrain and the known enemy dispositions in this area. Tentative missions, objectives and boundaries were outlined.

During the night of May 7-8 the SAN VITO outpost manned by one platoon of the 1st Battalion engaged in a fire fight with an enemy patrol. One soldier of a machine gun section of Company "D", 351st Infantry in SAN VITO was captured by the enemy and another was killed.

In order to conceal the identity of this regiment and the fact that a relief of the 337th Infantry had been effected, which would offer possible indication of a proposed attack, the patrolling in the regimental sector was carried out by an attached company of the 337th Infantry and was limited to close-in ambush patrols. The capture of one soldier from this regiment was unfortunate, but it was hoped that no vital information would be revealed.

Two German deserters, both non-commissioned officers, wandered into the first battalion lines during the night. The organization of these prisoners had been previously identified and remained the same. Valuable information of enemy dispositions and morale was obtained.

At 0900 hours a conference was held at the 351st Infantry Command Post between officers of the 88th Infantry Division and the 85th Infantry Division, to coordinate the offensive operation, outline the plans of the two adjacent assault battalions and to establish a definite boundary between the 88th and the 85th Divisions. COLONEL CHAMPENY, LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVIDSON, G-3, 88th Division; LIEUTENANT COLONEL OHME, G-3, 85th Division; COLONEL QUINN, G-2, 7th Army, a visitor; LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENDALL, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 351st Infantry; and LIEUTENANT COLONEL JACKSON, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 338th Infantry, the adjacent battalion commanders; and the regimental staff, 351st Infantry attended the conference. The divisional boundary between the 1st Battalion, 338th Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 351st Infantry was established as a general line running parallel, 200 yards west of the MINTERNO-SANTA MARIA INFANTE road. The attack plans of the two adjacent battalions were outlined by the battalion commanders and the battalion boundaries on the successive objectives were established.

Three war correspondents, Mr. Graham Hovey, International News Service; Mr. Ed Johnson, "Chicago Sun"; and Mr. Ed Morgan, "Chicago Daily News" and BRIGADIER GENERAL KENDALL were guests of the Regimental Commander for supper, after which GENERAL KENDALL and COLONEL CHAMPENY conferred on tactical plans.

May 9, 1944: Field Order #6, Headquarters 88th Infantry Division was received ordering the 88th Infantry Division into the attack at H hour on D day. The mission of the US II Corps was to attack west with divisions abreast; the 88th Division on the right, the 85th Division on the left, to secure Ausonia defile and to cut the PICO-ITRI road in the vicinity of ITRI. The Corps artillery was to fire counter-battery and placed in direct support of the 88th Division, the 631st Field Artillery Battalion and the 6th Field Artillery Group.

The XII Tactical Air Command was to attack line of communications, supply and artillery targets, to include gun areas in the vicinity of FORMIA and gun areas in the triangle SPIGNO-CORENO-MOUNT ROTUNDO. Fighter-bomber support would be furnished by this Air Command on call.

Attached to the 88th Division was the First Armored Group, less one battalion, the 804th Tank Destroyer Battalion, the 601st Field Artillery Battalion, the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, and the 2d Chemical Weapons Battalion.

May 10, 1944: MAJOR CHEEK, S-3, 760th Tank Battalion visited the Command Post and discussed attack plans for regimental zone of action. COLONEL CHAMPNEY, Regimental Commander visited all battalion areas for final inspection and coordination with battalion commanders.

May 11, 1944: D DAY -- It was officially announced this morning that 11 May 1944 is D DAY, and that H HOUR is 2300 HOURS. This is the long-awaited day for which we have been preparing for so many months. Morale and confidence were never higher. MAJOR GENERAL JOHN E. SLOAN, personally visited each company assuring the men of his interest in their welfare and expressing his confidence in their ability to accomplish the task ahead.

Officers and non-commissioned officers of the 1st Battalion visited the sandtable during the day and were oriented as to the terrain and situation by MAJOR BROWN, Battalion Commander. Mr. Faust, Harper's Magazine writer, who had been living with a platoon of "L" Company, visited the Command Post and was granted permission to accompany the assault platoon of "E" Company which would lead the attack. Enemy artillery concentrations were unusually heavy in MINTURNO, one round making a direct hit on the roof of the Command Post.

At 2300 hours, H HOUR, one of the greatest artillery barrages in history opened up, and continued with undiminished force for about one and one-half hours, then gradually decreased to a little more than usual intensity. Second Battalion jumped off from the Line of Departure with "E" Company, the leading company, on the right, "F" Company on the left, and "G" Company in reserve. Company "F" met first resistance receiving heavy machine gun fire from hill 130.

May 12, 1944: Company "F" overcame the resistance and continued their advance up the terrain feature known as the "tits", abreast of "B" Company. LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENDALL, Battalion Commander, with his command group followed "E" Company. CAPTAIN CARLSTONE, Commander of "E" Company, was wounded. "E" Company was then held up on the "spur". When LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENDALL'S radio was damaged by

shell fire, he moved forward to determine the cause of the delay and assumed command of "E" Company when he learned that CAPTAIN CARLSTONE was a casualty. Finding that Company "E" was held up by two machine guns in pill boxes, he led a platoon in an attack on one of the pill boxes. This machine gun was knocked out and LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENDALL then led the company to the right of the "tit" under heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire. Coming up on the forward slope of the "spur" the machine gun fire from both flanks and the front again stopped the company with a number of casualties. Deciding that the right machine gun located in a stone house was most effective, LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENDALL took a squad from the second platoon and advanced to silence the enemy gun. He first built up all the fire possible using his maximum squad fire power and firing the carbine, bazooka, BAR, and M-1 with anti-tank grenades himself. He then led the final assault on the building and as he pulled the pin on a hand grenade preparatory to throwing it, he was struck by machine gun fire from his left flank, mortally wounding him. Unable to throw the grenade, LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENDALL held it, and fell upon it, to prevent injury to his men. Thus died one of the finest officers of the United States Army.

Inspired by his sacrifice, Company "E" captured the "spur" and held it for several hours until reinforcements arrived, then pushed on into SANTA MARIA INFANTE, but were forced to fall back slightly by a strong counter-attack.

Company "F" forged ahead on the left and reached a position near Tame. Tanks brought up to knock-out the pill boxes were unable to get through because of mines and enemy self-propelled guns. MAJOR EDWIN L. SHULL, Executive Officer, 2d Battalion, assumed command when LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENDALL became a casualty. Third Battalion commanded by MAJOR CHARLES P. FURR was ordered at 0415 hours to move forward and pass through the 2d Battalion to keep the attack moving. Company "G" moved up the SANTA MARIA INFANTE-MINTURNO road, cleaning up machine gun nests in the rear of the two assault companies. 3d Battalion jumped off at 0730 hours in an attack on hill 172. They were held up temporarily at hill 103 by machine gun fire, but continued the advance. 3d Battalion Aid Station was shelled and CAPTAIN LEROY D. HARSHMAN, Battalion Surgeon was wounded. Prisoners taken were few. Nine reported.

May 13, 1944: Attempts to clear mines from the SANTA MARIA INFANTE road and get tanks forward were not successful. Two more tanks were knocked out by self-propelled guns near SANTA MARIA INFANTE. Company "F" was isolated by the German counter-attack which forced "E" Company to withdraw. The Battalion Adjutant, CAPTAIN GILMER H. HEITMAN JR. went forward to attempt to improve the supply situation. Upon arriving at positions of Company "E" and "G" he found both companies disorganized, "E" Company having lost its Company Commander, and "G" Company Commander being wounded. Company

"E" had suffered heavy casualties and had approximately two platoons left. The morale of the men was high. In spite of the heavy casualties suffered, an order to attack at 1530 hours was received by radio at 1440 hours. Under these circumstances, CAPTAIN HEITMAN assumed command of Company "E", made the plan of attack and coordinated with the Commander of Company "G", 1ST LIEUTENANT THEODORE W. NOON JR., who though wounded, insisted on remaining with his company for the attack. To complete coordination with the 85th Division, the attack was delayed until 1700 hours. At this time, CAPTAIN HEITMAN crawled forward with the first platoon of "E" Company and made an attack on two machine gun emplacements. Crawling under the final protective line of fire, he found two dead American soldiers and from grenade fragments lying near, determined the direction from which the grenades had come. All but two men were pinned down by the machine gun fire, so CAPTAIN HEITMAN crawled forward accompanied by only two men, and attacked the right machine gun nest. While he was still several yards away, a hand grenade was thrown from the first bunker. The grenade went off a few feet away but the three were not injured. CAPTAIN HEITMAN then sent the two enlisted men around to the flank of the pill boxes and waited for another hand grenade to be thrown. When the German soldier raised up to throw the grenade, CAPTAIN HEITMAN shot him through the head before he could throw. When the third grenade came, he repeated the same procedure. A third German was killed in the same manner. At this time, grenades from a second pill box were thrown at CAPTAIN HEITMAN and his men. The second grenade from this pill box wounded all three of them. The action described had taken one and one-half hours. CAPTAIN HEITMAN had discovered the location of three other machine gun emplacements and their range of fire, so he withdrew to secure aid for the wounded men and prepare for a night attack on the positions.

Frederick Faust, war correspondent for Harper's magazine, and better known under the pen name of Max Brand, as a fiction and movie writer was killed by shell fragments shortly after the attack started.

Mr. Faust had obtained permission to accompany an assault platoon in the attack, stating in his own words that "the first attack is the cream and I wish to be a part of it."

Mr. Faust had been with the regiment a little less than three weeks, but had made many friends among both officers and enlisted men.

During daylight hours the Second Chemical Mortar Battalion kept smoke in front of PULCHERINI and MOUNT BRACCHI to hinder observation of enemy artillery. In spite of this, the shelling in MINTURNO was very heavy and accurate. No communication and no contact with Company "F" since 1730 previous day. COLONEL A. S. CHAMPENY, Regimental Commander ordered that a new Company "F" be formed from the remaining companies of the Second Battalion.

After having been held up by machine gun fires from our left flank on Hills 109 and 131 which were out of the Regimental zone, the Division boundary was moved so that Hill 109 would be included within Regimental Zone for the ensuing attack with the CO 538 Inf guaranteeing to Division Commanders of both 85th and 88th Divisions that he would reduce Hill 131. The first battalion was then ordered to attack at 1600 hours. While making his run the Bn Commander was subjected to heavy artillery fire in which Capt Shoemaker, Company Commander, Co D, was killed. The Bn Commander of 1st Bn then became separated from his Bn as it had moved forward toward the line of departure while he was making the reconnaissance. He was personally conducted to his Bn by Regimental Commander who also directed the Bn to the Line of Departure remaining with them until the attack was launched at 2045 hours.

May 14, 1944: Early on the morning of 14 May 1944 the 1st Bn took Hill 109 after meeting considerable enemy resistance which included traversing an extensive mine field and repelling an enemy counterattack. Hill 131 which the 538 Inf had promised to capture had not been taken and in order to protect the flank of the Regiment the 1st Bn left the regimental zone and captured Hill 131. The 2nd Battalion moved on SANTA MARIA INFANTE from the right. The 3rd Battalion moved up the MINTURNO-SANTA MARIA INFANTE road. The town was occupied by 1000 hours, with the Germans apparently retreating up the ANSONIA-SPIGNO road. The enemy had hardly cleared SANTA MARIA INFANTE when the engineers arrived in the town with bull-dozers and equipment and began clearing rubble from the streets. Having reached their first objective, the Regiment was given a new objective to the West, MOUNT CIVITA, and the 2nd Battalion was placed in the Division reserve, northwest of SANTA MARIA INFANTE. After reorganization and receiving rations and supplies, the 1st and 3rd Battalions jumped off at 1500 hours down the SPIGNO road, with the 1st Battalion leading. From 1500 hours to 1800 hours this road was heavily shelled, but the regiment moved on and took their objective at 2200 hours. Company "C" moved to the base of MOUNT CIVITA by riding on tanks which pushed ahead in the assault echelon. The 1st Battalion then took up positions on the forward and reverse slopes of MOUNT CIVITA.

Three enlisted men of Company "F" emerged from a culvert in the vicinity of TAME to solve the mystery of the men of Company "F" who advanced so rapidly in the initial attack that they were cut off from the remainder of the regiment. These men had taken up positions greatly in advance of regimental front lines and were able to hold out though surrounded for 30 hours. The Germans who had suffered many casualties in trying to rush the "F" Company position, finally resorted to an old ruse to capture the company. Several Germans advanced with hands in the air, yelling "Kamerad".

As the men of Company "F" arose to capture them, many other Germans closed in from the rear. A machine gunner of Company "H" took terrific toll before a German bullet ceased his firing. Among the group captured by the Germans was CAPTAIN CARL W. NELSON, Company Commander, LT. AUGUST J. KASPER, Battalion S-2, LT. JOHN M. WESTON, and LT. VERGA, platoon leaders, LT. STANLEY J. RYDZEWSKI, JR., Cannon Company Liaison Officer, and approximately fifty enlisted men. The three enlisted men who escaped, had "played dead" in their fox holes as the Germans marched away their comrades. Thus ended the fighting of a gallant, courageous company who fought so bravely against insurmountable odds.

15 May 1944: At daylight on the morning 15 May 1944 the 1st Bn attacked and captured MOUNT PASSASERA North West of MT CIVITA, completely surprising and overrunning a German pack artillery battery capturing and killing approximately 100 Germans. Almost simultaneous with the launching of this attack MAJOR SADLER S-2 and CAPT (then 1st Lt) EDMONSON, Asst S-3, arrived after an all night climb up CIVITA with orders for the Regiment to continue attack to Northeast to cut off the withdrawal of Germans from SPIGNO. The 1st Bn accomplished this mission rapidly followed by 3rd Bn. A patrol made up of MAJ BROWN, CO 1st Bn, MAJ HOBSON S-3 and several riflemen moved into the town of SPIGNO being the first American troops to enter that ill-fated rubble of a city. Soon afterward the 1st Bn 550 Inf accompanied by BRIG GEN KENDALL entered the town of SPIGNO. The 551st Inf received orders personally from GEN KENDALL to relieve the 1st Bn 550 Inf within SPIGNO and protect the town from German counterattack. 3rd Bn 351st Inf accomplished the relief of 1st Bn 550 Inf at 1800 hours with the 1st Bn 551st Inf occupying defensive positions on high ground NW of SPIGNO. During this phase of operations, communications became a serious problem; wire could not be maintained because of continuous enemy artillery fire. The distance and numerous hill masses made radio communication uncertain. Regimental Communications Platoon had been working without rest since the attack started on the night of 11 May. During all this time, the Regimental Commander, COLONEL ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY, and his command group, MAJOR VICTOR W. HOBSON, S-3; CAPTAIN CORCORAN, Artillery Liaison Officer; and 1ST LT. CHARLES D. EDMONSON, Assistant S-3, accompanied the forward elements of every assault. Up to this point, the rear Regimental Command Post had remained in MINTURNO. Orders were received from GENERAL SLOAN for the Regiment to push forward as soon as possible for MT SAN ANGELO. Two loyal "peasants" were engaged as guides and the 3rd Bn moved out for MT SAN ANGELO over a rocky steep trail at 2230 hours followed by the 1st Bn. Orders were also received relieving the 2nd Bn from positions vic SANTA MARIA and PULCHERINI and placing them again under regimental control. However, the 2nd Bn were unable to overtake the Regiment until 18 May.

May 16, 1944: On the morning of May 16, the Rear Regimental Command Post and the Regimental Aid Station moved to SPIGNO. LT NEAL J. PRICE, with a small medical detachment started over the mountains with his medical equipment packed on mules to attempt to catch the troops. BRIGADIER GENERAL BROWN, Assistant Division Commander arrived at SPIGNO to remain with the Rear Regimental Command Post. LT. THOMAS J. GILLEN, Regimental Liaison Officer, was sent forward on foot with a message for COLONEL CHAMPENY.

There was still no communications by wire or radio with the Regimental Commander. CAPTAIN FREDERICK A. BLANCHE, JR., Regimental Communications Officer, started over the mountains at 2200 hours to attempt to improve the communications. 3rd Bn reached the Regimental objective, MOUNT SAN ANGELO at 0800 hours. At 1200 hours, the Regimental Commander, COLONEL ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY, arrived at 3rd Battalion Command Post and shortly received orders from Corps Commander by Radio designating MOUNT RUAZZO as their next objective, 3rd Bn was ordered to move out immediately followed by 1st Bn. At 1810 hours 3rd Bn arrived on MOUNT RUAZZO. Large numbers of Italians welcomed the troops and gave them the information that about 400 Germans had left the area the preceding night and that some of them were still on the reverse slope. LT. STANTON D. RICHART, 3rd Battalion I & R Platoon Leader, with 18 enlisted men went to investigate. He made contact with a group of approximately fifty Germans, killed 6, and caused the remainder to disperse in small groups, many of which were captured by the 1st Battalion the following day. The 1st Battalion following behind the 3rd, had moved on MOUNT MESOLE, cutting off the valleys and draws behind FORMIA, and reached their objective at 1930 hours.

May 17, 1944: The 601st Field Pack Artillery moved over the mountain trails in an attempt to reach the Regiment and give them artillery support. At 1500 hours the 3rd Battalion followed by the 1st Battalion, moved out towards their next objective, MOUNT GRANDE, in the vicinity of ITRI. Before reaching this objective, the battalion encountered enemy resistance in the hills above ITRI valley. Fire from self-propelled guns, snipers, mortars and tanks was extremely heavy. Artillery support had not yet reached the regiment. Our casualties were high. In spite of their losses and the heavy resistance, the battalions attacked again at 2300 hours and after reaching the ITRI road, were again stopped by German tanks. While on a reconnaissance during the day, LT. GEORGE D. SCHAFFER, 1st Battalion S-3, and LT. JOHN F. CURRY were captured by a group of one German officer and eighteen men. By convincing the Germans that they were surrounded by American troops, the entire group was persuaded to surrender to the two American officers, who returned with them to the battalion command post.

May 18, 1944: The heavy shelling continued and the battalions were forced to set up on MOUNT PERETTA and reorganize. Heavy shelling continued all day from German artillery, mortars and tanks. Machine gun and snipers were very effective. Supplies had not reached the regiment and ammunition, rations and water were very low. One artillery shell hit the 1st Battalion command post, killing two radio operators, Corporal Metzker, and Private Cook, and injuring a third, Private Yusz. LT. JOHN F. CURRY also suffered a slight wound in the shoulder. At 1700 hours, salvation came in the form of 240mm fire from II Corps Artillery. This fire effectively silenced the tanks. The 601st Pack Artillery arrived and set up in position to support the regiment.

MAJOR SOL I. FRANKEL, Regimental Surgeon suffered a heart attack and was evacuated when he started over the mountains with a pack train with the Regimental Aid Station. CAPTAIN CECIL COHEN, Regimental Dental Surgeon

took charge of the Regimental Aid Station and continued with the train.

BRIG GEN KENDALL arrived at Advanced Regtl CP followed by 350th Inf. After making recon and estimate of situation, GENERAL KENDALL ordered the Regiment to attack at daybreak. The 3rd Bn, making the main attack, would advance from present positions, cut the PICO-ITRI road, and continue the attack to seize that position of MONTE GRANDE within its zone. 1st Bn would move North around MASS ARCIGLIANO so as to reach Highway 82 at daybreak, continue the attack to seize that part of MONTE GRANDE within its zone. 2nd Bn was to follow the 1st Bn. Two Bns 350th Inf would move forward and occupy present positions of 1st and 3rd Bns, 351st Inf, as soon as vacated.

May 19, 1944: At 0200 hours the 1st Bn moved around MASS ARCIGLIANO reaching Highway 82 at daybreak as scheduled. After crossing the Highway to begin the ascent of MONTE GRANDE, Company B, the leading company, engaged a machine gun nest killing 8 Germans, capturing two and wounding one. The 1st Bn then occupied positions on that part of MONTE GRANDE within its zone.

The 3rd Bn jumped off at 0500 hours and crossed Highway 82 at daybreak with only slight resistance. That part of MONTE GRANDE within Bn sector was occupied promptly.

At 0910 LT. RICHART and the I & R platoon entered ITRI. The patrol captured 19 Germans and killed 6 more. The Corps objective as announced in initial attack order had been reached. LT. RICHART'S patrol were the first American soldiers in ITRI.

May 20, 1944: The Regiment was placed in Division reserve and promptly began to reorganize. The pack trains which had been coming across the mountains with rations and ammunition began to catch up with the regiment. At 1400 hours a message was received from GENERAL SLOAN, Commanding General, 88th Infantry Division, assigning the Regiment a new objective, MOUNT PAS-SIGNANO, with the additional mission of cutting the road in the vicinity of MOUNT CANACCAVIA and mopping up the Germans from that point of the road back of FONDI. The regiment moved out in columns of battalions, 1st Battalion leading with 2nd Chemical Battalion and the 601st Field Pack Artillery Battalion attached. Company "C" in the assault echelon was engaged by the enemy, but successfully knocked out several machine guns and mortars and the battalion by-passed the point and continued on with the mission.

May 21, 1944: On the morning of 21 May 1944, Regimental Headquarters Company received its first baptism of fire from strafing by an enemy fighter plane.

In moving on MOUNT VALLONA, in the vicinity of FONDI, early in the morning, the 1st Battalion met heavy machine gun, mortar, and sniper fire. MAJOR HAROLD MAC V. BROWN, the Battalion Commander, was killed by a sniper. Until the Battalion Executive officer, CAPTAIN TREVOR E. WILLIAMS, could

reach the head of the column, LIEUTENANT SCHAFFER, Battalion S-3 took command of the Battalion. In an earlier attack, LT. SCHAFFER had been wounded by a rifle bullet passing through his helmet and grazing his skull, rendering him unconscious. While lying unconscious, he was stripped of all his equipment by German soldiers who thought him dead. LT. SCHAFFER regained consciousness while the Germans were searching him, but gave no sign. He waited until the Germans had left, then got up and rejoined the battalion. It was at this time he found that MAJOR BROWN had been killed, and took command of the Battalion and continued on with the battalion's mission, refusing to seek medical aid until the objective was reached and the battalion took hills 486, 536 and 461, and organized positions on the latter. The 3rd Battalion arrived on MOUNT PASSIGNANO, the regimental objective, at 0600 hours and received heavy shelling from the enemy. MAJOR FURR, Battalion Commander, and about ten enlisted men were injured. Later in the day, MAJOR MAVRAKOS, Battalion Executive Officer was also injured. Both MAJOR FURR and MAJOR MAVRAKOS, refused evacuation. At 0750 hours, the battalion moved to assist the 349th Infantry in the attack on the hills overlooking FONDI. However, when they arrived at the base of their mountain objective, they found it already occupied by the 349th Infantry. The battalion got orders to remain in the vicinity in an assembly area to await orders. COLONEL ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY, Regimental Commander, accompanied by MAJOR SADLER, S-2; and MAJOR HOBSON, S-3, arrived at 3rd battalion Command Post at 1300 hours to orient the Battalion and Company Commanders on their next mission. COLONEL CHAMPENY ordered MAJOR FURR to the hospital for treatment of his wounds. At 1820 hours the battalion received orders to organize positions on MOUNT CHIAVINO. After taking its objective, MOUNT PASSIGNANO, the regiment was moved into an assembly area and was placed in Divisional reserve with 3rd Battalion occupying MOUNT CHIAVINO. The Regimental Command Post (rear) moved from ITRI to the vicinity of FONDI.

May 22, 1944: Supplies were brought up and distributed to the battalions. For the previous nine days, the troops had been supplied with rations, ammunition, signal equipment and all other supplies and replacements by mule trains of Italian packers over the mountain trails. In the afternoon, the Regimental Command Post moved to a position northwest of MOUNT PASSIGNANO, still in the vicinity of FONDI. At 2245 hours an order was received from the Commanding General of the 88th Division to move the 1st Battalion to MONSICARDI to relieve a battalion of the 349th Infantry.

May 23, 1944: The 2d Battalion was assigned to the Division reserve and followed the 350th Inf northwest to MOUNT ALTO. The 3d Battalion remained on MOUNT CHIAVINO throughout the day and night. The 1st Battalion remained on MONSICARDI suffering two casualties from artillery fire. At 0800 hours the Regimental Commander, COLONEL ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY and the forward command group moved into the mountains and established a forward command post on the reverse slopes of MONSICARDI.

May 24, 1944: At 0300 hours, the area of the Regimental Headquarters Company received an air raid by approximately 8 German bombers. No casualties were sustained, though two vehicles were damaged in the Regimental Motor Pool, and an ammunition dump at FONDI was hit. MAJOR GENERAL JOHN E. SLOAN visited the Rear Regimental

Command Post and informed LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES H. DRAKE, of the Division Directive to seize the line of the AMASENO river. The morale of the troops had been very high, but was improved even more by the news that ANZIO BEACHHEAD forces had cut highway 7 on both sides of CISTERNA in a new offensive.

The 1st Battalion moved from MONSICARDI to MOUNT PIZZUTO at 0800 hours to continue protection of the right flank of II Corps. 2d and 3d Battalions remained in position. MAJOR JOHN A. MAVRAKOS Executive Officer, 3d Battalion was hospitalized as a result of a leg injury. MAJOR FURR, Battalion Commander rejoined the 3d Battalion. The 1st Battalion maintained contact from MOUNT PIZZUTO with the French forces on our right by a series of connecting patrols.

25 May 1944: 1st Battalion continued the defense of MOUNT PIZZUTO and maintained contact with the French. At 1630 hours, the battalion received orders to move to a reserve assembly position near SAN BIAGIO where the 3d Battalion had already moved earlier in the day. The move was made by trucks. The 3d Battalion became a part of II Corps reserve. The Regimental Command Post moved to SAN BIAGIO and opened at 2100 hours.

26 May 1944: On the morning of 26 May 1944, 1st and 3d Battalions had hot meals, clean clothes and many of the men were able to bathe for the first time since the attack started. One of the most welcome surprises of the day occurred when the Red Cross girls of the 88th Division appeared at noon with cookies. At 1500 hours, the 3d Battalion moved into an assembly area in the vicinity of PRIVERNO. The 1st Battalion moved to the same area at 1700 hours. The Regimental Command Post moved to a new location near PRIVERNO and occupied a large stone dugout in a mountainside until the next day.

27 May 1944: The 2d Battalion rejoined the regiment at 0400 hours. At 0600 hours the 3d Battalion received orders to move to MOUNT SAN ANGELO to relieve the 338th Infantry. The 1st Battalion moved to MOUNT PISTERNO and the 2d Battalion to MOUNT NERO, completing the relief of the 85th Division. The Regimental Command Post moved to the vicinity of SEZZE. Continued good news from beach head forces. CORI and the air base at LITTORIA were taken.

28 May 1944: MAJOR GENERAL JOHN E. SLOAN, 88th Division Commander, visited the Regimental Command Post and conferred with COLONEL CHAMPENY on immediate future plans. The 88th Division has been placed under IV Corps, command by MAJOR GENERAL CRITTENBERGER. The 85th Division and US II Corps have been relieved from this sector. The 1st and 2d Battalions remained in position and the 3d Battalion moved from MOUNT SAN ANGELO to an assembly area near the 1st Battalion. The regiment was ordered to outpost MOUNT ACQUAPIZZA, MOUNT DEL CERRO

and MOUNT DELLA BUFALA. The 602nd Field Artillery was reattached to the regiment. At 2310 hours orders were received to move 2d Battalion from SEZZE to MOUNT CARMELINO and sweep the area between these two positions. The 3d Battalion moved to SEZZE.

29 May 1944: At 0910 hours BRIGADIER GENERAL KENDALL, Assistant Division Commander visited the Regimental Command Post and outlined tentative plans and operations for the regiment. The 2d Battalion moved from the vicinity of SEZZE along the SEZZE-BASSIANO-NORMA highway to CANTOCCHI, sending out patrols to mop up enemy stragglers and snipers along the road to the northeast. Their mission was to make contact and find out where the enemy was located, but not to become seriously involved. The 1st Battalion followed the 2d to the vicinity of BASSIANO, outposted the highground in the vicinity and sent out patrols. Two patrols from "B" Company both met determined enemy resistance on MOUNT TERENCE and were forced to withdraw. Each patrol consisted of ten enlisted men and one officer. Two patrols from "C" Company were unable to reach their objectives because of rifle and automatic weapons fire, as well as grenades. Two men were wounded, one by small arms fire, and one by a concussion grenade. At least two enemy were killed by BAR fire. The patrols withdrew carrying the wounded men.

The Regimental Command Post moved to BASSIANO at 1900 hours. Three prisoners of war were brought in by the Regimental I & R platoon. LT. EARL F. FRANDSEN, 2d Battalion S-3, reported to Regimental Command Post at 2030 hours with LT. WRIGHT, who brought in seven prisoners of war taken on hill 1064.

30 May 1944: The 3d Battalion moved into their new area near BASSIANO at 0700 hours. The Regimental I & R platoon was given the mission of contacting the French and establishing OP's for observation on German routes of withdrawal. Company "A" sent out two ten men patrols. One led by LT. PAUL CULBERTSON was ordered to attempt to get observation from the west on the CARPINETO-ROMANO road, search the immediate high ground and kill or capture Germans. The patrol approached their objective and occupied it without enemy resistance. Observation on the CARPINETO-ROMANO road was difficult due to haze. The patrol returned at daylight. A 3d patrol from Company "B" consisting of ten men led by LT. ROBERT P. ELLIS, left at 1600 hours, following the route to CASTA DELLA SOMBELLE via PALOMBARA. The patrol reach MOUNT GORGOGNONE from the south without incident and found prepared enemy positions on both the north and south slopes unoccupied. They proceeded northeast to MOUNT PALOMBARA and found unoccupied positions on the south slope. The patrol then moved north towards the final objective. At 2100 hours, on moving up the south slope of MOUNT CASTA DELLA SOMBELLE three enemy were observed by the patrol. Upon discovery, the enemy jumped into concealed positions. LT. ELLIS sent three men,

one a German speaking soldier, around the left, flanking the position. The soldier ordered the Germans to come out and surrender. The Germans agreed to do so, then suddenly opened fire with machine guns, killing one of the American soldiers. The remaining two returned the fire. The patrol leader sent his sergeant and four men to the right in an attempt to out-flank the position from that direction, and took the remaining two men up to where his men were fighting. Another machine gun and two rifles opened fire on the patrol. At the same time, the sergeant reported that a machine gun had outflanked him on the right. A concussion grenade was thrown at the sergeant and four men from above. The patrol at this time was returning the fire with unknown results. Fearing that he might be surrounded, the patrol leader withdrew the patrol to the west, and attempted to by-pass the strong points to the north. However, the patrol was again caught in cross fire from two more machine guns from above. All machine guns seemed to be protected by riflemen. Five machine guns widely dispersed, blocked the patrols advance, so that they remained in position, attempting to locate the enemy positions exactly and withdrew just before dawn without further casualties.

At 2200 hours the regiment was alerted for a motorized move. Battalions and special units were notified and transportation officers ordered to meet Captain RIGA, Regimental Transportation Officer at 0100 hours, 31 May 1944.

31 May 1944: LIEUTENANT ROBERT E. BOWKER, former A & P platoon leader of the 3d Battalion, officially reported for duty as SSO Athletic and Recreation Officer, Trial Judge Advocate, Awards and Decorations Officer and Assistant S-1. At 1230 hours Combat Team 3 was relieved by the French units and moved from BASSIANO Italy to an assembly area near TRE CONCELLI, Italy, formerly a part of the ANZIO BEACHHEAD. The Division was committed to Army reserve and again became a part of the II Corps. Hardly had the Regiment closed in the new area before a message was received from G-3, 88th Division alerting Combat Team 3, for movement at 2400 hours, pending approval of the Movement Control Officer. A Liaison Officer was sent to Division Headquarters for instructions concerning the route and destination. A quartering party led by LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES H. DRAKE, Regimental Executive Officer, was alerted to move to a new area as soon as the Division Order was received.

Thus ends the narrative of a month in which a relatively untried regiment in twenty days of fighting against the hitherto impregnable German Gustav Line, crushed that line and turned the German retreat into a rout, an accomplishment which deserved and received the highest commendations.

The men and officers of the 351st Infantry now have a new pride in their organization, a new sense of accomplishment, and a spirit second to none in the United States Army.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 735017

By W.D. NARA Date 4/25/00

Arthur S. Champeny
ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY
Colonel, 351st Infantry,
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS 351ST INFANTRY
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 88

7 July 1944

HISTORY OF THE 351ST INFANTRY REGIMENT FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE 1944.

The battle of Santa Maria with its three days of bitter fighting which resulted in the 351st Infantry Regiment breaking through the fortified Gustav Line; the grueling pursuit of the enemy across rugged mountains from Spigno to Itri; the penetration of the vaunted Hitler Line and again the mountains; days without food; K rations; sleepless nights; mules; Goums; the many dead and wounded comrades who had fallen along the way -- all seemed far away when the 351st Infantry was again ordered to engage the enemy and move from its concentration area near Tre Cancelli, Italy, east of Anzio, through Cisterna to an assembly area 3 miles SW of Cori.

The Combat Team quartering party under command of Lt. Col. Drake, Regtl Ex. G., departed at once. After experiencing much difficulty in securing trucks, the combat team moved out at 0215 hours in order, Company C, 313 Med Bn., A-T Co., Cn Co., Co C, 313th Engr Bn., 3rd Bn., 2nd Bn., 1st Bn. Upon arrival at new concentration area it was discovered that the Regimental area had been changed to a new location some two miles to the north. Troops were detrucked rapidly and marched after temporary halt to newly assigned area. At 0800 hours the Regimental Command Post opened in the vicinity of Cori. At 1130 hours Major Beggs, A-3, arrived at the Command Post with instructions for quartering officer to leave at once for reconnaissance of new Regtl assembly area west of Rocca Massima. Lt. Col. Drake, was designated by the Regimental Commander for this mission and departed at once. At 1200 hours, Lt. Col. Davidson, Division G-3, visited the Command Post with instructions that the Regiment move to forward assembly area in rear of the 349th Infantry which was attacking Colle Casalupi, southwest of Valmontone, and be prepared to pass through the 349th Infantry, and continue the attack. Since this area was different from that then being reconnoitered by Lt. Col. Drake, Captain (then 1st Lt.) Edmonson, departed at once with another quartering party for the newly assigned area. Trucks furnished by II Corps for the move were directed to the battalion areas by 1st Lt. Beale, Regimental Liaison Officer. At 1400 hours Regiment moved out in the order, 3rd Bn, Regtl Hq., 1st Bn, 2nd Bn., A-T Co., Cn Co. The Regtl CP was established at 1600 hours on southwest slopes of Mount San Angelo. All battalions were closed in by 1630 hours in same general vicinity. The Regimental Commander received orders to report with S-3 to division CP vicinity Rocca Massima at once to receive orders. At the Division CP Major General Sloan directed that this Regiment less 1st Bn relieve the 338th Infantry now located abreast of and to left rear of our 349th Infantry, and launch an attack as soon as possible thereafter. The 1st Bn ^{was to} remain in present bivouac area as Division Reserve. The Regimental commander and S-3 ^{then} returned to Regimental CP where ~~CROSSING~~ ^{crossing} was planned for accomplishment of mission, to Bn commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Bns respectively. The 3rd

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Bn was directed to relieve the 3rd Bn, 338th Inf on its present position vicinity Colle Pastore and launch attack directly to the north in regimental zone of action. 2nd Bn was directed to relieve the 1st Bn, 338th Infantry, protect the left flank of the regiment and follow the 3rd Bn in the attack. Bn commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Bns left at 2000 hours on hasty reconnaissance since relief was to be effected at night-fall. Regimental Commander and S-3 located with much difficulty the Regimental Command Post of the 338th Infantry and completed arrangements for effecting the relief of that regiment with Colonel Safay, Regimental Commander. Colonel Champeny and Major Hobson then joined the 3rd Bn as it was proceeding forward. The Bn commander of that battalion was forced due to shortage of time, to make a night reconnaissance of the Regimental zone of action with his company commanders prior to issuing orders for attack at 0400 hours.

June 2, 1944

The relief of the 338th Infantry was completed at 0100 hours and 3rd Bn launched its attack on time. The Regimental Command Post was set up in the Command Post location of the 3rd Bn, 338th Infantry, in a deep cellar on Hill 506 which provided an excellent OP as well as CP. The attack launched with some apprehension due to the fact that the Regiment was known to be faced by elements of the vaunted Hermann Goering Division. These German soldiers were known to have a high morale in addition to being young, vigorous, fighting men. The attack of the 3rd Bn proceeded rapidly. Enemy machine gun nests and snipers were dealt with effectively by artillery fire and efforts of our own riflemen. Major Furr, Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn, received from one of his company commanders, an erroneous report that Hill 401 had been captured and proceeded at once to join that company. However, upon arrival on the objective, Major Furr with his Bn S-3 and Operation Sgt, instead of finding his company, discovered a group of 15 Germans. One of the Germans was immediately shot by Major Furr while at the same time the Bn S-3 and the Operations Sgt opened fire, killing two others. The remainder of the Germans threw several hand grenades, wounding the Bn S-3 and the Operations Sgt, and fled. Company "I" arrived on their objective to find it already captured by the Battalion Commander. The 3rd Bn pushed forward aggressively all during the day, capturing and killing many Germans. Included among the captives were the Battalion Commander and the Battalion Surgeon of a Hermann Goering Battalion. One prisoner of war stated that 60% of his battalion were casualties due mostly to accurate small arms fire of our dough boys. Many of the Germans were killed by hand grenades thrown into dugouts in which they were trying to conceal themselves. Upon the capture of the initial objective, Mount Mezza Sebra, by the 3rd Bn, the regimental zone of action was widened to such an extent that it was necessary to employ the 2nd Bn (less one company in Regimental Reserve) abreast of the 3rd Bn. The drive continued unabated, 3rd Bn clearing the town of Carohitta while the 2nd Bn drove the Germans from the town of San Cesareo. Together the two Bns pushed across Highway 6, main supply route of the Germans from Rome, and gained high ground north of it. During this operation tanks from the 752 Tank Bn were employed effectively once they were able to overtake the fast moving doughboys. Several German tanks,

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self-propelled and 88mm guns were knocked out by direct fire of our tanks. Upon cutting Highway 6 at 1630 hours, the 2nd and 3rd Bns reorganized and established road blocks along Highway 6 and road north of and running generally parallel to Highway 6.

The 1st Platoon of Co "G" under the command of 2nd Lt. Andrew Salynski, acting as advanced guard for the 2nd Battalion in the vicinity of the small town of San Cesareo, Italy ran into enemy resistance. This was reduced. Twelve German prisoners were taken and sent to the rear. During this action Private First Class Asa E. Farmer with his bazooka destroyed two German half-tracks, containing approximately twenty men. In order to completely destroy the personnel, Private Farmer threw a fragmentation grenade into the half-tracks.

After reorganization, the 1st Platoon continued with the mission of entering the town of San Cesareo from the west and cleaning out the enemy. One German machine gun was encountered at the square and through the initiative of S/Sgt Roy A. Boettger, was promptly knocked out by rifle fire.

Again reorganizing, the 1st Platoon moved out of town on to Highway 6. Here a road block was established by Lt. Salynski. The men took advantage of all protection and concealment afforded by several houses and stone walls in the vicinity. The large bend in the road was to be the center of all activity. An OP was established in the 2nd floor of a nearby building from which the entire platoon could be alerted at the approach of enemy vehicles. The enemy had no knowledge whatsoever of our being in position here.

The first German vehicle to come down Highway 6 from the direction of Rome was a reconnaissance car containing four men. The 2nd squad under the able leadership of Cpl Edward J. Murphy opened fire on this car and slowed it down sufficiently to allow the bazooka team on the bend and the rifle grenadiers to demolish the vehicle, killing all occupants.

Almost simultaneously, a German sedan appeared from the opposite direction, containing three field grade officers and a non-commissioned officer as chauffeur. The 3rd squad under Private Felix P. Burakiewicz, opened up on them forcing the vehicle to crash into the platoon OP building. One of the officers attempted to get away and was promptly shot down by Lt. Salynski. Next a motorcycle from the same direction as the sedan came along and was destroyed by concentrated rifle fire from the 3rd squad. About twenty minutes later the first of five jeeps to be destroyed by this platoon approached from the direction of Rome. Private Francis G. Crites, with his BAR was instrumental in destroying this jeep along with its four occupants. The other four jeeps were completely destroyed with their occupants by the combined efforts of the entire platoon. Immediately thereafter, two motorcycles came down the road and were likewise destroyed. The last motorcyclist had just destroyed a bridge 200 yards southeast on Highway 6. Fifteen minutes later, the prime mover of a German 88 with its gun attached was captured in the vicinity of the bridge previously blown up. The driver and the assistant driver were wounded as they attempted escape.

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Approximately thirty minutes later a German half-track approached from the direction of Rome and again Private Farmer with his bazooka took careful aim and made a direct hit, blowing pieces of the half-track one hundred yards away and killing all occupants. Ten minutes later another half-track coming from the opposite direction was destroyed by Private Farmer. This time the half-track was forced into the platoon O.P. with all five Germans killed.

Enemy mortar fire then began to fall on the 1st Platoon. All men took cover and remained in position while a messenger went back to the company commander, 1st Lt. William G. Hohenadel, in order to get more ammunition and report the general situation. Immediately after dispatching the runner an enemy machine-gun opened fire from a building across the highway without doing any damage to the platoon. After locating the machine-gun from the O.P., fire was brought to bear on it by Sgt. John F. Ebel, and Lt. Salynski, and the gun was finally silenced. This gun was later proven to have been knocked out. Next, a light sedan came down the highway, observed the chaotic scene and surrendered without any fight.

Two men were then sent back, as all bazooka and grenade launcher ammunition had been expended. The Cal .30 ammunition was also getting very low. A check of the platoon showed no casualties at this time. While awaiting the arrival of ammunition; four American tanks arrived and were fired on by German tanks. The American tanks went back into partial defilade and took up the fight. The 1st Platoon found themselves in the center of this activity. The tanks fought for about two hours until darkness fell. After dark, contact was made with the company O.P. about five hundred yards away in order to get relief. After having been relieved for two hours by "E" Company, the platoon returned to the same area and again took up their positions to remain until dawn. About 0700, 3rd of June, the 88th Division reconnaissance company arrived to take over.

The regimental CP was established in an old factory building near Stazne di Zagarele, and Lt. Gillen, Liaison Officer was dispatched to guide the rear regimental CP to this location. As the CP personnel proceeded forward, they were subjected to heavy strafing attacks by enemy airplane as well as being fired upon indirectly by enemy 20 mm gun. At 0515 hours, Lt. Mayfield, Division Liaison Officer, arrived at the CP with Division Directive calling for attack west along, and to the south of highway 6, within a regimental zone of 3000 yards. The Division and Corps objective was the cutting on North South road via Tor Sapienza just east of Rome as well as siezing important bridges over the Aniese River. Time of attack was designated as 0530 hours with Line of Departure the north and south road running through San Cesareo. The 85th Division on the left was to attack abreast and simultaneously with us. Due to the fact that orders were received just 15 minutes prior to the time the attack was to be launched and also that the assault battalions were some distance north of their Line of Departure, displacement thereto incurring complete change in direction, it was impossible to launch the attack at the time designated. At 0630 hours, the 3rd Bn jumped off with 2nd Bn, which moved more slowly crossing the LD at 0700 hours.

The Battalions were generally abreast, 2nd Bn on left and 3rd Bn on right. The 1st Bn which had been in Division reserve was released to the Regiment at 2300 hours 2 June and had moved up during the night of 2/3 June to a position some 5000 yards south of highway 6. The 1st Bn was directed to close to 600 yards and follow the 2nd Bn protecting the flanks of the regiment. Both assault Bns moved orward aggressivley meeting resistance from German armored elements and self-propelled guns. At this time it was noted that there had been some confusion in

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designating boundaries for the two other divisions participating in the attack. Our 2nd Bn which was using a power line within its zone found that a regiment of 85th Division (337th Inf) had the same power line within zone assigned to it. The 3rd Division had, through some mistake, been given boundaries almost identical with those assigned this regiment. As a result, after we had crossed the LD it was necessary for the 2nd Bn to sidestep in front of the 337th Inf, while our 1st Bn found itself following the 337th Inf and was forced to sidestep to the right thence to the left, in order to follow our 2nd Bn. Also the regiment was being followed by the 3rd Division which was deployed in attack formation. In spite of these complications the regiment was kept intact and under control while moving forward aggressively in the attack. The town of Collonna within the regimental zone was partly by-passed by 3rd Bn and the regimental staff with a portion of the Regimental I & R platoon, officially captured the town and were greeted by numerous Italian civilians who insisted all join in merry-making over bottles of Dago Red vino. The command echelon stopped momentarily along the road running just east of the town of Collonna to make radio contact with the leading battalions some 500 yards west. As this contact was being established, a terrific artillery barrage (direct fire) descended upon the command personnel. The barrage emanated from immediately in rear of the CP within regimental zone of action. Thinking that possibly during the rapid advance German 88mm guns had been by-passed to our right, all personnel moved west of the road, but artillery fire continued falling very close to all individuals, wounding the regimental commander in the shoulder. The CP again moved some 300 yards to the west to a house which promptly received direct hits from what seemed to be 3 inch tank destroyer guns or 75mm guns. After the house had received 4 such direct hits, all personnel took cover in a German dugout in a nearby field with the exception of the regimental commander and the artillery liaison officer, Captain Corcoran, who was frantically calling our own division artillery, requesting that all artillery fires be lifted from Collonna, due to the fact that the fire was falling on friendly troops. In the meantime, Major Sadler, S-2, located on the ridge to our rear, an American tank battalion attached to 3rd Division (Howze Task Force) which had been delivering this demoralizing fire. After admonition by Major Sadler in no uncertain terms, the firing ceased. The regimental command post them moved at 1100 hours to a large villa on a ridge overlooking the Regimental zone of action, which made an excellent OP as well as a comfortable command Post. In the meantime, the rear regimental CP had been having difficulties as great as those experienced by the forward CP.

At about 1000 hours a report came to the rear regimental command post located in Stanz de Zagarola, Italy, that two wiremen from Regimental Headquarters Company had been wounded by enemy snipers only about 500 yards away from the CP. Captain Leo L. Sautter, Headquarters Commandant, immediately secured an M-1 rifle and taking four men also armed with M-1s with him, he went to the assistance of the wounded men. As he neared the spot where they lay, he observed that another group of wiremen were pinned down in an open field by enemy machine gun fire. Captain Sautter located the enemy machine gun position, but found that it could not be fired upon except from an exposed position. He then ordered his men to take cover and though exposed to enemy fire, he crawled to a point which commanded the machine gun position and opened fire. He killed six of the enemy thus silencing the gun and enabling his wounded men to be evacuated.

The presence of a number of German snipers caused Captain Sautter to send a message back to the command post for more men. When he discovered a German armored car and two other machine guns, he sent a driver back to get a 50 caliber machine gun and a tank or armored car. In the meantime he observed a company of the 349th Infantry approaching and standing up in full view of the enemy, he signalled to the approaching company to prevent them walking into the fire of the

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machine guns and armored car. Unable to attract their attention, he ran down the slope to contact the company commander. While Captain Sautter was talking to the company commander, a sniper shot the lieutenant, wounding him seriously. Captain Sautter seeing no other officer in the vicinity, took command of the company reorganizing it, and had it in position for an attack when other officers of the 349th Infantry arrived. By this time two tanks requested by Captain Sautter arrived to assist the 349th Infantry in their attack and Captain Sautter and his men withdrew to the command post.

Captain R.D. Brown, Regimental Adjutant, had gone forward in a jeep to assist Captain Sautter early in the fight but had run into a perfectly camouflaged German machine gun which opened fire at a range of about thirty yards. Two men in the jeep were killed and Captain Brown was wounded.

Brigadier General Kendall visited the command post at 1130 hours and discussed the situation and plans with the Regimental Commander, supervising the dressing of his wound, received by the previously described artillery barrage. The 350th Infantry which had been following to our left rear was ordered by Division to pass through our 2d Battalion once they were able to overtake it. The 1st Battalion was shifted from the left flank to the right flank and given the mission of following the 3d Battalion and protecting the right flank of the regiment. Both assault battalions progressed satisfactorily, capturing many prisoners of war and cleaning out machine gun nests and snipers. Both battalions were ordered by the regimental commander to push forward aggressively so as to obtain the regimental, division and corps objective prior to daylight.

It was the ambition of the regimental commander to keep the 2d battalion moving at such a pace that the 350th Infantry would be unable to overtake it, in spite of the fact that this battalion was moving in the face of determined enemy resistance, while the 350th Infantry was merely marching in route column. Our hopes fell at 1900 hours when the 2d Battalion Commanding Officer, Major Shull, reported that the 350th Infantry had overtaken his rear elements. Luckily enough, the regimental commander was not convinced that such had happened and upon rechecking with Major Shull, found that the report was incorrect. The 350th was still some distance to our rear. The 2d Battalion then forged ahead with a renewed determination not to be overtaken.

At 0400 hours by way of SCR radio, the regimental commander was notified that both assault battalions were on objectives, vicinity of Tor Sapienza, 4000 yards east of Rome, and that important bridges over the Aniene River had been siezed before the Germans were able to demolish them. The Regimental Command Post displaced at 0530 hours to a position southwest of Sapienze directly in rear of leading battalions. The objective which the regiment had anxiously been awaiting, the city of Rome, was now close at hand. From our positions, we could see the towering buildings of the city. If the orders had not been such that we were required to stop on this objective, the regiment could have entered Rome early on the morning of 4 June with less resistance than was later encountered on the afternoon of 4 June when our 1st Battalion did enter the city. Both battalions reorganized and were resupplied while the

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By MDJ NARA Date 4/25/00

1st Battalion closed to positions 1000 yards to right rear of 3d Battalion. At about 0830 hours orders were received from Major General Sloan through Lt. Mayfield, Division Liaison Officer, to push forward at once with one battalion utilizing motorized elements along highway 101, enter Rome and sieze important bridges over the Tiber River. One platoon of the 88th Reconnaissance Troop was attached to the regiment for this operation. The regimental I & R platoon together with part of the platoon of the 88th Reconnaissance Troop moved forward rapidly along highway 101 towards Rome to be followed by Company "C" which was motorized, by prime movers of the regimental anti-tank company. Led by Captain Meeks, Commanding Officer, Anti-Tank Company and Captain Williams, the Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, Company C entered highway 101 vicinity Sapienza at 0930 hours, proceeding rapidly to join the I & R platoon. The 1st Battalion of the 350th Infantry with tanks attached (a special task force with the same mission as that given the 1st battalion) followed in rear of our 1st battalion. The Regimental I & R platoon met considerable resistance from a German strongpoint on ridge line approximately one mile east of Rome, just north of the suburb Centocelle. The platoon left their vehicles and proceeded forward on foot in an effort to reconnoiter the terrain and determine the strength, location and armament of the strong point. In the ensuing action, Lt. McClure, I & R platoon leader, was killed, by cross-fire from two German machine guns. Thus ended the career of one of the most fearless fighting men of this organization. Almost single-handed in the preceding day's action, he had captured approximately 50 Germans. In accomplishing every mission to which he was assigned, he proceeded with utter disregard for his own personal safety. His death was indeed a great loss to the regiment.

As Captain Meeks and Captain Williams, Commanding Officers, Anti-Tank Company and 1st Battalion, respectively, leading Company C, rounded a curve near the German strongpoint mentioned above, they were fired upon by a machine gun which punctured the tires and radiator of their "jeep". The startled driver braked the vehicle so suddenly that Captain Williams, riding in the rear seat, did a complete somersault in the air, landing on his feet in the roadway. Needless to say, all other occupants of the vehicle dismounted rapidly, taking cover in the ditch to the right of the road. Just as the last man cleared the "jeep", an 88mm shell demolished it. The ditch on the right of the road proved to be poor cover as machine gun and sniper fire came uncomfortably close to all individuals. Noticing better defilade to the left of the road, all dashed across, miraculously escaping injury from the hail of machine gun fire.

Meanwhile, Company C in the 1-1/2 ton trucks had been greeted with the same hail of machine gun and 88mm fire. However, in spite of the exposed position of the trucks, the men detrucked rapidly, in good order with very few casualties. (One killed). Company C was held up by enemy resistance. The 1st battalion, (less company C) under command of the battalion executive officer, Captain Carmon, following Company C, moved to the west of Company C and went around this resistance. The 1st battalion accompanied by several Tank Destroyers and three tanks, then moved promptly into the city of Rome, arriving at 1530 hours, the first Infantry to enter the city.

Our reception was tremendous. The streets were jammed with the exulting Italian populace. In spite of the occasional skirmishes with German snipers, it was almost more difficult to advance through the throngs of grateful Romans than against enemy resistance. Vino offered in glasses, in pitchers, in bottles, and even in kegs was plentiful on every hand. Vehicles were completely covered by Italians who clambered aboard for the triumphal procession. Kisses were freely bestowed by both male and female citizens and suffered or enjoyed by the recipient accordingly. Long

concealed American and Italian flags made their appearance as if by magic, and the Italian carabinieri, emboldened by the presence of friendly troops, hunted down Germans and Fascists alike. This city has been touched lightly by the war. There are few scenes of devastation such as we have seen in most Italian cities evacuated by the Germans, nor does the appearance of most of the people indicate such hardships as were suffered by the people of southern Italy. Nothing was too good for the American soldier in Rome today. Though our troops were quite naturally pleased with their reception, nothing could distract them long, from their primary objective, to catch and destroy the fleeing Germans. Since our mission was to seize three bridges over the Tiber River and continue to the northwest to seize high ground beyond Rome, we were not able to tarry within the city of Rome to enjoy the revelry. At 0100 hours, 1st battalion reached Ponte Milvio, the bridge over the Tiber which had been designated for this regiment to cross. X The regimental command post was established in a park near this bridge at 0100 hours. Detachments from Company "A" were placed on the Ponte Milvio to protect it from sabotage. The 1st Battalion followed by the 2d Battalion then continued across the bridge and after a short rest, both moved down highway 2 at about 0530 hours. As the 1st battalion moved down a slope approximately 1-1/2 miles from the Tiber river along highway 2, they were greeted by heavy machine gun and small arms fire. Company B was sent to the east in an attempt to outflank this resistance which was holding up the advance of the battalion, but ran into heavy machine gun and sniper fire, and was unable to execute the maneuver. 2d Battalion about 600 yards to the rear had halted behind the first hill mass. Orders were promptly issued by the regimental commander for the 2d Battalion to take up the attack to the north in regimental zone of action, the 1st battalion to follow the 2d battalion. The 2d battalion advance to the north on a broad front, using tanks, and cut the road at Castel-Giubbileo-Sepalera. From this point, the regimental commander and members of his staff were able to observe the enemy taking up delaying positions to our front. Through Captain Corcoran, Artillery Liaison Officer, heavy artillery concentrations were placed upon the Germans, killing many and causing the remainder to abandon their positions and withdraw rapidly to the rear. Tank destroyer units were brought up and placed direct fire upon parked enemy vehicles. At 1630 hours the 2d battalion reached the objective, taking up positions north of the road. The 1st battalion took up positions just south of the road. 3d battalion remained in division reserve in the vicinity of Rome. Lt. Mayfield, Division Liaison Officer, reported with the information that the 3d battalion had been released to regimental control and was moving forward by marching, also that the regiment would be relieved by 349th Infantry on this position. Lt. Farley was dispatched to meet the battalion and indicate to them their assembly area in rear of regimental objective. The regiment rested and resupplied during the remainder of the 6th and 7th of June. The regiment was prepared to move forward in the afternoon of the 7th of June, by motor shuttle to an assembly area immediately in the rear of the 350th Infantry. 3d battalion was designated as part of a special motorized force, (Ellis Task Force) which included the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, 756th Tank battalion and 804th Tank Destroyer battalion. This force moved forward at 1415 hours, 7 June, to seize and occupy division and corps objectives in the vicinity of Orte and Lorian. At 1600 hours the regiment received orders to move forward by shuttle and relieve the 350th Infantry at its present position. Quartering parties and battalion commanders moved at 1700 hours to make reconnaissance and arrangements for relief. At 1800 hours, 2d battalion moved out on the first shuttle and relieved the 1st battalion, 350th Infantry in the vicinity of Monterosi, Italy. The 1st battalion on the 2d shuttle completed the relief of the 2d battalion

350th Infantry in the vicinity of Monterosi, Italy at 0130 hours. The regimental command post was established in Monterosi. The 3d battalion continued as part of the Ellis Task Force. Lt. Richart, Battalion S-2 with two riflemen, while on road reconnaissance, surprised a group of 100 Germans which included six officers, marching down the road. Pointing the light machine gun mounted on the jeep at the group, Lt. Richart stated in English that they were all surrounded and demanded that they surrender. Fortunately one of the German officers understood English. In the meantime, one of the riflemen with Lt. Richart, spoke the same message in German. The Germans were convinced, and Lt. Richart with his riflemen took the entire group prisoners without firing a shot. At 2205 hours, 7 June, 2d battalion was alerted for motor movement to join the Ellis Task Force upon orders from division headquarters. Trucks for this motor movement were spotted in the battalion area by 0600 hours 8 June. Brigadier General Kendall and Brigadier General Kurtz, arrived at the command post at 1000 hours and conferred with Colonel Champeny. Previous to their arrival, the regiment had been ordered to entruck Company F in preparation for movement forward. General Kendall gave further details for this movement, specifying that one platoon, Company F move to Sutri and Company F (less one platoon) to Capranissa. One platoon of machine guns from H Company joined Company F to provide additional fire power. At 1440 hours, Major Lowenberg, 82d Fighter Unit, 15th Air Force visited the command post and requested permission to move to the front to observe the action there. Permission was granted by the regimental commander and transportation was furnished Major Lowenberg. He was sent to Major Furr, Commanding Officer, 3d battalion. At 1930 hours he returned to the command post after having witnessed the destruction of many Germans as well as having obtained a much clearer picture of the life of an infantryman. At 2115 hours, 2d battalion was ordered to move to the vicinity of map coordinates 5920 and join the Ellis Task Force in that vicinity.

9 June 1944-- At 1300 hours Brigadier General Kendall, Assistant Division Commander visited the command post and indicated the new boundaries of II Corps. Upon close observation, it was noticed that the 88th Division was pinched out of the operation and that the French Expeditionary Corps would relieve the II Corps on a narrower Corps frontage.

10 June 1944--At 0930 hours, message was received from Division releasing both the 2d battalion and the 3d battalions to regimental control. Transportation was immediately dispatched to 3d battalion while 2d battalion was ordered to return to its area in the vicinity of Monterosi in transportation now with them. Orders were received at 1000 hours to dispatch a quartering party at once to Ostra Lido southwest of Rome to reconnoiter bivouac area to be occupied by the regiment during the coming rest period. Shortly after the quartering parties departed, another message was received from division stating that the area vicinity of Ostra Lido was unsuitable as a rest area. Major Sadler, S-2 was dispatched at once to endeavor to retrieve the regimental quartering parties. However they had reached their destination before he overtook them and were on their way back, having received information concerning change in orders at the proposed bivouac area.

The 2d battalion closed in new battalion area at 1325 hours. The 3d battalion due to extreme congestion of traffic on roads caused by the moving up of the 6th South African Armored Division, did not close in new area until 2400 hours.

Sally, the German radio propaganda girl, announced in her regular daily broadcast, that the 85th Division were a bunch of good boys, but the 88th Division fights like blood-thirsty out-throats.

11 June 1944-- At 1005 hours all organizations of the regiment were ordered to turn in all ammunition except that necessary for guard and anti-aircraft protection, this being in preparation for movement to rest area. At 1400 hours, Colonel Champeny and Major Hobson, attended a meeting with the Division Commander at the Division Command Post located at Formello. During the course of this discussion, Major General John E. Sloan commended the regiment highly for its work in the offensive. He stated that the division had received many commendations which have been forwarded to lower units and which must reach the men in order that they might know their work was being appreciated greatly. He stated that utmost efforts should be made in selecting at once, officers and men for promotions and decorations. The regiment was singularly lauded by the General for its march from Mount Civita across the mountains to Itri, declaring it as outstanding and that the operation in taking Mount Civita was in itself a "max". The following specific points were stressed by General Sloan as lessons to be learned from experiences in the offensive:- 1-Reorganization; 2-Swift movement; 3-Maneuver-use of troops; 4-battalion commanders must learn to handle task forces; 5-Regiments must not be road bound; 6-Tanks should be out front whenever possible; 7-Communications-radios did not function properly; 8-Speedier staff work in transmitting orders from higher echelons to lower echelons; 9-Maximum use of fire power; 10-Orientation of new officers and men with the standards of the 88th Division; 11-Cooperation of the tanks, artillery and infantry. The Division Commander stated that Rome was not open for passes as yet. However, the Army commander desires that all men know that they will be permitted to visit Rome as soon as possible. It is the desire of the Division Commander that the top men be rewarded by being given first opportunity to visit Rome on pass. Other points to be stressed during the rest period included the maintenance of motor transportation, care of men and weapons, sanitation, anti-malarial practices and venereal prophylaxis. Men will be stripped for action by doing away with all unnecessary issue equipment.

12 June 1944--At 0530 hours, Lt. Mayfield, Division Liaison Officer reported to the regimental command post with final approval on location for regimental bivouac area southeast of Rome in the vicinity of Lake Albano. Quarters parties were directed to move out immediately with regimental mine platoon in order to clear any mines which might be discovered in bivouac area. Lt. Colonel Drake, departed with these parties at 0930 hours. The greater part of the day was spent by the men in taking showers and care and cleaning of equipment with short exercise periods and hikes.

13 June 1944--At 0845 hours, Movement Memorandum from the Movement Control Officer, Headquarters, 88th Infantry Division was received. The 351st Infantry was to proceed along route 2 through Rome, thence along highway 7 to bivouac area. II Corps furnished 128 2-1/2 ton long wheel base vehicles in 9 series departing at 1200--1245--1330--1415--1500--1545--1630--1715--1745 hours. A march table was prepared and submitted to all units. At 1250 the

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the command post at Monterosi was closed and march command post established. At 1530 hours, new command post in vicinity of Lake Albano was opened. This command post was probably the best yet occupied by regimental headquarters since it consists of a large villa which although located in zone of heavy fighting, it miraculously escaped damage. Plumbing and lighting fixtures were in good condition. At 1940 hours, the regiment closed into the new bivouac area and that fact was reported to ACoFS, G-3. Training Memorandum No. 11, Headquarters 88th Infantry Division, was received and action taken to comply with same at once. Until the 19th of June, the regiment would rest, reorganize and resupply, with particular attention being given orderly arrangement of bivouac areas, police, sanitation, and malarial and venereal disease control. Maximum number of pass privileges would be extended to both officers and enlisted men during this period; passes to be issued on a priority basis to those most deserving. After 19 June, training will be continued daily between hours of 0700 and 1500, Sundays and holidays excepted, with particular emphasis on these subjects: a. Attack training; b. Correction of errors made in combat; c. Physical conditioning; d. Discipline and courtesy; e. Infantry-Tank-Artillery coordination; f. Care of weapons and equipment; g. Specialist training; h. motor maintenance; i- Instruction of backward men; j-Special schools in tactics for all officers and platoon sergeants; and k.-Special instruction of staff officers. Bath schedules were to be arranged to insure each man getting at least two hot showers per week. In order to be prepared for any possible contingency, one battalion in the Division would be kept constantly alerted and would be designated as the alert battalion.

A message was transmitted to all battalions and special units to submit training schedules by 1800 hours, 14 June for period of one week-schedules to be based upon the training prescribed in the Training Memorandum 11, Headquarters 88th Infantry Division.

14 June 1944--At 0918 Major General John E. Sloan, Commanding General, 88th Infantry Division, visited the command post for conference with the regimental commander. During the conference, General Sloan stated that in addition to the training directed in Training Memorandum No. 11, Headquarters, 88th Infantry Division, instruction and practical work would be given in the attack of a fortified position. This training had been directed by the Commanding General, of II Corps. General Sloan was in a very good mood and commended the regiment on its work. At 1400 hours all officers were assembled at the regimental command post for a conference with the regimental commander. The regimental commander reviewed the extensive operations from Santa Maria Infante, to Monterosi, Italy in great detail, pointing out mistakes made and calling attention to corrections which would be applied in future operations. In addition to this, he covered quite completely all points taken up by General Sloan in his meeting of 11 June. Emphasis was placed upon the indoctrination of new officers and men in the standards expected of men in the division. At the conclusion of this conference, the regimental commander requested that all company commanders having new officers assigned, to their companies, bring them forward for introduction and brief talk with the regimental commander. Throughout the day all organizations were engaged in reorganization, resupply and organization of bivouac areas and bathing. During the afternoon it was learned that 200 men would be granted all day passes to Rome on the 15th of June. This news was received with great enthusiasm by all individuals due to the fact that although this regiment was the first to enter the Eternal City, it had not been given the opportunity to enjoy it.

15 June 1944--At 0630 hours the 1st convoy of 200 men and 20 officers left the regimental area for a one day visit to Rome. Edd Johnson, war news correspondent of the Chicago Sun, visited the command post for a conference with Major Hobson, Regimental S-3. Lt. Bodie and Lt. Gillen were placed in charge of plans for the recreation and entertainment of the men of the regiment. Lt. Bodie was in charge of movies and U.S.O. shows. Lt. Gillen in charge of arranging for convoys taking the men and officers on pass to Rome and swimming in nearby Lake Albano, and to shower units on schedule. Lt. Mayfield, Regimental Liaison Officer to Division, returned to the regiment for duty during the rest period. The work in the battalions consisted of improvement and policing of bivouac areas and continued reorganization and resupply of equipment. The first movie in several weeks was enjoyed by the men of the regiment in an outdoor theater centrally located in the regimental bivouac area.

16 June 1944--Lt. Col. Furr, Major Shull, and Captain Williams, battalion commanders and Major Hobson, Regimental S-3, and Captain Blanch, Regimental Communications Officer, left for a well deserved rest at Sorrento, Italy. Captain Edmonson, Assistant S-3, called a meeting of battalion S-3's to discuss plans for the training of the regiment during the following week. Overlays of the bivouac area and training area of the division were distributed. The regiment received its quota to Irving Berlin's original show "This Is The Army" which was being presented at the Royal Opera House in Rome, by an all G.I. cast. The Division Commander announced that rotation of men and officers of the division to the United States would begin immediately and requested recommendations for the month of June. This announcement was received with great enthusiasm by all members of the regiment. An order was received by the regiment to reorganize during this rest period under Table of Organization 7-11 dated 26 February 1944. Orders were issued to effect reorganization.

17 June 1944-- Colonel Arthur S. Champeny, left by plane for Cairo, Egypt early this morning for a well earned rest. The pass quotas for one day passes to Rome were doubled today and a group of 110 enlisted men went to Foro Mussolini, 5th Army Rest Camp on the banks of the Tiber in Rome for a four day period. Six officers of the regiment left for the Hotel Excelsior in Rome, which has been converted into a 5th Army Officer's rest center. The Division Red Cross unit set-up a snack bar and recreation area near Albano which was well patronized and enjoyed by the men of the regiment. Lt. Elton H. Mayfield, Regimental Liaison Officer to Division, was awarded the Bronze Star for exceptionally meritorious service in combat during the period 16 April 1944 to 8 June 1944. Lt. Mayfield's determination and resourcefulness in carrying out his duties as Liaison Officer between Division and Regiment are well known to all of us. He made many trips over the most difficult mountainous terrain oftentimes under fire, to carry orders from the division commander to the regimental commander, when all other means of communication was not successful. Lt. Mayfield's award was well deserved.

18 June 1944--There was no training schedule today although a 100% Ordnance inspection was made by all units. Both Protestant and Catholic services were held by all units of the regiment by the regimental and battalion chaplains. Passes for enlisted men and officers to Rome were continued. Many officers and men were able to attend services in the beautiful churches of the Eternal City. At 2145 hours a directive was received from division alerting the regiment for a move to a new area and all units were notified immediately.

19 June 1944--Lt. Mayfield returned from division with maps and an overlay

of the new regimental area, located north of Civitavecchia. Orders were received that henceforth, gas masks will be kept so as to be available to all personnel within 30 minutes. In combat, gas masks will be worn at all times. An immediate check of all chemical warfare equipment was ordered. At the same time a meeting of all 1st Sergeants was held at the Service Company area, with the regimental personnel officer to discuss means of improving administrative procedure, particularly with reference to battle casualty reports. The daily drill schedule will run from 0700 hours to 1500 hours. The remainder of the day to be spent in athletics, recreation and care of bivouac areas and equipment.

20 June 1944-- At 0600 hours, quartering parties from all units and the entire Anti-Tank Company left for the new bivouac area near Civitavecchia. The Anti-Tank company accompanied the quartering party for the purpose of sweeping any uncleared territory in the bivouac area for enemy mines. All company commanders, 1st Sergeants and the personnel officer and adjutant attended a meeting conducted by Colonel Watkins, Inspector General, MATOUSA, concerning means of reporting battle casualties more promptly. Colonel Watkins cleared up several points concerning recent changes in morning reports and battle casualty reports with which the companies had been concerned. He also outlined the procedure which should be used in getting reports on casualties to higher headquarters promptly. Lt. Colonel Wilder, Division Chemical Officer, visited the command post to discuss passive air defense and bomb reconnaissance with regimental S-3. Major General Sloan visited the regimental command post during the afternoon and ordered that the training schedule be extended from 1500 hours to 1630 hours daily with one third of the training to be night training hereafter. A showdown inspection was ordered for Sunday 25 June. All passes were cancelled until further notice.

22 June 1944--Regular training schedule carried on throughout the day. Showers were scheduled between 0800 and 1100 hours continuing the regular schedule of showers which had been maintained during the rest period. March tables for the move to Tarquinia were prepared and distributed to all units.

23 June 1944--The regular training schedule was maintained throughout the day, in addition to preparation for the move to Tarquinia. The first unit to move was regimental headquarters and headquarters company, which left the area at 1745 hours. The remainder of the regiment followed on schedule, the last unit clearing the regimental area at 2315 hours. The Headquarters Detachment arrived at the new area at 2140 hours, and established the new command post. Shortly afterwards, Colonel Arthur S. Champeny, Regimental Commander returned from his trip to Cairo, Egypt. Colonel Champeny was in excellent spirits and expressed himself as having enjoyed the six day excursion thoroughly. Battalion commanders were made responsible for the police of their respective battalion areas, following the departure of their units. Captain Edmonson, Acting S-3, and Captain Byron, Regimental Surgeon, remained behind to check the condition of the areas by daylight on the morning of the 24 June. A detail also remained to correct any deficiencies found at that time.

24 June 1944--By 0135 hours the regiment had closed into the new bivouac area. Most of the morning was spent in organizing and policing the new bivouac area. Lt. Colonel LaMotte, G-1, and Major Beggs, Assistant G-3, visited the regimental command post and remained for lunch with the staff.

Captain Edmonson and Captain Byron arrived at the new command post after making the final inspection of the regimental area in Albano with a report that the area was left in excellent condition. Colonel Champeny, Regimental Commander, attended a meeting at 1600 hours with General Sloan, Commanding General, 88th Infantry Division. At 2000 hours a meeting of battalion staff officers and special unit commanders with Colonel Champeny was held at the regimental command post to discuss means of correcting deficiencies noted by General Sloan, and to establish a training schedule. Revielle was to be at 0530 hours; breakfast was to be at 0545 hours; drill call at 0730 hours, with all policing and inspections completed prior to that time; recall was to be at 1630 hours with a complete personal inspection of all men at 1700 hours followed by a 1/2 hour period of instruction in military courtesy, discipline, habits, etc. At 1830 hours to 1930 hours, instruction in these subjects was continued for all replacements in the regiment, and for any other men needing such instruction. During the same period a school in close order drill was to be conducted by Lt. Colonel Drake, Regimental Executive Officer for all officers of the regiment. Colonel Champeny further outlined tactical moves that were expected to be used in future operations. Second Lieutenant Arthur S. Johnson reported to regimental headquarters to replace Second Lieutenant Robert E. Bowker, who had been ordered to division on detached service.

25 June 1944--A showdown inspection was held by all units during the morning. All excess equipment was turned in to regimental S-4 for disposition. Barracks Bags were to be supplanted by officer's field bag for carrying personal equipment of enlisted men. At 1330 hours a meeting of all officers of the Division with General Sloan, Division Commander, was held. The General discussed proposed changes in tactical plans for future offensives and commended all units of the Division for their recent performance. He especially commended the 3d battalion of this regiment for its aggressiveness. He also commended Captain William M. Thompson, 3d Battalion Chaplain, both for his work in the campaign, and for devoting several days of his rest period to visiting wounded men of this organization and carrying mail and news of the outfit to them. The General reported an increase in the rate of malaria in the division and called for enforcement of countermeasures. Another point emphasized by the General was the necessity for improvement in maintenance of motor vehicles and in the display of military courtesy. Following the meeting with General Sloan, a meeting of regimental, battalion and company commanders, 1st Sergeants and personnel officers of the division was held with a representative of Fifth Army Casualty Report Section, Major Hallow. The purpose of the meeting was to impress even more than had been done by previous meetings the necessity for immediate accurate reports of battle casualties.

26 June 1944--Lt. Colonel William E. Boyd and Lt. Colonel Harry M. Whittington were attached to the regiment per VCOG. Colonel Champeny, Regimental Commander went to division headquarters for a meeting with General Sloan and the two new battalion commanders. A meeting of all battalion commanders, regimental S-3, and S-4 with Colonel Champeny was held to discuss recommendations for the composition and equipment of a battalion mountain combat team. It was recommended that the following units be attached to an infantry battalion: (1) At least one battery, preferably one battalion of pack artillery; (2) One platoon of combat engineers with necessary mules for rations and equipment; (3) One Chemical Mortar Company; (4) At least

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40 litter bearers with officer and non-commissioned officer personnel and with mules for rations and equipment; (5) 150 mules for the initial battalion train. Changes in communications recommended were: (1) 24 hour air O.P. assigned to the battalion; (2) Pigeons maintained by resupply by air O.P.; (3) Artillery Liaison Officer with radio operators and mules to carry radios; (4) Battalions should have 8 SCR 300 radios with 2 extra for use with heavy weapons company. Recommended changes in weapons: (1) Light machine gun with standard light weight mount to replace heavy machine gun; (2) three 81mm mortars to be carried, with 25 pack boards for carrying ammunition; (3) two 60 mm mortars to be carried in each rifle company.


27 June 1944-- Brigadier General Kendall, Assistant Division Commander, visited the command post to discuss training plans with Colonel Champeny. Major Beggs, Assistant G-3 visited the command post for discussion of Infantry-Tank-Artillery cooperation. He informed the regimental commander that Company C, 760th Tank Battalion would be attached to the regiment for training, commencing Saturday 1 July 1944. Shortly afterwards the Commanding Officer, Company C, 760th Tank Battalion reported to Colonel Champeny for a discussion of the proposed plans. Major General Sloan, Commanding General, 88th Infantry Division, visited the command post at 1630 hours, after a tour of the regimental area and expressed his satisfaction at the condition of the area and training. He also discussed Infantry-Tank-Artillery coordination with Colonel Champeny. A message was received from Division Headquarters that passes for men and officers of the regiment would be resumed 28 June 1944.

28 June 1944--Brigadier General Kendall visited the command post and discussed training of the regiment. A division formation was massed at 1600 hours for the presentation of awards by the Division Commander. The Silver Star for Gallantry in Action were presented to Captain Garvin C. McMakin, 1st Lt. Stanton D. Richart, T/Sgt. James A. Kirby and Private Jose C. Orona. Awards of Silver Stars to 1st Lt. John M. Weston, Private First Class Richard NMI Zip pel, Private First Class Henry NMI Dombrowski and Private Rogers C. Hall could not be made since Lt. Weston was missing in action and the remaining three were still hospitalized as a result of wounds. The regimental Commander presented the Bronze Star ribbon for heroic or meritorious achievement to the following officers and men of the regiment: 1st Lt. Emmet B. Lyle, 1st Lt. Byron H. Groesbeck, T/Sgt Fields H. Church, Pfc Lloyd NMI Marshall, Pfc George E. Rowe, Pfc Frank J. Masin, Pfc David A. Luna, Pfc Tidolo Munoz, Pvt. Lawrence A. Schiavoni, and Pvt. Leon C. Herell. Awards of the Bronze Star approved by the Division Commander to 1st Sgt. Daniel D. Boone, 1st Lt. Jasper K. Parks, S/Sgt W.A. Trapp could not be made due to the fact that they were still hospitalized. Announcement was made of posthumous awards to 1st Lt. Robert J. Murphy, Tec 4 Carlton NMI Williams, and Private Max NMI Cohen. Announcement was made of award to Sergeant Peter NMI Szmenciak, who was missing in action.

29 June 1944--Captain Edmonson and the regimental liaison officers attended a meeting at division headquarters called by Lt. Colonel Davidson, G-3, to effect a more efficient liaison organization in the division. A meeting of battalion S-3's, battalion commanders and the Regimental Commander was held with the Regimental S-3 to discuss training program for the following week. Captain Brown, Regimental Adjutant, who had been hospitalized due to wounds received 3 June 1944, returned to duty, bearing his twice punctured helmet as a souvenir of his experience.

30 June 1944--Captain Corcoran, Liaison Officer, 913th Field Artillery Battalion, who was attached to this regiment during the past operations, inspected the artillery range with Captain Edmonson, Acting S3. Lt. Colonel Miller, Commanding Officer, 913th Field Artillery Battalion, called at the regimental command post for a conference with Colonel Champeny.

The month of June has seen the fall of Rome, the first of the three major Axis capitols to succumb, an event in which this regiment played a major role, being the first infantry unit to enter the Eternal City. The spirit of the men and officers of the 351st Infantry remains at a high level, and training for expected future operations, together with past accomplishments, has engendered a feeling of calm confidence in anticipation of our next engagement with the enemy.


ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY
Colonel, 351st Infantry
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS 351ST INFANTRY
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 88

4 August 1944

HISTORY OF THE 351ST INFANTRY REGIMENT FOR THE MONTH OF JULY 1944.

As the month of July began, the officers and men of the 351st Infantry Regiment were again engaged in a strenuous training and conditioning program in preparation for our return to the fighting front. Efforts to imbue all new officers and men with the traditional fighting spirit of the 351st Infantry appeared successful and the esprit of the regiment was high. All were filled with the desire to destroy the German Army of Italy and to liberate the portion of northern Italy still held by the enemy.

At 0900 hours, 1 July 1944, Major R. A. Cheek, S-3, 760th Tank Battalion, and Captain Nelson, Commanding Officer, Company C, same organization, visited the command post for a discussion of Tank-Infantry-Artillery coordination—a subject which was to be stressed during the remainder of the training period of the regiment while out of the "line". An intensive study was to be made of this subject in order to improve liaison, cooperation and coordination between Tanks, Infantry and Artillery. Field problems involving the battalion in attack, supported by one company of tanks and one battery of artillery, were planned. Communications between the company commander of the tank company and the infantry battalion commander were to be stressed. Plans were drawn up whereby the welding of a bracket on the rear turret of a medium tank and a SCR 500 radio could be installed thereon, providing a rapid and easy means of communication between the Infantry battalion and the tank company. In addition, a tank liaison officer with an SCR 508 radio mounted in a light tank would accompany the battalion commander. Through these means, the tank commander would be able to keep abreast of the tactical situation as well as the tactical disposition of troops, enabling him to function effectively and efficiently.

During the morning, Lieutenant Colonel Treseder, Division Signal Officer, visited the command post for a discussion of the improvement of Infantry-Tank communications, from the point of view of a communications officer, and the development of more efficient communications between elements of the regimental command net during active combat operations. The pressing need of a simple telephonic code and the training of officers in the use of radio and radio security were discussed. The high percentage of killed and wounded American radio operators during the campaign was discussed as trained operators had become a critical item due to the difficulty of securing replacements.

At 1000 hours, Lieutenant Gelston-Gelles, who had served the regiment with distinction during the campaign 12 May to 15 June 1944 as prisoner of war interrogator, reported to the command post with the notification that he had been transferred to the 91st Infantry Division,

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as Division Interrogator. The transfer of Lieutenant Gelston-Gelles was definitely a loss to the regiment, since through his untiring efforts, the regimental S-2 had been constantly supplied with information concerning enemy troops opposing this regiment in combat. As a reward for his fine service with the regiment, he had been awarded the Bronze Star. 1st Lieutenant Ruopp, the new prisoner of war interrogator who accompanied Lieutenant Gelston-Gelles to the command post was introduced to all members of the staff.

Sunday, 2 July 1944 was the first holiday for this regiment in many weeks. Chaplain Wertz, Chaplain Beyenka, and Chaplain Thompson conducted church services in each battalion area and reported an unusually large attendance. At 1045 hours, Brigadier General Kendall, Assistant Division Commander visited the command post for a discussion of training to be conducted by the regiment prior to its re-entry into combat. He expressed satisfaction with the training now being conducted and with that planned for the future.

During the day of 3 July 1944, the strenuous training program was continued. It was of vital importance that the many replacements which had been received by the regiment, be indoctrinated with the standards of the 351st Infantry, and the state of their training improved to the extent that the regiment could continue its success in battle. During the afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel LaMotte, G-1, 88th Infantry Division, visited the command post for a discussion with the regimental commander of the number, type and suitability of replacements being received in this regiment.

On 4 July 1944 a holiday celebration was held in the Piazza Venetia, Rome, where the flag which had flown over our national capitol in Washington, during the Pearl Harbor incident and at the time of the Declaration of War with Germany, was unfurled over the first conquered Axis capitol. This incident was of particular interest to the men of this regiment due to the fact that troops of our 1st battalion were the first Infantry to enter the Eternal City. It was the hope and determination of all, that this regiment be instrumental in causing the same flag to fly over the city of Berlin.

No formal celebration was held within the regiment due to the necessity of completing our final phase of training prior to combat. At 1630 hours on this date an order was received from the division commander, cancelling all passes and alerting the regiment for movement into the active combat zone.

On the 5th of July 1944, word was received that Mr. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, would make an official visit to the division on the following day. Our regiment was designated as the host organization and plans for the reception were immediately undertaken. Since Mr. Stimson's plane was scheduled to land at the Tarquinia air field, some 2 1/2 miles from the regimental bivouac area, that location was selected for the ceremonies.

During the morning, 1st battalion with company "C", 760th Tank Battalion and "A" battery, 315th Field Artillery Battalion, attached, executed an Infantry-Tank-Artillery problem which had been prepared by Captain Edmonson, Acting S-3. Major Edwin L. Skull acted as chief umpire. Dummy bunkers had been constructed, with wrecked German vehicles placed within the combat area to be used as bazooka and tank targets. Major General Sloan, Brigadier General Kendall, Brigadier General Kurtz, and Colonel Jacobson (Division Artillery Executive Officer) were present to observe the execution of the problem. All expressed satisfaction with the administrative set-up of the problem, tactical solution of Captain Reid, (Acting Battalion Commander) and the performance of troops, tanks, and artillery in carrying out their respective functions. In the critique of the problem, Captain Reid was criticized for ordering the tanks to support the infantry instead of having them precede or accompany the infantry--their normal and logical function.

At 1230 hours, 6 July 1944, the regiment was formed with battalions in line on the Tarquinia Air Field, to receive the Secretary of War, Mr. Henry L. Stimson. At 1445 hours, four fighter planes swooped low over the field, acting as harbingers of the arrival of Mr. Stimson. Several seconds later, the big transport bearing the Secretary of War gracefully settled to the ground, coming to a halt in the center of the troops drawn up smartly to attention by Colonel Arthur S. Champeny, Regimental Commander. The Call to Colors was blown as Mr. Stimson stepped from the plane. After the troops were presented to the Secretary of War, he inspected the lines in a "jeep" distinguished by four stars, and flying the red colors of the Secretary of War. Lieutenant General Mark Clark, and Major General John E. Sloan accompanied him on the inspection. Following Mr. Stimson in another "jeep" were Mr. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, Major General Surles, Army Chief of Public Relations, Major General Kirk, the Surgeon General, Major General Keyes, II Corps Commander, Major General Coulter, Commanding General, 85th Division, and Major General Livesey, Commanding General, 91st Division.

Immediately following the tour of inspection, Mr. Stimson was introduced by General Clark. "I have come a long way to see this sight," he said, "and it was worth coming." "The people back home have followed your course on the road to Rome with pride and admiration." "You need have no fear your countrymen will welcome you home with the heartiest of good will and the greatest of gratitude". "In Italy the thrill of victory is in the air everywhere."

Following the ceremonies, General Sloan introduced Colonel Champeny to Mr. Stimson as the "best Colonel of the best regiment of the best division of the United States Army"--a singular honor well-deserved.

Company "I" acted as Guard of Honor for this occasion, and the regimental colors flew the streamer signifying that at least 65% of the regiment had been awarded the Combat Infantryman's Badge.

Immediately following the return from the inspection area, the movement of the regiment to the vicinity of Pomerance, Italy began. The regimental command post in the vicinity of Tarquinia closed at 1850 hours.

After a motor march of 165 miles, the regiment closed in its bivouac area northwest of Pomerance at 0915 hours, 7 July 1944. At 1300 hours, the regimental commander and S-3 met the commanding general at the Division Command Post located in an olive grove near Pomerance. Oral orders were received for a division attack to be launched at 0400 hours, 8 July 1944. The 350th Infantry would displace under cover of darkness to an assembly area, 2000 yards northwest of Saline; attack to the northeast and capture the hill mass 1000 yards northwest of Cipriano. The 349th Infantry would launch an attack from present positions to the northeast, by-pass the town of Volterra, and capture the high ground 1000 yards north of Volterra; thus, together with the 350th Infantry, cutting all avenues of escape from this city bastion, which gave the appearance of another Cassino. The 351st would, after capture of objectives by 349th and 350th Infantry Regiments, attack to the north, making the main effort of the division, and capture the high ground in the vicinity of Palala. Our regiment would make "the long forward pass run", as expressed by General Clark.

Immediately upon return from his meeting with General Sloan, Colonel Champeny called a meeting of battalion commanders and S-3's at the command post to discuss the pending operations. Colonel Champeny reported a remark of Lieutenant General Clark to General Sloan that he hoped the 88th Division would spend its 2d Anniversary in Florence, Italy. Orders were given that gas masks be worn at all times during combat operations. The importance of by-passing heavy resistance and pocketing the enemy to avoid a stubborn fight and consequent heavy losses was stressed. Major Sadler, Regimental S-2, in his discussion of enemy information, stated that G-2 reports indicated an estimated 4000 fighting men in the Division zone of action. The principal known enemy organizations were the 26th Panzer Division, the 3d Panzer Grenadier Regiment with foot troops from the 162d Infantry Division, and the 1027th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. To our immediate front, two battalions of self-propelled artillery had been reported. Recent fighting in this area had been chiefly between armored units and consequently, due to the rough terrain, was restricted to roads. The enemy had resorted to extensive anti-tank mining operations and demolitions to impede our progress. Very few anti-personnel mines had been located. The tactics of the enemy continued to be the utilization of small, strong, isolated pockets of resistance for delaying purposes only.

Beginning at 0100 hours 8 July 1944, the regiment moved to an assembly area, southwest of Montecatini. All elements closed prior to daylight with the command post established in an old power station.

Cannon Company took up firing positions near the 913th Field Artillery Battalion to support the attack of the 350th Infantry since our regiment was not to be committed initially. All men improved individual cover and concealment and rested. Only a few spasmodic rounds of enemy artillery fire were received during the day.

At 1030 hours a message was received that General Clark, the Army Commander, would arrive at the command post shortly--the message specifying that Lieutenant Noon, Commanding Officer, Company G, be present. At about 1100 hours, General Clark, with Major General Crittenberger, Commanding General, IV Corps, Major General Sloan, Commanding General, 88th Infantry Division, and Major Henry Cabot Lodge, ex-senator from Massachusetts, arrived. General Sloan formed the command post personnel into two ranks, placing Colonel Champeny and Lieutenant Noon a few paces to the front of the group. As the group stood at attention, Lieutenant Myers, Aide to General Sloan, read the following citation: "ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY, (08264), Colonel, Infantry, United States Army, for extraordinary heroism in action, from 11-14 May, 1944, at Santa Maria Infante, Italy. On the night of 11 May 1944, Colonel CHAMPENY was commanding a regimental attack on an enemy hill position when the advance of one of his battalions was halted as a result of the loss of key commanders. Completely disregarding his own personal safety, Colonel CHAMPENY moved through lanes of heavy enemy fire to reach the battalion area where he assumed command, reorganizing the force and resumed the offensive. He directed this attack for more than three hours, moving from unit to unit, encouraging and inspiring his men. Later that night, he personally directed a company flanking attack which forestalled imminent enemy counterattacks. The same night, noticing two disabled tanks, Colonel CHAMPENY proceeded through an enemy mine field to reach the tanks and supervise their removal in order to allow other tanks to move forward in support of the advancing regiment. On the morning of 14 May 1944, Colonel CHAMPENY observed a German battery in position approximately 400 yards beyond the crest of a hill. Under direct enemy machine gun fire, he moved to a company position to lead an attack on the artillery position. Inspired by Colonel CHAMPENY, who stood boldly erect in the face of enemy machine gun fire, these men left the cover they had previously sought, overran the enemy artillery battery and killed or captured approximately 100 Germans. The completely fearless and selfless actions of Colonel CHAMPENY inspired his troops to assume an offensive spirit which led to the capture of Santa Maria Infante, and the crushing of the southern hinge of the Gustav line. Entered the military service from Oxford, Kansas."

General Clark then pinned the Distinguished Service Cross upon Colonel CHAMPENY, congratulating him heartily and stating that it was such leaders as he, who had made the American Army a great fighting organization.

Lieutenant Myers then read the following citation concerning Lieutenant Noon: "THEODORE W. NOON, Jr., (O-1285480), First Lieutenant, Infantry, United States Army. For extraordinary heroism in action, on 12 and 13 May 1944, near Santa Maria Infante, Italy. While advancing in an attack, First Lieutenant Noon's company became pinned down by enemy fire. First Lieutenant Noon was severely wounded in both arms by machine gun fire; but in spite of his wounds he rushed an enemy pill box and singlehandedly knocked a machine gun out of action. During this engagement, he received several wounds on his face and head, but returned to his company and led his men forward to take the objective. Refusing to be evacuated for medical treatment, First Lieutenant Noon led his company in an attack against another enemy position. While making a personal reconnaissance, he was wounded in both legs by shell fragments. Again refusing aid, he ordered the officers with him, to return to the company and start the attack. In the last phase of the attack, First Lieutenant Noon had recovered sufficiently to lead his men forward in the assault. When the objective was taken, he personally supervised the re-organization of his company. Only upon the order of his superior officer did he allow himself to be evacuated for hospitalization. First Lieutenant Noon's courage under fire, his prodigious determination and his aggressive leadership were an inspiration to his men, and his heroic performance reflects the finest traditions of the Armed Forces of the United States. Entered military service from Belmont, Massachusetts."

General Clark praised Lieutenant Noon for his extraordinary heroism and personally promoted him to the grade of Captain on the spot, pinning on both the Distinguished Service Cross and the Captain's bars (furnished through the courtesy of Captain Meeks who happened to be at the command post at the time).

Although the conventional parade ground setting for the awarding of decoration was absent, it was appropriate that these two battle leaders were decorated but a short distance behind the battle lines, in the field. The ceremony was poignant and impressive as the tall Army Commander pinned this coveted award on the shirts of these two fighting soldiers before the Corps Commander and the Division Commander, who had come to pay them tribute.

At 1600 hours Brigadier General Kendall visited the command post reporting that both the 349th and 350th Infantry had met stubborn resistance. It was his opinion that 350th Infantry would reach its objective by dark. This regiment, as Division reserve, would not be allowed to begin its mission until both other regiments had taken their objectives. However, the 3d battalion was ordered to advance at 2200 hours and capture hill 191 some 5500 meters north of its assembly area to protect the left flank of the 350th by closing a small gap created by their advance.

At about 1800 hours, 2d battalion, 351st Infantry which had made a reconnaissance of high ground in the vicinity of the town of Montecatini, earlier that day, was ordered to relieve the 1st Armored Regiment (1st Armored Division) northwest of the town as soon as possible. 2d battalion moved at once to the vicinity of the town of Montecatini, since it was necessary to take a circuitous route with some countermarching to escape enemy observation.

At about 1930 hours, General Sloan visited the command post with final instructions. The regiment (minus 1st battalion) would attack at 0400 hours, 10 July 1944 in column of battalions (the 2d battalion echeloned to the left rear of the 3d battalion) and capture the Division objective--the high ground in vicinity of Palaia. The 1st battalion (motorized as Division reserve) would remain in present position. One company of Sherman tanks and one company of Tank Destroyers were attached to the regiment for this operation. The 91st Reconnaissance Squadron would protect the left flank of the regiment and maintain contact with the 34th Division until relieved by two platoons of the 88th Reconnaissance Troop charged with the same mission.

At 2200 hours, the regimental command post began displacement to a new location at Montecatini, near the command post of the 2d battalion. At 2330 hours, the 2d battalion reported that the relief of the armored elements had been completed. Since these elements were covering a very broad front, it was necessary for the 2d battalion to occupy positions on the commanding terrain only, in order that it might form easily for the attack at 0400 hours the next morning.

At 0110 hours, 19 July 1944, the 3d battalion reported that its objective had been reached, (hill 191) without meeting enemy resistance. At 0330 hours, the 2d battalion moved forward to close the gap between the 2d and 3d battalions. At 0400 hours, the 3d battalion attacked, as the 2d battalion continued its advance. When the "jeep" of the artillery Liaison Officer, Captain Corcoran, struck a mine on the trail north of Montecatini, (luckily injuring only one man, although the "jeep" was completely destroyed) the regimental command post group parked "jeeps" and joined on foot, the command post group of the 2d battalion.

The 2d battalion moved forward without resistance until its forward elements had reached hill 201 some 5000 meters north of Montecatini, where the advance was halted by heavy small arms, machine gun, artillery and sniper fire--the machine gun and sniper fire emanating from the left flank (slightly to the left rear). The artillery liaison officers, due to faulty radio sets, were unable to contact 913th Field artillery for supporting fires. By relay from the regimental SCR 300 set, to the 1st battalion, thence to the 913th Field Artillery battalion, artillery fire was placed on enemy positions. In the meantime, the regimental command post group was busily engaged in digging slit trenches with tools available (spoons, bayonets, helmets) to afford protection from artillery, machine gun and sniper fire which was falling uncomfortably close. The regimental commander actively aided 2d battalion commanding officer in organizing the 2d battalion for continuation of the attack.

If the tanks attached to the regiment had been present at this time, this resistance could have been neutralized without delay. However, due to extensive mine laying of the enemy, the tanks were experiencing extreme difficulty in reaching the forward areas having lost six tanks to mines. The regimental Anti-Tank mine platoon was accompanying the tanks, removing mines and expediting their progress as much as possible. However, it was late in the afternoon before they were able to overtake the Infantry, thus de-

prising the regiment of most valuable firepower in a critical stage of the attack.

To reduce the enemy strongpoint on the left flank of the 2d Battalion Company G was sent around the left flank, moving slightly to the rear to execute the maneuver, while 88mm mortars of Company H placed accurate fire on enemy positions. Company G progressed satisfactorily, capturing about 30 prisoners, killing approximately 6 enemy and completely destroying this enemy strongpoint which had succeeded in delaying the battalion about two hours. The regimental command post displaced 1000 meters to the east to a house on a ridge which, although somewhat exposed, provided excellent observation of the terrain to our front.

During the first phase of this advance from Mantecchini, 2d Lieutenant Jack B. Spangenburg, a platoon leader in Company E, was leading and directing his platoon in a small arms fight against several enemy snipers, when the company was subjected to a terrific artillery barrage. Lt. Spangenburg was mortally wounded by shrapnel from these shells as he exposed himself to continue the fire fight.

In the meantime, the 3d battalion had encountered resistance similar to that of the 2d battalion, but forged ahead to a hill near the locality of la Mandriola where, due to excellent enemy observation, the battalion was unable to advance further in daylight as large casualties would have resulted. At this time, the company commander of K company was severely wounded and Lieutenant Edward E. Tucker, an old officer of the regiment, began to move forward with his radio operator to assume command. As he reached the crest of the hill, a terrific artillery barrage killed both him and his radio operator.

The 2d battalion, after reorganization, reached ridge Colle al Asino by nightfall. The regimental commander made plans for the continuation of the attack at 2250 hours, but after a telephone conversation with General Sloan, temporarily suspended plans pending arrival at the regimental command post of the Assistant Division commander, General Kendall, with instructions. All battalions were alerted for an attack at any time during the night. At 0240 hours, 10 July 1944, 1st Lieutenant Bodie, Liaison Officer of this regiment with the 350th Infantry, reported that the 350th Infantry was planning an attack at 0500 hours, 11 July. As a result, instructions were issued to 2d and 3d battalions to plan an attack at the same time. Since the Assistant Division Commander had not arrived at the command post, it was presumed that he had been unable to locate it during the night, and that the Division would probably launch a coordinated attack with both regiments. However, about 15 minutes prior to the set "jump-off" time, wire communications were reestablished with the Division command post and the regimental commander was ordered to hold in present positions due to a counter-attack threat which had developed on the Division left flank.

A Division Artillery Air Observation Post had reported enemy troops of approximately battalion strength detrucking in the zone of the 34th Division on our left flank, a dangerous threat due to the fact that the 34th had been unable to keep abreast. However, the expected counter-attack did not materialize and the regiment was ordered at 0805 hours by the Division Commander to continue the attack at 0900 hours. Both assault battalions "jumped off" on time, but the 3d battalion, after an advance of 350 yards received very heavy resistance from prepared enemy positions on the ridge to it's front. Captain Glen H. Erickson, Commanding Officer of Company I, leading the assault of his battalion, was killed by artillery fire. The advance of the battalion was halted.

The 2d battalion was more successful in its attack, and advanced through fairly heavy resistance for 900 yards to a position on ridge 150, north of the town of Suciato, before meeting resistance from slopes of hill 214 just south of Laiatico. The hill mass upon which the town of Laiatico was located (hills 214 and 196) presented a serious obstacle to our advance since it provided excellent enemy observation along our entire front as well as offering excellent terrain advantages for a defensive position. At about 1100 hours, General Sloan visited the command post, remaining for approximately two hours. During that time, heavy artillery fire observed and adjusted from the regimental command post was placed on Laiatico by the artillery liaison officer. One company of chemical mortars, which had been attached to the regiment, began registering on the town of Laiatico. Under instructions of the Division Commander, smoke was placed upon the town by the chemical mortars followed by heavy artillery concentrations. The smoke screen deceived the Germans into believing that we were attacking, causing them to leave their cover to occupy forward positions where our heavy artillery concentrations were placed.

At 1720 hours, the 2d battalion again resumed the attack but were able to advance only 250 yards, suffering too many casualties to warrant continuing.

The 1st battalion which had moved by truck and marching to an assembly area in vicinity of Fecciano on 10 July, was ordered by the Commanding General to move at 0900 hours, 11 July, and seize the road junction southwest of Laiatico. Reconnaissance patrols were to be dispatched from that point to a road junction, 2500 meters to the northwest to gain contact with the 34th Division. The 1st battalion reached its objective without incident. The reconnaissance patrol which was dispatched at once, reached the designated road junction without contacting either the enemy or the 34th division. At about 1630 hours, 1st battalion from it's position, was subjected to a counterattack by an estimated German company advancing under cover of artillery fire. Our artillery concentrations together with rifle and machine gun fire, repelled the counter-attack, inflicting about 25% casualties upon the enemy. During the day, plans were made by the regimental commander for an attack by the 1st battalion at 0800 hours 12 July to seize the town of Laiatico and the commanding ground in that vicinity. The 2d battalion and the 3d, would hold in present positions, while the 1st battalion flanked the town from the left.

Brigadier General Kurtz, Division Artillery Commander, visited the Command post, to complete plans for artillery support for the attack. At 1930 hours Brigadier General Kendall visited the Command Post, studied and approved plans as made, and remained for the night.

The attack of the 1st battalion jumped off on time in column of companies, with company C in the lead moving just to east of the Laiatico road. After an advance of 500 yards, company C, moving rapidly, was fired upon from both flanks by German machine guns. An enemy strongpoint had been penetrated, but due to heavy flanking machine gun fire, company C was unable to advance or exploit the penetration. The men of the company were widely dispersed and not under good control. The battalion commander then sent company B around the left flank of company C across the Laiatico road. However, the maneuver was not pushed and daylight found the battalion in the open ground on the western slopes of Laiatico hill mass under direct enemy observation. As daylight came, the enemy artillery fire increased in tempo and intensity. Due to the fact that the troops on our left were not abreast of our regiment, artillery fire was brought to bear on the 1st battalion from their left rear, a demoralizing direction; as well as from enemy gun areas just north of Laiatico. This artillery fire was deadly accurate due to the excellent enemy observation from Laiatico.

If the 1st battalion had pushed forward aggressively, instead of proceeding with undue caution, it is believed that the town of Laiatico and the high ground in the vicinity thereof, could have been taken in this attack. As it occurred, daylight came while the battalion was in positions which were under observation from the high ground in the vicinity of Laiatico. Sustained accurate artillery fire was placed upon the battalion all during the day, making any movement impossible.

On the 12th of July 1944, battalions reorganized and made reconnaissance of their respective areas studying the terrain to their immediate front. At 1500 hours, battalion commanders reported to the command post for orientation of terrain on the regimental front and discussion of plans for a night attack pursuant to a telephone conversation with Commanding General, 88th Infantry Division, about 1100 hours same day. The Regimental Commander directed that as a tentative plan, subject to approval by higher headquarters, the 1st battalion would assemble in draws in rear of present position as a regimental reserve, reorganize, and protect the left flank of the regiment. The 2d battalion would make the main effort, sieze hill 214 south of Laiatico, skirt the west edge of the town and continue to the high ground north of the town. The 3d battalion, which was to be relieved by elements of the 349th Infantry, would move to the left rear and follow the 2d battalion in the attack. After the capture of hill 214 by the 2d battalion, the 3d battalion would move to the right front and mop up the town, continuing northeast to capture high ground in that vicinity. Battalion commanders departed for their respective organizations to complete plans and wait for the "green light" from regiment. At about 1900 hours, a telephone message from the division commander was received to the effect that Brigadier General Kendall, Assistant Division Commander, was enroute to the command post with orders. Battalion commanders were immediately

ordered to return to the regimental command post. At about 2100 hours Brigadier General Kendall arrived and orders were issued. The new plan was different from the original plan in that the regiment would attack, 2d battalion from the west, and 3d battalion from the east, instead of battalions in column. 1st battalion would have the same mission, i.e., to assemble in regimental reserve, protect the regimental left flank, and, in addition, be prepared to relieve either the 2d or 3d battalions on their first objective so that either might continue to the other regimental objective--the high ground north of Laiatico. The 2nd battalion would attack generally northeast, seize hill 214, and continue the attack to capture Laiatico and hill 196 as the first objective. 3d battalion would attack to the northwest and seize the ridge projecting east of Laiatico as its first objective. Both assault battalions would be prepared to complete the regimental mission by moving north to capture the ridge running north from the town. The battalion to first accomplish its initial mission would be given the mission of taking the second objective. Company C, 760th Tank (medium) Battalion, was attached to the regiment for this operation in addition to Company E, 1st Armored Regiment (medium tank company) which had been supporting the regiment since the operation began. No artillery preparation was planned prior to H hour in order not to destroy the surprise effect. At H hour, three successive ten minute concentrations employing both light and medium artillery and chemical mortars were planned. The chemical mortars would fire two rounds of white phosphorous to each round of high explosive.

The attack was launched on time. The 3d battalion proceeded with greatest possible speed advancing on a relatively narrow front (column of companies) close behind the supporting artillery (fifty to one hundred yards at times), knifed into enemy defensive positions along the ridge running east from Laiatico, penetrating as far as the battalion command post of the 1st battalion, 1060th Grenadier Regiment. In the ensuing action, the Grenadier Battalion commander and Major Fabian, the German combat team commander, were killed by hand grenades thrown into the building used as the battalion command post. Confusion was so great among the Germans that over one hundred prisoners were taken without the loss of a single American soldier. By following so closely behind the artillery, the 3d battalion prevented the enemy from getting set in prepared defensive positions before our doughboys reached them. The 3d battalion continued moving rapidly up the ridge.

In the meantime, the attack of the 2d battalion was proceeding with similar success. Hill 214, which had proven to be an almost insurmountable obstacle in the daylight attack (due to the excellent observation and fields of fire of the German automatic weapons) was captured with comparative ease, and after mopping up, the 2d battalion continued the attack to seize hill 196, reaching the northern outskirts of the town at daylight. In this initial action, the 2d battalion captured one hundred forty German prisoners. By the time the 3d battalion had completed its mopping up operation, it had become daylight. Both battalions were then subjected to concentrated artillery fire as well as heavy fire from German automatic weapons in secondary defensive positions, but continued their efforts to press

forward. The 1st Battalion was ordered to move northeast to a reserve position immediately in rear of the center of the assault battalions. During their move to this position, some 40 prisoners of war, which had been by-passed by the two assault battalions, were captured.

At about 0600 hours, the regimental command post displaced to the old 2d battalion command post, remained there for a short period of time, then displaced forward to a large German dugout just north of Hill 214 on the south edge of Laiatico. During the day both battalions, continued to push forward employing attached tanks. The 2d battalion, due to the intense artillery and automatic weapons fire, was unable to advance beyond the northern outskirts of Laiatico. At 1300 hours, the 5d battalion launched an attack to the northwest but were halted after an advance of 800 yards. At this time, both assault battalions were ordered to reorganize and dig in. During the afternoon the town of Laiatico received the heaviest artillery bombardment ever experienced by any member of this regiment. Nebelwerfers together with artillery of many calibers were fired into the town from three directions; northeast, north and northwest. The hail of the artillery fire was incessant.

However, by the end of the day, when mopping up operations were completed, 420 prisoners, the largest haul made thus far by any regiment in the Division, had fallen into our hands.

Due to their inactivity and lack of aggressiveness in this operation the battalion commander and the executive officer of the 1st battalion were relieved of command. Captain Williams was designated as the new battalion commander and Captain Lanzendorfer as his executive.

At 2400 hours, the attack was resumed with the 2d and 5d battalions abreast; the objective being the north end of the ridge running north-south from Laiatico. The 2d battalion advanced to the west of the road; 5d battalion east of the road. The 1st battalion moved to a reserve position around Hill 104 prepared to repel a counterattack from any direction and provide security for the regimental flanks and rear. Both assault battalions advanced with little resistance reaching their objectives at 0300 hours. According to Division plan, upon the capture of this objective, the regiment was pinched out by the 349th Infantry which had moved into the gap between the 351st and the 350th Infantry Regiments.

The 13th day of July was spent in reorganizing and resupply by all elements. At 1100 hours, General Sloan visited the regimental command post and outlined plans for an attack tonight, in which one battalion of this regiment would aid the 349th Infantry. At about 1830 hours, Brigadier General Kendall visited the command post with final plans concerning tonight's objective. The 1st battalion would attack at 2400 hours on the left flank of the 349th Infantry seizing Hill 142 to include the town of Montevocchio. The 3d battalion would follow the 1st battalion in the attack, protecting its left flank from attack and, upon completion of the capture of Hill 172

near Montecchio by 1st battalion, relieve the 1st battalion of the relief, the 1st battalion would be attached to the 349th Infantry. The 3d battalion would dispatch patrols in the direction of Peccioli. The 2d battalion would remain in its present position and protect the left flank of the division by holding the high ground in the vicinity of Laatico.

The 1st battalion crossed its line of departure on time (2400 hours) 13 July 1944, and proceeded across country, without opposition, to the town of Montecchio. The 3d battalion followed the 1st battalion and took up defensive positions on high ground, hill 172, east of Montecchio. Upon arrival of the 3d battalion, the 1st battalion became attached to the 349th Infantry and moved out on order of the CO, 349th Infantry to hill 192 in the vicinity of the church of Madonna della Serre. 1st Lt. James H. Markham, 1st battalion Anti Tank Platoon Leader, while making a reconnaissance for Anti Tank gun positions closely behind his advancing battalion, struck a teller mine near a curve in the road, killing Lt. Markham and completely destroying the vehicle. One company of the 3d battalion, company L, was sent to mop up the town of Peccioli. Upon entering the town, two Mark IV tanks were encountered. One tank was knocked out by accurate "bazooka" fire of the men of company L, and the crew captured. The other tank escaped to the north. At 1100 hours Lt. Mayfield, Division Liaison Officer, reported to the command post at Montecchio with orders relieving the 1st battalion from attachment to the 349th Infantry and directing that this regiment (less the 2d battalion) continue its advance to the north. The 1st battalion which had already advanced to hill 192 was notified at once that it had reverted to this command and was ordered to continue the attack to seize hill 137 south of Monte Foscoli. The 3d battalion was ordered to move, echeloned to the left rear of the 1st battalion, and capture hills 146 and 124. Company L, which was mopping up the town of Peccioli, would rejoin the battalion in the vicinity of hill 124. Both battalions reached their initial objectives with slight resistance which consisted mainly of scattered artillery and mortar fire. As the 3d battalion continued northward from hill 124, it received heavy artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire which halted its advance. The 1st battalion, making maximum use of all cover and concealment proceeded further forward to the high ground in the vicinity of P'Vio del Pratello at which point the battalion came under enemy observation and its advance was halted by machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire. The terrain to our front was natural defensive terrain, providing excellent fields of fire for automatic weapons and necessitating that the attacking troops cross a broad flat valley to reach their objectives.

The 1st battalion was ordered by the regimental commander to attack at 2300 hours and seize hill 137. The 3d battalion would remain in position on hill 124 protecting the left flank of the division. The 1st battalion crossed its line of departure on time. Upon moving up hill 137 the battalion was subjected to a very heavy cross fire from automatic weapons as well as heavy mortar and artillery fire. When the advance was halted about 1/2 way up the hill, all attempts to outflank the automatic weapons positions failed. As dawn approached, the battalion commander realized that the present position was a precarious one due to the observation that the enemy would have upon him at daylight. With this in mind, he withdrew his battalion back across the valley to its original position in the vicinity of P'Vio del Pratello.

Per instructions from division headquarters, the attack was continued at 0900 hours, 15 July 1944 with both battalions continuing the assault; the 3d battalion holding one company as regimental reserve not to be committed except on order of the regimental commander. The 1st battalion with great difficulty was able to cross the valley to its front and start up the slopes of hill 137. The thick growth of trees on these slopes, although providing concealment, proved to be the most dangerous area on the battlefield due to the deadly "tree bursts" of artillery and mortar shells placed on our advancing troops.

The fighting was extremely heavy all during the day as the 1st battalion inched its way up the slopes of 137 and the 3d battalion moved slowly across the flat land to hill 127. Through the untiring efforts of Major Cheek, Tank Liaison Officer of the 760th Tank Battalion, one platoon of tanks was worked down into the valley on the left flank of the 3d battalion, in spite of numerous mines which had been laid by the Germans on all roads and trails in this area. These tanks were able to deliver direct fire on suspected machine gun positions and observation posts, materially aiding the advance of the battalion. By darkness, the 1st battalion had succeeded in gaining the crest of hill 137 although German machine guns continued to be emplaced on the reverse slope while the 3d battalion had reached the saddle between hills 127 and 147.

During this action, 2d Lieutenant Edward L. Dolan, platoon leader of company K, 3d battalion, was wounded in both legs by enemy machine gun fire, as he was advancing with his platoon in the attack. As he attempted to return to the rear for medical aid, another burst from the enemy machine gun caught him in the chest, killing him instantly.

At 0300 hours, 16 July 1944, the attack was resumed, hoping to catch the Germans before they could complete a suspected withdrawal. The 1st battalion had the mission of capturing Monte Foscoli; the 3d battalion, hill 101; both battalions would continue the advance northward on seizing these objectives. As the 1st battalion was preparing to jump off in the attack, our artillery began to zero its guns in upon the enemy positions at 0230 hours. Several preliminary rounds fell short and landed close to the company A area. It was believed that no casualties were sustained, but as the zero hour approached, a runner was dispatched to the foxhole of Lt. Argonne C. Dixon, a platoon leader, with final orders for the attack, and the report was brought back that he was apparently asleep and could not be awakened. Upon further investigation, it was found that he was mortally wounded, and he died before medical aid could reach him.

The attack progressed satisfactorily. Each battalion destroyed the few machine guns and snipers to its front which constituted the German rear guard. The 1st battalion reached the town of Monte Foscoli at about 0600 hours, halting there until the regimental commander personally urged them forward to continue the attack on the town of Partino and destroy the retreating Germans. The 3d battalion, after capturing hill 101, moved to the valley beyond where stubborn resistance was again encountered from German machine guns emplaced along the Saletta (hill 145) Partino (hill 190) ridge. The

1st battalion continued its advance in a column of companies. The leading company started down the slope north of Monte Foscoli, leading into the Tosola creek, it was met by heavy fire from machine gun, sniper, and German self-propelled guns. Due to the lack of cover and concealment, it was impossible for the 1st battalion to advance any further north in daylight under such heavy enemy fire without suffering heavy casualties.

The 5d battalion however pushed forward aggressively with the leading elements of company I (one platoon) reaching the southern outskirts of Saletta. Company L was ordered by the battalion commander to move to the left, generally along the north-south draw to the west of Saletta, outflanking the resistance opposing company I. Initially, the maneuver progressed satisfactorily, but soon, serious opposition was encountered from German automatic weapons and artillery.

The 2d battalion, which had been released to the regiment from division reserve, had moved to covered positions behind Monte Foscoli during the morning and was ordered by the regimental commander to pass through the 1st battalion, in its present position, at darkness and attack Partino, at 0100 hours 17 July 1944. The 3d battalion would attack at the same time, continuing north to seize hill 126. Upon completion of its relief, the 1st battalion would be attached to the Ramey Task Force--a special task force protecting the division right flank. Both attacks were launched on time, but the 2d battalion, due to stubborn enemy resistance, progressed very slowly. The 3d battalion captured Saletta, continuing forward at a rapid rate of advance, cutting the east-west road out of Colleoli, and advancing some 500 yards beyond, north of C (Montexari). During this attack, Company E, 2d battalion became engaged in a fierce fire fight in the vicinity of Colleoli, and had just captured two houses on the top of a ridge line, overlooking the town. Second Lieutenant Ray H. Cosby, a platoon leader, proceeded down the forward slope of this ridge, to check on the location of the wounded men of his platoon. As he did so, a German machine gun opened up on him, killing him almost instantly.

This rapid advance by the 3d battalion constituted a definite breakthrough in the enemy lines, which was evidenced by the disruption caused the enemy and their surprise at finding our soldiers so far to their rear. Accurate artillery fire was placed on fleeing enemy troops and vehicles by Lt. Hopkins, 3d battalion Artillery Liaison Officer, killing many enemy and destroying a number of vehicles. The 3d battalion organized a perimeter defense for its exposed position and delivered deadly small arms fire upon the Germans as they withdrew from forward positions by-passed by this battalion.

In the meantime, the 1st battalion moved by trucks to join the Ramey Task Force, thus again leaving the regiment with a force of only two battalions. If the 1st battalion had been on hand at the time, the 3d battalion knifed through the enemy defense, the breakthrough could have been exploited. With only the 3d battalion, the front was too wide and the force too small to exploit the breakthrough successfully.

As the Anti-Tank Company was displacing to a new location where it could render effective aid to the forward elements, Captain Clarence R. Meeks, Commanding Officer, preceded his men on a reconnaissance for these positions. While travelling over a previously well-used road, he pulled his

"jeep" over onto the shoulder to allow another vehicle to pass, but as he did so, the "jeep" struck an enemy teller mine, completely demolishing the vehicle and killing the radio operator instantly. Captain Meeks was mortally wounded, and died on the way to the Clearing Station, shortly afterwards.

All during the morning, heavy artillery concentrations were placed upon enemy, sighted withdrawing from the vicinity of Saletta and the ridge line to the west of Partino. The regimental command post provided excellent observation for the adjustment of this fire. At about 1230 hours, the 2d battalion, held up since early morning, rejuvenated its attack and surged forward, capturing Partino at 1245 hours and continuing to seize the town of Gelle at 1615 hours. Company E refusing to be impeded by the German automatic weapons, slashed fiercely at the German rear guard. Its leading elements entered the southern edge of the town of Colledara where heavy fighting took place. At nightfall, company E had captured approximately 1/2 of the town, holding that position until the attack was resumed at 0100 hours, 18 July by both battalions. The third battalion was ordered to take hill 161 continuing north to the town of San Bartolommeo, thence northeast to the high ground north of Montopoli which overlooked the Arno river valley. The 2d battalion was to continue north to hill 208, thence northeast to hill 132 in the vicinity of San Barbara continuing northeast to hill 139 and take up positions on the high ground overlooking the Arno valley. Both battalions advanced rapidly in spite of the fact that the 349th Infantry on our right and the 362d Infantry (91st Infantry Division) on our left, were unable to keep abreast. Only slight resistance was encountered and final objectives were reached. It was with great enthusiasm and pride that the regiment reported to the Division Commander that that part of the Division objective within the regimental zone had been taken and secured by 1800 hours. Combat patrols were immediately dispatched north to the Arno river, and organization of the ground was begun. One platoon of tanks, 760th Tank Battalion, was attached to each battalion as direct support, with company C, 84th Chemical battalion going into position behind the 2d battalion of our regiment and company D of the same battalion taking up firing positions in the rear of the 2d battalion.

The regimental command group received a great ovation upon entrance into the town of San Bartolommeo, being the first Americans to enter that place. As a part of the celebration, the Italian civilians rang their church bells loud and long, giving everyone a bad case of "jitters" due to the fact that the sound could cause the Germans to place artillery fire upon the town. The regimental command post was established in a large palatial residence just south of the town of Marti, previously occupied as the command post of the German Fabian combat group. Excellent observation posts were established forward of the front line battalions and accurate fire was placed upon Germans observed laying mines along the river bank. Brigadier General Kendall visited the command post during the afternoon, studied and approved the dispositions of the regiment and remained for supper with the regimental commander. At 2115 hours, reports were received from reconnaissance patrols dispatched towards the Arno river earlier in the day. All patrols reported contact with the enemy along the improved highway running generally parallel with the river between the towns of San Angelico, San Romano, and Fonte a Evola. The two patrols dispatched to the river bank were unable to reach their destination due to heavy enemy resistance.

During the 19th of July 1944, positions were prepared for all-around security. Observation Posts were established and improved and small reconnaissance patrols were dispatched in the direction of the Arno river. Major General Sloan visited the command post and discussed the disposition of troops within the regimental zone, expressing satisfaction with same.

At 1245 hours Colonel O'Brien, 5th Army G-3 section, visited the command post for conference with Colonel Champeny concerning rifle marksmanship. He was particularly interested in the attack of this regiment which cut highway 6 southeast of Rome. The 3d battalion of our regiment had destroyed 60% of a battalion of the Hermann Goering Division by small arms fire alone. This fact was substantiated by the captured battalion surgeon of the badly mauled German battalion.

At 0730 hours 20 July 1944, Colonel Champeny departed for his daily inspection of all troops and installations. During the morning Major Beggs, Acting G-3, visited the command post, studied the disposition of troops, and went forward to the regimental observation post in Montopoli to make a terrain study of the banks of the Arno river. Major Beggs revealed that he had no knowledge of what future operations had been planned for the division, but that all indications were that the situation would remain as is for the time being. He knew of no plans for a river crossing within the present division area. From our study of the banks of the Arno, to our front, as well as from patrol reports and interrogation of civilians, it was the unanimous opinion that a river crossing made here would be an extremely hazardous one for two reasons: (1) the nature of the terrain. The enemy could maintain excellent observation on any established bridgehead. (2) The extensively prepared enemy positions on the north bank of the Arno.

During the afternoon, Major Walker, G-2, called at the command post with a group of South American officers on an observation tour of the 5th Army front. After a short pleasant conference with the regimental commander, the delegation departed expressing regret that further observation of the front lines could not be made due to shortage of time available.

The troops continued to improve defensive positions as well as getting resupplied, rested and re-equipped. Patrol activity was intensified all along the front to obtain as much information as possible concerning our side of the river. From all indications, it seemed that the enemy were occupying only the town of San Romano in strength, although clashes with German patrols were reported to the east of the town.

During the night, all company kitchens were brought forward into company areas enabling the troops to get continuous hot meals for the first time since the start of the present operation on 10 July. Needless to say, the kitchen crews received a great ovation upon their arrival.

At 1200 hours, 21 July, the regiment was notified by G-3 that the two attached chemical mortar companies, Company A and Company D of the 84th Chemical Battalion, were detached and would assemble in their battalion headquarters area. It was with misgiving on our part, that this message was conveyed to the companies concerned due to the fact that both had rendered a fine service to the regiment. Their white phosphorous shell which created great fear and confusion among the Germans at Lalatico and Partino would be missed in future operations.

At 1800 hours, Lieutenant Mayfield, Division Liaison Officer, reported to the command post with a division directive which specified that the 351st Infantry would on the night of 22-23 July eliminate enemy in the vicinity of San Romano and Ponte a Evoia, keep these points under observation and free of enemy with nightly patrols, and send small reconnaissance patrols across the Arno river to determine enemy strength and dispositions.

This directive was received with much enthusiasm due to the fact that it had been the desire of the regimental commander since our arrival on the division objective to clear the area specified, but orders from higher headquarters had limited us to patrol action in that area. At 0800 hours 22 July, all battalion commanders and battalion 4-5's reported to the command post for orientation, discussion, and issuance of orders for the operation. The plan in general was to employ two companies from each of the 2d and 3d battalions. The 3d battalion would clear the area of San Romano to include the 91st Division boundary west of Capenne; the 2d battalion would clear the area San Romano (exclusive) to Ponte a Evoia (inclusive). Each battalion would outpost the cleared areas with one company to prevent enemy infiltrations. The attack would be launched at 2300 hours with no artillery preparation in order not to destroy the surprise element. One platoon of tanks would follow each battalion to its objective to be available at dawn if needed.

At 1130 hours, Brigadier General Kendall, Assistant Division Commander, visited the command post for discussion of plans for this operation. The plans as announced were considered satisfactory and the Assistant Division Commander remained for lunch with the regimental commander. It was revealed that the 349th Infantry and 350th Infantry were launching their attacks on objectives generally on line but slightly to our right rear one hour earlier than our "H" hour. However, coordination would not be disrupted due to the fact that the division right flank was refused, making the distance to their objective considerably greater than the distance to ours.

The attack was launched at the designated hour--2300 hours 22 July. The 2d battalion employing F and G companies, occupied its objectives with comparative ease, left F company as an outpost and withdrew G company to the vicinity of Stibbio where the battalion had established its defense area. The 3d battalion, however, proceeded with greater difficulty--K company swung northwest to the town of Angelico, then turned east along the road towards the main battalion objective--San Romano. In the meantime,

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L company moved northeast to strike San Romano from the east; thus both companies combining to execute a pincer movement on the town. K company reached San Angelico with no resistance, checked houses for Germans, and evidently became confused as to the location of San Romano, reporting that the western edge of the town had been reached when actually the company was still in San Angelico. Company L, too, became confused in the maneuver. Skirting the southern edge of town, company L contacted Company K, reporting at 0615 hours to the battalion commander that San Romano was ours. K company returned to its defensive area in the vicinity of Montopoli after sending one platoon to outpost the town of Capanne. One platoon, company L, was dispatched to outpost San Angelico with the remainder of company L located in the southern outskirts of San Romano.

At 0830 hours, 25 July 1944, the regimental commander, with Major Sadler, S-2, left the command post for an inspection of the L company outpost at San Romano. As Colonel Champeny and Major Sadler approached San Romano, fully expecting the town to be occupied by enemy troops, they came under fire of a German machine gun. Checking with an L company platoon located in a house nearby, it was discovered that German troops had infiltrated into the town during the night and had set up a formidable strongpoint utilizing the thick walled houses as pill boxes. On order of Colonel Champeny, the platoon of Company L immediately set to work clearing the houses. The 3d battalion commander was then notified to withdraw the platoon of company L from Angelico and utilize the entire company to clear the town of San Romano. This work was carried on throughout the day, a slow, methodical, house-to-house job with great harassment by German artillery, mortars and machine guns. By darkness, about 1/2 of the town had been cleared and two strong patrols were designated to complete the job to include the adjacent town of Buche. During the night, L company was subjected to an extremely heavy artillery barrage followed by a counter-attack which forced the company to withdraw and reorganize in the vicinity of the road junction just west of San Romano.

On 24 July 1944, the town of San Romano which was rapidly becoming a tougher assignment every day, still remained under German domination. The 3d battalion commander was ordered by the regimental commander to utilize all forces under his command to accomplish the mission. The 1st battalion was alerted for possible employment. Accordingly, company L was ordered to attack east from present position while company K moved to the northwest and attacked the town from the west, a maneuver similar to that planned for the first attack on San Romano. Upon reaching the outskirts of town from either side, both companies encountered heavy enemy resistance from mortars, artillery, snipers and machine guns. Fierce fighting continued throughout the day with companies K and L advancing only a few houses in the face of the withering machine gun fire.

Lieutenant Colonel Furr, battalion commander, 3d battalion, who had been in the hospital for some time, returned to duty with his battalion in

the afternoon of 24 July and re-energized the attack. At 2210 hours, efforts would be renewed to destroy the enemy strongpoint with companies K and L attacking simultaneously.

At 1100 hours, a reconnaissance party from the 362d Infantry, 91st Infantry Division, headed by Colonel Cotton, Regimental Commander, visited the command post to discuss plans for the relief of this regiment by one battalion of 362d Infantry which of course would occupy an extremely broad front for a battalion. Such details as could be worked out on a warning order were accomplished and the 362d Infantry reconnaissance party went forward to visit the battalion areas.

At 2210 hours 24 July 1944, the 3d battalion again attacked the town of San Romano. K company, advancing from the east, L company advancing from the west. Company L reached a point 200 yards from the center of town before receiving any fire. At that point the enemy was engaged and a heavy fire fight ensued. At 0040 hours 25 July 1944, K company which had made a similar advance was held up by an enemy mine field, by-passed the mine field, and reached its objective, after heavy fighting, at 0200 hours. L company which was fighting for every inch of this town of many stone houses, advanced more slowly, reaching its objective at 0445 hours. During this operation, Captain Allen R. Vail, Commanding Officer of L company, and one of the outstanding company commanders of the regiment, had rejoined his company, after spending some time in the hospital for wounds received in earlier operations. The leading elements of the company were in a house that was receiving fire from enemy snipers, which were well hidden and impossible to locate from the cover of the house. Captain Vail decided to make a hasty reconnaissance and proceeded to dodge from house to house until he had reached the street corner. As he reached this position and began to search for the snipers, a direct artillery hit upon the corner building killed him instantly. Captain Vail was the holder of the Silver Star Award for Gallantry in Action. Artillery and mortar fire was extremely heavy on both companies during the attack. By 0510 hours K and L company had established contact and taken up positions for reorganization just north of San Romano between this place and the town of Bucche. The news that the town of San Romano had finally been occupied, was received with great enthusiasm due to the fact that this bastion of a city had been a sore spot within the regimental zone. Its capture would have been completed much earlier, had permission been granted by higher headquarters. All during the day 25 July 1944, both 2d and 3d battalions were busily engaged in clearing our zone of Germans up to the Arno river. This operation was carried on by patrols of platoon size, and proceeded with some difficulties at times, due to stubborn opposition of isolated machine gun nests. The area was entirely cleared and the mission accomplished by nightfall. During this cleaning-up operation, Lieutenant Ernest I. Berk, a platoon leader of Company K, was engaged in leading replacements from the company command post, to his platoon position, when a heavy artillery barrage landed in the immediate vicinity, killing him almost instantly.

On 26 July 1944, the regiment was officially notified that it would be relieved in its sector by the 2d battalion, 362d Infantry, 91st Infantry Division. Lt. Col. Thompson, Commanding Officer, this battalion, visited the command post, discussed the relief and proceeded to the forward areas to make a reconnaissance. Due to the fact that his dispositions would be somewhat different from ours, because of smaller strength, this reconnaissance was necessarily minute in detail. At 0640 hours, Brigadier General Kendall visited the command post and discussed the relief of the regiment, suggesting that the relieving unit maintain a smaller outpost along the railroad and patrol the south banks of the river.

At 1400 hours, Colonel Champeny addressed all new officers, recently assigned this regiment as replacements, who were enroute to their new organizations. This group, largely First Lieutenants, contained several Cavalry Officers who had been transferred from Cavalry to Infantry due to the small need for Cavalry in this war. Colonel Champeny in his talk briefly traced the history of the regiment from its activation, explaining its standards and traditions. The talk was enthusiastically received and as the replacement officer group departed, their expressions and actions indicated that they would maintain the fighting spirit of the regiment, enabling it to continue to be, as General Sloan has expressed many times, the best regiment in the Army.

On 27 July 1944, plans were completed for the relief of the regiment. The 2d battalion of the 362d Infantry would employ two companies to relieve the advance battalions of the regiment. Company E would relieve the 3d battalion within its zone, outposting the railroad and patrolling to the Arno river. Company F, similarly, would relieve 2d battalion of this regiment, outposting the railroad and patrol to the Arno river. One platoon of company E together with a platoon of company F would occupy the San Romano-Buche sector. Company G in reserve would go into position west of Stibbio, an ideal location with good routes of approach to meet enemy attack in any direction.

At 1120 hours, Archbishop Spellman of New York accompanied by Colonel Ryan, 5th Army Chaplain, and Colonel LeFevre, II Corps Chaplain, met Major General Sloan at the regimental command post and was introduced to Colonel Champeny, the staff, and command post personnel. The Archbishop heartily shook hands with all, expressing the hope that he would see all in New York soon. The party then departed for a visit to the 1st Battalion where Archbishop Spellman requested the names and addresses of all the soldiers whom he met in order that he might convey best wishes to their families when he returned to the United States.

The relief during the night of 27-28 July proceeded smoothly without

incident. Due to the long distance from the outpost units to the entrucking point (necessarily so, in order to escape enemy observation) it was felt that some units might not be relieved in time to depart from the area by daylight. However, due to detailed prior planning by Lt. Col. Thompson, of the 362d Infantry and our battalion commanders, the outpost units reached their destination on time. The regiment was trucked to the area of Montognoso. All organizations were closed into bivouac area by 0815 hours 28 July 1944. Particular attention was given to dispersal in, and camouflage of bivouac area. During the day, troops rested, cleaned and repaired clothing and equipment and were shuttled to a Quartermaster Clothing Exchange Shower Unit some 22 miles away at Saline.

At 1500 hours, all battalion S-3's and Special Unit commanders met with the regimental S-3 for discussion of training to be conducted during the ensuing rehabilitation period. The first and foremost subject for study and training was designated as River Crossing Operations. Concurrently, disciplinary training and physical conditioning would be stressed. The period from 28 July to and including 31 July would be devoted to cleaning, servicing and maintenance of motor vehicles and crew served weapons, orderliness, police, sanitation, and showers. On 1 August the regular drill schedule would begin, covering the principal subjects listed above to include training with and firing automatic weapons.

On the 31st of July, schools for officers and key NCO's in River Crossing Operations were conducted in each battalion. Officers and NCO's from regimental headquarters, engineer, tank, tank destroyer and chemical weapons units that normally would support or be attached to the respective battalions were distributed equally to battalion schools. Officers and personnel from Company C, 518th Engineers and Company F, 19th Engineers, (recent attachment from IV Corps) acted as instructors and demonstration crews for pertinent Engineer subjects while carefully selected Infantry officers instructed in the Infantry phases of River Crossings. The school covered a total of 8 1/2 hours instruction. All officers expressed the opinion that it would definitely improve training to be conducted for troops.

At 1800 hours, all officers of the regiment assembled in the 26 battalion area for a conference with the regimental commander. The operations conducted since the regiment returned to the "line" on 7 July were reviewed with a discussion of mistakes made, corrections therefor, and lessons learned. The use of firepower was stressed. Since the Germans are adept at camouflage and their powder is smokeless and flashless, their gun positions are usually difficult to detect. Nevertheless, it is absolutely necessary that our troops return the fire immediately with all appropriate weapons on likely enemy locations. It can be logically assumed that, although such fire is inaccurate, the morale effect on the Germans will be the same, if not greater, than that caused by German fire on us. The effectiveness of a well planned and well executed night attack when a daylight attack had failed, was pointed out in describing the Battle of Lailico. Greater use of the compass to maintain direction at night was emphasized. The regimental commander stressed the point that responsibility for the prevention of AWOL's and stragglers lies with NCO's as well as officers.

Instances of poor patrolling in the San Romano area were cited with the directive that the standard of patrolling be improved. The regimental commander further stated that he expected the training period to be a "pep up" period with short, concentrated drill days giving troops ample time for athletics, recreation, and movies.

The fighting during the month of July had been some of the bitterest yet engaged in by the regiment. Casualties were heavy and many of the old members of the regiment had fallen as the regiment advanced and took the contested towns of Laiatico, Monte Foscoli, Partino and finally San Romano, on the banks of the Arno River. Soon, perhaps, the Arno River Line, and the vaunted Gothic Line would take their place along with the Gustav Line, the Hitler Line, and Rome, as another important German line that the 351st Infantry has helped to crush.

Arthur S. Champeny
ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY
Colonel, 351st Infantry
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS 351ST INFANTRY
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 88

Authority NMD 7350PZ

By W.D.T. NARA Date 4/25/00

7 September 1944

HISTORY OF THE 351ST INFANTRY REGIMENT FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST 1944.

The operations from Montecatini, Italy to the Arno River, during the month of July 1944 had brought much hard and bitter fighting to the 351st Infantry Regiment and the opportunity for rest and training was welcomed by all.

On 1 August 1944 the extensive training program in river crossing operations continued in all organizations. Intensive study and practical application of principles learned, was made of the employment of engineers in a river crossing; reconnaissance for river crossing sites; German methods of defending a river line; organization and employment of crossing groups based on a reinforced infantry battalion; and communications.

At 1120 hours, Lieutenant Colonel Armogida, Division Engineer, visited the command post for a conference with the Regimental Commander concerning coordination and cooperation with the engineers for river-crossing operations. He revealed that Company F, 19th Engineers would be attached to the regiment during this preliminary training phase, as well as for the actual crossing itself. This company would be an asset to the regiment due to the fact that it had actually participated in the crossing of the Rapido River in the vicinity of Cassino earlier in the Italian campaign. The lessons learned there would serve us well for our operations.

During the day, Lieutenant Colonel Drake, Regimental Executive Officer, Captain Edmonson, Assistant S-3, and a representative from each of 915th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 315th Engineers, Company F, 19th Engineers, and Company C, 760th Tank Battalion, reconnoitered a combat team assembly area south of the Arno River (southwest of Empoli). Reporting to the 8th Indian Division command post for all available information concerning the proposed assembly area, clearance was obtained for the group to continue their personal reconnaissance. As the reconnaissance progressed, it was noted that a conflict with a Corps Artillery Group existed due to the fact that the same assembly area had been assigned to both the infantry and the artillery. This conflict was remedied by a conference with representatives of the Corps Artillery Group and 88th Infantry Division Headquarters.

On 2 August 1944, it was revealed during the day that a plan for a river crossing operation had been developed by II Corps. The 86th and 85th Infantry Divisions would cross abreast—each division forcing four crossings, employing one battalion in the assault at each crossing site. This plan was named the Pistoria Plan from the first Corps objective—the high ground in the vicinity of Pistoria.

CANCELLED

BY W.D.T. W.D.T. W.D.T.
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE 4 Nov 46

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The Division Plan was to employ three Regiments abreast, in the crossing, the 549th Infantry on the left, crossing two battalions abreast, while the 351st Infantry in the center and the 550th Infantry on the right, each forced a one battalion crossing. The zone assigned the Division extended from the vicinity of Montelupo west to San Miniato. When the bridgehead became established, the 549th Infantry would be "pinched out", becoming Division reserve, while the 350th Infantry and the 351st Infantry continued to advance toward the Corps objective.

Up to this time, the 8th Indian Division had not completed clearing the area south of the Arno River of Germans--their line extending from the river bank at Montelupo generally southwest along the railroad track south of Empoli, to Osteria. The 8th Army had, however, agreed to drive the Germans north of the Arno river and plans were being made to accomplish the task.

The day of 3 August 1944 was spent by all battalions, special units, and combat team attachments reconnoitering the assembly areas assigned them, south of the Arno. In order not to create suspicion by heavy traffic in the new area, all organizations were limited to one "jeep".

At 1850 hours, in answer to a request of this regiment, Company F, 19th Engineers were granted road clearance beginning at 2200 hours to move into the new assembly area. Company F would clear the new area of mines, make necessary road repairs, and build a Bailey Bridge over the Elba River. As the 8th Army moved forward to the Arno, the areas cleared of Germans would be carefully reconnoitered by this company and the necessary engineer work completed.

At 0600 hours 4 August 1944, Colonel Champeny, Regimental Commander, received by special messenger, a letter from the Commanding General, in which future operations were discussed. Strict compliance with the security plan as published by the G-5, 86th Infantry Division, was emphasized. Everything practicable to gain deception and surprise in our river crossing could be used. The question of dispersion in our bivouac areas would be a fact and not fiction. In connection with front line reconnaissances to be made, security detachments from the 8th Army would accompany our reconnaissance elements--this, in order to avoid any possibility of capture of our personnel which would indicate our presence on that front. The selection of recuperative targets for the expenditure of munitions, the importance of maneuver in the attack, and the indoctrination of all new men and officers into the spirit of the division, (the spirit of aggressiveness in combat, and the willingness to accept responsibilities) were fully discussed. For personal information of the regimental commander, in order not to establish undue optimism with reference to the immediate future of the division, provisional plans were to be prepared within each regiment for the civil administration of an assigned district. Each district would be assigned to a regimental commander, who would have under him, his entire regiment for the administration and control of his district. This information was not to be published to the lower units at the present time. The importance of careful handling of absentee ballots by designated soldier-voting officers, was emphasized. Any gain or criticism with reference to this matter would react most unfavorably with reference to the Army.



Finally, the Division Commander expressed his desire that over the week-end, religious services be conducted in all units. An outline for the conduct of services was presented in which the Regimental Commander would, with all denominations in a group:

- (1). Give a general orientation of the present international situation stressing the successes of the Allies.
- (2). Discuss the operations of our Division and its successes using these as a background for establishing pride in our accomplishments.
- (3). Stress the reason that we were able to accomplish these successes; the esprit, bravery, energy, enthusiasm and aggressiveness of our older men particularly those who were killed or wounded in action.
- (4). Without too much optimism, to impress upon all present, the fact that by putting all we have into our next few operations, we have a splendid opportunity for ending the war with Germany in the near future.
- (5). And stress the pride our people at home will take in our successful accomplishments. After this introductory program, the group would be separated into denominational groups and the regular religious services conducted.

At 1018 hours, Captain Davis, Commanding Officer of Company C, 84th Chemical Battalion reported to the Command Post for briefing and discussion of dispositions in the proposed forward assembly area. This company, having left the regiment when the Arno River was reached, in the vicinity of San Romano, had returned to us after supporting the 54th Division in its capture of Leghorn and later supporting an anti-aircraft brigade (acting as Infantry) which relieved the 54th Division south of the Arno River at Pisa. Captain Davis with two of his platoon leaders, left for the forward assembly area for a thorough reconnaissance of the area assigned him.

At 1450 hours, Captain Myers, aide to the Commanding General, visited the command post for a discussion of the program for a combat team formation for presentation of awards on Sunday, 5 August 1944 by Major General Sloan. The regimental theater area was selected as the site for the formation and a practice session for recipients of awards planned for the morning of 5 August.

At 1350 hours, 5 August 1944, Captain Sidell, Commanding Officer, Company C, 515th Engineers, conducted an interesting, instructive period in the use of prima cord for the clearance of a path through a minefield. The instruction began with a discussion and demonstration of the type mines which were most common in our new area, namely, the Holtz mine, the Schu mine, the Teller mine and the "S" mine. Each type was examined carefully, and the ways and means of converting the high-powered anti-tank mine into a deadly anti-personnel mine were demonstrated. It was decided by all present that the German inventors of such hellish devices should definitely be classified as "war criminals" and be made to die by the direct action of their own handiwork.

Strands of prima cord were placed on all these mines, the effect noted. One strand of prima cord was successful in detonating a Schu mine but had no appreciative effect upon a Teller. From experimentation, by trial and error process, it was decided that by utilizing four strands of prima cord, all anti-tank and anti-personnel mines (with one exception) would be cleared for a distance approximately one and one half feet on either side of the prima cord strands. The one exception, strangely enough, proved to be a German "S" mine which as a result must be cleared by use of a mine detector or by probing. Another interesting revelation occurred when it was discovered that trip wires in most cases would not be set off by the heavy explosion of the prima cord due to their streamlined surface.

Methods or means of throwing the prima cord into a mine field in order to clear a path were next demonstrated. The most successful means proved to be the use of the rifle grenade and the "bazooka" rocket. In the first case, four strands of prima cord bundled in rope fashion were securely attached to a rifle grenade and fired with a high angle of elevation. By constructing a crude trough for the "bazooka" rocket, attaching the prima cord securely to the shaft of the rocket, and setting the rocket "off" with a flashlight battery, the four strands were extended into the simulated mine field with a great deal of force, exerting a strong pull on a stake to which the end of a 20 foot length of prima cord was attached. In both cases, the rifle grenade and the rocket, the safety pin was not pulled preventing detonation of either the grenade or the rocket.

Brig General KENDALL, Assistant Division Commander who attended the demonstration, expressed satisfaction with instruction given, recommending that all rifle platoons train and equip men to clear paths with prima cord.

On 6 August 1944, the 351st Combat team assembled at the Regimental theatre (2nd Bn Area) for the presentation of awards and decorations by Major General SLOAN to members of this regiment for feats of bravery and outstanding accomplishment. In his introductory talk to the Combat Team, General SLOAN'S speech had marked signs of optimism and presaged a near end to the Italian campaign.

"We are here to honor our dead" he said, "and we should thank God for his blessings. We want to conclude this war so decisively that American men may never again face these conditions. We must not allow ourselves to be satisfied with the death of Hitler as he is only a figurehead. We must beat the German people; we can not let them surrender. We must lick them so conclusively that they never again can wage war."

General SLOAN encouragingly spoke of the mounting Allied successes on land, sea and in the air, declaring that the Germans are on the run. In addition, he expressed extreme thankfulness for being in command of the 88th Division, particularly the 351st Combat Team which "has never failed to reach its objective."

Upon completion of his speech General SLOAN presented the Legion of Merit for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the regimental commander, Col Arthur S. Champeny, and to the regimental Operations Sgt., M/Sgt Chester A. Post. The Silver Star for gallantry in action was received by Capt Leo Sautter, Company Commander Hq & Hq Co, Capt



George Schaeffer, CO Co "A", 1st Lt Stanton Richart, CO Co "K", Cpl Mills, Co "M", Pvt Rust and Freisinger and Pfc Deay of Hq Co 5d Bn.

Upon the departure of General SLOAN, Colonel Champeny addressed the assemblage. The magnificent accomplishments of the 351st Combat Team in the Italian Campaign were enumerated. Mentioned was the march from Spigno across the mountains to cut the Pico-Itri road, one of the finest marches in military history. The capture of Laiatico was spoken of as the greatest victory of the regiment.

"San Romano was a success well earned," declared the Colonel. "The place was heavily defended—which proves that we can beat the Germans at their own game."

Colonel Champeny took pride in mentioning the high honor bestowed upon the regiment when Major General SLOAN stated to the Secretary of War, Mr STIMSON, that ours was "the best regiment of the best Division in the Army."

The Regimental Commander then meted out well deserved praise to the 915th FA Bn whom he declared was the best Field Artillery Battalion in the army. Co "C", 313th Engr Bn and Co "C" 313th Med Bn were also lauded for their achievements. The 349th Infantry was referred to as "good fighting partners on whom we could count at all times." The famous remark of Sally the German propaganda radio girl—"the 88th is a bunch of blood thirsty cut throats"—was repeated with pride and once more accepted as a great compliment.

Concluding with a note of optimism Colonel Champeny remarked that he felt the coming offensive would be our last in Italy.

After brief instructions by the new Regimental Chaplain, Captain E.B. Hoover, Chaplain, the formation dispersed into three denominational groups. It was with reluctance that the news was received that Chaplain Werts who had served the regiment so loyally and faithfully since its activation, was transferred to Division Headquarters as Assistant Division Chaplain, although all were happy to see him receive the promotion.

At 1330 hours on this date the Regimental S-3 with the Division G-3 met for a discussion of a new plan of attack of the II Corps known as the "Scramble Plan." This plan was based on a presumption that the 8th Army would be able to establish a shallow bridgehead in the vicinity of Florence, flanking the Arno River and causing the Germans to withdraw from its banks northward to the Gothic Line. The Division would execute a contemplated unopposed, or lightly opposed, crossing with a special combat team commanded by Brig General KENDALL, composed of the 549th Infantry Combat Team with additional engineers, tank and tank destroyers attached. The 350th and 351st Infantry Regiments would cross the river abreast, pass through the 349th Infantry at the bridgehead line, and continue northward to secure the Pistoria objective.

The 7th of August found the regiment actively engaged in river crossing exercises. Each battalion had selected a site within its allotted training area

resembling the probable crossing site as nearly as possible. In spite of the fact that very little water existed in the stream beds chosen as training sites, organization commanders used initiative and ingenuity to make the training as realistic as possible. Each battalion had up to this time, accomplished one full scale daylight and one night river crossing exercise, employing all arms normally attached or in support of such an operation. In addition, indoctrination of new men and officers in the division standards continued. Refresher training for both new and old men was given. Discipline and courtesy were emphasized. Physical conditioning continued to be stressed along with the river crossing exercises. Marches over difficult mountainous terrain were being conducted by all organizations daily.

At 0815 hours, Major David H. Sadler, Regimental S-2, Captain Charles D. Edmonson, Assistant S-3 and Captain Sidell, Commanding Officer, Company C, 315th Engineers, departed for further reconnaissance of the forward Regimental Assembly area near the Arno river and terrain study as far as tactical situation would permit, of the banks of the river.

At 1900 hours, the Regimental S-3 attended a conference with the Division G-3 where detailed plans of the Pistoria and "scramble" plans were discussed. Missions, objectives, and boundaries were carefully explained to each Regimental representative. The fact that the 8th Army had not cleared the area to the south banks of the Arno, thereby preventing reconnaissance to the river bank for crossing sites, was discussed in detail. All regimental commanders with two staff officers were ordered to assemble at the Division Command Post of the 2d New Zealand Division, now completing relief of the 8th Indian Division, for a coordination and completion of plans for the river crossing. The 2d New Zealand Division would screen our movement into assembly areas prior to the crossing.

At 0945 hours, Colonel Champeny, Major Hobson, S-3, and Major Sadler, S-2, met Brigadier General Kendall outside the 2d New Zealand Division Command Post for final instructions prior to meeting with the New Zealand Commanders. The fact that the 8th Army had promised to clear the south bank of the Arno was emphasized by General Kendall, with instructions that each Regimental Commander insist that the mission be accomplished as soon as possible.

Representatives of the 85th, 88th and 91st and the 2d New Zealand Divisions then assembled at 1000 hours. Major General Freyberg, Commanding General, 2d New Zealand Division, welcomed all, expressing great pride and satisfaction in being able to work with the American Divisions which had accomplished so much in Italy. Each of his Brigadiers then briefly pointed out the tactical dispositions of their respective Brigades, giving all information known of enemy dispositions. The Division Intelligence Officer revealed that the 26th Panzer and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions were occupying the proposed zone of action of our II Corps.

Brigadier General Kendall, representing our Division Commander, expressed sincere desire that the Germans be cleared from the south bank of the river in our sector, in order that the necessary reconnaissance for crossing sites be made. With the Germans occupying strong points along the railroad track from

1000 meters to 2500 meters south of the river such reconnaissances were an impossibility.

General Freyberg in closing the conference, promised that this mission would be accomplished without further delay and adjourned the meeting after directing that our regimental commanders confer with the Brigadiers occupying their proposed zones of action in order to discuss routes, attack positions, crossing sites, engineer reconnaissances, routes and movement to assembly areas, and plans for thinning out and later relieving New Zealand troops.

In conference with Brigadier Pleasants, Commander 5th New Zealand Brigade and his Brigade Major, Major Judd, such of these points as could be intelligently discussed with available information, were coordinated. Plans for another meeting at 1030 hours the next day, 9 August 1944, were made since the 5th Brigade planned extensive patrolling during the nights of 8/9 August to determine exact enemy strength and dispositions south of the river.

At 0940 hours, this date, Lieutenant Colonel Franklin P. Miller, Commanding Officer, 913th Field Artillery Battalion, visited the command post with the information that his battalion was now in receipt of six new towed 3" guns, a valuable addition to the fire power of his organic 12 105mm howitzers. At 1300 hours, final coordination in assignment of Arno assembly areas were completed with assignments to Captain Nelson, Commanding Officer, Company C, 760th Tank Battalion and Captain Chandler, Commanding Officer, Company C, 804th Tank Battalion (Combat Team attachments).

At 1300 hours, 9 August 1944, 1st Lt. Gillen departed for the Headquarters of the 5th New Zealand Brigade to act as liaison officer with that organization. The 5th New Zealand Brigade now occupied the zone assigned this regiment for the execution of a crossing of the Arno River. Since the Germans had not yet been driven north of the Arno, it was particularly important that this regiment be kept informed of the progress of the New Zealanders in accomplishing this mission in order that our reconnaissance parties could reach the banks of the Arno for reconnaissance of crossing sites.

During the day, the Regimental Commander, Colonel Champeny, and Regimental S-2, Major Sadler, visited the scene of the battle of Laiatico, (terminated 13 July 1944--greatest victory of the regiment). German defensive positions were examined and found to be much more extensively prepared than was ever anticipated--German automatic weapons emplacements were well camouflaged, had extensive observation and fields of fire--some containing overhead cover for gunners. The number of such emplacements was appalling. The victory of the Battle of Laiatico gained magnitude when one examined the extensively prepared German positions and their observation upon our movements as well as the great quantities of abandoned German equipment and materiel.

At 1030 hours 10 August 1944, notification was received that our movement to an assembly area south of the Arno, scheduled to begin 11 August had been delayed one additional day allowing more time to complete final preparations for the river crossing operation.

Upon study of aerial photographs of the zone assigned to the regiment for the river crossing, the banks of the Arno were seen to be steep enough to require a climbing aid. Consequently, the 315th Engr Bn developed several means of negotiating steep banks to facilitate and expedite the movement of troops. These developments were displayed for the Regimental Commander to select those considered desirable. Included in the display was a knotted rope with a grappling hook attached to one end, rope ladders, a steel ladder, and a collapsible wooden ladder. After careful study, it was decided that the rope without the grappling hook would be satisfactory for our use. The other aids were too bulky for use of fast moving infantry assault troops.

On 11 August 1944, the regiment was notified that the movement into the assembly area south of the Arno preparatory to forcing a crossing, had been postponed indefinitely. This order had come from Headquarters Allied Armies of Italy.

At 1145 hours, Lt Gillen, liaison officer with the 5th New Zealand Brigade reported to the Command Post with information that the New Zealanders had pushed forward during the night, eliminated small pockets of enemy resistance and established outpost near the south river bank. Upon receipt of this information, the 3rd Bn S-2, 3rd Bn "Ranger Platoon" leader, and 3rd Bn company executive officers were dispatched with Lt Gillen to the 23rd NZ Bn (5th NZ Bde) to make reconnaissances along the south bank of the Arno, cross the river if possible, and pick possible crossing sites. The New Zealanders would provide necessary protection for these officers to assure that none were captured.

At 1400 hours 12 August, all officers attended an instructing conference and demonstration on "booby traps" given by Capt Sidell, CO Co "C", 315th Engr Bn. Prior to the instruction period, the assembly area was quite well booby-trapped by men of Co. "C", 315th Engr Bn with blasting caps. As a result, as the officers began to take their seats quite a stir was created. After several of the caps had been exploded, it was with great difficulty that Capt Sidell was able to convince the officers that the area was clear for a continuation of the conference.

On 13 August, the regiment was notified to recall all reconnaissance parties from the Arno river. This was done with reluctance on our part due to the fact that the delay in driving the Germans across the river had caused our reconnaissance of the riverline to be incomplete. Major David H. Sedler, S-2, who left earlier in the day to check the progress of the reconnaissances and he himself attempt to cross the river, was ordered at 1700 hours to assemble the parties and return to the command post at Montignoso.

While on patrol on the south bank of the Arno, Lt Alfred Trubehnuch, executive officer of Co "E", stepped on a "Sohn mine." In spite of the fact that he was evacuated at once by New Zealand medical personnel, the effect of the mine was so great that he lost his life.

On 16 August, verbal warning orders were issued by Brig General Kendall that the regiment be prepared to move during the night to previously reconnoitered positions southwest of Empoli. However, training would continue as schedul-

ed since the order at this time was quite indefinite. During the afternoon, the tension was relieved when Colonel McBride, Chief of Staff, called to inform the Regimental Commander that this movement had been postponed several days.

Training continued as directed by Training Manual 19, Headquarters 88th Division with emphasis on mountain training employing mules. Each communication section received practical training in dropping and picking up messages with artillery liaison planes. During the day, Colonel Champeny and Major Sadler again visited the battlefield of Laistico for a further study of that action. The Counter-intelligence Corps detachment attached to the Division G-2 gave lectures during the day to all members of the regiment explaining the functions of the Counter-intelligence Corps and its relation to our combat operations in Italy.

At 0800 hours 18 August 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Walter B. Yeager reported to the Regimental Commander as the new Executive Officer replacing Lieutenant Colonel James H. Drake on rotation. Lieutenant Colonel Yeager is no stranger to this regiment as he commanded our 3rd Battalion from the time of its activation until just prior to our departure overseas. His most recent duty was commander of the 3rd Battalion, 349th Infantry, where he and his battalion made an excellent battle record.

The following directive was received from G-3: the 351st Infantry would 1-remain in present location in 5th Army Reserve, 2-maintain direct liaison with IV Corps, and 3-prepare to repel any enemy offensive action in IV Corps sector—plans for such action to be prepared in coordination with IV Corps.

Major Hobson, S-3, and Lt Thomas, Liaison Officer, departed for the IV Corps Command Post where plans for the regiment under this new directive were discussed with the IV Corps G-3, Colonel Harrison. Three possible locations of enemy thrusts were designated by Colonel Harrison as places upon which counter-attack plans would be based. Lt Thomas remained at the Corps Command Post for direct liaison with this regiment.

On 17 August 1944, all men of the regiment enthusiastically received a press release to newspapers at home giving the Italian battle history of the 351st Infantry—the first regiment in Italy to receive such a distinction. "The 351st Infantry Regiment," the release read, "commanded by Colonel Arthur S. Champeny, of Wellington, Kansas, is one of General Clark's Fifth Army units that played a major part in the recent offensive which drove the Germans from the Garigliano to the Arno River, it was revealed today.

Part of the 88th Infantry Division, the first selective service infantry division to come overseas in World War II, the 351st was the first element of that division to enter combat. Its 2d Battalion was initially committed in the Cassino area during the latter part of February. Early in March, the entire regiment went into line in the Minturno-Tufo sector. Its most recent action was the capture of San Romano and adjacent high ground south of the Arno, battles which except for a brief rest period culminated almost continuous marching or combat from the Garigliano.

From March until 11 May, the 351st conducted aggressive patrolling in the Minturno sector. It participated in the great Fifth Army assault of 11 May, and three days later it had taken the important objective of Santa Maria Infante, a key enemy bastion.

Swinging west from that point, the regiment seized Mount La Civita the following morning in an overland movement so swift that an entire German mountain artillery battery and mule train were captured. The mules were utilized by the 351st in carrying supplies in the subsequent action which found the regiment operating in some of the most rugged terrain in Fifth Army's sector.

Fighting through mountains, the 351st as part of the 88th Division cut the Itri-Pico road, a vital enemy lateral link, and later seized the town of Itri after a brisk fight. Continuing as part of the Fifth Army's advance over the mountains, the regiment next seized Mount Passignano. It now had its first rest—three days as Corps reserve.

It then relieved a regiment of an adjacent division, and cleaned out patrols and pockets of resistance which were harassing the left flank of Fifth Army's French forces in the Sezze area.

This was followed by a motor movement to Nettuno where the regiment was held in Army reserve. Incidentally, this was the unit's first motor movement since the start of the offensive. Its fighting had been in rugged terrain, typical mountain warfare, with the infantry marching on foot all the way.

The stay at Nettuno was brief, merely a matter of hours, and the 351st relieved another infantry regiment, and with other units, was given the mission of cutting Highway 6 east of Collona. It accomplished this with the same dispatch that had characterized all of its action, and headed west for Rome. Passing through Rome, the 88th Division with the 351st in the lead continued its northward advance, and on 5 June, the regiment severed an important enemy lateral road some fifteen miles north of the Eternal City. The 2d and 3d battalions were then attached to two task forces.

The 351st Infantry Regiment went into a rest area south of Rome about the middle of June, and early in July was inspected by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson during his visit to Fifth Army.

Returning to combat in the Montecatini sector on 7 July, the 351st took up its efficient defeat and pursuit of the enemy. It won a singular victory at Laistico on 15 July. Here, in a well executed night attack, the regiment wrested the key defensive position from the enemy, capturing 400 prisoners in the process.

From there, the regiment as part of the division fought its way north, participating in the capturing of Montecchio. On 16 July, it took Montefoscoli, and the following day, Partino fell. One after another, villages and terrain features in the 351st's sector were taken. The capture of San Romano on 25 July, after bitter street and house-to-house fighting, brought the regiment along with other Fifth Army troops, to the south bank of the Arno River.

In addition to being the division's first regiment to enter combat, the 351st was it first regiment to arrive overseas, the first to arrive in Italy, the first to have a DSC awarded, and the first to receive a battle-field promotion.

Colonel Champeny, the regiment's aggressive commander, graduated from Washburn College, Topeka, Kansas. He served overseas in the first World War, during which he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, Legion of Honor and Croix de Guerre.

As a result of his outstanding service in the present campaign, he has been awarded a cluster to the Distinguished Service Cross, Legion of Merit, Croix de Guerre, and has received the Purple Heart and two clusters.

He joined the 351st Infantry Regiment at Camp Gruber, Oklahoma, on 25 July 1942. Exactly two years later the regiment captured San Romano.

Colonel Champeny's foreign service included a tour of duty in China where he served under General Stilwell. He also served in Hawaii as assistant deputy chief of staff to Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons, commanding the Hawaiian Department. Colonel Champeny was at Schofield Barracks when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor."

On the 24th of August 1944, because of the unfortunate illness of Major General Sloan, Brigadier General Kendall, Assistant Division Commander, assumed command of the 88th Division. The loss of General Sloan was regretted by all. He had been the Division Commander since the activation of the 88th Division at Camp Gruber, July 15, 1942, and his brilliant and enthusiastic leadership contributed greatly to the high standard of efficiency and to the many successes of this division.

Having Brigadier General Kendall as the new Division Commander was welcomed by all officers and men of this regiment, for he had gained the reputation of being a "fighting, front line General". In the most serious situations, General Kendall always appeared in the front line and was a great source of encouragement to all.

On 25 August 1944, a new training memorandum from Division Headquarters was received. New training hours were specified—morning training from 0730-1130, and afternoon training 1530-1630 hours. Supervised athletics could be scheduled the last two hours of the day. When scheduled, athletics would be fully organized and would provide for participation of all personnel available.

During the week beginning 28 August, each Infantry battalion would conduct a battalion mountain combat team problem of 24 hours duration. All supply during the course of the problem would be by rations and pack board. In these problems battalion commanders would experiment on organization of "stream-lined" battalion mountain combat teams giving consideration to what personnel and equipment could be spared in mountain operations in order to reduce supply problems.

On 27 August 1944, the regiment together with the attached Italian Pack Mule Co assembled on the 1st Battalion ball park for a retreat parade—the first since arrival overseas. The 29-piece Japanese band of the 44th Japanese Regiment provided music for the occasion. Brigadier General Kendall, recently designated as Division Commander of the 88th Division during the



sickness of Major General Sloan was the principal guest. General Kendall stated that the smartness, snap, and precision of our soldiers was excellent. He was especially pleased with the enthusiasm and fine military appearance of the Italian Pack Mule Company.

At 1400 hours 26 August, Colonel Champeny and Major Hobson attended a meeting at Division Headquarters with the new Division Commander, Brigadier General Kendall. The new Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Ramey, was introduced to all present. In his opening remarks, General Kendall stated that it was his aim to maintain the standards and reputation of the 88th Infantry Division. Improvement in saluting, discipline, and wearing of the uniform were stressed. Particular attention would be given to anti-malaria control as nine new malaria cases within the division had been reported. Referring to a map, General Kendall explained briefly the II Corps Bologna Plan of attack in which the 91st Division and the 34th Division on the left would attack with a line of departure across the Arno river east of Florence. The 88th Division would follow the 91st Division in the attack and be prepared to pass through and continue the attack. II Corps had been placed on a 96 hour alert by Headquarters Allied Armies of Italy. Major General Keyes, II Corps Commander, had stated that the watchwords for the coming offensive would be speed, aggressiveness, maneuver, and smooth passage of lines. No strongpoints would be attacked frontally but would be flanked or by-passed.

General Kendall concluded his meeting with a warning to all that Florence was "off limits" except to those holding passes issued by II Corps Provost Marshal. If and when the Division passed through Florence, no command post or installations of any sort would be established therein.

On 30 August 1944, Brigadier General Ramey, Assistant Division Commander, spent the day with the Regiment, visiting all battalions to inspect training. Company problems and battle drill were observed in the 2nd Battalion area. The 1st Battalion was observed as it departed at 1300 hours for a 24 hour battalion problem being conducted over mountainous terrain between our present location and Mt Nero. This problem was written so that contact with the enemy out post line would be made one hour before darkness with a continuation of the attack no earlier than one hour before daylight. Resupply of troops would be entirely by mule. Radio silence would be maintained and wire would be carried by mule. Between 1700 and 1800 an artillery liaison plane would drop and pick up messages from the battalion. The enemy detail consisted of Co "C" 51st Engrs, who would use blank ammunition and explosive charges extensively to enhance the tactical realism of the problem.

At 1900 hours this date, Lt Thomas, Liaison Officer with IV Corps, reported to the Command Post with Field Order #8, Headquarters IV Corps. Under this order IV Corps would follow up an enemy withdrawal at any time after a II Corps attack, cross the Arno river, capture Pisa, secure Corps phase line running generally eastward through Pisa, and protect the left flank of the 5th Army. D Day and H Hour would be announced 24 hours in advance.

At this time, from the United States, was received a copy of a press release written by Eve Curie, daughter of the prominent French scientist, Madame Curie, who had visited our combat command post during the July offensive. Although this article was delayed in reaching the regiment, it was received with interest and enthusiasm. "I am back from a visit to our American neighbors of the 88th Division, Lieutenant Curie of the Volontaires Francaises wrote, "which has been fighting for so many weeks on the left flank of the French Corps. From French Headquarters to the American sector, the distance is not great. For some reason, however, one seldom takes those lateral trips behind lines, unless one has a liaison mission to perform. Going to an Allied division's territory, to the right or to the left, is like travelling to a foreign land."

"We reached the command post of the regiment installed a few hours before, and for a few hours previous to that in a half-demolished house. With the colonel and the younger members of his staff, was Major General John E. Sloan himself. A short, wiry divisional commander whose sunburnt face and light, amazingly keen eyes immediately suggest dynamic action. He stood on the balcony of this excellent observation post."

"He looked through field glasses at the villages of Partino and Palaia on a hill facing us. They were only recently in American hands. Groups of enemy snipers still infested the slopes that were being cleaned up by one of the battalions. I stood there motionless with the two French correspondents whom I had brought with me on this trip. Having finished what he had to do, the general took off his helmet and his glasses. Meantime, somebody had told him my name.

"At once he greeted me charmingly in his quick, animated manner. 'Hello, welcome to you—I am glad to see you here. So you French came to visit the old 88th? You know, we like to think of ourselves as "American Goums" --because of the historical march of ours, across mountains in the first days of the May offensive. People said we couldn't make it. We did.' Before leaving the room, he added: 'Go and see my regimental commanders. They are the finest officers I know. Talk to them. Ask them what they think of the French. No, you cannot get to the battalion positions--not by daylight, at least. The going is hard, the Germans are putting up a stiff resistance. Come dine with me at headquarters after you are through.' "

"Without taking off the thick coat of dust that covered our faces, which whitened our hair and eyelids, we had a quick lunch with Colonel Arthur S. Champeny of Wellington, Kansas, who commands a regiment. A veteran of the last war, he won the Legion of Honor in France on the Vosges battlefields. This strong, quiet man has been with his division since it was reactivated July 15, 1942."

"A few more miles on the road and we stopped at a house in another Italian village. In a dilapidated room, the command post of the regiment, five men in tired uniforms, carry on a quiet, attentive conversation. One of them who bends over a map is Lieutenant Colonel Joseph B. Crawford, the youngest colonel of this division. He is entirely concentrated on his task. He looks like a student. But he is also a strong fellow who can march twenty miles without being tired, work nights, and go without food. Before coming to this division, he got the Distinguished Service Cross from President Roosevelt for his achievements in the Tunisian campaign."

"His regiment is the one which protected the left flank of the French Corps from May 21 to May 29 during the difficult progression across Mounts Ausoni and Lepini. In the boldly advanced positions, they had to win together or fail together. They won."

"We have learned many things from the French," he said. "For instance, we learned to use artillery power en masse; also how to progress in very rough country and to fight always on the heights." There is not much time, however, for conversation. There is fighting to be done this day. The colonel calls one of his

battalion commanders on his field telephone as we slip out."

"Our jeep covers one more mile. Now we are with another regiment, one that fought alongside the French at the start of the Garigliano offensive. The reception we receive at this command post gives me an idea of what my two French friends and myself must look like under our crust of dust. As we enter the house, one-third of which was annihilated a few hours ago by a shell that killed one officer and wounded three enlisted men, somebody looks at us with interest and says: 'Are these the three German prisoners?'.


"When we say 'No', we feel there is a genuine disappointment among these Americans who were eagerly awaiting freshly captured prisoners of war to collect valuable information. They had expected enemies and we were only friends."

"Colonel George C. Fry, who was out on reconnaissance, then entered the command post. He talked with us awhile, sipping coffee and munching green prunes. We heard of Monte Calvo where the battalions were attacked on the flanks, where rations, medical supplies, ammunition, had to be dropped by parachutes; the colonel gave us figures of casualties—heavy ones—and told us of the amazing width of fronts that at times this regiment had to hold by itself."

"And he spoke of the French in direct words indeed." "Why do I like fighting with the French? I will tell you. Because they are always there. When I am told they will advance up to such and such a line, on my right, I just know they will get to that line at the assigned time. I don't have to worry for my own doughboys. There is nobody I would rather fight with, than your people!"

"It just so happens that I spent the last few days with Moroccan troops and with Tabors' Moroccan Goums—with the very officers and men who fought alongside General Sloan's 88th. It can be said in complete truth that the prodigious march of the 88th from Garigliano to Rome to Volterra, is something which has filled with respect, everybody in the French Expeditionary Corps. Our liaison officers with the 88th keep on mentioning the American outfit as "their division"."

This month spent in the hills of Tuscany, south of Florence, was of great value to the men of the regiment. The officers and men were rested, morale was excellent, and the "fighting spirit of the 351st Infantry" had returned to the battle weary veterans and was instilled in the new replacements. The training program was extensive and valuable. The 351st Infantry was ready and anxious to join the offensive to annihilate the German Armies of Italy.


ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY
Colonel, 351st Infantry
Commanding.

Authority NMD 735017
By MWJ NARA Date 4/25/00

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HEADQUARTERS 351ST INFANTRY
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 88

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* Date - 18 Nov 1944
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**CLASSIFICATION
CANCELLED**

8 October 1944

**BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE**

HISTORY OF THE 351ST INFANTRY REGIMENT FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1944.

In early September training and rehabilitation continued uninterrupted; and the program for recreation was effective and enjoyable to all ranks. Many officers and men visited Rome since the regiment arrived in this area. The morale is high. The regiment had an ample period in which to lick its wounds. Once again we are refreshed and battle ready. There is discernable an attitude of self-confidence: We can meet and defeat the enemy--on our own terms.

Rumors have been indicating a resumption of large scale offensive operations in the near future and reversion from Army to Divisional control on 5 September 1944 predicts our participation. Upon the receipt of a Division warning order at 1242 hours 6 September 1944, the Operations Section prepared movement plans to a forward area in the vicinity of GALLUZZO, several miles southeast of FLORENCE. Heavy rains delayed the movement which was not completed until noon, 9 September 1944. Several days were spent arranging camp in the new area.

Our bivouac in the Florentine Hills overlooking the art-famed city of FLORENCE in the ARNO VALLEY was indeed delightful. Cool breezes and the shade of pine and olive trees made the days more pleasant. However, the countryside had not escaped the path of battle, and there are many evidences of the fighting leading to the liberation of FLORENCE. Many villas are scarred and partially destroyed by shell fire. Here and there German and British graves could be found amongst the vineyards.

Salerno Day, 9 September 1944, was honored with a regimental formation at 1730 hours. The Army Commander's Order of the Day, (7 September 1944) briefly tracing the valorous operations of the 5th Army Troops including the Salerno Landing, Naples, Crossing of the Volturno, Anzio, and Rome was read to the assembled regiment. At this time, a Distinguished Service Cross Decoration was awarded to First Sergeant Paul N Eddy of Company "F", 351st Infantry. The Division Commander, Brigadier General PAUL W KENDALL, spoke to the regiment commending its praiseworthy conduct in battle and its outstanding record: "Six of the seven Distinguished Service Crosses awarded in the 88th Division have been presented to members of this regiment"--an indisputable testimonial. In conclusion, Colonel Arthur S Champeny, Regimental Commander, addressed his officers and men reiterating the brave achievements for which we are justly entitled to be proud and which will spur us on to greater victories.

A meeting of unit commanders with General KENDALL was held at 1700 hours, 10 September 1944, during which the operations of the American II Corps in its newly started drive to the north were discussed in detail. The 1, 2, 3, and 4 staff sections of Division Headquarters presented their respective elements of

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information. In addition to the II C corps plan, the Dutchess Plan or Exploitation Plan, was discussed. The Italian order of battle was revealed to be: from right to left, British 8th Army, American II Corps, and American IV C corps. Within the II C corps sector, from right to left were the 85th, 91st, and 34th Divisions. The 88th Division was initially placed in Corps reserve. The two missions of the II Corps were emphasized:

"1) Move boldly and rapidly with multiple columns across the APPENINES, capture BOLOGNA and MODENA, and secure crossings over the PO RIVER in the vicinity of S ERMIDE and OS TIGLIA.

2) Be prepared for further operations in the PO VALLEY to capture VERONA, BRESCIA, CREMONA, and MILANO."

The 88th Division had the mission (FO #8, dated 7 September 1944):

"1) Initially in Corps Reserve in assembly area prepared to move on six hours notice.

2) Displaces forward on short notice prepared to pass through an assault division with troops especially equipped for mountain operations to continue advance with maximum speed."

The terrain to the north, within the C corps sector, is traversed by the APPENINE MOUNTAINS, a range running northwest and southeast between the valleys of the PO and ARNO RIVERS, whose courses are generally parallel, with the PO emptying into the ADRIATIC and the ARNO flowing west into the TYRRHENIAN. The city of FLORENCE is on the ARNO, and BOLOGNA, situated in the southern foothills of the PO VALLEY, is some eighty airline kilometers to the north. Highways to the north are few, No 65 being the best and most direct route from FLORENCE to BOLOGNA. A scarcity of lateral highways add to the problems of supply. The watershed crest of the APPENINES runs northwest and southeast and cuts Highway 65 approximately half the distance from FLORENCE to BOLOGNA. At this point, known as the FUTA PASS, is located the central anchor of the GOTHIC or PISA-RIMINI LINE.

Training in the reserve position south of FLORENCE was in accordance with Training Memo #22, Headquarters 88th Infantry Division, dated 7 September 1944. Training of the individual soldier was stressed and a high standard of physical conditioning maintained by daily cross country marches. A night problem was held on the night of 15 September 1944, devoting periods of several hours duration to individual, squad, platoon, and company night training.

Fierce and furious assaults by the II Corps finally secured a route through the main GOTHIC LINE positions coincident with the seizure of the commanding features MOUNT ALTUZZO and MOUNT FRENA, the latter having been taken 20 September 1944. Elements of the 85th Division reached the town of FIRENZUOLA. Several days prior to these gains, the 88th Division began moving north to assembly areas. The 350th RCT moved to SAN PIERO on 16 September 1944 and was temporarily placed under 85th Division control. The 349th RCT was also alerted and moved to an assembly area north of the SIEVE RIVER. At the time a new plan of attack employing the 356th and 349th regiments under 88th Division control to attack through elements of the 85th Division from the line MONTECELLI-ALTUZZO was received from II Corps. This attack was to jump off early 19 September 1944. However, an improvement in the progress of the 85th Division delayed the plan.

The 351st Infantry moved to an area in the vicinity of SCARPERIA on the 20th of September 1944 and on the following day, a reconnaissance party under Lt. Col. Walter B. Yeager, Regimental Executive Officer, went forward to select forward assembly areas in the vicinity of MOUNT FRENA, located three kilometers southeast of the town of FIRENZUOLA. In the meantime, the 350th Infantry was passing through the 337th Infantry, two kilometers to the east to continue the advance northeast and the 349th Infantry was in movement to the left adjacent zone. By the 22d September 1944, the 351st Infantry had moved again and was on the reverse slopes of MOUNT FRENA.

Appropos at this time would be a brief description of the terrain in this part of Italy and the ground that must be traversed in the 88th Division zone of action. Forty-two airline kilometers north of FIRENZUOLA is BOLOGNA, main supply hub of the Wehrmacht in Italy. Highway 9, running southeast from BOLOGNA, leads to IMOLA and eventually RIMINI, eastern anchor of the GOTHIC LINE, but now in the hands of the British 8th Army. IMOLA is approximately forty-five kilometers northeast of FIRENZUOLA and is connected with that town by a fairly good, hard-surfaced highway. Commanding heights running northeast on the south of the highway are: RONCACCIO, 1044 meters; FAGGIOLA, 1031 meters; CARNEVALE, 711 meters; MOUNT CAPPELLO, 589 meters; BATTAGLIA, 715 meters. North of the highway are: COLORETTA, 970 meters; IL SASSO, 856 meters; PRATOLUNGO, 802 meters; and PUNTA DELLE ARE, 662 meters. The sizeable towns along the FIRENZUOLA-IMOLA Highway are CASTEL DEL RIO, FONTANELICE, and TOSSIGNANO, the latter being fourteen kilometers from IMOLA. From TOSSIGNANO to IMOLA the country prepares itself to meet the PO VALLEY. The mountains diminish and the small valleys broaden out; until, arriving at IMOLA, the terrain is part of the vast flat floor of the PO VALLEY. The mountains through which the regiment must operate are abruptly rising and precipitous, crossed only by a few tortuous mule trails. In many places the canyons are vertically walled and insurmountable. Circuitous routes afford the only means of advance. For this reason, the terrain lends itself heavily in favor of the defender. Many of these barriers need not be occupied by the enemy. Consequently, only the approaches require defensive organization. These positions are correctly labeled strongpoints and have a large proportion of emplaced automatic weapons. Flanking the approaches, well concealed snipers hinder and harass advancing columns, frequently requiring deployment and the resultant slowing down of our assaults on main positions. Precise registration by mortars and artillery on these approaches, causes further delay. This is true mountain warfare.

At 0735 hours, 23 September, the 351st Infantry was ordered to prepare itself to pass through the 349th Infantry on the Division left, on the night of the 23rd. The 349th Infantry was meeting stubborn resistance and receiving a number of casualties from mortar and artillery fire. With the 350th Infantry, the advance was slowed down by machine gun and sniper fire. However, the two leading regiments continued to advance until the necessary wide deployment of the 349th Infantry weakened the impetus of its assaults and made imperative the commitment of fresh troops if the advance was to be continued. This situation found the 351st Infantry in the vicinity of CAMAGGIORE some seven miles northeast of FIRENZUOLA. The 3d battalion was on the high ground north of the highway, the 2d battalion was on the south side, and the 1st battalion nearer the bottom of the gorge and within five hundred yards of CAMAGGIORE, where the regimental command post was located. Further information arrived at 1300 hours directing the regiment to move around the right of the 349th Infantry and continue the attack without pause. Later in the afternoon, Colonel Champeny issued his attack order to the battalion

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commanders at the forward command post. "H" hour was designated as 1800 hours with the 3d battalion on the left, 2d battalion on the right, and the 1st battalion following. The highway would be the boundary between battalions. One company from the 1st battalion would advance generally along the highway. It was only a short while after the conclusion of this conference that a concentration of approximately twenty-five rounds estimated to be medium artillery landed in the command post area wounding two men and killing 1st Lt Bernard M Moynahan, 3d battalion Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon leader, who was some fifty yards down the road.

By 1935 hours both assault battalions had made excellent progress. The 3d battalion had advanced almost 2000 yards meeting light artillery fire. The 2d on the right covered 1500 yards and ran into a machine gun that was quickly put out of action; however, a short while later, "F" Company had a sharp encounter with four machine guns, which they by-passed. By midnight both battalions had gained an additional 1000 yards. The 2d battalion contacted elements of the 1st battalion, 349th Infantry while Company "E" captured five Germans. Meanwhile Company "C" advancing up the highway had several brisk encounters and received small arms and self-propelled artillery fire. At 0340 hours, the twelve man patrol preceding Company "C" became involved in a scramble near a bridge and three men were wounded.

Daylight found both battalions and "C" Company with substantial gains. The 3d had advanced an additional 2000 yards and the 2d was 2500 yards further ahead. Company "C" was 1500 yards further up the road.

Progress became increasingly difficult as the day wore on. Early in the afternoon the 3d battalion received a vicious counterattack. On the right "C" Company had almost come to a standstill. In addition to determined resistance the battalions were receiving unusually heavy mortar and artillery bombardments. Several self-propelled guns further up the valley were particularly active and were silenced after heavy counter-battery fire was brought on them. Two tanks were sent up to support "C" Company by fire at 1500 hours. The 1st battalion still in reserve, continued to follow the 2d battalion and encountered only artillery fire with the exception of one sniper, who shot and killed 2d Lt Charles L Kennedy of Company "A".

So bitterly did the Germans fight that the 351st gained little ground by nightfall. The 3d battalion was somewhat disorganized after the counterattack it had received earlier and darkness found them reorganizing on the ground they now held. The 2d battalion was shifting slightly to ground that offered better cover. Company "C" was ordered to hold, and Company "A" moved out at 2115 hours to pass through them and attack the village of MORADUCCIO. Several machine guns in the town were very difficult to silence, and it was not until early in the morning that the town was mopped up. The 2d and 3d battalions resupplied during the night and were ordered to continue the attack at 0300 hours.

By 0715 hours the 3d battalion had advanced slowly, but the battalion commander and "K" Company were not definitely located. All of this advance was made under artillery and machine gun fire. During the early morning of September 25th, it was learned that "K" Company had run into heavy cross fire from well emplaced German machine guns. The extremely heavy fire coupled with the surprise effect created confusion among the men of Company "K" causing them to become wide-

ly dispersed and disorganized. Lt. Colonel Charles P. Furr, seeing that the battalion column was becoming disorganized, moved up with K Company to rectify the situation and it was this devotion to duty that resulted in his untimely death. Rather than slow the advance and lose the initiative, he took personal command. From Private Rickenbacker of Company K, the following information was received. "Colonel Furr was leading. I was the third man in the column. We were moving down a small nose. In front of us, a curved ridge extended around both sides of the nose we were on. Colonel Furr turned left, while a platoon of K Company continued to move down the nose. I thought the Colonel must want to see if there was anyone on the left flank. A German stuck his head up and threw a grenade at the Colonel. It hit the right side of his helmet and exploded at the same time. The Colonel fell with a very bad wound in his right temple." Meanwhile, Captain Stanton D. Richart, Company Commander, K Company, who was with the platoon that had moved down in the draw, received heavy machine gun fire from both flanks and the front. Many were wounded, including Captain Richart and before the remainder of the platoon could extricate itself, the Germans launched an assault and captured several men, including Captain Richart.

The loss of Lt. Col. Charles P. Furr is an irreparable blow to the regiment. In the eyes of all in the regiment, he not only proved to be the most promising leader, but also, he achieved a position that won him the genuine respect of all. He has been with the regiment since its activation on 15 July 1942, at Camp Gruber, Oklahoma. It can be said without reservation that in all things, attention to duty, loyalty to his men, cheerful acceptance of responsibilities, fearless leadership, he excelled.

At 1050 hours, Major Harold B. Ayres, now commanding the 3d battalion, notified regiment that the battalion was being counterattacked. This counterattack was reported to be of battalion strength. It was repulsed with determined fighting and artillery fire by 1355 hours. One platoon of K Company was dislodged; but all other positions remained tenable.

Lt. Col. Walter B. Yeager and Captain Edwin H. Marks, Jr. left the regimental command post early in the afternoon to join the 3d battalion. Arriving there, Colonel Yeager assumed command and reorganized the battalion. Colonel Champeny ordered the battalion to rest, resupply and resume the attack at 0600 hours on the morning of the 26th.

The 2d battalion making better progress, moved ahead a good 1200 yards during the day, and reported "resistance light". Continuation of the attack was ordered for 0600 hours the next morning and an objective approximately 1000 yards south-east of the town of CASTEL DEL RIO was assigned to them. Company C had shoved well ahead and at 0255 hours was located to the left and approximately 800 yards beyond the 2d battalion.

CASTEL DEL RIO was the regimental objective and is worthy of a few remarks. It was here that the 132d German Infantry, commanded by Major Leitner, had its command post located in a castle from which the town derives its name. The present castle, situated in the north central part of the town, dates back to the 16th century and was built by one Caesar Alidosi, a direct descendant of Cardinal Alidosi. The castle in the form of a square with four castellated towers at the corners, rises five stories and the walls between the towers are fitted with battlements having small firing slits approximately four inches wide and twelve inches high. This castle was selected for the regimental command post and the massiveness of the walls were a welcome sight to the command group when they later

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moved in; especially was the protection afforded appreciate which the command post had been located, the day before, received three direct hits from 105mm, or larger, artillery fire, caving in the roof. Colonel Champeny, Major Hobson, Major Sadler, and several liaison officers, narrowly escaped injury or death. As it was, all were shaken up and a new command post was set up immediately, 500 yards away.

The plan for the capture of CASTEL DEL RIO specified that the 3d battalion move up along the high ground on the left and assault the town from the west. Company C would endeavor to enter the town from the south. Prior to 0600 hours, 27 September, the time set for the attack, the 3d battalion was 1000 yards southwest of the town. Company C was in the southern outskirts, and the 2d battalion was east and slightly south of the town. At 0700 hours, after moving all during the night, the 3d battalion succeeded in getting one company in the northern part of town in the vicinity of the castle. The enemy had well-located machine guns, covering all approaches. Company C was unable to advance in the face of several machine guns firing south along the main road. At 0730 hours, the Division Commander, Brigadier General KENDALL, issued the following directive to the Regimental Commander: "3d battalion will take MOUNT MAGNOLA and continue advance in Division left sector, left of the road. 2d battalion will take MOUNT GAUSTETO, continue to MOUNT CAPPELLO and be prepared to continue advance in old sector on right of road. This regiment would protect the Division left flank. Must move ahead with all possible speed to clear route for 349th Infantry to cut across our rear and take over our abandoned zone." Suddenly, all organized resistance in CASTEL DEL RIO was liquidated and town captured by 0910 hours; however, for the remainder of the day, the Germans gave the town heavy shellings. It might be mentioned that Colonel CHAMPENY called for an air mission on CASTEL DEL RIO the day before it fell, obtaining excellent results which were verified when the command group entered the town. Major General GEOFFREY KEYES, II Corps Commander, and Brigadier General PAUL W. KENDALL, both sent congratulations to the 351st Infantry for the capture of CASTEL DEL RIO.

Company C was moved from the town and at 1500 hours, reached a position approximately 1000 yards east of the town. The 1st battalion moved to an assembly area in this vicinity, while the 2d and 3d battalions continued the attack, meeting stiff resistance. Second Lt. Amos C. Raley, of Company D, was killed when the 1st battalion received a shelling in their reserve position.

The new objectives for the 2d battalion were designated as MOUNT GAUSTETO and MOUNT CAPPELLO. Company C would move north, along the road as the 2d and 3d battalions moved to their objectives. By 1515 hours, the company had secured high ground 1200 yards northeast of CASTEL DEL RIO. The 3d battalion aggressively seized MOUNT MAGNOLA and at 1430 hours were 1000 yards northeast of that hill mass.

The battle for MOUNT CAPPELLO ends the history for the month of September 1944. It lasted for two days and turned out to be a very bitter struggle between German soldiers who would not withdraw and American soldiers who refused to be stopped. The bayonet was used, and Captain Frank W. Carmon of the 1st Battalion, personally saw an unknown Private of Company A, kill a German with the bayonet on MOUNT CAPPELLO.

MOUNT CAPPELLO is 3000 yards east-north-east of CASTEL DEL RIO. The Italian word "cappello" means hat. Between the town and this feature, there are two ridge lines running northwest. The second ridge line from the town is the higher of the two. CAPPELLO itself, is almost a ridge line running north and south and slightly to the east at the northern extremity. There is a slight saddle effect and the Germans set up a line consisting of about twenty-five riflemen and ten or twelve machine guns just below this saddle.

The 1st battalion was ordered to occupy MOUNT GAUSTETO while the 2d battalion attacked MOUNT CAPPELLO. The attack was launched at 0845 hours, September 29th. Lt. Col. YEAGER was dispatched to the 2d battalion to assist the battalion commander. By 1335 hours, the 2d battalion reached a draw 800 yards southwest of CAPPELLO. At 1340 hours, the Division Commander sent the following message: "Exert all effort with White. CAPPELLO must be taken. Red probably cannot be used." In the meantime, Lt. Colonel YEAGER had joined the 2d battalion and at 1417 hours made the following report: "Making steady progress—do not think I'll need the other family." However, at 1545 hours, the fight had become so fierce that one company from the 1st battalion was requested to assist the 2d battalion. As dusk approached, Lt. Colonel YEAGER reconsidered this request for aid, changing from a request of one company, to a request for use of the 1st battalion, less Company C. General KENDALL after much consideration, granted the request, stipulating that MOUNT CAPPELLO must be taken on this night. For the attack, the 1st battalion, less Company C was moved to the right of the 2d battalion, in a wide enveloping move, in an attempt to flank and surprise the enemy. The 2d battalion was receiving heavy resistance from mortar fire, while six machine guns were holding up Company A. Initially, the advance of the 1st battalion was rapid; the leading elements reaching a point forty to fifty yards from the top of MOUNT CAPPELLO by daylight. Here a fierce fight ensued. One soldier stated: "The Germans would assault with a deployed squad and with two or three machine guns on its flank. These guns would cover their own displacement. While one gun was firing, another would advance almost in the lane of fire, set up, and open fire." In the meantime, neither the 2d battalion nor Company B, could gain ground. At 0532 hours, early in the morning of the 30th September, Lt. Col. YEAGER put Major Williams, CO, 1st Battalion, in command of Company A, and Captain Carmon, Executive Officer, in command of Company B. Within the 2d battalion, the battalion headquarters company was employed as riflemen to increase the depleting fighting strength. All morning the two battalions hammered away in the face of heavy mortar barrages and small arms fire. At 1250 hours, the first encouraging news came from Lt. Colonel YEAGER: "We are proceeding ahead slowly." For three more hours, the fight did not diminish in intensity. Finally at 1536 hours, Lt. Colonel YEAGER sent the message: "MOUNT CAPPELLO taken by 1st and 2d battalions." The fighting did not end here; it had only shifted in such a way that the 1st and 2d battalions were now on their objectives. This continued for another hour, until the last German had been killed. Colonel Champeny ordered the battalions to hold MOUNT CAPPELLO at all costs. The congratulations of the Corps Commander to the Regiment, for the capture of MOUNT CAPPELLO, were phoned to Colonel CHAMPENY by General KENDALL, who added his commendation for the fine work of the regiment in this operation.

There were many acts of heroism in this action. Captain GEORGE D. SCHAFFER, CO of Company A, fearlessly knocked out a machine gun nest with a hand grenade and then killed the two gunners with his carbine as they attempted to run to a secondary emplacement. This enabled his handful of remaining men to assault the position.


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Authority NMD 7350P7

By W.D.J. NARA Date 4/25/00

First Lieutenant FOSTER C. BURCH of Company H, was killed by a mortar shell landing near the 2d battalion command post on the morning of the 30th September 1944. It was not known until later, that Lt. Colonel YEAGER was wounded by this same shell, but he refused to be evacuated. With the 3d battalion, Second Lieutenant George F. Sesselmann of I Company was killed the day before.

In spite of fanatical German resistance, mud, rain, and mountains, the 351st Infantry Regiment continues to advance towards the valley of the PO; no obstacle, no hardship, no resistance has broken the regiments will to win and the desire to annihilate the enemy.


ARTHUR E. CHAMPENY
Colonel, 351st Infantry
Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS 351ST INFANTRY
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 88

6 December 1944.

HISTORY OF THE 351ST INFANTRY REGIMENT FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 1944.

November's history consists of two periods; the first, a week of rest and rehabilitation at Montecatini Terme; the second, back in the lines again, occupying defensive positions east of Livergnano and southeast of Bologna. Throughout October and part of September for a total of thirty-nine days the Regiment had been in continuous action against the enemy. The increasingly adverse weather and the savagely stubborn resistance of the enemy finally brought the impetus of our attacks to a standstill. At the farthest point of our advance within the division zone of action the 351st Infantry had reached nearest to the Po Valley and with the subsequent stabilization of positions this regiment occupied ground nearer to Highway 9 than any other unit in the 5th Army. Although the unit suffered more heavily in casualties than ever before, and, despite appalling weather conditions, the 351st Infantry Regiment has added another chapter to its splendid and spectacular record of "long continued aggressive combat against the enemy" as stated by the Corps Commander in a message of congratulations to Colonel Arthur S. Champeny, Regimental Commander.

Upon receipt of relief orders on 30 October 1944, the situation was as follows: The 1st Battalion held ground in the vicinity of Hill 435 (003301); the 3d Battalion secured ground in the vicinity of Parr le Tombe (999272) and Mt. Trebbo (999376), while the 2d Battalion was in a forward assembly area in the vicinity of Colanco (977279). The mission of the regiment was to secure and hold. Fire plans were developed and plans for repulsing a counterattack were formulated. The 1st Battalion would remain attached to the 362d RCT.

With memories of Castel del Rio, Gesso, and Vedriano still fresh, the regiment, less the 1st Battalion, slowly and laboriously made its way over the quagmire roads to Montecatini Terme, but at the end of this trek were baths and clean clothes, entertainment -- and easier breathing.

Montecatini Terme was a quiet little town. Being a German hospital center the town was untouched with the exception of the railroad station. The people were for the most part, well-kept and well fed. Montecatini, approximately twenty-five miles west of Florence, was formerly a summer resort famed for its sulphur baths and many fine hotels. These hotels during our stay at Montecatini were used as billets for our men, much to their surprise. The sight of electric lights, dining halls, bathrooms with running water, and, in brief, the benefits of civilization--at first quite a novelty--recreated the desire to live for the day when these will again be accepted as a normal part of life. The beneficial contribution to morale by these accommodations provided by 5th Army cannot be overstated.

Aims of the rest period as prescribed in TM 23, Headquarters 88th Infantry Division, were:

- a. To promote high standards of morale and physical condition.
- b. To indoctrinate and properly train replacements and inexperienced personnel.

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- c. To correct errors observed in combat.
- d. To rehabilitate equipment.

The success of the 5th Army Rest Center at Montecatini Terme reflects much effort on the part of the 5th Army City Command Section. Lt. Col. Elam's efforts produced results that were appreciated by all. In all matters it was clearly evident that the City Command Section desired to do anything and everything within its powers to make the stay of the combat troops as pleasant and enjoyable as possible. Conveniences such as electric lights, running water, bathing and clothing exchange units, recreational features such as movies, stage shows, including the fine production of "The Barretts of Wimpole Street", starring Catherine Cornell and Brian Aherne; all created a pleasant and refreshing atmosphere.

Preparations were immediately made for a concentrated training program. Since the regiment had so many new replacements, this program was of pivotal importance. Machine gun, mortar, and small arms ranges were set up three kilometers northwest of Montecatini and a firing schedule was organized with provisions for each battalion to fire all courses for as long as the rest period permitted.

Each morning at 1000 hours, the Regimental S-3 attended a meeting with the 5th Army G-3 representative, Lt. Col. Eyebold, at which time training was discussed and clarified, and training schedules were submitted to 5th Army for approval. Training hours extended from 0830-1200 hours and 1300-1530 hours with an additional hour every other day for officers and non-commissioned officers devoted to leadership, duties, and responsibilities.

On 3 November, the regiment gained a new Battalion Commander, Lt. Col. Lewis, assigned as 3d Battalion Commanding Officer. At 2345 hours, two hundred new replacements, many former ASTP students and Air Cadets, who were transported by plane from France, arrived at the three hotels reserved for them.

The following day, 4 November, at 0340 hours, the 1st Battalion, after travelling all night through cold, driving rains, arrived, thoroughly soaked and cold and were guided to hotels awaiting their arrival. The hot coffee prepared for them was indeed a welcome treat.

On the morning of 7 November, the regiment was highly honored by a visit from Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, Army Commander. Accompanied by Colonel Champeny, General Clark inspected the 2d Battalion in quarters, shaking hands with many of our soldiers and conversing with them about past operations. After this visit, the Army Commander expressed his great satisfaction with the fine and clean appearance of the men and their quarters, and concluded by praising highly "The grand job" the regiment has accomplished.

At about 1845 hours, this date, the following message from G-3 was received by telephone: "351 RCT RELIEVES 168 RCT COMMENCING NIGHT 9/10 NOVEMBER, RELIEF TO BE COMPLETED BY DAYLIGHT 11 NOVEMBER. UPON COMPLETION RELIEF 351 RCT ATTACHED TO 85 DIVISION. CO 351 INFANTRY WILL ARRANGE DETAILS OF RELIEF WITH CO 168 INFANTRY SUBJECT TO APPROVAL THIS HEADQUARTERS. MAKE PRELIMINARY RECONNAISSANCE 8 NOVEMBER AFTER CLEARING WITH 34 DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AT (870220). DO NOT RELIEVE BOTH FRONT LINE BATTALIONS SAME NIGHT."

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Authority NM 735077

By W.D. NARA Date 4/25/60

Thus a short but most appreciated rest period was brought to a close. The gratitude of a line soldier for such accommodations as were arranged for him by 5th Army is a difficult task, but the men of the 351st Infantry unanimously revealed their appreciation by maintaining a high standard of behaviour during their stay in Montecatini Terme.

While a party consisting of Colonel Champeny, Major Hobson and the three Battalion Commanders were forward making a reconnaissance of 168th Infantry sector east of Livergnano preparatory to beginning the relief, the range firing schedules on the Montecatini ranges proceeded as planned. On the 9th of November beginning at 0800 hours the 2d Battalion moved by motor to the vicinity of Savazzo, Italy, completing the relief of the 2d Battalion, 168th Infantry night of 9/10 November 1944. On the next day, 10 November, the remainder of the regiment cleared Montecatini by motor—1st and 3d Battalions relieving corresponding Battalions 168th Infantry on position during the night of 10/11 November. The new Battalion Commander of the 2d Battalion, Lt. Col. Farthing joined his command this day.

During the rest period several observers from other arms and branches joined the regiment for a brief stay. Major Paul D. Woodward and Captain Louie Reese, Jr., 900th AAA, came to accompany the regiment to the front to observe infantry tactics, and Captain Robertson, a B-24 pilot and Lieutenant Tatman, a P-51 pilot, both stationed in the vicinity of Bari, accompanied the troops on their return to the lines.

The Commanding Officer, 351st Infantry assumed command of the defensive sector at 0505 hours, 11 November 1944, the relief of the 168th Infantry having been completed at that time. Upon completion of the relief the dispositions of the regiment were as follows: Battalion occupied positions extending from the vicinity of M. Ceresa (923320), to the vicinity of Ca di Razzone (934323). The 3d Battalion held ground from the vicinity of La Maddelena (908327) to Casseta (914329) to Ceresa. The 1st Battalion was in reserve in the vicinity of M. Della Formiche (917289).

According to TM 55, Headquarters 88th Infantry Division, dated 10 November 1944, the combat mission of the Division was the active defense of the assigned sector with two battalions of each regiment in the line and one in reserve. Battalions would be rotated so that a battalion would have twelve days in the line and six days in reserve. Replacements would join the battalions they were assigned to when the battalions were in reserve. Elaborate plans for the establishment of a casual Replacement Training Company were made and a schedule worked up by Major Marks, Assistant Regimental S-3, affording each replacement a minimum of one week's training prior to joining his organization. Replacements found deficient in training would be held in the casual company until declared proficient.

On 11 November 1944, cobwebs were brushed from the props of the JUs and the rusty gears of the Heinkels were oiled, for the Luftwaffe, long dormant on this front, staged the first of several nuisance raids. These brazen raids occurred about dusk. One such raid took place at 1800 hours 11 November 1944, when a single German plane, believed to be a JU 88, bombed the 2d Battalion kitchen train at Savazza (926273). Three light bombs were dropped. Casualties to personnel were sustained as well as slight damage to equipment.

By the nature of our mission, active patrolling was of course of prime importance. A first group of our patrols left our lines under cover of darkness night of 11/12 November 1944. One patrol searched out the area in the vicinity of Camerla (940328), and the vicinity west of this objective. Area was reported mined with "S" and Box mines. The other patrol, the first of several to probe an enemy strongpoint at (913333), some

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six hundred yards north and slightly west of Casetta. The vicinity (935328) was cleared by a thirteen man patrol, while another thirteen man patrol attempted to investigate the town of Ferrara. The latter was stopped by heavy machine gun and machine pistol fire from buildings, and, by accurate mortar fire.

On 13 November 1944 the 1st Battalion began training at 0830 hours and also conducted range firing. Major General Coulter, Commanding General 85th Infantry Division, visited the Command Post in the morning and discussed the tactical situation and operations with Colonel Champeny. Intelligence activity for the day commenced with a report at 0500 hours from 85th Division's G-2 that several enemy agents were expected to enter our lines. Later a civilian interrogation of several Italians, who came through our lines (and who were subsequently evacuated) revealed German positions manned by some 200 Germans along the ridge extending from Ferrara toward Collina. Observation Posts reported Kraut activity, shell reports, and mortar positions. An estimated total of 489 rounds of enemy fire from the period 121300 to 131300 hours fell in the regimental sector, the bulk of which was mortar. Two reconnaissance patrols left our lines this night, returning without much success. Thus ended a typical day in our new positions.

During the day, the Regimental Commander, accompanied by the Regimental S-3 made his daily visit to front line organizations, this time calling at the 2d Battalion. Besides his visits to the battalions in line, the Regimental Observation Post was a favorite spot of the Regimental Commander, where he directed fire and observed terrain.

November 17th 1944 proved to be an exciting day for the 3d Battalion, particularly so for Company "L". At 0250 hours a German patrol of undetermined strength attacked the forward positions and was driven off by small arms fire. At 2043 hours the Germans attacked again in the same vicinity (917326) and were again beaten off with small arms fire. Many of the men in Company "L" are new to the organization and this was their first taste of close combat. It was an opportunity for them to learn first hand the mettle of the German Infantryman. On the body of one Grenadier H. Kanzler, who died gloriously for his Fuhrer during this attack on Company "L", was found an interesting document in the form of a court-martial order. It seems that Kanzler, whose hefty appetite forced him to eat his "Iron Ration" that was issued and duly entered into his pay-book, conceived the idea of red-lining this entry and signing the initials of the accounting clerk, thus falsifying a legitimate entry. What's more, Grenadier Kanzler, age 19, had intent to pull the wool over the Fuhrer's eyes by eating the remainder of his ration! His three month sentence was suspended to enable him to redeem himself by front line service. (See IPW Section for original).

Brigadier General Paul W. Kendall, Commanding General, 88th Infantry Division, and Lt. Col. Beggs, G-3, visited the Command Post earlier in the day in anticipation of the Division's assuming command of this sector from the 85th Division. The situation of front line positions and the condition of the troops were discussed. Both visited the Regimental Observation Post with Colonel Champeny which provided an excellent view of the front.

A vigorous and vigilant counter-mortar (as well as counter-battery) program was maintained. The importance of shell reports was continually emphasized---with apparent favorable results. BC scopes scanned outlying enemy territory betraying any and all enemy activity that moved into their fields of observation. A record of all shell reports, flashes, and suspected mortar positions were kept on a special form. These reports

also sent on to Fire Direction Center (913th Field Artillery Battalion). From a compilation of these reports, an Enemy Mortar List Number 1, this Headquarters, was published on this date, including twelve concentrations known as the Collina Group.

During the night of 17/18 November 1944, an ambush patrol from Company "F" led by Lieutenant Decker captured six Germans at (937327), the first prisoners taken since the regiment's return to the lines. These Germans, carrying rations, were all headed for an enemy strongpoint in front of our positions when Lieutenant Decker and his patrol interrupted their plans. Lieutenant Decker challenged the Germans and quickly surrounded them. His fine work in securing badly needed prisoners for identification purposes was promptly rewarded by Colonel Champeny who allowed him to fill the one officer quota allotment of this regiment for a trip to Cairo, Egypt. Adroit interrogation by the Regimental IPW Officer, 1st Lieutenant Martin F. Ruopp, uncovered considerable information. (See attached IPW Reports, 18 November 1944).

On the following day, 18 November 1944, the Regiment had as its guest Major General Rooks, Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters, who was brought to the Command Post by Major General Coulter, Commanding General 85th Infantry Division. Shortly after his arrival, General Rooks was conducted on an inspection of forward positions by the Regimental Commander. On the following morning, after remaining overnight at the Regimental Headquarters, General Rooks observed enemy positions from the Regimental Observation Post on Mount della Formiche.

According to Operations Instruction #66, Headquarters 85th Infantry Division, received at this Headquarters, 19 November 1944, the 88th Infantry Division:

- a. Relieves the left battalion 85th Division (338th Infantry), commencing night 18/19 November 1944 and completes relief by daylight 20 November 1944.
- b. Relieves two battalions of the right regiment (339th Infantry), night of 20/21 November and the remaining battalion the night 21/22 November 1944.
- c. Assumes command of 85th Division sector on completion of above relief 22 November and reports to II Corps hour of passage of command.

Early the morning of 19 November 1944, an enemy artillery barrage fell in the Regimental Motor Pool killing Captain Alvin Riga, Regimental Transportation Officer, Master Sergeant Downing, Regimental Transportation Sergeant, and wounding several others of the Regimental Transportation Section as they slept. Having maintained the highest standard of motor transportation care within the Division, as evidenced by the numerous commendations received from the Commanding General, Captain Riga's superior work will be sorely missed.

Command of the 85th Division sector passed to the 88th Infantry Division as of 0001 hours 22 November 1944. The tactical situation of this Regiment remained much the same. To date, the 3d Battalion occupied the same positions as on the initial relief of the 168th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, having relieved the 2d Battalion the night of 20/21, held the ground extending from the vicinity of Mount Cerrara (923-320) to the vicinity of Ca di Razzo (934-323). Both battalions in line maintained a program of vigorous patrolling. Meanwhile the battalion in reserve in the vicinity of Mount della Formiche followed a training schedule which stressed weapons and small arms firing.

A second counter-mortar plan was published by this Headquarters, this date, consisting of slight changes to the original Collina Plan and the new Casetta Plan. During the day Brigadier General Kendall, Commanding General 88th Infantry Division and

Brigadier General Sherman, Assistant Division Commander, called of their very frequent visits to the regiment while in the line.

On 24 November 1944, facts about the Battle of Laticco, still considered the foremost accomplishment in the long and continuous fighting history of this regiment, were brought forth again. A unit citation was proposed and forwarded through channels to 5th Army, for the 3d Battalion, whose gallantry in action under almost insurmountable odds was responsible in taking this key enemy stronghold, thus enabling the regiment and Division to continue the advance to the Arno River.

At 2130 hours 24 November men of the 1st Battalion were improving their positions at Poggio when they were subjected to a mortar barrage. Since the positions were as yet inadequate to afford protection, the men fell back on the reverse slope for cover. When they moved forward again they found that the Germans, believed to have been patrol strength had occupied the hill. At 2155 hours a report was received that an attempt was being made to drive the Germans off. At 2300 hours the following message reached Regimental Headquarters: "Baker on Poggio. Situation straightened out".

The second intra-regimental relief operations in this sector was completed by 2356 hours, 26 November 1944, when the 2d Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion on position.

At 2134 hours, 27 November 1944, the Regimental Headquarters was subjected to a heavy artillery barrage, the first shelling to threaten the Regimental Command Post. As a result, the CP truck was partially destroyed and a generator that supplied the electric current was hit. No casualties were sustained by the Regimental Headquarters personnel.

Two Germans on outpost guard were captured at 0200 hours the next morning (28 November) by Company "F's" forward platoon in the vicinity of (913331). Both prisoners were Yugoslavs and of the 7th Company, 15th Infantry Regiment, 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. One prisoner, a corporal of twenty-two years, was very cooperative and willingly gave much information to the extent of pointing out positions from the Regimental Observation Post. Later, the Regimental IPW Officer, Lieutenant Ruopp, was able to secure more detailed information as to strength and disposition of enemy units occupying defensive positions facing the left portion of the Regimental sector.


A message was received from 88th Division G-3 on the 29th of November that Task Force 45 in the IV Corps sector was pushed off Mt. Belvedere, a key terrain feature, as a result of a counterattack by a force of 600-1000 Germans. Four raids were also reported in the 34th Division sector. Possibilities of a similar attempt by the enemy in this sector appeared quite possible in lieu of this information.

Lt. Col. Van Alstyn assumed command of the 3d Battalion this date. This post was vacated when Lt. Col. Lewis left the regiment to become a Regimental Commander in the 34th Division.

At 1838 hours a report was received that Company "B" was being counterattacked. A force believed to be approximately thirty Germans moved in under heavy artillery and mortar bombardment, attacking a Company "B" platoon position. The platoon leader reported that one flank was caving in. As an immediate precautionary measure, the reserve company of the 1st Battalion, Company "C", was alerted. The 3d Battalion was also alerted for action should further developments prove dangerous. One German, relying on an old ruse, ran forward shouting in English to our troops that they were surrounded and that they would therefore give up. The situation from our angle however was explained to this Kraut when he ran into a bullet fired by a member of Company "B". The Company held its ground, and with the aid of defensive artillery fires, the attack was repulsed without

...ing to press the reserve company into the fight. Two Germans were known to have
n killed, and later two machine pistols with fresh blood stains were picked up.
Company "B" sustained two men killed and one wounded in action.

This brings to a close the regimental history for the month of November—a month including a brief rest period and then a return to defensive operations. The latter period has been, in some respects, one of good fortune, because of the fact that the regiment has many new men and officers, who, by the present nature of operations have had a gradual introduction to actual combat conditions. They have had an opportunity to learn to know each other better; they have patrolled together; they have endured mortar and artillery barrages; they have learned to live under actual combat conditions. In short, they have become a part of the Regimental Team, thoroughly battle indoctrinated, and prepared to defeat the enemy in battle.


ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY
Colonel, 351st Infantry,
Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS 351ST INFANTRY
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 88

9 January 1945

HISTORY OF THE 351ST INFANTRY REGIMENT FOR THE MONTH OF DECEMBER 1944

Throughout the month of December 1944, and since 10 November 1944, the 351st Infantry Regiment occupied defensive positions in the static situation some eight miles Southeast of BOLOGNA. The terrain held included the bitterly fought for objectives of the 34th and 85th Divisions during the Fifth Army advances following the penetration of the main GOTHIC LINE positions in the months of September and October. From our forward observation posts, BOLOGNA, The Observatory at the University of Bologna, stretches of Highway 9, and bridges along this highway can be seen. The valley of the PO on a sunny day is clearly in view while the Italian Alps, snow covered and brilliantly white, can be seen across the valley. Thus the month of December, ending a period of over two hundred days of combat, found the 351st Infantry Regiment once more in defensive operations, a tactical situation similar to the one initiating them to combat at CASSINO, 27 February 1944, and at the GARIGLIANO sector near MINTURNO early in March 1944.

Activity during the December period can best be described in the hackneyed and trite jargon of the news correspondent -- "patrol clashes and artillery duels". But to the combat infantryman the month has meant sticking it out in the miserable weather, the mud, frequent artillery and mortar barrages, anti-personnel mines, and life on an Italian mountainside -- best termed wretched. However, the men have not complained; and the issue of adequate winter clothing and footgear, and all other possible contributions to what little comfort they might enjoy, has had a good effect. The liberal quotas of passes to ROME, FLORENCE, and MONTECATINI TERME were extremely beneficial. These brief interludes out of artillery and mortar range were of inestimable value. In addition to these passes each battalion was relieved once during the month and sent to MONTECATINI TERME for a period of four days.

Patrolling throughout the period was aggressive and provided an excellent opportunity for new men and officers to gain valuable experience. Enemy artillery fire was heavy and reports of up to seven hundred and fifty rounds in thirty minutes are on record. All concerned are aware of the fact that the Wehrmacht in Italy is not running short on artillery and mortar ammunition; however, our counter-battery and counter-mortar program under the firection of the Regimental S-2, Captain CHARLES D. EDMONSON, and the Regimental Artillery Liaison Officer, Captain JOHN L. CORCORAN, has done much to keep the Krauts busy frequently changing their gun and mortar positions. The effectiveness of counter-mortar fire has been recognized by the front line companies who received the bulk of enemy mortar fire; and, as a result, they have learned to report mortar flashes promptly. During the month the troops, many of them new to combat, have learned much. ~~CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO~~ defensive operations have been their introduction to combat.

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CANCELLED 1945
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
William D. Tapp 12/27/62 9812
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE 5 Nov 45

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Authority NMD 735077

By W.D. NARA Date 4/25/60

Future operations of an offensive nature received much thought and planning in accordance with the memoranda from higher headquarters. The Regimental and Battalion Staffs spent much time in observation posts and in conferences. Maps, air photos, and oblique photos were studied diligently and through reconnaissances made for possible supply routes, assembly areas, routes of advance, and positions for supporting weapons. Two objectives were assigned to the Regiment by Field Order #14, Headquarters 88th Infantry Division, 5 December 1944 -- a hill immediately in front of the right forward Battalion known as Hill 363 and further to the North the feature POGGIO SCANNO. As time passed variations were made and phase lines were introduced. The Corps plan did not contemplate the seizure of distant objectives. Each Battalion was required to prepare attack plans and made all necessary reconnaissances. Particular emphasis was placed on maximum initial surprise as set forth in the Corps directive. Consequently, the artillery plan did not include preparatory fires prior to H hour and thereafter only on call available to the Regimental and Battalion Commanders. In addition to artillery concentrations on the objective all 81mm mortars, chemical mortars, and Infantry Howitzers within and attached to the Regiment were registered on all known enemy mortar positions within the Regimental sector and would fire simultaneously with any artillery fire called for on the objective. All plans were written up with accompanying overlays and were submitted to the Acting Chief of Staff, G-3, 88th Infantry Division for approval. Major VICTOR W. HOBSON, JR., Regimental Operations Officer, coordinated all plans with those of the 350th Infantry on the right and the 168th Infantry on the left. In addition to so-called "routine patrols", reconnaissance patrols were instructed to seek routes of approach to enemy positions. By careful expenditure of mortar and artillery ammunition a reserve was built up on positions. As the month wore on the date for the attack was postponed frequently and by the end of the month with the small German offensive in the IV Corps sector the postponement became indefinite.

Training during the month was pushed as vigorously as the tactical situation would permit. A small arms range was set up in a draw behind the reserve battalion and new weapons were fired. Many new men who were armed with weapons they had not fired had an opportunity to zero their weapons. Technical training with the Infantry weapons; mechanical functioning, stoppages, immediate action, care and cleaning received emphasis in view of previous experience within the Regiment of weapons failure. The training of non-commissioned officers was stressed by the Regimental Commander, Colonel ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY; and examinations for promotions to fill vacancies were conducted by the Regimental Executive Officer, Lieutenant Colonel WALTER B. YEAGER.

Care of the feet required constant attention and supervision. Daily massage of the feet and exchange of socks prevented trench feet. During the month no cases were reported -- a record unequalled in the Fifth Army for December. The disease rate for the month was the lowest in the Division. On the other hand casualties from enemy fire was higher than that of the other two regiments.

First Lieutenant JOHN C. CLANCY, while taking men of Company "G" in


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trucks for showers, was killed by enemy artillery fire, 7 December 1944. First Lieutenant WILSON G. WEISERT of Company "L", leading a patrol on the night of 7/8 December 1944, set off an enemy mine near CASA COLLINA (935327). Lieutenant WEISERT lost his left foot and three men were wounded by the explosion. On the night of 22/23 December 1944, a patrol led by Second Lieutenant TIMOTHY W. HEALEY of Company "G", set off an "S-mine" east of the COLLINA position and one man was killed and three wounded including the patrol leader. Lieutenant Colonel WALTER B. YEAGER was seriously wounded 15 December 1944, near MONTE DELLA FORMICHE, by artillery fire. The loss of Lieutenant Colonel YEAGER is a blow to the Regiment. Having joined the Regiment as Regimental Executive Officer in August, Lieutenant Colonel YEAGER had won many friends who respect him highly and wish him a speedy and complete recovery from his misfortune. Lieutenant Colonel FRANKLIN P. MILLER joined the Regiment on 16 December 1944 as Lieutenant Colonel YEAGER's successor. Lieutenant Colonel MILLER formerly commanded the 913th Field Artillery Battalion, part of the Regimental Combat Team, and has been with the 88th Infantry Division since its activation, 25 July 1942.

Section 3, General Orders Number 188, Headquarters Fifth Army, dated 20 December 1944, cited the Third Battalion, 351st Infantry for "outstanding performance of duty in action". The Battalion is awarded citation streamers and individuals assigned or attached are entitled to wear the distinguished unit badge to identify such action. The action for which the Battalion was cited was the Battle of Laiatico, Italy, 9th to 13th July, 1944.

Many distinguished callers visited the Regimental Commander. The II Corps Commander, Major General GEOFFREY KEYES stopped by 22 December 1944 and had lunch with Colonel CHAMPENY. General BOLTE, 34th Infantry Division Commander made a call 8 December 1944. Both the Divisional Commander and Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier Generals KENDALL and SHERMAN, visited the Regiment frequently.

Christmas, 1944, was merely another day in combat for the majority of the Regiment; however, there were some members who were fortunate enough to be on pass at ROME, FLORENCE, or MONTECATINI. Christmas Day marked the Regiment's two hundredth day in combat since February 27, 1944. In those two hundred days, the 351st Infantry has proved by its consistent aggressive action against the enemy that it is an outstanding Regiment. Those within its ranks can be justly proud to be members of a splendid fighting organization - the 351st Infantry Regiment.


ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY
Colonel, 351st Infantry
Commanding

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Authority **NMD 7350P7**

By **MDJ** NARA Date **4/25/00**

**HEADQUARTERS 351ST INFANTRY
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 88**

By **C. J. J. [unclear]**
Initials **[unclear]**
Date **[unclear]**

7 February 1945 **FEB 16 1945**

January

HISTORY OF THE 351ST INFANTRY REGIMENT FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY 1945

The 351st Infantry Regiment welcomed 1945 from foxholes in the Italian Apennines. From the American soldier's standpoint it was hardly a spectacular way to celebrate the coming of a new year; however, all were glad to see 1944 end. Glad because it terminated two hundred five days of combat; including, the defensive operations in the Cassino and Garigliano sectors, the May 11th Offensive with its bloody battle of Santa Maria Infante, the long trek through the mountains to Rome, the bitter Tuscany fighting from Volterra to the Arno River, including the highly successful and decisive Laiatice engagement; and then, the later, critical operations following the initial penetrations of the Gothic Line; including Castel Del Rio, Mount Cappello, Gesso, Montecaldero, and the disappointment at Vedriano, farthest point reached by Fifth Army troops in its effort to cut Highway No 9. Through all this fighting the regiment has distinguished itself by the brave actions of individuals, fine soldiers, true Americans, some of whom, it is deeply regretted, are no longer with the regiment; but they are not forgotten and their deeds continue to be an inspiration to those who remain.

The first twelve days of 1945 saw the regiment occupying the defensive positions including Mount Belmonte. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were disposed forward and the 1st Battalion in reserve near Mount Delle Formiche to constitute the left forward regiment of the 88th Division sector. The regiment had relieved the 138th Infantry on the night of 30 December 1944. January 12, 1945 the regiment moved to Montecatini Terme ending a period of sixty days in the line. Eight days were spent at Montecatini, the first five being rest and the last three training in accordance with 88th Division Training Memorandum No 1, dated 13 January 1945. On the night of January 22, 1945 the regiment, having moved north on Highway 65 by truck, relieved the 361st Infantry of the 91st Division in the vicinity of Livergnano, Italy. The month of January ended with the regiment occupying these positions; which made up the right forward regimental sector of the division. Throughout the month, in both sectors, aggressive patrolling was conducted and not without a profitable catch in prisoners taken, the total number being nine; which, incidentally, was the total number taken by the division for the month. A limited number of passes to Florence and Rome were granted during the month which provided much appreciated diversion for the officers and men permitted to go.

While at Montecatini Terme, men and officers were awarded decorations at a ceremony held January 18, 1945. Lieutenant Colonel Franklin P Miller, Regimental Executive (presented) presented awards which included two Silver Stars, sixty nine Bronze Stars and one Legion of Merit. At an extremely impressive ceremony on the morning of January 19, 1945, General Mark W Clark, Commanding General of the Fifteenth Army Group in Italy, comprising the Fifth American Army and the Eighth British Army, presented decorations to the 3rd Battalion, 351st Infantry, cited for its actions at the Battle of Laiatice, Italy, July 1944.

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CHANGES TO
CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE
27 Feb 1945
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Authority MM 7350P7By W.D. NARA Date 4/25/00

9-12, 1944. General Lucian K. Truscott, 5th Army Commander, General A.M. Grunther, General Paul W. Kendall, 88th Division Commander, Colonel Arthur S. Champeny, Regimental Commander, 351st Infantry, and Colonel James C. Fry, Regimental Commander, 350th Infantry, were present. Colonel Robert C. McBride, Chief of Staff, 88th Infantry Division read the orders. The Division Band played for the ceremony.

At Montecatini the Regimental Commander addressed the assembled officers of the regiment at which time he expressed his happiness at having an opportunity of having all officers present at one time. Colonel Champeny's talk stressed the need for aggressive leadership in companies and battalions, mentioning also that all battalion officers must spend as much time as possible in their sectors learning the situation thoroughly. Concerning replacements the Colonel made the following stipulations: They must have at least two weeks training and indoctrination with the Regimental Replacement Company before joining companies; they must be oriented better by company officers and non-commissioned officers after joining their new organizations; they must be taught to understand the seriousness of absence without leave, and the shame it involves; not only personally, but also, to their unit; and they must also be made aware of the high standards demanded by the regiment and division. The wearing of the uniform, saluting, sanitation and hygiene, are all important things to remember; as trivial as they might appear. On the subject of patrolling the following factors were highlighted: Formation (always a get-away man), security (bear security in mind at all times), routes (don't choose the easy routes, they are frequently mined), firefights (don't indulge in ineffective exchanges of small arms fire beyond the effective night ranges of the weapons you use—close with the enemy and depend on the hand grenade and bayonet); and above all, accomplish your mission—reach your objective. The Colonel concluded his talk by reminding all officers present of the responsibilities they must assume and the trust placed in them by their country. Learn to know all your men—instill confidence in them.

Since the pause in the offensive operations of the northward drive last October, the regiment has steadily achieved progress in rehabilitation, training, and morale. Marked progress has been made in patrolling. Patrolling is the most effective form of small unit training. It teaches officers, non-commissioned officers, and men how to operate as small independent groups. It instills self-confidence and demonstrates more lucidly than in any other manner the basic Infantry role of closing with the enemy and destroying him in close combat.

Several of our successful patrols are worthy of special mention. Two of these patrols led by Lt. Ralph Decker Jr, resulted in the capture of eight German soldiers, badly needed for identification purposes. His first patrol on the night of 2/3 January captured a five man enemy ambush patrol intact. The capture was made about 1 Kilometer northeast of Monte Belmonte and the prisoners were from the 1st and 2d Companies of the 1060th Infantry Regiment, 362d Division. Lt. Decker's prompt aggressive action seized these Germans without a fire fight. His second patrol with a specially organized battle group of twenty-four men advanced on Casa Nuova, some two Kilometers north of Livergnano and captured four Germans (members of a machine gun squad), one of whom was killed by German fire in the return to our lines. This patrol in addition to having the mission of capturing prisoners, placed explosive charges in the house at Casa Nuova (a total of over thirty pounds of TNT) and destroyed the building which the Germans had been using as a strongpoint. There were three Germans trying to get out of the house at the time the explosion occurred. White phosphorous grenades were thrown in a number of nearby dugouts and more casualties inflicted upon the enemy. One German machine gun position which tried to discourage Lt. Decker's operation resulted in the death of the machine gunner and his assistant. The Stars and Stripes gave the following account of the action at

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Authority NND 735017
By MDJ NARA Date 4/25/00

Casa Nuova:

"On the Highway itself, (i.e. Highway 65), south of Bologna, a volunteer combat patrol of the 351st Infantry Regiment raided an enemy outpost, killed a large number of Germans and brought back three prisoners.

The objective was first isolated by a curtain of artillery fire and the patrol closed in under the rolling barrage. After rushing the objective despite deep snow and the fire from two Kraut machine guns covering the approaches to the outpost, members of the patrol tossed at least thirty hand grenades through the doors and windows of a house being used as a strongpoint. One machine gun was knocked out and the crew of the second was overpowered and captured. Small arms fire continued from bunkers beneath another house and Lt. Ralph Decker of Junction City, Kansas, leader of the patrol, placed a large demolition charge in the house and a few seconds later blew up the building, Krauts, bunkers and all".

Lt. Linnsey L. Wheeler of Company "A" took a patrol to the church at San Ansano, approximately 2 Kilometers northwest of Livergnano on 31 January. Here he killed two Germans with his tommy gun and another member of the patrol killed a third German who tried to interfere. A fourth German, convinced that Lt. Wheeler and his patrol meant business, yelled "Hello, Kamerad" and was taken prisoner.

On the afternoon of 28 January 1945, Brigadier General Paul W. Kendall, Division Commander, presented nineteen Bronze Star awards, one cluster to the Bronze Star, and three Silver Star awards, one of which was posthumously, to members of Lt. Decker's patrol group. The formation of this special volunteer patrol group has proved to be a valuable undertaking.

During the month many distinguished callers visited the regiment. The Divisional Commander, Brigadier General Paul W. Kendall was a frequent caller. Generals Sherman and Lewis, respectively Assistant Divisional Commander, and Division Artillery Commander, made several visits. Major General Geoffrey Keyes, Commanding General II Corps visited Colonel Champeny on the 29th of January. Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, Fifth Army Commander stopped by on 31 January 1945. Thus ends the history for January 1945.

Arthur S. Champeny
ARTHUR S. CHAMPENY,
Colonel, 351st Infantry,
Commanding.

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Authority MM 7350P7

By W.D. NARA Date 4/25/00

**HEADQUARTERS 351ST INFANTRY
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 88**

By Authority of
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Index W.D.
Date MAR 22 1945
8 March 1945

HISTORY OF THE 351ST INFANTRY REGIMENT FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY 1945.

At the beginning of February, the regiment was occupying positions astride Highway 65. Monte Adone, with an elevation of 655 meters, faced the left sector which was occupied by the 1st Battalion. This feature dominated the entire Regimental sector and provided the enemy with observation along Highway 65 as far back as Monghidoro, 14 kilometers behind the line.

Several enemy mine fields were located. Some platoon positions were within rifle grenade range of the enemy, and, daylight movement even from hole to hole was under observation over most of the front. Smoke between Livergnano and Pre-dosa was continued with one or two interruptions, and daylight movement on roads was forbidden.

Due to our constant raiding of his positions, the enemy was extremely alert and constantly mortared any observed or suspected movement. The cracking of a twig was enough to start flares across the front and draw small arms fire.

Enemy artillery decreased in some cases, as few as ten rounds per day falling on us. German patrols were infrequent and not very aggressive, although our own patrolling remained constantly aggressive. Artillery, Cannon Company and mortar harassing fires were limited by low ammunition allotments, and an attempt was made to substitute this lack by the provisional .50 caliber machine gun battery firing 20,000 rounds per day and scout cars of the Reconnaissance Troops firing 37mm High Explosive ammunition.

The month opened auspiciously with a 1st Battalion patrol led by Lieutenant Wheeler of Company "A" capturing a PW whose identification revealed the relief of the German 4th Paratroop Division and established the 157th Mountain Infantry, 65th Infantry Division boundary.


One member of the patrol who had his foot blown off by a Schu mine was lost during the fight but, rather than be captured, crawled a thousand yards or more, swam the ice cold Savenna River which was in flood at the time, and called for help just outside our outpost line. He was decorated with the Silver Star for his action.

The 2d Battalion, as Regimental Reserve, occupied positions near Ia Guarda. Some training in map reading, mechanical training in weapons, and gun drill was conducted and the switch line maintained and strengthened.

Construction of the defense line proved valuable in the education of officers and non-commissioned officers in that it added much to their knowledge of methods of organizing terrain.

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On the second of February, Co "G" relieved a company of the 549th Infantry joining the left regimental boundary. Company "G" was attached to the 1st Battalion and our sector was extended eight hundred yards to the left.

The morning of 12 February, Colonel Arthur S. Champeny passed command of the Regiment to Lieutenant Colonel Franklin P. Miller. Colonel Champeny had commanded the 351st Infantry since its early days at Camp Gruber and had led it through a year of combat. Lieutenant Colonel Miller was by no means a stranger, having served as Regimental Executive Officer for a short time and having commanded the combat team artillery, the 915th Field Artillery Battalion, since the summer of 1942. Under him, the 913th Field Artillery Battalion achieved the name of being one of the most aggressive artillery units in the Fifth Army. Thus Colonel Miller was known by reputation if not personally by all the officers of the regiment.

On the night of 13/14 February the Germans hurt us severely by capturing a large standing patrol at Barchetta. A relieving patrol led by Lieutenant Cowan on the night of the 12th engaged in a fire fight while attempting to reach the Barchetta patrol led by Lieutenant Jackson. Only Lieutenant Cowan and three men reached their destination, the rest of the patrol became scattered and filtered back into our lines. Since daylight movement would only have brought down a shower of enemy mortars, it was decided to wait until the next night and send a rescue patrol early enough to go and return under cover of darkness.

At 0800 one man ran the gauntlet of German fire and returned with the news that he had seen sixteen Germans on his way back and that Lieutenants Jackson and Cowan with fifteen men, one of whom was slightly wounded, were all gathered in a small house. At 0840 a fire fight broke out at Barchetta.

At dusk the Ranger Platoon went to the rescue, reaching their destination by 2000 hours. They found nothing. A deserter entered our lines on 18 February and said that the Americans were all in a house at which the Germans fired Panzer-Fausts, causing the Americans to surrender. The Germans later shot propaganda which discussed the incident. (See penultimate page S-2 Section).

On February 14th, Lieutenant Colonel Paul P. George, 513th Bomb Squadron, 376 Bomb Group, 15th Air Force, joined the regiment for a brief stay as an observer. He was well liked and his departure was regretted by everyone.

On the night of 13/14 February, the 2d Battalion, less Company "G", relieved the 3d Battalion, less Company "L", and on the night of the 19/20 the regiment was relieved and went into Division Reserve. The 3d Battalion remained in La Guardia attached to the 350th Infantry as reserve.

The 1st Battalion Command Post was in Bibulano with all companies in the general area. The 2d Battalion Command Post was placed in Trassasso with the companies disposed north and south of the Command Post along the east side of the Monzuno ridge.

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By W.D. NARA Date 4/25/01

Major Byron, Regimental Surgeon, former New York State gynecologist, continued his anti-trench foot campaign with marked success. We continued to remain low in self-inflicted wounds and non-battle casualties.

On the 26th of February the regiment was told that it would relieve the 135th Infantry and be attached to the First Armored Division. Colonel Miller and staff called at the First Armored Command Post that day and obtained details of the relief.

In the meantime the battalions of the regiment continued to maintain and improve the switch line. A training program consisting of squad and platoon problems, security training, physical conditioning, weapons training, night raids, military courtesy and discipline, clock system of adjusting artillery fire, compass work, and map reading was pressed vigorously.

The melting of the snow and warmer weather greatly improved living conditions during the latter two thirds of the month. The men's spirits seemed to improve with the weather, and the physical conditioning after a long, almost uninterrupted period of lying in a defensive position with consistently bad weather, was welcome. We look forward confidently to the successful close of the Italian Campaign.

F. P. Miller

F. P. MILLER,
Lt. Col., F. A.
Commanding.

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By W.D.J. NARA Date 4/25/00

**HEADQUARTERS 351ST INFANTRY
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 88**

11 April 45

10 April 1945


HISTORY OF 351ST INFANTRY FOR MONTH OF MARCH 1945

Two distinct periods are the keynotes of March. The first period, up to, and including, March 9th was spent in the Loiano sector where the tactical mission of the 351st Infantry constituted being the division reserve. The rest of the month found the regiment in the pleasant Barberino area where training was stressed and the division was in II Corps reserve.

The persistence of a continued period of sunny weather has almost reinstated the long since exploded myth of "Sunny Italy"; expounded so profoundly in the realm of poetic fancy. March has been a good month. There were no more than two or three rainy days.

Rehabilitation progressed without interruption. "Men, motors, and weapons", a byword in the 88th Division, received considerable attention. Adequate bathing facilities and clean clothing were provided; including the excellent service rendered by the model shower unit organized and operated by the regimental supply section under the direction of Major William H. Klein, Regimental Supply Officer. Motor vehicles received the repair work and replacement of worn and missing parts that an extended period of combat duty over torturous roads necessitated. All weapons, with the exception of the Cannon Company howitzers, were fired on ranges within the regimental area and ordnance repairs were made on those requiring attention. Frequent inspections and care and cleaning put all weapons in first class condition.

Training in the Barberino area was progressive and in accordance with Training Memorandum No. 3, Headquarters 88th Division, dated 1 March 1945. Tactical training was emphasized. One-fourth of all training was spent in night training. Small unit training beginning with the squad and progressing through platoon, company, and battalion exercises, culminated in a forty-eight hour regimental problem. The 88th Reconnaissance troop with the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon and the Ranger Platoon constituted an enemy detachment under the command of Major William H. Clark. The problem stressed constructive thought and practice based on an endeavor to remedy tactical weaknesses discovered during actual combat operations. Primary importance was placed on the proper and effective employment of company, battalion, and regimental reserves. An innovation designed to enhance regimental fire power was devised and tried by the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Franklin P. Miller. Two platoons of the Regimental Anti-Tank Company have been equipped with 81mm mortars (a total of six (two from each battalion; since experience has proved that the present Table of Organization for 81mm mortar platoons provides more weapons than it is possible to adequately supply with ammunition)). These platoons each have three mortars and have SCR 610 radios for communications in addition to the standard SCR 300. The addition of the SCR 610 makes these six mortars available to the battalion artillery officers.



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BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
Paul J. Zirkle Maj AGO
WNGRADING COMMITTEE *27 Feb 46*

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Competition within the battalions for the best Battle Drill squad were held and the winners competed in a regimental competition in which Staff Sergeant Edward Krolick's squad of Company "A" were the winners. This squad received a pass to Florence as a reward for their efforts. Colonel James C. Fry, Assistant Divisional Commander visited the training areas frequently. Range firing included firing the anti-tank guns, the new 37mm gun mounted on the caliber .50 machine gun tripod, bazooka, and rifle grenades. The two latter weapons were fired at a German self propelled 75mm assault gun. Up to two and one half inches of armor was pierced easily and the sieve-like condition of this piece of "Smiling Albert" Kesselring's ordnance convinced GI's that the bazooka and anti-tank grenade are effective weapons. The new 37mm gun shooting modified ammunition proved highly accurate. All battalions are experimenting with a system for packing this weapon by mule, and will employ them in the next attack.

Future operations were given much thought; and planning was made for the execution of several tentative operations. In conjunction with these efforts many reconnaissance flights were made over the front lines by the regimental commander and his staff, battalion commanders and their staffs, and company commanders. First Lieutenant Hayden of the Division Artillery piloted all of these flights. General Paul W. Kendall, Division Commander, assured all officers at a meeting held March 31st that we will soon again be employed in offensive operations. The General also expressed his extreme satisfaction with the completeness, thoroughness, and spirited enthusiasm which the regiments of the division have devoted to training. Not previously mentioned, but with considerable importance attached, was the special mine training conducted within the regiment. Many various means of crossing mine fields by the use of expedients employing explosives were studied and used in crossing actual mine fields set up within the area. The goal in our training has been to impress all with the fact that mine fields can and will be crossed. Mines have a psychological effect that is overrated. Exact figures are not available but the fact that eighty percent of all battle casualties in the Italian fighting came from artillery and mortar fire and the remaining twenty percent divided between small arms fire and mine action is proof enough of the relatively low casualties from mines.

A unique event in the overseas history of the 88th Division took place on 31 March 1945 when, for the first time since leaving America, all units of the division were assembled at one time at a division review at the Florence Airport. A number of distinguished guests were present: General Mark W. Clark, XV Army Group Commander, Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, Fifth Army Commander, and Major General Geoffrey Keyes, Commanding General of II Corps. General Clark spoke briefly recounting the splendid combat record of the division and concluding with a remark that the next time he hopes to see us we will be north of the Po River. Two members of the 351st Infantry received Distinguished Service Crosses: Lieutenant Ralph Decker and Lieutenant Linnsey L. Wheeler for extraordinary heroism during the regiments occupation of defensive positions in the Lofano sector.

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Relaxation and recreation were not overlooked in the Barberino area. Many day passes to Florence were granted and U.S.O. shows and movies provided entertainment in the evenings. The Red Cross Bar under the direction of Miss Louise Osborn has undoubtedly provided the finest facilities along these lines that the regiment has heretofore enjoyed. Boxing matches were held and all battalions including the Special Units entered contenders. The Second Battalion was the regimental champion.

Franklin P. Miller
FRANKLIN P. MILLER,
Lt. Col., F.A.,
Commanding.

- 6 Incls:
#1 - S-1 Reports
2 - S-2 Reports
3 - S-2/3 Journal
4 - S-3 Plans & Tng
5 - S-4 Reports
6 - Battle Casualty Reports.

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MONTERUMICI after three days of bitter fighting. On the night of 16 April 1945, the 351st Infantry moved to assembly areas in the vicinity of TRASASSO and was prepared to move forward on short notice to carry out one of three contemplated missions: to pass through either of the assault regiments and continue the attack; secondly, to assist either of the assault regiments, and thirdly, to be prepared to move through or assist elements of the 6th South African Armored Division to the left of the 88th Infantry Division. The latter mission to include a probable crossing of the RENO RIVER south of SASSO BOLOGNESE. As the battle progressed, IV Corps, further to the left, made a breakthrough in the 10th Mountain Division and 1st Armored Division zone leading north from VERGATO. 85th Division was pushed through to exploit and on 18 April 1945, 351st Infantry was motorized and moved to VERGATO under II Corps control and reverted to 88th Division control when the remainder of the division closed in its new zone.

After commitment near LAMA, south of SASSO BOLOGNESE, the Regiment coordinated an attack with elements of the 6th South African Armored Division (an Indian Battalion, the only of its kind in 6th South African Armored Division) and seized LAGUNE early on the morning of April 20th. Resistance was scattered and confined mainly to sniper fire although some mortar fire was encountered.

Without pause, the regiment moved forward to capture MOUNT CAPRA which surmounts the northern end of a long ridge line running north from LAGUNE. MOUNT CAPRA is a great hill mass studded with many houses. Two hills compose the feature, one on the east and one on the west, the latter being the minor. At about 1200 hours, the 337th Infantry was contacted and requested to lift their artillery and tank fires from that area in order that the Second Battalion, 351st Infantry, which was already deployed, could advance. The Germans chose to defend the eastern hill covering the slopes of MOUNT CAPRA and the road that runs between the two hills, and eventually to GESSO, with fire from at least six 120mm mortars and many automatic weapons. Elements of the 157th Division, the 8th Mountain Division, and the 1st Parachute Division manned the defenses. This stubborn defense and heavy fire forced the Second Battalion and its supporting tanks to retire in a disorganized condition. This same heavy 120mm mortar fire hit the Regimental Forward Command Post killing several men, wounding six others and scoring a direct hit on the Regimental Commander's car turning it over, fortunately without injury to the Commanding Officer or the driver. The assault battalion was reorganized and the Third Battalion was moved to give initial fire support for the renewed assault. Tanks, tank destroyers, and artillery laid down heavy counter mortar fire and neutralized the 120mm fire. Six of these mortars were later found destroyed with their crews dead around them. The actual

assault of MOUNT CAPER was accomplished with two rifle companies. Between the two hills a bald knob was cleared in which action over 100 prisoners of war were taken, 27 Germans killed and a number wounded. Rather than clear the entire feature, tank, tank destroyer and artillery fires were concentrated on the east hill neutralizing it and making it possible to by-pass it with the Third Battalion and the remaining elements of the Second Battalion. The First Battalion was left the mission of completing the job and by twilight had over 400 prisoners of war. In the meantime, the Second Battalion and Third Battalion pushed on until a foothold at RIALE, between GESSO and PALAZZO, had been consolidated.

At 0600 hours, 21 April 1945, with the First and Second Battalions abreast, and RIALE as a line of departure, the regiment moved north to cut Highway #9 and thence northwest to S GIOVANNI, a Division objective. Lieutenant RALPH DECKER, with the Intelligence and Reconnaissance and Ranger Platoon, screened the regimental right flank and later in the afternoon killed one German and captured 44.

Advancing against scattered resistance, both Battalions encountered strongly increasing fire as noon approached. The widespread advance by-passed groups of machine gunners and snipers, these made a determined stand and delayed the regiment for four hours while the reserve Battalion cleared them out. During this time the regiment received consistent, but sporadic, artillery and mortar fire from the front and right flank.

About 3000 yards south of SAN GIOVANNI there is a canal along which all bridges had been demolished. Along this canal and at the demolished bridges the enemy had organized a strong delaying position held by about 700 Germans who had nine tanks and self-propelled guns supporting them. A task force from the 6th South African Armored Division and the Third Battalion made a coordinated attack but failed initially to cross the canal. In the meantime, the First Battalion was swung 6000 yards to the west where it outflanked the enemy resistance and entered the outskirts of SAN GIOVANNI with tanks and infantry. Not long after this, the Third Battalion and the task force from the 6th South African Armored Division destroyed seven German tanks and forced a crossing of the canal. At twilight the First Battalion assaulted SAN GIOVANNI. Here, whether deliberate or not, the "white flag" trick was used by the Italian civil population; and, while ostensibly welcoming the liberators, two tanks and approximately 200 Germans opened fire, the latter firing from windows, roof tops, and the heavily fortified bank building. The Regimental Executive Officer, Lieutenant Colonel VICTOR W. HOBSON, JR., then Major, who was bringing a platoon of tanks forward, and coordinating their employment at about this time, went to the spot, forced a crossing of the

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dry canal which surrounds the town, eliminated several enemy machine guns enroute, and led the tanks into SAN GIOVANNI. There are two main streets in SAN GIOVANNI and scattered elements of the First Battalion were conducting a disorganized fire fight in both. Lieutenant Colonel HOBSON reorganized the elements in one street while the First Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel CLAUDE M. HOWARD, rallied those in the next street. Together these two groups cleared the town. Over 67 Germans were known to be killed and both enemy tanks destroyed. By midnight an outpost line had been set up two kilometers north of the town.

CREVALCORE was the next objective on the 351st Infantry route of march. Early on the morning of 22 April 1945, the regiment advanced with the First Battalion on the left and the Third Battalion on the right. The Second Battalion, in reserve, advanced along the SAN GIOVANNI-CREVALCORE highway. The lead Battalions swung wide of the town and 3000 yards north of SAN GIOVANNI the Third Battalion met heavy resistance. Again aided by the 6th South African Armored Division task force, the Third Battalion cleared this resistance after a five hour fight. The First Battalion rapidly by-passed the resistance in front of the Third Battalion and at this time the Regimental Commander, Colonel FRANKLIN P. MILLER, decided to sidestep the First Battalion into the Third Battalion zone taking over the Third Battalion mission. Simultaneously, the Second Battalion, having moved almost parallel to the First Battalion, entered CREVALCORE without resistance.

At 1400 hours, the First and Second Battalions were moving toward the PANARO RIVER while the Third Battalion completed mopping up the resistance left behind. With the aid of the 6th South African Armored Division task force, the Third Battalion knocked out 9 enemy tanks in this action. The Third Battalion then became regimental reserve and moved forward. By 1500 hours, the First and Second Battalions reached the PANARO RIVER; but the First Battalion was engaged in a fight in which they were opposed by 2 enemy tanks, 2 self-propelled guns and about 300 infantrymen, in the vicinity of CASELLE. The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel CLAUDE M. HOWARD, assumed personal command of Company A and the one tank available to him on the right flank and initiated an attack on CASELLE despite overwhelming odds. Simultaneously 351st Infantry Rangers led by Lieutenant RALPH DECKER and Captain CHARLES D. EDMONSON, Regimental S-2, attacked a village to the west and captured a German Signal Battalion intact taking 137 prisoners of war, killing 11 and wounding a number of others. Lieutenant Colonel HOWARD's attack destroyed the two enemy tanks and 2 self-propelled guns and in the ensuing fire fight the Division Artillery Commander of the 305 Division was killed, a Regimental Commander and two Battalion Commanders were captured plus 89 additional prisoners of war. A hasty count revealed 47 dead Germans in CASELLE.

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During this fight, unengaged elements of the First Battalion and the Second Battalion reconnoitered the river for crossing sites. Meeting heavy small arms and mortar fire they remained behind the levee on the south bank of the river.

At 1530 hours, the Divisional Commander, Major General PAUL W. KENDALL, visited the Regimental Command Post which was in a house 60 yards from the levee. The Commanding General issued positive instructions that the river must be crossed before darkness. The levee was too steep for tanks to climb; however, with many attempts, one tank and one armored car reached the top. Both were promptly hit by self-propelled fire. The armored car was completely destroyed and rolled over several times before reaching the bottom of the levee. The heavy fire forced Company A to retire from the levee in disorganization until they managed to regroup in CASELLE.

In view of the Divisional Commander's stringent orders and the absence of the Battalion Commander and Executive Officer of the First Battalion at this time, the Regimental Commander assumed personal command of Companies B and C and arranged to assault the river line later. The PANARO RIVER at this point was 60 yards wide flowing between 30 foot levees and averaged about 10 feet in depth; although air reconnaissance claimed it to be dry.

Desiring a coordinated attack, the Regimental Commander proceeded to the Second Battalion which was 1000 yards to the west, and, using the levee for an observation post, arranged for and adjusted heavy artillery fires from the 913th Field Artillery Battalion. He also ascertained by personal reconnaissance that a crossing on the debris of a demolished bridge near his vantage point was possible.

At 1900 hours, under a heavy curtain of artillery fire, the crossing was initiated by both Battalions. Having no means of crossing in its zone and no engineer bridging equipment present, the First Battalion made the crossing by swimming and using doors and timbers carried from the buildings in CASELLE. Both crossings were against diminishing opposition due to the heavy and accurate artillery fire. After crossing, the bridgeheads were joined and the Second Battalion struck 1500 yards to the west to clear the village of CAMPOS-ANTO. There, a German held bridge was captured intact. Over this bridge all vehicles, tanks and remaining infantry of the combat team were successfully passed by midnight to hold a bridgehead three kilometers deep. On this day, over 1500 prisoners of war were captured by the regiment.

At 0500 hours, 23 April 1945, the 350th Infantry passed through the 351st Infantry and with the 349th Infantry operating on its right attacked north to seize crossing sights on the PO RIVER, in the vicinity of OSTIGLIA.

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The 351st Infantry followed through unbelievable scenes of utmost confusion. Every farm house was surrounded by abandoned German Vehicles, many of which were completely destroyed. One German Regiment of artillery had destroyed its guns and surrendered all surviving personnel. Although the 351st Infantry was in reserve and followed the 349th Infantry, over 2000 by-passed Germans were taken prisoner with hardly a shot fired. The scene was one of debacle with enemy troops fleeing wildly or surrendering wholesale in shattered confusion.

On the 24th of April, at 0500 hours, the 351st Infantry moved into the interval between the 349th and 350th Infantry Regiments and occupied the town of REVERE on the south bank of the PO near the railroad bridge which had been partially destroyed by German demolition and the Mediterranean Air Force. At least one-third of the town was in total ruin and all streets were littered with abandoned German equipment and motor vehicles, the bulk of which were destroyed and still burning. A personal reconnaissance conducted by the Regimental Commander, Colonel FRANKLIN P. MILLER, and the Regimental Intelligence Officer, Captain CHARLES D. EDMONSON, convinced them that determined men could cross on the debris of the bridge despite the fact that personal experience indicated it to be defended by at least three 20mm guns, numerous machine guns and mortars. Prisoner information, found to be true, also indicated the north shore to be defended by six companies from the 1st Parachute Division sent there for the purpose. These troops had formerly been Field Marshall Albert Kesslering's personal bodyguard. To the east, crossing sites favorable for the use of ferrys and assault boats were discovered. Crossing equipment being unavailable, Captain EDMONSON volunteered to lead a picked detail of Rangers across the debris of the railroad bridge and secure a small bridgehead through which other troops might pass. Simultaneously, six abandoned German rubber boats were discovered by the Regimental Executive Officer, Lieutenant Colonel VICTOR W. HOBSON, JR., The Second Battalion, Major HAROLD B. AYRES, commanding, arrived at the river line and waited behind the levee on the south bank. The First and Third Battalions were enroute to the river bank at this time. Artillery and chemical mortars were in position to support the crossing. Tanks which had just been released from the other regiments had not as yet arrived. The Regimental Anti-Tank Company, commanded by Captain PAUL J. MAILANDER, was well forward as usual, available in REVERE. Briefly, the plan was as follows: Captain EDMONSON, Lieutenant DECKER and Lieutenant MAC DONALD, and 16 Rangers were to cross at noon and secure an initial bridgehead using the demolished railroad bridge for crossing and thereafter facilitating a crossing on the same bridge by Company G, commanded by Captain LIONEL R. KAYE. 800 yards to the east Company F, under the command of 1st Lieutenant JEFF P. ENOCHS, was to cross using the captured German rubber boats. Company E was to follow Company F. Company H placed its machine guns on the south levee to cover and support the crossing by fire. Heavy artillery fire from 913th Field Artillery Battalion

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and others, was arranged for on OSTIGLIA and 300 yards in front of the contemplated bridgehead. The Second Battalion Anti-Tank Platoon and the Regimental Anti-Tank Company guns were placed on the levee to afford direct fire support in addition to which two multiple mount .50 caliber machine gun carriages were emplaced, greatly enhancing the fire power. The chemical mortars were to screen the crossing with smoke, placing their concentrations as near to the enemy as possible.

To an eyewitness, the actual crossing was not only spectacular, but also gave the impression of having been rehearsed. At 1200 hours, Captain EDMONSON and his picked detail moved onto the bridge and immediately became the target of all enemy small arms fire, machine gun and 20 mm gun fire within a thousand yards distance up and down the river. Three men were wounded before the demolished part of the bridge was reached. The 913th Field Artillery Battalion, reinforced by the 339th Field Artillery Battalion, laid intense fire on the opposite bank. Machine gun bunkers and 20mm gun positions were engaged by the 57mm Anti-Tank guns and the two .50 caliber "flak wagons". Reaching the gap Captain EDMONSON tied a rope from beam to beam and led his group on. At one point it was necessary to climb a 30 foot ladder left by the Germans who had used the same means for crossing earlier. Just before starting up the ladder, Captain EDMONSON was wounded in the hip by an explosive projectile from one of the 20mm guns as he forced his way through the debris and water that at times was waist deep. The Regimental Command Post was in a ruined house 200 yards east of the railroad bridge and on top of the levee. From this hours, which received direct hits from 20mm and self-propelled fire, the entire operation was visible. It is interesting to note that some of the 57mm Anti-Tank guns were firing diagonally under the undemolished portions of the bridge at German positions to the west of it, while troops crossed above.

Emerging from the German end of the bridge, Captain EDMONSON's detail became embroiled in a furious fire fight. Lieutenant DECKER followed by two men, crawled 100 yards to within 10 feet of a German machine gun emplacement. Although the gunner tried frantically to hit him, Lieutenant DECKER threw a hand grenade and rushed the emplacement. With his tommy gun blazing, he literally cut the German in two. Then running to a house 50 yards away, Lieutenant DECKER and his two men went to the third floor and looked down into an extensive network of German fortifications and trenches from which two machine guns were still firing on the bridge and bridgehead. With a Browning Automatic Rifle, one of the men killed one gunner at his gun and forced the others to take cover in a dugout. They also opened fire on the crews of three camouflaged 20mm guns about 100 yards away. Since ammunition was nearly exhausted, Lieutenant DECKER sent two volunteers, Private First Class WELSS and Private First Class CONRAD, back across the river in a captured German rubber boat. These men paddled back across six hundred yards of open water and never wavered

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once although the water was churned all about them by German fire. Captain EDMONSON placed Private First Class SHIPLEY and TRAVENNER in position on the north end of the railroad trestle to deliver incessant fire on the three 20mm positions. They wounded seven Germans and forced them to keep their heads down, although they were constantly sniped at by other Germans. Lieutenant DECKE R, with his two original men then, attacked a second house killing a German in a nearby foxhole while his two men killed another German and took three prisoners. Captain EDMONSON with three men was nearby and firing his carbine into a dugout wounded one German and caused seven others to surrender. Lieutenant DECKER and Captain EDMONSON joined parties, put their prisoners under guard in the second house, rushed the three 20mm positions capturing seventeen Germans, many of whom they wounded. This highly successful action secured the initial bridgehead and Company G crossed without delay. 800 yards to the east Company F crossed meeting light opposition, although the south bank continued to receive heavy mortar and artillery fire. The lighter resistance met on the right demonstrates that the Germans had located their strongest defenses in the vicinity of the railroad bridge based on the premise that we would make our main crossing at that point. By 1600 hours, the Second Battalion was completely across and the bridgehead was finally established. Engineer equipment began to appear and LCVs manned by the 752nd Tank Battalion arrived. Prompt bulldozing of the embarkation site was performed by the engineers and the remainder of the regiment crossed in the order: Third Battalion, First Battalion. Soon thereafter, DUKWs arrived and supplies were ferried across the river.

Throughout the night, German aircraft bombed and strafed the crossing sites; however, the presence of many anti-aircraft batteries and their concentrated volume of fire greatly reduced the effectiveness of Luftwaffe operations.

Many of the houses on the far bank were found to be filled with German dead and wounded. The house seized by Regimental Headquarters for a Command Post contained seven bodies and nineteen badly wounded Germans.

Radio instructions to press on with all possible speed to VERONA were received at 0600 hours, 25 April 1945, and shortly after dark of the same day, the 351st Infantry entered the city. One of the biggest problems after the crossing was to get armor across. During the night some armor was gotten across on the pontoon bridge further to the east; however, not in the quantities desired.

The advance was made in two columns with the Second Battalion preceded by four tank destroyers moving north on the OSTIGLIA-VERONA highway and the Third Battalion marching on a roughly parallel road 3000 meters to the east.

The Third Battalion was without armor but had a platoon of 57mm Anti-Tank guns along. The First Battalion was to follow the Second Battalion. Light resistance was encountered until NOGARA was reached at which time one light tank and one armored car from the 88th Reconnaissance Troop joined the head of the column. The light tank was immediately sent to the Third Battalion to give it some armored assistance. At NOGARA, a determined enemy rear guard action was met at about 1300 hours. Captain STANLEY A. VAN TESLAAR, and seven other men were wounded in the first blast of enemy fire. The German defense consisted of 300 men, one 57mm gun emplaced in a fortified mill, two 20mm guns and numerous machine guns, all in long prepared positions. One tank destroyer was hit which rendered track repairs necessary and the armored car was knocked out by 57mm and 20mm fire wounding the occupants. Major HAROLD B. AYRES, commanding the Second Battalion, was nearby and courageously climbed atop the disabled scout car despite heavy enemy fire and dragged the three wounded men out of the burning vehicle. In the meantime, all others had taken cover in the ditches along the highway. Major AYRES ran back along the highway through the heavy enemy machine gun and 20mm fire and ordered Company E to make a flank attack around to the east. He then personally led the three remaining tank destroyers forward, using arm and hand signals to designate targets for them. He personally knocked out an enemy machine gun nest killing the gunner with one shot from his carbine. He directed tank destroyer fire on the 20mm gun positions and on a house into which a German officer and one of the 20mm gun crews had entered seeking refuge from the terrible tank destroyer fire. Major AYRES threw two hand grenades into this house forcing the Germans to surrender. Major AYRES' brave action opened the way through NOGARA. With this resistance eliminated, over 200 prisoners of war, 27 Germans killed, and 7 machine guns, 1 57mm anti-tank gun, and two 20mm guns destroyed the advance was resumed.

From here on, because the advance guard stayed well ahead, the main body was not delayed. The Third Battalion on the right was doing its share of fighting and supported by only one light tank fought four engagements in which it destroyed eight 20mm guns and numerous machine guns. At about 1800 hours, four more tank destroyers and five light tanks arrived at the head of the column on the main highway and were carrying infantry which had been loaded on them as they passed. Three more engagements, all light, rear guard actions, took place between NOGARA and CA DI DAVID before the advance guard, now consisting of seven tank destroyers from 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion and five light tanks from 752nd Tank Battalion, carrying most of Company F, entered VERONA and crashed through until stopped by enemy resistance and the debris in the vicinity of the heavily bombed railroad yards at 2210 hours. This magnificent accomplishment - from the PO RIVER to VERONA - a distance of forty miles by roadway, was completed in slightly more than sixteen hours. The main body at this time including both columns was in the vicinity of CA DI DAVID

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and was moving forward as rapidly as possible using all available transportation. Jeeps, anti-tank prime-movers and all other vehicles that could be found were used.

The actions of the advance guard led by Lieutenant JOHN F. EBEL of Company E, is a story in itself. All members of his platoon and the crews of the three tank destroyers that accompanied him fought with aggressiveness and plucky determination that exemplified the highest qualities in fighting men. They were determined to close with and destroy the enemy. At one point in their advance they were opposed by a 75mm German self-propelled gun which was neatly dispatched with two rounds from one of the tank destroyers. The German vehicle did not appear damaged for it had not burned, but at a point dead center and one and one-half feet from the bottom of the chassis, two 76mm holes, almost keyholing each other, could be found upon a closer inspection. The combat infantrymen of the 351st Infantry discovered that their teammates, 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion, knew how to shoot; and again later, and much more effectively, they saw what can happen to troops who congregate at a road junction under the surveillance of tank destroyer fire. The road junction in mind was in VERONA. Five burning vehicles and over fifteen German carcasses littered the roadway.

The appearance of the 351st Infantry in VERONA was so unbelievable to the Germans that many units found themselves facing the road blocks, established by the Second Battalion, as they poured into the city from the less important side roads to the southeast and southwest while attempting to rally in the city. Our tanks and infantry had a field day capturing and killing large groups of disorganized Germans who tried to rush the road blocks.

Reconnoitering forward shortly after 0600 hours, 26 April, Colonel FRANKLIN P. MILLER, Regimental Commander, contacted Colonel DARBY, Assistant Commander, 10th Mountain Division, near the railroad bridge at VERONA. Colonel DARBY's comment was, "You seem to have had an interesting brawl during the night, I heartily approve of the results". Elements of the 10th Mountain Division were at this time entering the city from the west.

Shortly thereafter, the Regimental Commander, Colonel FRANKLIN P. MILLER, returned to his command post at CA DI DAVID and here, while receiving new instructions from the Division Artillery Commander, Brigadier General LEWIS, friendly aircraft bombed and strafed the Regimental Command Post. Two precious gas-laden trucks, for the tank destroyers, were destroyed. The "Rover Joe" (air support) radio-operator and two other men were killed. Five other men were wounded and three jeeps damaged sufficiently to immobilize them, including the Division Artillery Commander's car.

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The new instructions directed the 351st Infantry to move southeast out of VERONA and secure crossing sites on the ADIGE RIVER in the vicinity of ZEVIO, approximately 15 kilometers southeast of VERONA. Lieutenant RALPH DECKER and the Rangers motorized on jeeps entered the town of SAN GIOVANNI, which is situated half way between VERONA and ZEVIO and received the surrender of a regiment of Czechoslovakians at about noon. The regimental column preceded by tank destroyers carrying infantrymen, moved on towards ZEVIO. Hardly 2000 yards east of SAN GIOVANNI they were stopped by steel road blocks covered with small arms fire. Attempts to remove the road blocks by ramming, failed; and simultaneously, German rifle and machine gun fire rattled from the flanks of the halted tank destroyers and forced the infantrymen to take cover. A brisk fire fight ensued before the covering party of Germans was neutralized with tank destroyer and machine gun fire killing nine and resulting in the capture of thirty. By-passing the road block by using another route the 351st Infantry column continued on toward ZEVIO. At this time, a company of tanks and a platoon of tank destroyers arrived and made possible the complete motorization of the Third Battalion. Before ZEVIO was reached, the column encountered unbelievably large numbers of disorganized enemy troops who surrendered wholesale with their officers. In this bag, a German Field Hospital Battalion, complete with motor transportation, casualties, and nurses, surrendered. So great was the number of prisoners of war that it became almost impossible to guard them; but they were not difficult to handle for the war was over for them and they seemed happy. The regiment closed in the ZEVIO area prior to 2400 hours, 26 April 1945.

On 26 April 1945, the Commanding General, 88th Infantry Division, Major General PAUL W. KENDALL, received the following commendation from the Commanding General, II Corps:

"Congratulations to you and the other Blue Devils for a magnificent race won against great odds. Please convey my congratulations to Colonel MILLER and the 351st and their team mates from the 752nd (Tank Battalion) and 805th (Tank Destroyer Battalion)."

Due to the rapid current and no available bridging materials, crossing of the ADIGE presented as difficult an operation as that met at the slower moving PO. Although the 349th Infantry and 350th Infantry were to continue the attack northwest toward VICENZA, all units of the 88th Division were ordered to cross the ADIGE with the least possible delay. 350th Infantry found an Italian ferry boat that handled much traffic before it finally became inoperative.

During the night, foot elements of the 351st Infantry crossed the ADIGE

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using the debris of a destroyed bridge near ZEVIO, with no resistance. A partially destroyed railroad bridge at VERONA was soon made serviceable for vehicular traffic and during the day of the 27th of April, armor and supply vehicles of all sizes poured across the river.

A task force led by Colonel JAMES C. FRY, Assistant Division Commander, 88th Division, raced east and northeast along Highway #11 and entered VICENZA before noon, 28 April. The 351st Infantry followed, shuttling with all available vehicles, and at 1500 hours orders from higher headquarters directed that SANDRIGO, MAROSTICA and BASSANO be taken. Between the latter two towns another swift river, the BRENTA, had to be crossed. On the night of the 27th, prior to the movement to VICENZA, Lieutenant Colonel VICTOR W. HOBSON, JR., Regimental Executive Officer, went north of Highway #11 and, in the vicinity of TREGHANO, accepted the formal surrender of 700 Russians and 6 Russian officers composing a Georgian Infantry Battalion.

Advancing swiftly toward SANDRIGO, the 351st Infantry by-passed scattered enemy elements and cleared the town by daylight of April 29th, there capturing over 300 prisoners and eleven 20mm anti-aircraft cannon intact with primers, ammunition, and other pieces of transportation. A task force consisting of four rifle platoons, riding tanks and tank destroyers, pushed forward at 0600 hours and entered the town of MAROSTICA at 1000 hours. The Regimental Commander, Colonel FRANKLIN P. MILLER, contacted a Partisan Headquarters and before noon was receiving accurate, timely, intelligence through Partisan channels (one of which consisted of a commercial telephone line in communication with BASSANO Partisans) as to the enemy situation in BASSANO.

Two possible crossing sites on the BRENTA RIVER were located; one at Bassano, consisting of an incompleated wooden bridge constructed by German Pioneers and the other site a ford further to the south at a place called NOVE.

Several plans for continuing the operation were considered; however, the presence of large numbers of enemy forces made the situation a puzzling one to straighten out without considerable delay. The First Battalion was sent on ahead to secure the crossing sites near BASSANO with the view of passing the Third Battalion through the First to cross the river. In the meantime, the Second Battalion continued to assemble in the vicinity of MAROSTICA and coordinated with the Third Battalion in establishing a perimeter of defense about the town.

By early afternoon with German columns advancing from the south and intercepting the already greatly extended regimental column and with a large force of Germans advancing south from SCHIO (to the northwest), with the

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apparent mission of assisting German forces to escape, the situation assumed a threateningly precarious aspect. The Regimental Commander, Colonel FRANKLIN P. MILLER, directed that air and artillery be placed on SCHIO and then went forward to the First Battalion where C companies A and B were engaged in a street fight in the hamlet on the west bank of the BRENTA RIVER near BASSANO. Tanks were pushed forward and reached the river bank only to be driven back by bazooka and self-propelled fire from the opposite side. The Regimental Commander followed by several men, entered a house on the bank, and while doing so, the man immediately behind the Regimental Commander was hit by a burst of machine gun fire from across the river. Upstairs the windows could not be used for observation purposes because of this machine gun fire. The house was evacuated and it was decided to put the Regimental Command Post several hundred yards to the rear. While this incident was occurring, members of 1st Parachute Regiment, 1st Parachute Division, established a strong road block on the highway between MAROSTICA and BASSANO.

A task force consisting of one rifle platoon from the First Battalion and four tank destroyers was hurriedly organized and placed under the command of Major FRANK W. CARMON, JR., with the mission of opening up the highway and clearing the area to MAROSTICA. This task force pushed forward aggressively and was soon in a furious fire fight. At least two companies of Germans held this road block which consisted of four heavy machine guns (two on each side of the road) two "Panzerfaust" teams (one on each side) and one 88mm bazooka team. The German riflemen were deployed on both sides of the road. Major CARMON was in the turret of the lead tank when the enemy opened fire. He quickly seized the caliber .50 machine gun mounted on the turret ring and swung it into action. Simultaneously, the platoon of infantry riding the tank destroyers dismounted and sought defilade in the ditches along the road. Major CARMON's first burst of fire killed one "Panzerfaust" team; and then in succession he killed the remaining "Panzerfaust" team, the bazooka team and put four machine guns out of action. The only pause in Major CARMON's deadly hail of fire occurred when he stopped to place another belt of cartridges in the gun. By count, 18 Germans were killed, 20 wounded and 52 were taken prisoner. This action took place at about 1430 hours. The road was then held firmly by Anti Tank Company and a patrol of four tank destroyers.

Returning to BASSANO, Major CARMON's task force was given a new mission. At 1500 hours, the task force moved south paralleling the BRENTA RIVER to reconnoiter the ford sites in the vicinity of NOVE. This completed, they then turned northwest on a road running in that direction and eventually to MAROSTICA and cleared this road to within one mile of that town. Many prisoners were taken. The force now did an about face and returned to NOVE by the same route. From NOVE, the task force struck west toward SCHIAVIDO and continued to round up Germans all the way. At SCHIAVIDO a large column of Germans were

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moving to the northwest. A few rounds of 76mm fire from the lead tank destroyer took all the fight out of them. Between 180 and 200 were captured. Light resistance was encountered all the way to SANDRIGO where the Regimental Service Company, Medical Detachment and a platoon of chemical mortars were "liberated". In the early morning, during the hours of darkness, this platoon had had a tangle with the Germans who succeeded in running away with two jeeps, one 4.2" mortar and 70 rounds of ammunition. Another task force consisting of one company from the Second Battalion, Anti-Tank Company and four tank destroyers, was given the mission of keeping the SANDRIGO-MAROSTICA highway clear.

In the meantime, Major CARMON's task force turned east at SANDRIGO and headed toward the BRENTA RIVER. As they proceeded they captured many scattered groups of Germans. Several miles from the river they came to a road block consisting of five German trucks set afire in the middle of the road. Major CARMON and the officer commanding the tank destroyers went forward to investigate the possibilities of dragging the burning wrecks away; however, exploding ammunition within them forced both to retire. A parallel road farther to the south was found and the column continued its march. After moving about one mile, a great column of enemy troops was contacted. They surrendered without a fight. The task force then headed north along a road paralleling the BRENTA RIVER and returned to their starting point. In this circuit they had captured 509 Germans and killed and wounded many others. It was now 2000 hours and the Third Battalion was moving up to cross the BRENTA and seize BASSANO. Organized resistance in that vicinity had practically ended.

By 2110 hours, the Third Battalion was across and mopped up the town before midnight. In the interim the First and Second Battalions and the second task force had collected a fantastic number of prisoners of war and placed them in the school house at MAROSTICA. 2735 were counted of which 1041 were from the 1st and 4th Parachute Divisions. This total does not include the 509 Germans captured by Major CARMON's task force. His prisoners were sent direct to SANDRIGO and did not pass through the Regimental Cage.

On the morning of April 30th, the Regimental Command Post moved across the river into BASSANO. With its mission completed the 351st Infantry was to "assemble vicinity of BASSANO and MAROSTICA and protect the 88th Division left by blocking to the north"; however, at 1348 hours, 30 April, a change in orders arrived and immediate advance up the BRENTA river Valley was ordered. The objective was to be FONZASO; however, before reaching that place the regiment received orders to follow the valley to the west and seize BORGO. At a village called CLSMON an important bridge was destroyed and some delay in getting armor across slowed the advance. The 349th Infantry, meeting increasing resistance in the next main valley to the east, was having difficulty advancing

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By MDJ NARA Date 4/25/00


on FELTRE and therefore, one battalion from 351st Infantry, the Second Battalion, was sent to ARSIE, northeast of CISMON. At this town a lively firefight took place, the first engagement being a scrabble with a horse-drawn supply column, part of the 1028 German Regiment. Many horses were killed, wagons destroyed and heavy casualties inflicted upon the Germans by tank destroyer and machine gun fire. 60 Germans were captured and 75 killed when the Second Battalion, led by Major HAROLD B. AYRES, mopped up the town. Partisans contacted near ARSIE led in 50 enlisted men and 4 Officers all ex-prisoners of war, and with the exception of one man from the 805 Tank Destroyer Battalion, all were from the 350th Infantry Regiment and had been captured several days before. In the meantime, the First and Third Battalions plus part of the Second Battalion, advanced north and northwest toward BORGO meeting very little resistance. The advance continued throughout the night and in the early morning of 2 May 1945, elements of the First Battalion entered BORGO. At this time it became necessary to halt the advance in order to assemble the regiment due to the greatly extended column that had resulted from two days of continued advance. In BORGO the first German Artillery fire received in several days landed during the mid morning and early afternoon. It was believed to be 88mm fire and the total number of rounds did not exceed twenty-five. Since it seemed to be coming from the vicinity of a town called RONCEGNO to the west, the 913th Field Artillery Battalion fired about five hundred rounds into the reverse slopes in the vicinity of that town.

At 1440 hours, Colonel RENNECKE, commanding the 1st Parachute Regiment of the 1st Parachute Division, came through our lines at BORGO and stated that members of the 1st Parachute Division had been informed of an armistice and had been ordered to hold in position until further orders were received. He also stated that he would not fire unless we advanced; but because of his orders to hold, he would resist should we move forward. He then returned to his own troops.

Orders from 88th Division and II Corps directed that the 351st Infantry continue its advance and a lively battle ensued. At 1800 hours, broadcasts from BBC and the AEF station were received announcing the first news of an armistice. At 2204 hours, Colonel JAMES C. FRY, Assistant Division Commander, arrived with orders to stop fighting and hold in place pending further orders. This order was complied with; but the recording of the surrender of the entire I Fallschirmkorps (1st Para Corps) complete, consisting of over 13,500 men and officers, tanks, armored cars, artillery, mortars, ammunition, equipment of all types, and four general officers, two days later, belongs properly in the succeeding monthly history.


F. P. Miller

F. P. MILLER
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding




SCHEMATIC SKETCH
TO ACCOMPANY HISTORY
APRIL 1945

SCHEMATIC SKETCH TO ACCOMPANY HISTORY - APRIL 1945



HQ - 351ST INFANTRY
"ACTION AT MAROSTICA"


SCHEMATIC SKETCH TO ACCOMPANY NARRATIVE HISTORY APRIL 1945



HEADQUARTERS 351ST INF
"PO RIVER CROSSING"

CONTEMPLATED
BRIDGE SITE

SCHEMATIC TO ACCOMPANY HISTORY APRIL 1945




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By: M.D. NARA Co. 4/25/60

Crossing the Po

When Allied
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INFANTRYMEN OF CO. H, 351ST REG., 88TH DIV. CROUCH BEHIND DIKE ON SOUTH BANK OF THE PO, WHILE A TANK SHELLS GERMAN IN OSTIGLIA




During a spell of enemy shelling, the 3d Platoon of the 351st Regiment takes shelter—and a rest—under the brick spans of a bridge. Note weariness of OLI.

Waiting to cross the Po, Fifth Army doughboys lie flat for cover under river embankment while sweating out heavy German artillery and machine-gun fire.


One of the 351st...

Three doughs dig foxholes inside shell craters for good protection in Rovere, on Highway 12 on south bank of Po opposite German-held Ostiglia, later taken by 88th.

Observer notes extent of damage to iron bridge between Rovere and Ostiglia. Troops of 88th Div. were able to use this crossing, despite central span in water.



When Allied troops reached the Po River, the Germans were in no condition to take advantage of the defensive features of this great water barrier. The Jerry strength had been smashed below Bologna. They abandoned hundreds of horses, tons of supplies and thousands of men on the south bank of the Po while they fled in rout toward the Alps. YANK's Pfc. Werner Wolff caught an 88th Division unit under enemy gun fire during one of many Po River crossings of Allied troops.



Iron bridge carrying Highway 12 over the Po was broken, but not utterly wrecked. Rangers of 351st Regiment were first across this span in pursuit of retreating Nazis.

IN OSTIGLIA



ANDREW WOLFF
 1105210000
 1105210000

Under river... One of the 351st Regiment...
 Mechan... to cover the Po River...
 Ostiglia, Italy

Wolff... behind smashed Jerry tanks...
 Ostiglia, Italy

NEAR EDITION

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By MPJ, NARA D&C 4/25/00

YANK

THE ARMY WEEKLY



10¢

By the men
in the



STORMING THE PO

~~SECRET~~
HEADQUARTERS 351ST INFANTRY
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 88

9 June 1945

HISTORY OF 351ST INFANTRY REGIMENT FOR MONTH OF MAY 1945.

May has been a month of great news; for with the surrender of German forces the long, hard, Italian fighting ended. On the eventful day the 351st Infantry was at Borgo, Italy, in contact with an old enemy, the 1st Paratroop Division. This same enemy unit had fought stubbornly and fanatically near Mount Grande; and it was the 1st Parachute Regiment that had captured Company G at Vedriano. To see the despised enemy at close range and not fight with him was an incredible experience for the combat-wise Infantrymen of the 351st Infantry. A person felt insecure; but by the terms of the surrender certain Germans were allowed to bear arms. It seemed fantastic that armed Germans and armed Americans marched along the roads and occupied small hamlets at the same time. The Germans seemed indifferent; however, they did not display indolence or create unnecessary disturbance. They carried out our orders in a spiritless manner of resignation. There were a few instances of failure to cooperate, but the German authorities, when informed, took strong disciplinary action.

The actual surrender required a number of parleys with the Germans and lasted for two days. At 1440 hours, 2 May 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Rennecke, Commanding the 1st Parachute Regiment entered the First Battalion outpost area with a white flag and was taken to the First Battalion Forward Command Post in the western outskirts of Borgo, Italy. An interpreter accompanied the German officer who wore decorations and whose boots shone brightly. The First Battalion immediately notified the Regimental Commander who directed them to hold the German officer until he could arrive. The meeting took place in the street in front of the Battalion Command Post where a cordon of Rangers were placed around the group to keep curious civilians and many by-standers away.

Colonel Rennecke announced that his Division (1st Para) had been informed that an armistice had taken effect at 1400, that under it both sides were to stand fast, moving only supply vehicles. He said it had been arranged by Marshal Kesselring and Field Marshal Alexander.

No such word had been received by the 351st, but the appearance of an officer of Rennecke's rank seemed to eliminate the possibility of any trickery.

At the moment, the 351st was halted, due to repairs on a bridge being necessary for passage of tanks, and the continuation of mop-up action in Borgo's western outskirts.

Colonel Miller replied that no such order had been received, that he would receive the unconditional surrender of Colonel Rennecke or his whole Division, but would not forward him as an accredited emissary without necessary papers signed by a Corps Commander.

Colonel Rennecke stated his Division Commander had proceeded to Corps to obtain such papers and would be back in an hour. He also stated that the Germans had orders to fire, if the Americans advanced.

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By MDJ NARA Date 4/25/00

Knowing that advance with tank support would be impossible for an estimated forty minutes, the Regimental Commander ordered Colonel Rennecke to return to the German lines, agreeing to a one hour armistice in the sector of the road, with Colonel Rennecke agreeing to return within an hour if humanly possible as an accredited representative who could be forwarded to Division.

There was neither wire nor radio contact with 88th Division at the time. An officer courier was dispatched to Division, radio relay stations were increased, but no answer to the puzzle was obtainable.

Meantime, the bridge was repaired, Infantry deployed, and the town of Roncegno was occupied.

One hour having elapsed, and no word from Division having been received, the advance was resumed.

Within three hundred yards savage resistance was met. As this resistance developed, a message was received from 88th Division that they had no knowledge of an armistice and that the regiment would push on to the objective, Trento.

In the ensuing battle five men and one officer of the First Battalion were killed, and four men wounded. Later the Germans claimed about twenty-eight Germans were killed, but visual evidence is available from American sources to confirm eight only.

After the attack had progressed about four hundred yards, Major Margold of the 1st Para Division (German) staff appeared under a white flag, bearing a letter from General Schulz of the 1st Para Division to General Kendall stating the terms of the "armistice" as understood by him. They coincided with Colonel Rennecke's previously given verbal message.

The letter was forwarded to 88th Division Headquarters, and the German sent back to his lines, since he lacked credentials from a Corps Commander, which had been specified in a directive from II Corps as necessary.

At 1830 hours, B.B.C. and A.E.F. radio broadcasts having been repeatedly heard at Regiment, to the effect that the German forces in Italy had surrendered, the Regimental Commander gave the order to cease fire to avoid further loss of life. This decision was confirmed at 1840, when a representative from Division G-3 arrived with orders to press on to the objective, but realized on hearing the broadcasts and seeing the local situation, that to do so would inevitably result in heavy casualties, after the war was over. At 1850, the same German representative, Major Margold, appeared at the out-post and announced that he had to report failure to procure a Corps Commanders letter of credential, that the Parachute Corps had been told again to hold fast and not to fire unless the Americans advanced, but that they were to do nothing about surrender until further orders came from 14th German Army which was in contact with 5th American Army. Further; as an evidence of good faith, 1st Para Division would withdraw its out-post line five hundred yards to avoid friction.

At 2204, the Assistant Division Commander, Colonel James C. Fry, arrived with confirming orders to hold in place, that the war was over. The regiment held in place, alert for action, and there was no elation at victory--the situation still remained too tense.

The next morning, 3 May, Major Edmonson and Lieutenant [redacted] by the Regimental Commander, Colonel Franklin P. Miller, to confer with General Schulz of the 1st Para Division. General Schulz reiterated willingness to comply with any order of 14th Army (German) regarding surrender, but would not act until ordered. This was a direct order from the 1st German Para Corps Commander, General Heidrich.

The agreement was made that an emissary would be sent instantly on receiving such orders to inform 351st Infantry.

The situation remained thus strained until late afternoon of 4 May. Meanwhile, the Regimental Commander, Colonel Franklin P. Miller, felt that too much opportunity for improving positions was being allowed the Germans, in case they decided to adopt guerrilla or "werewolf" tactics. Appealing to and receiving permission from General Kendall, Major Edmonson and Lieutenant Delfiner were sent to 1st Para Division Headquarters--and received information there that serious Partisan difficulties were arising and that General Heidrich would be glad to discuss surrender, if it could be honorably done, with the Regimental Commander opposing him.

The Regimental Commander, at once drove to 1st Parachute Division Headquarters, took the surrender of General Schulz, sent for the regiment to advance at once and take over, then started with a German guide car for 1st Para Corps Headquarters at San Cristoforo. Accompanying him were Major Edmonson, Regimental Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Delfiner, Interrogation Officer, and Technician Fifth Grade Peters, the Commanding Officer's driver.

Arriving at Para Corps Headquarters, the Regimental Commander found that the 1st Para Division Headquarters at Levico had been attacked by Partisans, and five American guards wounded--despite the fact all lights were on and vehicle lights were playing on the building. Also; 4th Para Division Headquarters was under attack, and Corps Headquarters was threatened.

Informing the Corps Commander, General of Paratroops Heidrich, that "this nonsense could not continue", Colonel Miller found the General was holding his men under rigid discipline, preventing guerrilla desires, and was willing to surrender, if 14th Army would give orders to do so.

A phone call was directed to 14th German Army by the Corps Chief of Staff at Colonel Miller's order and 14th Army decided to allow the 1st Para Corps to surrender, despite lack of such orders from Von Veitinghoff.

Thereupon the 1st Para Corps surrendered at 0135 on 5 May. It proved to be composed of:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1st Para Division | Major General Karl Lothar Schulz |
| 4th Para Division | General Heinrich Trettner |
| 26th Panzer | |
| Group Boemler | Strength approximately three thousand, plus supporting artillery |
| Group Hacker | Armored Cars and self-propelled guns |
| Corps Artillery | General Von Isslinger |
| (with twenty-four mobile 88's and forty-eight fixed mount A.A. dual purpose 88's plus sundry 40 millimeter guns) | |

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By MDJ NARA Date 4/25/00

This was the only unit in Italy, so far as can be discovered, which was relatively intact, with armor, artillery, and ammunition, plus the organization to make an effective resistance.

Phone calls were instantly sent to Group Boemler to allow free passage of the 10th Mountain Division northward.

Because the 26th Panzer was so far north as to be out of reach by the 351st Regimental Combat Team, orders were sent to it to surrender by sending white flags to whatever American troops appeared first. 26th Panzer was the reserve of the 14th Army, and was later administratively removed from Para Corps Command due to distance.

The total effectives in 1st Para Corps at time of surrender was over fifteen thousand officers and men, plus some five thousand service and anti-aircraft troops, but excluding the 26th Panzer and 278th Divisions. The 278th Division had been out of contact with Corps for five days and was presumed destroyed.

Establishing guards, and leaving lights on until dawn, the Commanding Officer ordered a conference of all unit Commanders. (German) at Para Corps Headquarters at 0800, and sent for the Partisan leader at Trento--well known to the Germans.

On his arrival, arrangements were made for Partisan attacks to cease, but they were asked to retain arms until further orders. Considerable difficulty was experienced in presenting the idea to the Partisan chief due to language difficulties and the confused situation. The German command evidently knew and had known him for some time, but had considered him a "steadying influence" and had not disturbed his efforts.

At about 0330 Brigadier General Lewis arrived at San Cristoforo and obtained a signed surrender, verifying the previous verbal arrangements.

Thereafter the German staff was ordered out of the San Cristoforo Hotel, the 351st Combat Team Headquarters set up therein, and some sleep obtained before the 0800 meeting.

At 0800, instructions were issued to concentrate the Corps in the area Trento, Pergine, Levico, Borgo, and all Generals and Group Commanders were sent under guard to the Division Commander, Major General Paul W. Kendall.

As a matter of interest, it might be added that the Combat group Boemler was at one time to have been the nucleus for a new Para Division, to be numbered the tenth; however, the formation was never made. The mission of this combat group at the time of the surrender had been to hold the Rovereto area. The accompanying map shows the 1st Para Corps boundaries and the locations of troops. It is the 1st Para Corps situation as of 2 May 1945.

In this sector and adjacent sectors many other German formations surrendered and were evacuated by the 351st Infantry; and included the 14th Panzer Corps, commanded by Fridolin Von Senger und Etterlin, General of Panzwe Troops and the 51st Mountain Corps commanded by Lieutenant General of Artillery Hauck. Separate

organizations included the 16th SS Division, the 25th Flak Division, the 94th Panzer Grenadier Division, many Organization Todt members, special railway battalions, a Sanitation Regiment, a Medical Regiment, a Signal Regiment, and a Railway Guard Regiment. All of these troops were part of the 14th German Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Lemelsen.

Apropos at this time would be a brief description of the surrounding country. Borgo is in the Italian mountains approximately fifty miles north of Verona which is on the northern edge of the Po Valley. The mountain ranges in this province are known as The Dolmites and are two and three times higher than those through which the regiment battled its way up the Italian peninsula from the Garigliano River. They are carpeted with velvety green trees and foliage; except for those that jut up to such a great altitude that plant life does not exist and where they are eternally capped with snow. In these mountains the German Organization Todt spent years constructing elaborate fortifications that came to be known as the Southern Redoubt. These were the lower defenses of the Inner-Fortress. It was here that the Wehrmacht would make its last stand, an imponderable that failed to materialize. It has been a great good fortune that American arms did not have to batter their way through these almost impregnable defenses. There are only a few good highways along which an attacking force might advance. In the gorges thousands of concrete obstacles such as pyramidal dragons teeth and deep anti-tank ditches cover all approaches; and fortresses from the first World War still remain whose defenses were subsequently modernized. The civilian population inhabits small villages along the valleys and on the mountain sides. The homes and buildings of these people are neatly kept and the architectural forms have a simplicity and purity of character that indicates a greater degree of development than that which exists in Central and Southern Italy. The inhabitants appear to have greater civic pride evidenced by clean streets and efficient public utilities systems. This province has been a refreshing land to war-weary Americans.

An idea of the vastness of the district occupied by the 351st Infantry can be visualized when one considers that the area occupied is nearly twice the size of the state of Delaware. The actual measurements of the 351st zone is two thousand eight hundred and forty-five square miles. From this district over fifty-two thousand German troops were evacuated by the end of May.

There is no accurate count or listing of the immense quantities of enemy materiel secured. In the main valley along the Brenner Pass route, north and south of Trento, ninety-one 88 millimeter anti-aircraft cannon, thirty-six of these with radar equipment, were located. At least thirty thousand rifles, eight thousand machine pistols, two thousand machine guns, two hundred mortars, five 37 millimeter guns, four 75 millimeter howitzers, two hundred and fifty 20 millimeter cannon and large quantities of ammunition of all types were collected. Thousands of motor vehicles ranging in size from the flimsy little "Volkswagons" to large heavy trucks and prime movers, were confiscated. These vehicles were of great use in transporting enemy personnel to the concentration areas at Modena, Bassano, and Ghedi. They also were used to haul German supplies and to collect ammunition dumps. In the Lake Garda area a number of submarines and motor boats were found unharmed. The motor boats were rather interesting for they contained heavy explosive charges and radio control equipment.

Many warehouses were found bulging with such items as dry goods, chinaware, cooking utensils, furniture, toilet articles, and other household goods. Most of these items were of Italian manufacture but had been seized by the Germans for their own use. German medical supplies were placed under guard and reserved for

German use. At first, looting by civilians presented a problem but as soon as the regiment could reach these warehouses they were barred from all persons and placed under guard.

The Germans had many mercenary troops and slave laborers throughout this area. There were Czechslovakians, Russians, Yugoslavs, Italians, Austrians, Poles, and large numbers of Italian civilians. All of these troops and laborers were used as service troops. Many were required in keeping the rail lines leading north to the Brenner Pass in operation. The civilians, now liberated, trekked to the south in disorganized streams, riding trucks, bicycles, and walking.

The mission of the 351st Infantry upon cessation of hostilities was to locate, collect, and guard surrendered enemy forces preparatory to their evacuation to concentration areas in the Po Valley. The regiment also was responsible for the evacuation of these troops. Using German and American trucks, convoys were made up with American officers in command and normal motor movement regulations applied. March Tables were published that were indeed strange to look at. The issuing headquarters was Headquarters 351st Infantry but the march units were German Units such as the 1st Para Regiment, Combat Team Boemler, and perhaps Headquarters 14th Panzer Corps.

Occupation of towns was by company. Smaller outlying towns were occupied by platoons. Motor patrols operated throughout the 351st Infantry zone. These patrols went to Verona, the territory northwest of Lake Garda, Bassano, and Vicenza. Company Commanders became a number of officials in one person. They were AMG officers, CIC officers, town mayors, and head of the local police, at the same time. Company L commanded by Captain Albert F. Reinwart, Jr., occupied the city of Rovereto and its outlying communities. The story of this occupation is typical of those of the other companies of the regiment.

Captain Reinwart, an Infantry officer, became the head administrator of a city of twenty thousand persons and for three weeks ruled the town. The 14th Panzer Corps was concentrated in the Rovereto area and numbered twenty-two thousand troops. This Corps consisted of the 305th Infantry Division, the 94th Panzer Grenadier Division, the 65th Infantry Division, the 8th Mountain Division, the 914th Flak Battalion, Corps Headquarters and Service Units. There were other German troops in this area including: The 626th Railroad Battalion, Pioneer Companies, and Signal Detachments. Captain Reinwart received daily morning reports on the strength of these units and had three German officers near, but not in, his headquarters for liaison. In addition to the above mentioned personnel there was one Hungarian woman, one French woman, and two German women, who had been working as secretaries at the Organization Todt Headquarters in Rovereto. These women uncertain of their fate, wondered what would become of themselves; but they were evacuated without incident to the concentration area at Modena.

While Captain Reinwart was acting as town mayor many domestic problems arose, many of them boring and tedious, but not all without humor. There was the case in which two Italians, one owning a cow, and the other a horse, wanted permission to trade with each other. On another occasion an Italian requested permission to go to Milano for the purpose of visiting his girl friend. Captain Reinwart's office consisted of an outer and inner office. In the outer office his interpreter handled all of the minor civilian problems and brought the more important ones to Captain Reinwart for his decision.

The warehouses in the vicinity were bulging. Three thousand sewing machines were located, hundreds of bolts of cloth and uniform material, sweaters, refrigeration units, rubber matting, and kitchen equipment. Numerous ammunition dumps were placed under guard and two hundred and twenty-five horses were assembled. Some of these animals were made available to the civilians; especially those who had horses stolen or killed by the Germans.

For the most part the Germans gave little trouble. A few isolated cases are worthy of mention. The 94th Division billeted near Rovereto and occupying homes of many Italians was ordered to move out as directed by Regimental Headquarters. This order was not promptly complied with and Captain Reinwart delivered the following ultimatum to the Commander of that unit: "Move your troops into the fields immediately; if you do not do so we will move you, including yourself, into the fields". The Germans complied.

Another incident is that of the German General Ihne. General Ihne had been reported in the Rovereto area in civilian clothes harbored by Italian civilians. When he was apprehended he objected to the treatment he received and said that a British AMG officer had told him to demand treatment fitting his rank. He said that he wanted to see an American Colonel. The British officer who had given General Ihne this advice was located and consulted. It was true, he had told the General these things; and he further stated that he could not understand the reactions of American Officers and the courtesy they used in this situation. He said it was different in the British Army; they treated captured officers with the respect due their rank. The Regimental Commander, consulted by phone, said he was too busy to see General Ihne, even out of curiosity. Further, the General would be treated "like any other Kraut in civilian clothes". Accordingly Lieutenant Edward P. Toomey took the General to Verona to the Army Prison Cage and brought back the following receipt signed by a Staff Sergeant: "Received of Lieutenant Toomey--1 German General".

The largest city in the Regimental area was Trento. Here the service elements of the 351st Infantry were located. Major Charles D. Edmonson, Regimental Intelligence Officer, established a prisoner of war cage where German stragglers and all other unauthorized persons were collected and evacuated to the south. Through this cage representatives of nearly all European nations passed. There were German WAC's, French Workers, Czechslovakians, Yugoslavians, Hungarians, Austrians, Roumanians, and Russians. Because Trento is centrally located and on the main supply route Major William H. Klein, Regimental Supply Officer, established ration, gasoline and oil, and clothing dumps there. A theatre in Trento was requisitioned and the Information and Education film "Two Down and One to Go" was shown to the Regiment.

Early in the month, the 351st Infantry took over the 10th Mountain Division zone which included Lake Garda and territory northwest of Verona. On the north shore of this lake is situated the once famous spa, Riva. Rising suddenly from the shores of the lake and above Riva are magnificent mountains. The vista is breath-taking because of the incredible sheerness of the towering heights. Lake Garda itself is a pleasant and refreshing sight and its color ranging from deep azure to ultra marine to torquoise, and to sky blue, arrests the eye. Here in this beautiful spot the Third Battalion was located.

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 Authority NND 735017
 By MDJ NARA Date 4/25/00

GERMAN Troops EVACUATED

DATE	UNIT	EVACUATED TO	OFFICERS	G.M.
11/15	MISC	BASSANO	---	530
16	1ST PARA CORPS	GHEDI (ADV PARTY)	131	---
16	14TH PZ CORPS	GHEDI (ADV PARTY)	102	---
16	RUSSIAN BN.	MODENA	18	670
18	1ST PARA DIV	GHEDI	327	8621
18	BOEHLER GROUP	GHEDI	340	2668
19	MARINE COMPANY	MOENA	1	129
19	14TH ARMY SV UNITS	GHEDI	---	2160
20	4TH PARA DIV & PARA CORPS HQ	GHEDI	210	4299
21	51ST MTN CORPS	GHEDI	114	4705
22	14TH PZ CORPS	BASSANO	650	17895
22	14TH ARMY HQ	GHEDI	163	---
22	LUFTWAFFE	GHEDI	316	5785
24	524 SIGNAL COMPANY	GHEDI	---	700
24	MISC	GHEDI	---	139
25	682ND FIELD HOSP	PISA	---	85
25	CASUALS	MODENA	---	86
26	SAN CO II/190	LANA	1/7 NURSES	204
26	710 FUS BN, 305 INF DIV	BASSANO	7	289
26	CASUALS	MODENA	---	9
27	CASUALS	GHEDI	---	130
27	VERONA BKS	BASSANO	39	529
28	CIVILIANS	MODENA	---	24
29	677 FIELD HOSP	MERANO	2/25 NURSES	81
31	MISC	MODENA	---	53
31	MISC GERMAN	BASSANO	---	55

351st

TOTAL EVACUATED 52,279

REFRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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Authority NND 735017

By W.D. NARA Date 4/25/00

On 30 May 1945 representatives from the Friuli Group (Ita) were made for the relief of the 351st Infantry Regiment within the regimental zone. The Folgore Group and Friuli Group would make this relief. Division Headquarters ordered that the relief be completed no later than 3 June 1945.

The Regiment has spent a most pleasant month in a land characterized by scenic grandeur; but there was also much work to be done. The evacuation of over fifty-two thousand surrendered Germans and the collection and listing of vast quantities of enemy materiel was not an easy job; however it was a job well done, which in itself, is a testimonial of the 351st Infantry's ability to accomplish any assigned task.

F. P. Miller

F. P. MILLER,
Colonel, 351st Infantry,
Commanding.

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Authority NND 735017

By W.D. NARA Das 4/25/00



Colonel Frank W. Miller "laying down the law" to Major Margoid, representative from 1st Parachute Division near Borgo, Italy 2 May 1945.

Handwritten: 9 Aug 1945
Handwritten: 9 Aug 1945

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Authority NMD 7350P7

By W.D. NARA Date 4/25/00

**HEADQUARTERS 351ST INFANTRY
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 88**

CG 882nd AW
Initials W.D.
Date 21 July 1945
18 July 1945

HISTORY OF THE 351ST INFANTRY REGIMENT FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE 1945

The month of June, 1945, found the 351st Infantry Regiment widely dispersed in the general area of Borgo, Trento, Rovereto, Riva, and north to the Bolzano region. The area occupied by the regiment was very large—approximately twice the size of Delaware, and with the coming of summer the entire area became beautiful and lovely, for the Dolomite Alps in this region are among the most beautiful mountains in the world. Regimental Headquarters was established in a hotel in the village of San Cristoforo, on the shores of Lake Caldonazzo. For the past three weeks the regiment had been working vigorously to evacuate the thousands of surrendered enemy personnel who were concentrated in this area when the war ended in Italy. By the first of June the greater part of this task had been completed and only a few scattered units remained. Advanced parties from the Italian "Folgore Group" arrived on 1 June to discuss relief of the 351st, and almost immediately Italian troops began replacing units of the regiment. In addition to the Folgore Group, the 428th Field Artillery Battalion moved in to guard a large ammunition and vehicle dump north of Trento, and by 4 June the 351st was relieved of its responsibility in the whole area. After concentrating nearer to Trento for two days, the regiment moved by motor convoy on 6 June to a bivouac area a few miles south of Lake Garda, in the region of Gavardo and Sallo. Light training schedules were maintained and the troops made full use of the Regimental beach on the shores of Lake Garda while waiting for further orders. In this area the War Department's redeployment program began to take effect on the personnel who had fought together throughout the Po Valley offensive. Several hundred men with over eighty-five points left for replacement depots, and a lucky few obtained air travel to the United States for discharge. Simultaneously, new men from other units came to take the place of those who had left, and gradually the regiment began to change. Many of the high-score men were key men who had been with the 351st since its activation, and it became necessary to train new First Sergeants, communications personnel, drivers, and administrative clerks. In this area Colonel Miller's Command Post was located in a beautiful villa a few kilometers from Sallo, and this villa had been the residence of Italian Marshal Grazianni and the occasional visiting place of Mussolini during the last three years of the war. It was from this villa that Mussolini drove to Lake Como to meet his death at the hands of the Partisans late in April.

After six days in this bivouac area a new mission was assigned to the 351st Infantry—to guard the huge concentration camp for surrendered enemy personnel at the airfield near Ghedi, twelve kilometers southeast of Brescia. The regiment moved by motor convoy on the morning of 11 June 1945 and went into temporary bivouac near the camp and prepared to relieve the Japanese-American 442nd Infantry Combat Team. At that time there were approximately sixty-five thousand Germans in the area and none had yet been repatriated. The weather in the Po Valley was

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M. A. ... 12 Aug 46
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE

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very hot and humid, and living in tents did not help it to become more comfortable for the troops clad in woolen clothing. But the regiment had an important mission to perform and the officers and men quickly oriented themselves to their new environment.

Relief of the 442nd was officially completed on 14 June and the companies moved their tent-camps closer to the concentration area and assumed full guard responsibilities. The system employed to maintain security around the enclosure was to have one battalion on guard, one on an alert status, while the third was free for passes and recreation. Some difficulties with the administrative Sub-Command about stopping of vehicles at the main gate were quickly ironed out and the 351st settled down to its routine duties. Intense programs of beautifying the tent and bivouac areas were initiated, largely with German labor, and soon all kitchens were screened, sidewalks installed, and unit signs posted. Several formations for the presentation of combat decorations were held, and over four hundred bronze stars were awarded to fighting men of the 351st for heroism and merit during the final offensive of the war. Steps were taken to initiate an Information and Education program for the enlisted men, and the compilation of the history of the 351st Infantry was begun. Enlisted men enjoyed evening passes to Brescia and small villages in the vicinity of Ghedi, while four and seven day passes were allotted for Alassio, Lake Como, Milano, and Lake Maggiore. German personnel proved to be fairly cooperative and docile, and no escapes were attempted. Colonel Miller sent official congratulation to a Private in Company L for refusing to sell a package of American cigarettes to a German soldier, and all money was taken from the prisoners and held in custody.

And so the month of June passed quickly for the 351st Infantry regiment. A change from Category II to Category IV abruptly altered the composition of the troops and company grade officers of the regiment. For several weeks the 351st lost its low-score men and received new men with high scores; but near the end of the month a large group of very low point men was received from the replacement system, further changing the composition of the regiment. Every possible effort was made to keep the venereal disease rate at a minimum, but in spite of repeated lectures, warnings, and the installation of prophylaxis stations throughout the countryside, the number of infections increased slightly. The regiment was called upon to furnish individuals and detachments for specialized duty at various headquarters, and late in the month a platoon was sent all the way to Volturmo, near Caserta, to perform guard duty. Direct liason with MTOUSA was initiated in view of the wide dispersion of the 88th Division and in consideration of the mission of the 351st Infantry.

The closing days of June 1945 found the 351st Infantry Regiment still engaged in its normal mission of guarding and securing the largest enemy concentration camp in Italy, enduring the hot summer sun, and living by semi-garrison standards. June had been the first month in sixteen that the regiment had not heard the scream of German shells and the ripping noise of their machine guns-- and the absence of battle sounds was a welcome occurrence to all.

F. P. Miller
F. P. MILLER,
Colonel, 351st Inf.,
Commanding.

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DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE 12 Aug 46

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Authority NMD 7350P7

By MDJ NARA Date 4/25/00

Date 17 August 1945

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 351ST INFANTRY
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 88

HISTORY OF THE 351ST INFANTRY REGIMENT FOR THE MONTH OF JULY, 1945

July 1945 found the 351st Infantry Regiment busy continuing its mission of guarding the huge Prisoner of War Concentration Area at Ghedi Airport, Italy. It was to become an uneventful, routine kind of month, which closely approximated the garrison-type life of any Army installation in the United States.


The earlier part of the month was spent almost entirely building and polishing up the actual camp area, as well as formulating more workable plans for the defense of our extensive perimeter. An efficient, well-prepared plan resulted, incorporating searchlight batteries, scout dog guard posts, and more numerous walking and stationary guard posts. The further success of this defense was greatly aided by the construction of guard towers for more widespread vision, and individual sentry boxes for the protection of the guards from the fervid Po Valley sunshine.

Unfortunately, this smooth running plan was short-lived, due to the regiment's being called upon to furnish rail guards in the returning of repatriates to Germany, and a second plan had to be initiated. Fewer men were available for the normal Regimental Guard details since the repatriation duties required one full battalion; necessarily, the perimeter had to be shortened. As a result, it was now possible to create fewer guard posts, which, in turn, would allow limited recreational periods for those men not actually performing some duty. With the attaching of the 339th Field Artillery to the POW Command, relief appeared imminent, but their stay was shortened by their assignment in Southern Italy of a similar mission.

In the meantime, the 2nd Battalion, which had been selected to furnish the repatriation guard detail, had set up their battalion Command Post in Verona. Rail movements had commenced, and the battalion was averaging 112 duty hours per week.

Despite the manpower shortage, and the extra burden of guard duty placed upon the individual soldier, a system was devised whereby seven-day rest periods could be granted at Alassio, on the Italian Riviera, and Lake Como, near the Swiss border, for enlisted personnel, Lake Maggiore, and Milan for officers. To supplement these rest periods, daily trips were made to the 351st's beach area on Lake Garda. Relief from the intense heat, through these invigorating dips in the cool waters, helped to boost the sometimes sagging morale of the troops.

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By W.D.J. NARA Date 4/25/00

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The regiment was honored by having one of its soldiers, Staff Sergeant William R. Abrams of Richmond, Virginia, selected as the outstanding soldier of the 88th Division. As a personal token of his gratitude, Lt. General Truscott presented Sergeant Abrams with a fine wrist watch.

The highlight of the month's routine was the arrival of the Commanding General, 5th Army, Lt. General Lucian K. Truscott, who, accompanied by Brigadier General Fry, Division Commander, awarded six Distinguished Service Crosses, five of which were to members of this regiment.

The remaining days of July were without incident with only the fulfilling of our mission continuing. The Regimental Commander and his staff were kept constantly busy with the usual administrative details, and a great many daily "checks" of the Perimeter defense.

The month made its exit with two additional events. The first was the loss of the former Division Commander, Major General Paul W. Kendall, who was leaving the division to accept the duties of camp commander at Camp Howze, Texas. In his honor, an honor guard was formed, consisting of one platoon from each of the 88th Division's units, commanded by Lt. Colonel Harold B. Ayers, Executive Officer, 351st Infantry. General Kendall's leaving was regarded as a great loss to the Division. The second event, was, perhaps, the most morale-lifting of all. The Regimental Commander, Colonel Franklin P. Miller, had announced that large numbers of low point men and officers were to be immediately returned to the United States. Speculation and rumors ran rampant. Each soldier had his own idea as to what the future would hold for him. This promise of a few months, weeks, or even a few days at home, before probable assignment in the Pacific Theater, was just the stimulant for which each man had prayed since the European war's end.

Franklin P. Miller

FRANKLIN P. MILLER
Colonel, Infantry,
Commanding

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