

"DRY BOOKS OF TACTICS": U S INFANTRY MANUALS OF THE WAR OF 1812 AND AFTER, PART I

by
Donald E. Graves

"Dry books of tactics are beneath the notice of a man of genius."

-Francis Grose,
Advice to the officers of the British Army, 1783

From the end of the Revolution to the beginning of the Civil War, the U S infantry officially used seven drill manuals. The first of these manuals was written by a former Prussian officer in 1778; the other six were either copies or adaptations of contemporary French Army infantry manuals. What follows is a history not of U S infantry tactics during the period, 1778-1862, but of the manuals used to train U S soldiers in those tactics. The focus is on the period of the War of 1812 because that conflict both created a professional military establishment in the United States and firmly implanted the French Army as the source of U S infantry manuals.

This article is properly an exercise in bibliographic research and not a study of tactical warfare. The author, however, would like to state at the outset that those who analyze the tactics of a period using the drill manuals of that period as a source are in danger of misinterpreting the facts. Drill manuals are training aids; they are an indication of what can and perhaps should take place on a battlefield. But as it rarely does, the historian wishing to describe the tactics of a period is wise to study the drill manuals of that period with a very large grain of salt and in close combination with such other factors as training, motivation, terrain and leadership. This may seem like simple common sense but only too often historians working in the field of tactical warfare have been led astray because of their reliance on official publications.¹ Soldiers, not manuals, fight and win battles.

Throughout the text, the term "discipline" will be used in the same sense it was used in the 18th and 19th centuries when it was "... the mechanical part of war [that] ... determines the habits of men to certain rules of action, applicable to the motion of men and the use of arms."² A "system of discipline" of that period included not only the manual of arms but all the exercises, evolutions, and manoeuvres necessary to train soldiers during a time when parade ground or formal drill was the same as battle drill. For period authors, therefore, the term "system of discipline" included what modern soldiers term both "drill" and "tactics".

Steuben and the French 1791 Reglement

The first official infantry manual of the U S Army was the work of Frederick William, Baron Von Steuben, whose well-known role in the Revolution need not be recounted here. In 1778, the Continental Congress adopted Steuben's *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the*

United States as the infantry drill manual of the Continental and, later, the U S Army³ [FIG 1]. Following the Revolution, the Militia Act of 1792 stipulated that the militia were to use Steuben and most states printed numerous editions of Steuben's *Regulations* to satisfy this requirement.⁴

Steuben's "Blue Book," as it was known, consisted of two parts. The first part was a system of infantry discipline encompassing the manual of arms up to battalion exercises and evolutions. The emphasis was on battalion drill and Steuben devoted very little space to larger formations such as brigades. The manual of arms in Steuben has been described as a simplification of that found in the British 1764 *Regulations*. Apparently Steuben would have preferred to have followed European practices more closely, but an American familiarity with and prejudice in favor of the British 1764 *Regulations* brought him to base his system on that model.⁵ The evolutions in the Blue Book were performed at a common time of 75 and a double time of 120 paces to the minute, Steuben's pace being 2 feet in length. Formations were to be in two ranks.⁶ The second part of the manual was concerned with military administration and instructions were provided for the march of an army, encampment, sanitation, health, inspections, the posting of guards and instructions for the duty of every rank or position in a regiment from the lowest private to the commanding officer.

Steuben's Blue Book was a concise and basic manual of infantry discipline and military administration ideally suited to the needs of a very young and very raw army. From 1778 to 1812, a period of 34 years, the Blue Book remained the official U S infantry manual. And for most of that period, it satisfied the requirements of both the army and the militia. Although compiled in the United States, the Blue Book was the work of a professional European officer and reflected European practices. Thus, the first official U S infantry manual was European in origin and initiated a trend that was to continue for nearly a century.

In the 18th century Europe had a tremendous influence on military matters in the United States, but the converse was not true. The major battles and campaigns of the Revolutionary War were fought according to the precepts of warfare in Europe. Popular wisdom has often held that the Revolutionary War, in turn, had a significant effect on the armies of Europe because it demonstrated the superiority of intelligent skirmishers, light infantry and riflemen over the mindless automatons that were the heavy infantry of traditional

mid-18th century linear tactics. In fact, the Revolutionary War appears to have had little effect on tactical developments in Europe during the last decades of the 18th century; the North American combat experience of most French and German officers was discounted when they returned home.⁷ The War did have a more marked effect on the British Army as defeat usually does on the losing side. For a while, in the 1780's and 1790's, the British Army indulged in a mania for light troops and irregulars of all description, a mania that is generally held as being detrimental to that army's performance in subsequent conflicts.⁸ The evolution in infantry tactics that occurred in Europe at the end of the 18th century was the result of developments that had been occurring since mid-century at least and owed little, if nothing, to the events of the Revolutionary War.

In France these developments consisted of a debate over the most effective infantry formation in battle — the column or the line.⁹ The controversy between the proponents of the column or *l'ordre profond* and those of the line or *l'ordre mince* dated almost to the beginning of the 18th century and was given fresh fuel by the humiliating defeats suffered by France in the Seven Years War, defeats that resulted in a major attempt to reform all aspects of the French Army, including its tactics. A succession of different systems of infantry discipline, some favoring the column, others the line, were introduced. The culmination of this debate was a set of new infantry regulations dated 1791 but first issued in 1792.¹⁰

The *Reglement* of 1791, the result of the tactical debate, was a manual that avoided prescribing immutable rules for the battlefield and, instead, stressed a flexibility that presented French commanders with a variety of tactical options and manoeuvres.¹¹ The 1791 *Reglement* favored neither the column nor the line; both formations were presented, the choice was left to the officer on the spot. This was a marked change from previous European manuals which, often based on the rigid concepts of Frederician warfare, left little initiative and many rules to commanders. For its time, the 1791 *Reglement* was couched in clear and concise language, a quality that made it useful for training new troops. The flexibility of the 1791 *Reglement* allowed it to be modified as actual conditions required and also ensured that it did not become quickly outmoded.¹² A solid and valuable work, the 1791 *Reglement* remained the infantry manual of the French Army until 1831.¹³

The *Reglement* was divided into five sections.¹⁴ The first was an introductory section covering the formation of regiments and the positions of officers and non-commissioned officers in that formation. Great stress was laid on the responsibility of the commanding officers to constantly train both their officers and non-commissioned officers. Section II was the "School of the Soldier" and encompassed the fundamentals of marching, the manual of arms and methods of changing direction. Section III was the "School of the Company" and included formations, marching, changing directions, company firings and the manual of arms for soldiers, NCOs and officers. Section IV was the "School of the Battalion" and was concerned with battalion firings, marching and other evolutions. Section V was entitled "Evo-

lutions of the Line" and was a lengthy section of formations larger than a battalion that provided the fundamentals of manoeuvring these units in line. The regulation pace was 76 to the minute with a quick step of 100 which could be increased to 120 when manoeuvring under fire. Battalions were to form in three ranks for firing although only the first two ranks actually fired.

The flexibility of the 1791 *Reglement* allowed the French armies of the revolutionary period to develop a system of tactical warfare that could be altered as required, a radical change from the confining strictures of linear infantry tactics modeled on the dictates of Frederick the Great and practised by most European armies. Without intending it, the French Army changed the nature of infantry warfare. The effect of 1791 *Reglement* was best summed up by the knowledgeable commentator, Scharnhorst, when he stated that the French "... had developed a practical system of tactics that permitted them to fight over open or broken ground in open or close order, but this without their being aware of their system."¹⁵

It was not long before France's enemies made corresponding changes in their own tactical doctrine. Following a preliminary revision in 1805, the Austrian Army in their *Reglement* of 1807 adopted a much more flexible system of tactics.¹⁶ The Prussians, devastated by their defeat at the hands of the French in 1806, instituted a program of military reform that, guided by soldiers of the caliber of Scharnhorst, Yorck, Clausewitz and Gneisenau, resulted in the infantry *Reglement* of 1812, a very advanced manual for its time, based on simple logic and a sound knowledge of human nature.¹⁷ Taking the lead of the French, the new Prussian manual stated only very general rules and left the major decisions to the commanders using it. The Russian Army, under the tutelage of Minister of War, Barclay de Tolly, introduced a new manual, *Code on the Conduct of Major Military Operations*. But there existed a considerable gap between the theoretical possibilities of this manual and the actual capabilities of the Russian Army.¹⁸ The effect of the 1791 *Reglement* went as far afield as the Punjab in India where, in the 1820s and 30s, French emigré officers trained a Sikh Army of 30,000 men organized in 31 battalions to fight according to the French method.¹⁹

Of all the European powers of the period, only the British remained aloof from the new tactical system, preferring to retain a modified form of linear tactics. The British infantry manual of the Napoleonic Wars was an abridgement of an earlier work entitled *Principles of Military Movements* by Colonel (later General) David Dundas that had first appeared in 1788. An extremely competent officer, Dundas had travelled widely and had observed at first hand the drill of most European armies. With the direct support of George III and the commander of the army, the Duke of York, Dundas's 1788 work was adopted in a modified form in 1792 as the standard British manual under the title, *Rules and Regulations for the Formations, Field-Exercises and Manoeuvres of His Majesty's Forces*, commonly known as "Dundas's 18 Manoeuvres".²⁰ Although Dundas preferred linear tactics above all else, his grasp of infantry warfare was good and his regulations, based on a few solid principles explained in a

clear and simple manner, were to remain, with minor modifications, as the system of British infantry discipline until the Crimean War.²¹

British officers interested in the French tactics were well served by the publication in 1803 of Colonel John Macdonald's two-volume English translation of the *1791 Règlement*.²² Macdonald, a veteran of 20 years' service in India, had visited France during the Peace of Amiens in 1802, obtaining copies of the *Règlement* and conversing with French officers. His translation provided the reader with marginal notes that compared the French *1791 Règlement* to Dundas's *1792 Regulations* and in which Macdonald made sound objective comparison between both systems.²³ Macdonald's work was to have major importance in the history of U S infantry manuals.

Developments in the United States, 1798-1812

Toward the end of the 18th century, there appears to have been a growing awareness in U S military circles that Steuben's manual was becoming antiquated. When the Quasi-War with France occurred in 1798, the infantry component of the regular army was increased from two to twelve regiments. A board of officers compiled new rules and regulations that included changes in the infantry instruction and exercise but it is unclear whether these changes would have replaced or simply modified Steuben's Blue Book.²⁴ At the same time, a new system of exercises and discipline for the artillery was compiled.²⁵ Neither of the new systems were put into effect, however, as the army was drastically reduced after the crisis of 1798 had subsided.²⁶

In 1807 another crisis erupted, this time with Great Britain over the *Chesapeake-Leopard* Affair, and led to preparations for war and a tripling in the size of the regular army. As part of the general overhaul of the military organization of the U S, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn consulted with two officers, the senior general of the army, Brigadier General James Wilkinson, Major (later General) Zebulon Montgomery Pike and a civilian journalist, William Duane, about the subject of replacing Steuben with a more modern system of discipline. All three men recommended that the U S Army adopt the *1791 Règlement*.²⁷ The importance of the *Règlement* was not unknown in the United States. At about the same time that Dearborn put his question to the three men, a French emigré and former officer in the French Army, Amelot De Lacroix, published a small book entitled *Military and Political Hints* which he addressed to the U S Congress.²⁸ De Lacroix criticized the U S for the weaknesses in its military establishment and he prevailed upon the young nation to discard its "inadequate system of tactics" and "... to preserve the blood of your soldiers, adopt the modern French tactick [sic] which alone will give the United States the full force of American Valour and enable their citizens to crown with laurels their native intrepidity."²⁹

This was sound advice and Dearborn may have read it; in any case, he apparently encouraged William Duane to prepare a translation of the *1791 Règlement*.³⁰ Dearborn also supported Duane's proposal to assemble an encyclopedic reference work for the U S based on the best European sources by lending him books from the War Department

library and promising to purchase copies of the finished book for the use of the army.³¹

Duane, who was to have a major influence on American military literature, especially drill manuals, in the first two decades of the 19th century, deserves more attention.³² He was born at Lake Champlain, N Y in 1760; but after his father's death, went with his mother to Ireland where he became a printer. In 1787, Duane moved to Calcutta where he established the *Indian World*, a newspaper that made him a wealthy and prominent man. A dispute with the East India Company, the political rulers of India, led to Duane's arrest, deportation and the loss of his property. Returning to England, he vainly tried to have his property restored before giving up in disgust and moving to Philadelphia where he became editor of the *Philadelphia Aurora*. Duane was an outspoken partisan of Thomas Jefferson and the support of the *Aurora* may have been responsible for Jefferson's election as president in 1800. In 1801, Duane moved to the new capital of Washington where he established a press and, for a while, enjoyed much lucrative government business; but later lost considerable money.³³

Duane returned to Philadelphia and resumed and maintained publication of the *Aurora* until 1822 but suffered constant financial distress. In 1808, Jefferson tried to help Duane by securing him a lieutenant colonelcy in the Rifle Regiment.³⁴ Duane does not appear to have seen much service with the regiment and resigned his commission two years later. William Duane was a talented man but his outspoken and vitriolic attitudes made him few allies. Jefferson, a life-long friend and correspondent, described Duane as "... a very honest man, and sincerely republican, but his passions are stronger than his prudence, and his personal as well as general antipathies render him very intolerant."³⁵

Duane's translation of the *1791 Règlement* appeared in 1807 and became the first number in a series of small pamphlets which were later collected and published in 1809 in two volumes as the *American Military Library*.³⁶ The *Library* was the publication for which Dearborn had loaned Duane books from the War Department library and it was a very useful reference work.³⁷ The *Library* not only contained the text of the *Règlement* but also included excerpts from Dundas and numerous references to the Blue Book about which Duane was careful to say that "Wherever the principles laid down in Steuben's treatise are admissible, they are constantly kept in view in this work."³⁸ Secretary of War Dearborn was interested in the publication of the *Library* and promised to subscribe for as many copies "as will be prudent."³⁹

It seems clear that Dearborn intended to support the publication of the *Library* with government funds. What is not clear is whether Duane's translation of the *Règlement* was the version to be adopted by the U S Army. Duane later claimed that he had been encouraged to provide a translation and submit it to the War Department.⁴⁰ However, Dearborn also ordered the translation of other French technical treatises and manuals in 1808. But, as far as this author can ascertain, Duane's work was the only extant translation of the *1791 Règlement*, if not commissioned, at least encouraged by the War Department and published in the United

States.⁴¹ Whether it was to be Duane's effort or not, it is very apparent that the Secretary of War intended to introduce the *1791 Reglement* into U S service in 1808 because he had copper plates engraved of the positions of the manual of arms taken from the French original.⁴² These plates were copies of those in the French editions of the *Reglement* and the soldier figures in the U S version are depicted wearing the authorized French infantry uniform of the year 1791. Whatever Dearborn's intentions, the adoption of a new system of infantry discipline was suspended when the *Chesapeake-Leopard* crisis subsided in 1808.⁴³ The following year the government changed when James Madison was elected president in March 1809, and Dearborn was no longer secretary of war.

Dearborn's successor, William Eustis, showed little interest in infantry discipline. Duane sent him a copy of the *Library* in 1809 with a reminder that Dearborn had promised that the War Department would purchase a number of copies.⁴⁴ The following year, Duane published his *Military Dictionary* based on material he had been unable to fit into the *Library*.⁴⁵

Duane was a tireless worker. While compiling the *Library* and the *Dictionary*, he had also prepared for press "... small hand books or manuals, calculated for the mere parade duties for infantry, cavalry, or artillery..."⁴⁶ In 1809, he informed Eustis that he had suspended publication of these manuals "... under an expectation that the adoption of a new system, which was in preparation last year, would have enabled me to conform the exercise to that which should have been adopted by the War Office."⁴⁷ Duane was gently trying to find out what Eustis's intentions were concerning the replacement of Steuben. Duane's opinion of Steuben was unequivocal. Writing to the Secretary in 1810, he stated that the War Department should make a "... change of phrase and modification to the infantry system which is absolutely indispensable and without any change would only be bad made worse."⁴⁸

Eustis apparently suggested to Duane that the translation of the *1791 Regulations* contained in the *Library* was too bulky and expensive for practical use. Duane later claimed that Eustis advised him to "... provide an elementary book, of the size and price of the tract of Steuben" that would "... lay the foundation for the modern improvements in military discipline."⁴⁹ Duane thereupon produced *A Hand Book for Infantry* (described in detail below) and *A Hand Book for Riflemen*, both of which saw publication in 1812.⁵⁰ These were primers of the most basic sort and largely extracted from the contents of the *Library* and the *Dictionary*. It is unclear whether they were the same "small hand books or manuals" that Duane had compiled earlier in 1809 or new works. The *Hand Books* were popular both with the militia and those entering military service for the first time and sold well, going through numerous editions.

Duane was not the only author of military books at work in the U S in the years immediately preceding the War of 1812. Two Massachusetts militia officers, Epaphras Hoyt and Isaac Maltby, published military treatises in 1811.⁵¹ The more important was Maltby's *Elements of War* which contained an abridgement of Dundas's 18 manoeuvres taken from the British *1792 Regulations*. The work of the British

expert on infantry discipline, however, had already reached the United States in the form of an American edition of Robert Smirke's *Review of A Battalion of Infantry, Including the Eighteen Manoeuvres* . . . published in New York in 1810. Smirke was one of the best of the many private editions of the *1792 Regulations* that appeared during the Napoleonic Wars.⁵² The 1810 American edition was dedicated to N Y state Governor, Daniel D. Tompkins, and the anonymous author summed up the state of U S infantry discipline at that time when he wrote that the country had "... no established system, save the trifling and narrowly limited essay of the Baron Steuben, whose movements are few indeed, and those few have become obsolete, and given place to evolutions of the modern tactics far more prompt and valuable."⁵³

As knowledge of modern European infantry tactics spread in U S military circles through publications like those of Duane, Smirke and Maltby, dissatisfaction with the obsolescent Blue Book of Steuben appeared to grow.

Smyth's Regulations, 1812

In 1811 Secretary of War Eustis decided to replace Steuben's Blue Book with a new system of infantry discipline. Although he had available published abridgements of the British *1792 Regulation* and the French *1791 Reglement* to serve as a new manual, Eustis chose instead a work compiled by a U S Army officer, Colonel Alexander Smyth. Smyth was a Virginia lawyer and state politician who had been commissioned colonel and commander of the Rifle Regiment in 1808. William Duane, a lieutenant colonel under Smyth in the same unit, had a low opinion of Smyth's tactical abilities, characterizing him as a man who was "incapable of exercising a company."⁵⁴ In fact, very few people who came into professional contact with Smyth appear to have a good word for the man except fellow Virginian and lawyer, Winfield Scott, who thought Smyth well read, brave and honorable but with no talent for command.⁵⁵

Smyth finished his manual in early 1810 and Eustis directed him to test it with troops in a camp near Washington.⁵⁶ Eustis must have been satisfied with the results of this test as, in November 1811, he ordered Smyth to proceed to Philadelphia and supervise the printing of 1000 copies of his work.⁵⁷ Smyth seems to have been concerned that "another system would be adopted" and asked Eustis for definite assurances that his manual would become the official drill of the army.⁵⁸ Smyth was still anxious in February 1812, when the manual was nearly finished printing. In transmitting some rough copies to the Secretary, he requested, for insurance, that a Presidential order be included at the beginning of the book.⁵⁹ This was done and on 30 March 1812, Alexander Smyth's *Regulations for the Field Exercises, Manoeuvres and Conduct of the Infantry* were "ordered for the government of the infantry of the United States"⁶⁰ [FIG. 2]. For the regular army Steuben's Blue Book was now replaced, although it remained the official system for the militia.

There were two parts to Smyth's Regulations. The first, concerned with a system of infantry discipline proper, was an abridgement of the *1791 Reglement*. This part consisted of five sections that corresponded to those of the French original. Section I detailed the formation of a regiment and the





Fig. 10.



REGULATIONS

FOR THE

FIELD EXERCISE, MANŒUVRES, AND CONDUCT

OF THE

INFANTRY

OF THE UNITED STATES;

DRAWN UP AND ADAPTED TO THE ORGANIZATION OF THE

MILITIA

AND

REGULAR TROOPS.

BY AN OFFICER OF THE ARMY.
By order of the Secretary of War.

WITH EXPLANATORY PLATES.

PHILADELPHIA:
PRINTED BY FRY AND KAMMERER.
1812.

FIG. 2

Title Page of Smyth's 1812 *Regulations* and plate showing the *Manual Exercise*.

positions of officers and NCOs. Section II, entitled "The Soldier's Drill" rather than "The School of the Soldier" of the original contained elementary drills for marching, facing, dressing and the manual of arms. This was a 21-page condensation of the 48 pages of the French regulation.⁶¹ Section III was "The Drill of Company", a 23-page abridgement of 50 odd pages of the French and covered material relating company drills, marching, dress, firing and deployment from column into line and plying from line into column. Section IV, "The Drill of a Battalion", providing the same information as Section III but for battalion-sized formations. Section V "Evolutions of Brigades" was a 62-page abridgement of material covered in the French Section V "Evolutions of the Line" of 100 pages.

Smyth retained the 2 ft. pace of Steuben and prescribed an ordinary time of 75 and a quick step of 100 paces to the minute. Regiments formed in two ranks when a peace establishment but in three on a war establishment. Like the 1791 original, Smyth made considerable mention of the column, but, also like the original, gave no preference to it over the line as a formation. Smyth's "columns of attack" was basically a "column of divisions" (a division was two companies side by side; a 10 company regiment formed in columns of division thus had a five company depth). Smyth included the "oblique" step in which a soldier did not face in a new direction first but moved toward it obliquely, a difficult evolution to master and a curious thing to see. As a later soldier described it, the oblique movement was "adapted only to men with one leg shorter than the other".⁶²

In Part II of his regulations, Smyth "included as much of Steuben's work . . . not relating to drills or manoeuvres as possible."⁶³ This latter portion of the *Regulations* consisted of 45 pages of material directly from Steuben on the march of an army, camp duties, weapons maintenance, reviews and instructions to the various ranks. Finally, Smyth added five pages of original material on subordination, roll-calls, salutes and funeral duties.

In essence, Smyth's *Regulations* were a functional abridgement of the 1791 *Reglement* combined with useful administrative material retained from Steuben. A little over 200 pages in length, it was a concise and useful manual. Smyth's *Regulations* marked the formal introduction (albeit in shortened form) of the 1791 *Reglement* into U S service and was the first in what was to be a series of French infantry manuals that were to be dominant in the American army from 1812 until the Civil War. As if to emphasize that point, the plates used to illustrate Smyth were the same views of French soldiers which Dearborn had ordered engraved in 1808.

The army generally accepted Smyth's manual, although there were criticisms of certain technical points.⁶⁴ Compiling his regulations may have been the last positive service Alexander Smyth rendered his country as his subsequent military career was a chronicle of unparalleled incompetence.⁶⁵

Duane's Hand Book, 1813-1814

Alexander Smyth's manual did not have a very long service life. The disastrous reverses suffered by the army in the first year of the War of 1812 caused President Madison to find a replacement for William Eustis. After the brief interim

stewardship of James Monroe, Madison chose John Armstrong as the new Secretary of War. Armstrong was a Revolutionary War veteran although his record was somewhat blemished by his authorship of the infamous Newburgh addresses to the Continental Army at the end of the war. Armstrong had served in the Senate and as Ambassador to France and fancied himself somewhat of a military theorist having written a book on the subject of strategy.⁶⁶ Appointed a brigadier general in July 1812, his advice on military matters was often sought by Eustis and Congress. During the winter of 1812-1813, Armstrong corresponded with Senator D.R. Williams, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, on the subject of infantry tactics. On 8 February 1813, shortly before he assumed his portfolio as Secretary of War, Armstrong informed Williams that he had ". . . recently seen a work entitled 'A Hand Book For Infantry' . . . [which] . . . furnished the best preliminary instruction in relation to the subject I have met with; and I have no scruple in recommending it to the adoption of Congress, for the use of the army of the United States."⁶⁷ When Armstrong became Secretary of War, he put his own advice into action. On 19 March 1813, the Adjutant General ordered that Duane's *Hand Book* "will be received and observed as the system of Infantry Discipline for the Army of the United States"⁶⁸ [FIG. 3]. This was one day after Armstrong had commissioned William Duane a colonel and appointed him an adjutant in the U S Army, an appointment that caused outraged cries of abuse of patronage.⁶⁹ There seems little doubt that the two events were connected, but Armstrong had moved perhaps too quickly to change the system of infantry discipline and his action was to have an adverse effect on the army.

Duane's manual is best described by its title, *A Hand Book For Infantry: Containing The First Principles of Military Discipline, Founded on a Rational Method: Intended To Explain in a Familiar and Practical Manner, For the use of The Military Force of the United States, The Modern Improvements in the Discipline and Movement of Armies*.⁷⁰ Despite such an imposing description, the *Hand Book* was a basic primer suitable only for militia units and entirely insufficient for the requirements of a regular army in the midst of a war against a very professional opponent.

The *Hand Book* had twelve chapters totalling 109 pages. The first three chapters consisted of an essay on military discipline, a description of the changes made to the 1791 *Reglement* since its inception and a glossary of military and drill terms. The following eight chapters were an extreme abridgement of the 1791 *Reglement* from more than 300 to only 87 pages. Only two of these chapters were concerned with the evolutions of formations larger than battalions and, although Duane states in the *Hand Book* that his ". . . principles applied equally to the movements of a squad of 20 or a battalion of 1000 men, and to any depth of line.", this claim is doubtful.⁷¹

Duane included the oblique step, the *ligne de science* and prescribes a 2 ft. pace performed at a common step of 75, a quick step of 90 and a double time of 120 paces to the minute. His battalions could form in two or three ranks as required and he emphasized the column of attack, "the greatest secret



Plate.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON CITY, 19th March, 1813.

GENERAL ORDERS.

The "*Hand Book for Infantry*," compiled and published by William Duane, of Philadelphia, will be received and observed as the system of Infantry Discipline for the Army of the United States.

By order of the Secretary of War,
T. H. CUSHING, Adj. Genl.

A
HAND BOOK FOR INFANTRY:
CONTAINING
THE FIRST PRINCIPLES
OF
MILITARY DISCIPLINE,
FOUNDED ON RATIONAL METHOD;
INTENDED
TO EXPLAIN IN A FAMILIAR AND PRACTICAL MANNER,
FOR THE USE OF THE MILITARY FORCE OF THE
UNITED STATES,
THE
MODERN IMPROVEMENTS
IN THE
DISCIPLINE & MOVEMENT OF ARMIES.

THE SECOND EDITION.

BY WILLIAM DUANE.

C'est la discipline militaire qui fait la gloire du soldat et la force des armées,
car elle est le plus grand acte de son dévouement et le gage le plus assuré de
la victoire.
CARNOT, 1811.

PHILADELPHIA:

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR.

1812.

FIG. 3

Title Page of Duane's *Hand Book* and plate showing the *Manual Exercise* from second edition. The notice of 19 March 1813 is from a ninth edition dated 1814.

of modern tactics". His drills and evolutions were illustrated by diagrams of little pairs of black feet somewhat reminiscent of dance studio instruction but perhaps useful for training raw recruits. In the text of the manual, Duane shamelessly advertised himself, making numerous references to the *Library* and the *Dictionary* as being the source of his information. Duane also stated that "... the French system of discipline issued in 1791, has been improved upon several times, until the whole has become in effect a new system . . .", but Duane put little in the *Hand Book* that is not included in the 1791 *Reglement* and left out much of the original that would have been very useful.⁷² In sum, William Duane's *Hand Book* was exactly what its title said it was — a book of the "first principles of military discipline", interesting and informative but useless for training regular infantry.

The order of 19 March 1813, prescribing the *Hand Book* as the system of discipline caused consternation in the army. Most officers who were familiar with Duane's little pocket book knew that it was unsuitable as a system of infantry discipline and tried to find ways of getting around the order. Some concluded that, although the *Hand Book* was the established system, previous systems had not been superseded and could still be used.⁷³ Only a few regular regiments introduced the *Hand Book* completely, among them the 32nd U S Infantry Regiment at Philadelphia and the 46th at New York.⁷⁴ The state governments were more favorable toward the new manual and, although Steuben was still officially the drill for the militia, Virginia, Pennsylvania and New York introduced the *Hand Book* for their units.⁷⁵ On the northern frontier, where the bulk of the regular army was campaigning, the *Hand Book* was detested. When Armstrong toured the northern armies in 1813, the senior officers frankly told him that they were not using the *Hand Book* because "... it was objectionable & that the order establishing it required re-consideration."⁷⁶ As if this was not bad enough, Duane kept bringing out new editions of the *Hand Book* and each edition differed slightly from its predecessor. Even those few officers using the *Hand Book* became confused about which edition was correct.⁷⁷

Under these circumstances, senior officers, charged with the task of training their commands, simply used whatever manual they preferred. Major General George Izard, commanding the Right Division at Plattsburgh during the summer of 1814, stated bluntly to Armstrong that

Different systems of instruction have been adopted by the officers of this division. As uniformity is indispensable in this particular, I am about to authorize the former practice agreeably to Baron Steuben's regulations — without, however, giving to the latter the formality of a general order until the first of June, [1814] when unless I receive instructions to the contrary, I shall adapt them as regulations for the troops under my command.⁷⁸

Brigadier General Winfield Scott, in charge of training the Left Division at Buffalo in the spring of 1814, "... adopted, for the army of the Niagara, the French system, of which he had a copy in the original, and there was in camp another, in English — a bad translation . . ."⁷⁹

A more creative approach to the problem was taken by an officer at Charleston in 1814 who, finding that the regular and militia troops in the garrison were using different sys-

tems of discipline, and that "The words of command were culled from a variety of sources as suited the taste of each . . ." unit commander, compiled his own manual.⁸⁰ Largely based on the *Hand Book*, this work was ordered for the use of the troops in the 6th Military District (Georgia and the Carolinas).

By 1814, the situation regarding an established system of infantry discipline for the army had become chaotic. Commanders were using whatever system they wished, an extreme and dangerous inconvenience when regiments trained with different manuals were brigaded together. Armstrong had received many letters of complaint about the *Hand Book* and, in January 1814, he instructed the Adjutant General to send a circular letter to fourteen senior asking them two questions — should the *Hand Book* be altered or should it be replaced entirely?⁸¹ Of the ten officers who responded to the letter, only two, Generals Dearborn and Pinckney, recommended that the *Hand Book* be retained and Dearborn suggested that it be altered by including new manoeuvres found in the work of the British Colonel John Macdonald.⁸² The rest of the respondents were unanimous in their condemnation of the *Hand Book*.⁸³

The politically acute William Duane soon learned about the circular letter. On 26 March 1814, he wrote to Armstrong who sent him copies of the comments from some of the officer respondents.⁸⁴ These comments seem to have shaken Duane, a self-proclaimed expert on military matters, but he decided to go on the offensive by bringing out a new work that would be more in accordance with the original 1791 *Reglement* than the *Hand Book*. On 18 August 1814, six days before the British burned Washington, he wrote to Armstrong asking for the use of the plates engraved by Dearborn in 1808 and used to illustrate Smyth's *Regulations*, stating that he intended to "... give the whole of the French system, simplified and illustrated by much useful information and rules — such as will I am satisfied put an end to the silly notions which have disturbed some persons on the subject."⁸⁵

Duane got the plates and, within a month, published the *Explanation of the Plates of the System of Infantry Discipline for the United States Army; According to the Regulations of 19th March, 1813*. In an introduction dated 30 September 1814, Duane claimed that the *Hand Book* was only under consideration as a system of discipline by Congress when the order of 19 March 1813 had been issued and, at that time, he had made an engagement with both the War Department and Congress to complete the entire French system for the "public service".⁸⁶ Late in the same year, Duane published *The System of Infantry Discipline: According to the Regulations Established For The Army of the United States, 19 March, 1813*. The work contained the text to the volume of plates published earlier and was partially a correction of the errors in the *Hand Book* combined with the remainder of the 1791 *Reglement*. Neither book sold well and Duane later tried to bill the government for his expenses.⁸⁷ Mercifully, these two titles marked William Duane's last venture into military drill publishing. A talented but difficult man, Duane's best service to the U S military were his publications, the *Military*

Library and Military Dictionary, useful reference works in their day. At best, Duane was a compiler rather than an author, his one attempt to provide an original system of discipline, even though it was based on an excellent French manual, was a miserable failure.

NOTES

1. Two recent publications have taken this common sense approach to the study of tactics in the musket period and are highly recommended: John Lynn, *The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791-1794* (Chicago, 1984) and John Houlding, *Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795* (Oxford, 1981).
2. William Duane, *A Hand Book For Infantry Containing the First Principles of Military Discipline . . .* (5th edn., Philadelphia, 1813) (hereafter, Duane Hand Book), p. 20. All references to this publication are taken from the 5th edition.
3. On Steuben, see: John Palmer, *General von Steuben* (New Haven, 1937); Joe Riling, *Baron von Steuben and His Regulations* (Philadelphia, 1966); Robert K. Wright Jr., *The Continental Army* (Washington, 1983), and S.C. Vestal, "Frederick William Von Steuben," *Infantry Journal*, IV, (July-August, 1932).
4. Vestal, p. 290.
5. Wright, p. 141, quoting Steuben to Franklin, 28 Sept., 1779, in the Steuben Papers. The British 1764 Regulations were known by various titles and were widely printed in the North American colonies. These regulations were in service in the British Army from 1764 until 1778 when they were partially revised. See Houlding, pp. 209-215, for the genesis of these regulations.
6. All references to Steuben are from *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States . . .* (Boston, 1794), pp. 6, 13, reprinted as *Baron von Steuben's Revolutionary War Drill Manual* (Dover, 1985).
7. For an analysis of the lack of effect of Revolutionary War experience on warfare in Europe, see Peter Paret, "The Relationship Between the Revolutionary War and European Military Thought and Practice in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century", in D. Higginbotham, *Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War* (Westport, 1978), and Paret, "Colonial Experience and European Military Reform at the End of the Eighteenth Century", *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* XXXVII (May, 1964), pp. 51-55.
8. Houlding, pp. 226-240; Richard Glover, *Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the British Army, 1795-1809* (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 115-120.
9. The best work on the great debate over the column or the line is Jean Colin, *L'Infanterie au XVIIIe siecle, La Tactique*, (Paris, 1907). Robert S. Quimby, *The Background of Napoleonic Warfare*, (New York, 1957) follows Colin closely and adds little new. Useful information will be found in Peter Paret, *Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807-1815*, (Princeton, 1966) (hereafter Paret, *Yorck*), pp. 64-73. The best recent work is Lynn, see note 1 above.
10. Properly, *Reglement concernant l'exercice et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie. Du ler Aout, 1791*, (Paris, Bureau du Journal Militaire, 1792, and many subsequent editions).
11. Steven Ross, *From Flintlock to Rifle, Infantry Tactics, 1740-1866* (London, 1979), pp. 52, 55.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Jean Colin, *La tactique et la discipline dans les armees de la Revolution: Correspondance du general Schauembourg . . .*, (Paris, 1902), p. X. Gunther Rothenberg, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon*, (Bloomington, 1978) (hereafter Rothenberg, *Warfare*), p. 130, says that Napoleon ordered revisions of the reglement in 1809 and 1812 but was dissatisfied with the first and lacked the time to put the second into effect.
14. Details of the 1791 *Reglement* are from John Macdonald, *Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise and Manoeuvres of the French Infantry . . .* (2 vols., London, 1803).
15. Scharnhorst, "Introduction to Infantry Tactics" (1811) contained in Paret, *Yorck*, p. 258. The emphasis is in the original.
16. Gunther E. Rothenberg, *Napoleon's Great Adversaries, The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army, 1792-1814* (Bloomington, 1982), pp. 108-109.
17. Paret, *Yorck*, pp. 179-190. Paret is the accepted authority on the reform of the Prussian Army in the Napoleonic period.
18. Rothenberg, *Warfare*, pp. 202-203.
19. F.S. Bajwa, *Military System of the Sikhs* (Delhi, 1964), cited in Ross, p. 170.
20. Houlding, pp. 242-248. The manual of arms and infantry platoon exercises, not contained in Dundas's regulations were brought out separately as *The Manual and Platoon Exercises* (1792 and many subsequent editions).
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 241-242.
22. See note 14 above.
23. Houlding, p. 248n.
24. *Extracts From the Minutes of the United States Military Philosophical Society . . . October 6, 1806*. Brigadier General Jonathan Drayton presented a copy of these new regulations containing 167 articles to the society but it is not known whether they have survived.
25. William E. Birkheimer, *Historical Sketch of the . . . Artillery: United States Army* (Washington, 1884), p. 301.
26. *Ibid.* The new artillery system may have been destroyed in a fire at the War Department in 1800.
27. *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, (7 vols., Washington, 1832-1867) (hereafter ASPMA), II, p. 89, Duane to Secretary of War (hereafter SW), 27 August, 1819.
28. I.A. De Lacroix, *Military and Political Hints by Colonel . . . Delacroix . . . To Which is Added, The Artillerist* (Boston, 1808), p. 47.
29. *Ibid.*
30. ASPMA, II, p. 89, Duane to SW, 27 August, 1819.
31. Duane to Jefferson (Received 5 December, 1807), "Letters of William Duane", *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, Second Series, XX, (1907, 1907) (hereafter Duane, Letters), p. 305; SW to Duane, 8 March, 1808, in William Duane, *Explanation of the Plates of the System of Infantry Discipline . . .* (Philadelphia, 1814) (hereafter Duane, Plates).
32. Unless otherwise noted, biographical details of William Duane are from the relevant entries in *The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography* and the *Dictionary of American Biography*.
33. J.H. Powell, *The Books of a New Nation: United States Government Publications, 1774-1814* (Philadelphia, 1957), pp. 118-125.
34. Francis B. Hetiman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the U.S. Army* (2 vols., Washington, 1903), I, p. 385.
35. Jefferson to Wirt, Duane, Letters, p. 259.
36. Properly, *The System of Discipline and Manoeuvres of Infantry . . . Established for the National Guards and Armies of France*, (Philadelphia, 1807). Duane commissioned the translation and did not do it himself. This translation later became the supplement to Volume I of the *American Military Library*.
37. *The American Military Library, or, Compendium of the Modern Tactics. Embracing the Discipline, Manoeuvres, and Duties of Every Species of Troops . . . Adapted to the Use of the Militia of the United States*, (2 vols., Philadelphia, 1809). The Library consisted of two volumes with seven parts and a supplement. Part I was a historic review of war, Part II was concerned with tactics, Part III was Thiebault's manual of staff duties translated from the French. These three parts and a 223-page Supplement that was the translation of the *Reglement* composed the first volume. The second volume had material on rifle and light infantry tactics, field fortifications, cavalry tactics and an excellent 215 page summary of artillery matters. The

work was illustrated.

The *American Military Library* was, in effect, an encyclopaedia of Napoleonic warfare based on the best European sources. For the student of warfare of this period, it is an invaluable reference tool and deserves reprinting.

38. Duane, Library, I, p. 108.
39. SW to Duane, 8 March, 1808, Duane, Plates.
40. ASPMA, II, p. 89, Duane to SW, 27 April, 1819.
41. NA, RG 107, Microfilm 221, reel 48 (hereafter NA 107/221/48), Wilkinson to SW, 25 April, 1812. These treatises and manuals were: The Military Penal Code, Regulations for the Detail of the Services of Light Infantry, Regulations for the Details of Military Service, Preparations for Battle and the Conduct of Troops in Every Situation, and Regulations Respecting the Interior Service, Police, and Discipline of the French Infantry.
J.R. Jacobs, *The Beginnings of the U.S. Army, 1783-1812* (Port Washington, 1947), pp. 273-274, says that General James Wilkinson compiled a modern system of movements from the French but they were never published although Wilkinson billed the War Department for his labour. Birkheimer, p. 301, states that, in September 1808, Wilkinson prepared a complete "modern system of movements and manoeuvres for infantry, artillery and cavalry" translated principally from the French but that it disappeared before publication.
It may be that these authors are referring to Duane's translation and to the translations of the technical treatises that were still in Wilkinson's possession in 1812.
42. NA 107/221/47, Mifflin to SW, 4 June, 1812.
43. ASPMA, II, p. 89, Duane to SW, 27 August, 1819.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 3, same to same, 1 May, 1809.
45. Properly, *A Military Dictionary, or, Explanation of the Several Systems of Discipline of Different Kinds of Troops, Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry* . . . (Philadelphia, 1810). The *Dictionary*, which has been reprinted, contains a number of useful texts including a French military dictionary, a complete edition of R.W. Adye's *Pocket Gunner and Bombardier*, (a standard Royal Artillery reference work) and a collection of all the general orders and regulations issued by the U.S. Army up to 1810.
46. ASPMA, II, p. 5, Duane to SW, undated but probably May, 1809.
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*, p. 4, Duane to SW, 10 January, 1810.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 89, Duane to SW, 27 August, 1819.
50. Properly, *A Hand Book for Infantry: Containing the First Principles of Military Discipline* . . . , (Philadelphia, 1812). Subsequent editions were published in the same city in 1812 (2nd & 3rd), 1813 (4th and 5th) and 1814 (6th, 8th and 9th). Although there must have been a 7th edition, the author can find no bibliographic record of one.
A Hand Book for Riflemen: Containing The First Principles of Military Discipline . . . was first published at Philadelphia in 1812, with 2nd and 3rd editions published in the same city in 1813. The *Hand Book for Riflemen* largely consisted of material from the *Hand Book for Infantry* with the addition of some material on light troops and riflemen taken from Duane's *Library*. Although Duane claimed that this work was "the basis of all discipline" in rifle units during the War of 1812 (ASPMA, II, p. 89, Deposition of William Duane), this claim cannot be substantiated.
To complete the record, Duane also wrote *A Hand Book for Cavalry* (Philadelphia, 1814). This book was commissioned by the War Department and Duane was paid for his labours after the war (ASPMA, II, pp. 1-6, No. 271 "Relative to the Services and Accounts of William Duane . . .").
51. Epaphras Hoyt, *Practical Instructions for Military Officers* . . . Greenfield, 1811) and Isaac Maltby, *The Elements of War* . . . (Boston, 1811).
52. Houlding, pp. 247-248.

53. *Review of A Battalion of Infantry, Including the Eighteen Manoeuvres* . . . By Robert Smirke (New York, 1810), pp. 2-3.
54. Duane to Jefferson, 26 September 1813, Duane, Letters, p. 362.
55. Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, Written by (2 vols., New York, 1864), I, p. 55n.*
56. Theophilus Rodenbough and William Haskin, *The Army of the United States. Historical Sketches of Staff and Line* . . . (New York, 1896), p. 25.
57. NA 107/6/5, SW to Smyth, 19 November 1811.
58. NA 107/222/6, Smyth to SW, January 23, 1812.
59. NA 107/221/48, Smyth to SW, 3 February 1812.
60. Properly, *Regulations for the Field Exercise, Manoeuvres, and Conduct of the Infantry of the United States Drawn Up and Adapted to the Organization of the Militia and Regular Troops* (Philadelphia, 1812). The general order was part of the title page. All descriptions of Smyth are from this edition.
61. The pagination of the 1791 *Règlement* is from *Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercises and Manoeuvres of Infantry* . . . (New York, 1815) which is the U.S. version of Macdonald's translation, see note 14 above.
62. Astoria, "Army Sketches: Infantry Tactics", *Army and Navy Journal*, VI (August 22, 1868), p. 3, quoted in Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, *Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage* (University, 1982), p. 52.
63. NA 107/222/6, Smyth to SW, 23 January 1812.
64. In particular, see NA 107/221/47, Pinckney to SW, 7 April 1812.
65. In October 1812, Smyth was ordered to take a brigade of infantry to the Niagara Frontier where he quarreled with his superior officer. Issuing a series of bombastic pronouncements that earned him the nickname of "Van Bladder" from his men, Smyth botched up a number of invasion attempts of Canada and fought a duel with one of his subordinates, Brigadier General Peter B. Porter. As the local newspaper published editorials calling him a "museum piece" and an "orangoutang", his troops attempted to burn his tent and snapped empty muskets at him. Smyth was forced to change his quarters frequently and sleep under heavy guard. Finally, he applied for leave which was quickly granted and, while out of the army, was legislated off the list of general officers. Protesting, Smyth appealed to Congress for reinstatement offering to " . . . die, if Heaven wills it, in the defence of his Country" but his request was denied. Smyth returned to law and politics. In 1825, Smyth published *An Explanation of the Apocalypse, or Revelation of St. John* which contained his certificate, on honor, that he had discovered the "Key to the Apocalypse".
66. Armstrong was the author of a book entitled *Hints to Young Generals By An Old Soldier* (Kingston, 1812) which contained the author's ideas of strategy. Armstrong was a devotee of Jomini and, in his book, speaks at great length of simple, double, excentric, interior, concentric, exterior and deep lines of strategic fronts and facing.
67. Armstrong to Williams, 8 February 1813 in *Report of the Committee on Military Affairs*, U.S. Senate (Washington, 1813).
68. General Order, A.G.O., 19 March 1813, contained in Duane, *Hand Book*.
69. Heitman, I, p. 385; Henry Adams, *History of the United States During the Administration of James Madison* (7 vols., New York, 1930), vii, p. 41, says " . . . The appointment [of Duane] was improper, and the motives to which it was sure to be attributed made it more scandalous than the unfitness of the person made it harmful to the service." Adams quotes Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin as saying: "Duane's last appointment has disgusted me so far as to make me desirous of not being any longer associated with those who have appointed him." Gallatin was referring to Secretary of War John Armstrong.
70. Title from the 5th edition printed at Philadelphia and in the

author's possession. All details of the *Hand Book* in the text are from this edition but it should be noted that all editions of the work differ slightly.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8, 56, 87.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
73. Duane, Plates, Camp Marcus Hook, 30 September 1814.
74. *Ibid.*
75. *Ibid.*
76. NA 107/6/7, SW to Duane, 5 April 1814.
77. NA 107/222/10, Lt. Col. Hamilton's response to the circular letter of 24 January 1814.
78. Izard to SW, 7 May 1814, in George Izard, *Official Correspondence* . . . (Philadelphia, 1816), p. 3.
79. Scott, I, pp. 119-120. Scott actually had a choice of three different English versions of the 1791. Duane's *Library*, Duane's *Hand Book* and Smyth's *Regulations* were either translations or abridgements. As Scott uses the word "translation", it is the author's feeling that Duane's *Library* is the English version of the 1791 *Reglement* used in Scott's camp at Buffalo, as it is the only one of the three versions that is actually a translation.
80. *The Drill and Exercise Issued in Orders to the United States Troops of the Sixth Military District* (Charleston, 1814). This book was praised by Duane in Duane, Plates.
81. NA 107/222/10, Circular Letter, Adjutant General's Office, 24 January 1814. The officers circled were Major Generals Henry Dearborn, Thomas Pinckney, James Wilkinson, Morgan Lewis, and George Izard, Brigadier Generals Alexander Maccomb, E.P. Gaines, and Winfield Scott, Colonels F.K. Huger,

W. King, J. Gibson, J. Bankhead and W.S. Hamilton. Generals Wilkinson and Lewis and Colonels King and Bankhead did not respond.

82. *Ibid.* Dearborn suggested that the *Hand Book* be altered by the addition of "McDonald's improved manouvres of forming a line by small columns of divisions known in his work entitled *Instructions for the conduct of infantry on Actual Service*." Dearborn is referring here to the translation by Lt. Col John Macdonald of *Instructions for the Conduct of Infantry on Actual Service* . . . (2 vols., London, 1807). This was one of the technical treatises that Dearborn had ordered translated in 1808 (see note 41 above). These instructions were not an official French drill manual but were intended to supplement the 1791 *Reglement* when in the field.
83. *Ibid.*
84. NA 107/6/7, SW to Duane, 5 April 1814; SW to Duane, 17 May 1814.
85. NA 107/221/60, Duane to SW, 18 August 1814.
86. Duane, Plates. The author has read much (perhaps too much) of Duane's correspondence and writings and wishes to state that he has formed the opinion that Duane, like so many journalists, was not above altering the facts if it made a better story. The complicated saga of William Duane's services to the government was investigated by Congress after the war and their report can be found in *American State Papers: Military Affairs*, Volume II, pp. 1-6, "Relative to the Services and Accounts of William Duane".
87. ASPMA, II, p. 89, Duane to SW, 27 August 1819. This claim was disallowed.



1636-1986

CITIZEN SOLDIER ★ PATRIOT

THE NATIONAL GUARD: 350 YEARS OF SERVICE