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John Sugden



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THE SOUTHERN INDIANS IN THE WAR OF 1812: THE CLOSING PHASE

by JOHN SUGDEN

IT has been conventional to equate the conflict between the southern Indians and the United States during the War of 1812 with the Creek war of 1813-1814. More correctly, however, there were three stages of the fighting, each emanating from standing grievances against the Americans nursed by Creek and Seminole bands, but receiving their initial impetus from separate sources. In 1812 and 1813, the Seminoles and their Negro allies, rallied by the Spanish who were concerned to protect their possessions in the south from American filibusters, participated in a number of skirmishes. A second phase of Indian hostility to the Americans, and that most widely known, was ignited primarily by the admonitions of Tecumseh and his followers from 1811 to 1814. The fighting of the so-called Creek War commenced with an engagement at Burnt Corn in the summer of 1813, and lasted until the American victory at Horse-shoe Bend in March 1814. Within a few months of their defeat, however, the Indians were reinvigorated by the arrival of British forces in Florida, and the cooperation of the dissident natives with the British forms the closing stage of the conflict. To the collapse of this relationship, consummated by a British failure to uphold those clauses in the Treaty of Ghent which protected the Indians, a subsequent exchange between Indians and Americans, the Seminole war of 1818 acted as a finale, but this last lies outside the scope of the present article.

A clarification of the Indian resistance to the United States in the south during the closing phase of the conflict is here intended. Several previous examinations of this area have been published, but the emphasis of this study, as far as possible, has been upon the Indian viewpoint. However, since the natives left no written records, it necessarily is inferred from the re-

John Sugden is lecturer and research officer at Hereward College, Coventry, and is completing his doctorate at the University of Sheffield, England.

ports of their British allies.¹ The episode is best interpreted as part of the last, and the largest, of several desperate attempts made by the Indians of the eastern woodlands to arrest the social disintegration, cultural decay, depopulation, and loss of land occasioned by their protracted contact with the white frontier. A militant pan-Indian nativist movement, led by Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa, two Shawnees, developed in the northwest in the years preceding the War of 1812. Assisted by the outbreak of fighting between England and the United States, it eventually swept in some of the southern Indians, those who rose against the Americans in the Creek war. This movement was defeated in the north at Moraviantown in 1813, and in the south at Horseshoe Bend in 1814, but in neither theatre was it completely crushed.

In the summer of 1814 British forces arrived in the south to fortify the remaining Indian dissidents and to supply them with arms and provisions. The Indians welcomed the British as stronger and more steadfast allies than were the Spaniards, their immediate wants were relieved, and there were prospects of driving back the enemy and regaining their lands. Moreover, while many tribesmen in the south refused to commit themselves to war against the United States so long as the Americans retained the military ascendancy, the harsh policies of Andrew Jackson strengthened the hostile nativist faction. Nevertheless, the British invasion failed, and Indian hopes rested upon the Treaty of Ghent of 1814 which invalidated the dispossession of the Creeks by the Treaty of Fort Jackson signed earlier that year. But the Americans continued to uphold the Fort Jackson agreement, and the Indians were unable to persuade the British

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1. Mark F. Boyd, "Events at Prospect Bluff on the Apalachicola River, 1808-1818," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XVI (October 1937), 55-96; John K. Mahon, "British Strategy and the Southern Indians: War of 1812," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XLIV (April 1966), 285-302; John K. Mahon, *The War of 1812* (Gainesville, 1972); Frank L. Owsley, Jr., "British and Indian Activities in Spanish West Florida During the War of 1812," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XLVI (October 1967), 111-23. A sound appreciation of the Indian position is evidenced by J. Leitch Wright, Jr., "A Note on The First Seminole War as Seen by the Indians, Negroes and their British Advisors," *Journal of Southern History*, XXXIV (November 1968), 565-75, and in his books, *Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in North America* (Athens, 1971), *Britain and the American Frontier, 1783-1815* (Athens, 1975), and *The Only Land They Knew, The Tragic Story of the American Indians in the Old South* (New York, 1981).

to take up their cause as an infringement of an international treaty. Without that support the nativist movement in the south was powerless to contest further American aggression and the stage was prepared for the Indian removals of the ensuing decades.

Both of the principal Indian groups actively in opposition to the Americans at the time of the British invasion of the south in 1814 had been involved in the earlier conflict with the United States. One, the Seminole, had probably heard of Tecumseh's inflammatory talk to the Creeks in 1811, and according to tribal tradition two of the influential Seminole chiefs, Ben Berryman and Cappachamico, had been among those who heard the Shawnee at Tuckabatchee.² But whatever support Tecumseh might have reaped for his inter-tribal confederacy among the Seminoles and their Negro allies, a more potent influence was that of the Spanish. Spain, at this time, controlled the Florida peninsula and a strip of land south of the thirty-first parallel running westwards along the Gulf to the Mississippi. Between 1810 and 1813, however, Georgians and Tennesseans, supported cautiously by the American government and aware of internal unrest among the Spaniards, managed to wrest Baton Rouge, the area west of the Perdido, Mobile, and Amelia Island from Spain. To secure his country's possessions from further aggression the Spanish governor, Sebastián Kindelan, incited the Seminoles and Negroes against the American interlopers in 1812. Many of the Negroes were refugees from American plantations who had found considerable freedom and status among the Seminoles; they particularly feared the increase of American interference in Florida. Furthermore, the destruction of some Indian towns by American forces in 1813 gave additional cause for Seminole hostility towards the United States.³

The other major Indian opponents of the Americans were the "Red Stick" Creeks of Alabama. Their resentment had been long brewing. Creek society had been fraught with excessive

2. A. W. Crain to Lyman C. Draper, January 11, 1882, Draper Collection Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin, Vol. 4, YY, 16.

3. The best studies of this conflict are Rembert W. Patrick, *Florida Fiasco: Rampant Rebels on the Georgia-Florida Border, 1810-1815* (Athens, 1954); Edwin C. McReynolds, *The Seminoles* (Norman, Oklahoma, 1957). See also Julius W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812* (New York, 1949), 60-125, 189-237.

interference from the United States since the Treaty of Coleraine in 1796. Benjamin Hawkins, the American agent, tried to dominate the Creek National Council, to which delegates from all the Creek towns were invited. He also wanted to centralize Indian society by issuing certificates to Creeks intending to hunt or trade, testifying to their reliability. By the administration of public order rather than the allowance of its management to the clan, town, or individual, Hawkins also contributed towards this trend. Further, he encouraged agricultural development and production for the market. His efforts tended to promote the settlement of the Indians outside of the villages, away from the communal influences, and the development of ownership of private property and individualism. Many of the traditional Creek villages went into decline, some of the land was exhausted, and the sense of communal responsibility among the Indians was eroded.⁴

A schism rapidly appeared in Creek society. The so-called "progressive" faction, strong among the Lower Creeks of the Chattahoochee, Flint, and Ocmulgee rivers, adhered more strongly to the American program; the nativist or Red Stick Creeks, prevalent among the more remote Upper Creeks of central Alabama, espoused tribal independence and a separate cultural identity. The anger of the Red Stick Creeks against the Americans was enhanced by incursions onto Indian lands. Not only were the Spaniards being pressed in the south by the United States, but the newly organized Louisiana Territory, the growth of American settlements along the Cumberland River, and the perennial expansion attempts by Georgians, created among the Indians the feeling that they were being encircled by the United States and that such activity would lead to

4. For the Creek war, see R. S. Cotterill, *The Southern Indians: The Story of the Civilized Tribes Before Removal* (Norman, 1954), 146-93; McReynolds, *Seminoles*, 52-62; Angie Debo, *The Road to Disappearance* (Norman, 1941), 66-83; Merritt Bloodworth Pound, *Benjamin Hawkins, Indian Agent* (Athens, 1951); Frank L. Owsley, "Benjamin Hawkins, the First Modern Indian Agent," *Alabama Historical Quarterly*, XXX (Summer 1968), 7-13; H. S. Halbert and T. H. Ball, *The Creek War of 1813 and 1814* (University, Alabama, 1969); Frank Herman Akers, *The Unexpected Challenge: The Creek War of 1813-14* (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1975); John Spencer Bassett, ed., *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson*, 6 vols. (Washington, D. C., 1926-35), I, II; Theron A. Nunez, "Creek Nativism and the Creek War of 1813-14," *Ethnohistory*, V (winter, Spring, Summer 1958), 1-47, 131-75, 292-301.

exorbitant demands for Indian land. Tracts on the Georgia frontier, along the Ocmulgee and the Oconee, were ceded to the United States by the Creeks in 1802 and 1805, and a horse path was blazed across Indian territory between the Ocmulgee River and Mobile. In 1811, the Americans peremptorily demanded that the Creeks allow a north-south road to pass through their lands to connect white settlements on the Tennessee River with Fort Stoddert near Mobile.

This was the situation into which Tecumseh, in 1811, introduced his call for the tribes to unite, to reassert traditional Indian values and culture, and to resist further territorial encroachment by the Americans. Before the close of 1812, the Red Sticks had developed a militant, anti-American nucleus of warriors who looked to Tecumseh for leadership and who were able to increase their influence among the Creeks. In 1813 a civil war between the Red Stick and Americanized Creeks broke out, which in the summer escalated into a confrontation between the nativists and the Americans. The fighting ended with Jackson's victory over the Red Sticks at Horseshoe Bend and the cession of some 23,000,000 acres of Creek land to the United States at the Treaty of Fort Jackson on August 9, 1814.

The defeated Red Sticks made their way into Pensacola where the Spanish afforded them a refuge. There they heard of the Fort Jackson treaty and their anger increased. The terms were imposed upon Red Sticks and friendly Creeks alike, and without the representation of the former, whose presence, no doubt, was considered unnecessary. About half of the Creek territory was ceded in reparation to the United States and no payment was to be made for it. Later, in 1817 and 1853, \$195,417.90 was given to the friendly Creeks as compensation for the damage done them by the Red Sticks but during the forty years following the annexation, the United States Treasury realized over \$11,250,000 from the land.⁵ Naturally, the Red Sticks repudiated the cession immediately and it served to alienate some Creeks, such as the Big Warrior, who had been friendly to the United States.

It is difficult to estimate how many Red Sticks survived the war of 1813-1814. Various assessments of the size of the Creek nation, and the census of 1832, when the population may have

5. Debo, *Road to Disappearance*, 83.

recovered, would indicate that the tribe consisted of some 25,000 people. At the most there were about 5,000 warriors.⁶ More than half, perhaps sixty per cent of these, went over to the Red Sticks during the conflict.⁷ Many, undoubtedly, were lost in the fighting although the casualties ascribed to the hostiles by American commanders during the campaigns were grossly inflated.⁸ Hundreds of them managed to escape to the south, reportedly those from eight towns. In June 1814 some 200 warriors were believed to be at Pensacola and about 1,500 more were reportedly on the Escambia River.⁹ British reports indicated that about 800 warriors eventually gathered about Pensacola and that 1,300 others remained on the Alabama as "prisoners of war," although this last figure is likely not very accurate.¹⁰ It seems, however, that in the late summer of 1814 perhaps as many as 1,000 warriors who had resisted the American forces remained at large as potential enemies of the United States. Among those at liberty were some of the most implacable of the Red Stick leaders. A number of the principal hostile chiefs, such as High Head Jim, had been killed, and others, among them Menawa and Paddy Walsh, were in hiding. Some, such as William Weatherford, whom British reports suggest later fought for the Americans against his former colleagues at Pensacola, had surrendered.¹¹ But two of the most influential Red Sticks remained prepared to resume the conflict, Peter McQueen and Josiah Francis (Hillis Hadjo), both of whom had been fomentors of the rebellion.

Both men had a history of antagonism to the United States. Francis, the son of an Englishman and a Creek, was a leader of the Tuskegee Creeks and had risen to prominence as a prophet ministering the revitalization cult introduced by Tecumseh. Early in 1813, he had been in contact with the Spanish, and

6. *Ibid.*, 103; Mary Jane McDaniel, *Relations Between the Creek Indians, Georgia and the United States* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Mississippi, 1971), 2-3.

7. Akers, *Unexpected Challenge*, 137.

8. The British estimate of 1,800 warriors killed was also too high. "Return of the Muscogee or Creek Indians," War Office, Public Records Office, London (hereinafter cited as WO), class 1/folio 143/pp. 174-75.

9. Cotterill, *Southern Indians*, 190; Harry Toulmin to Andrew Jackson, June 22, 1814, Bassett, *Correspondence of Jackson*, II, 9-11.

10. "Return of the Muscogee or Creek Indians," WO/1/143/174-75.

11. Unsigned letter from Pensacola, July 19, 1814, Cochrane Papers, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh (hereinafter cited as CP), 2328, 32.

in the summer he may have accompanied the expedition to Pensacola which led to the first skirmish of the Creek war at Burnt Corn.¹² His movements, thereafter, are obscure and controversial. It has been asserted that at the time of the attack on Fort Mims in August 1813, he led a party against Fort Sinquefield, or that he was busy establishing his Indian town known as the "Holy Ground."¹³ However, according to Edward Nicolls, a British agent who knew the chief well, "Frances told me that while he was attacking Fort Mims the blacks were the first in, and I have one man who killed seven Americans in that affair."¹⁴

McQueen, probably the son of James McQueen, a Scots frontiersman, was a leader of the Tallahassee Upper Creek band and had been present at the Creek victories at Burnt Corn and Fort Mims. According to Nicolls, he and Francis led the Creeks, who, in a three-day battle on January 24th, 1814, turned Jackson's army back to Fort Strother, and who, with eighty warriors, defeated General John Floyd's superior force at Calabee Creek on January 27, 1814. Both chiefs fled to Pensacola after the defeat at Horseshoe Bend: McQueen escaped after he was captured on the Tallapoosa in April.¹⁵

At Pensacola the Indians depended upon help from the Spanish. By the middle of 1813 there were only about 500 Spanish troops in West Florida, and Spain, locked in combat with the French in Europe, was unable to send them any substantial reinforcement. Confronted with the obvious American threat, Juan Ruiz Apodaca, captain general of Cuba, and Mateo González Manrique, the governor of Pensacola, were ready to arm the Indians and provision them in case they would be needed to bolster the weak Spanish defenses.

Another possible source of support for the Red Sticks was the British. As early as the previous September and November, the Indians had appealed through Governor Charles Cameron, at New Providence in the Bahamas, for assistance, suggesting that contact might be made through the Apalachicola River. Not

12. Halbert and Ball, *Creek War of 1813 and 1814*, 125.

13. *Ibid.*, 184; Nunez, "Creek Nativism," 168.

14. Edward Nicolls to Alexander Cochrane, August 12, 1814, CP, 2328, 59-62; see also Nicolls to John Philip Morier, September 25, 1815, WO/1/143/137-39.

15. George Stiggins, a Creek half breed, is in error in suggesting that Francis fled to Pensacola after the destruction of his town in December 1813. Nunez, "Creek Nativism," 172-73.

until early in 1814, however, did Earl Bathurst, secretary of state for war in London, give instructions to the British navy to support the Creeks.¹⁶ The delay caused the Indians to despair, but their defeat in March, the loss of their fields and homes, and the appalling material conditions in which they were compelled to cluster about Pensacola merely accentuated their need for the British. Red Stick resentment of the United States was also growing. "Our Case is really miserable and lamentable," they told the British who eventually arrived at Apalachicola, "driven from House and Home without Food and Clothes to cover our Bodies by disasters and an Enemy, who has sworn our ruin, and hovering about Pensacola and its Vicinity, where We can get now [*sic*] Assistance, as the Spanish Government tells Us that it is scarcely [*sic*] able to support its Own Troops." Nevertheless, they "have Determined to make no Peace with the United States of America without the British Government's Consent."¹⁷ The same truculent attitude was forcibly put to Benjamin Hawkins, the American Indian agent: "We have lost our country and retreated to the sea side, where we will fight till we are all destroyed."¹⁸

Both the Seminoles and the Red Stick Creeks, despite their defeat in an unequal contest with the United States, were spoiling to renew the fighting, and the British were willing to oblige them. In Europe the war with France was drawing to a triumphant close, and an able admiral, Alexander Cochrane, had been appointed commander in chief of the American station to coordinate a campaign against the United States seaboard. Cochrane, as well as his predecessor, Admiral John Borlase Warren, had been aware of the possibilities of using southern Negroes and Indians in the subjugation of the American south, and he now moved quickly to respond to Bathurst's instructions.¹⁹ A British expeditionary force was sent to assist the Indians.

Captain Hugh Pigot, of the frigate *Orpheus*, was employed to make the first contact. He was given a message from Cochrane

16. Mahon, *War of 1812*, 341; Owsley, "British and Indian Activities," 111-15; Earl Bathurst to Charles Cameron, March 30, 1814, CP, 2338, 34.

17. Joshua Francis, Yahollasaptko, Hopoyhisihlyholla to British Commander at St. George's Island, June 9, 1814, CP, 2328, 28-29.

18. Debo, *Road to Disappearance*, 82.

19. Wright, *Britain and the American Frontier*, 162-65; Cochrane to George, Earl Spencer, March 13, 1797, CP, 2568, 49-50.

to the Indian chiefs and carried blankets and other presents, supplied by Governor Cameron, together with 2,000 muskets and ammunition. Accompanied by Lieutenant David Hope of the *Shelbourne*, Pigot sailed for Apalachicola Bay, and anchored there on May 11, 1814. He landed his acting lieutenant of Royal Marines, George Woodbine, who had been given the shore rank of brevet captain of marines and a provisional appointment as British agent to the southern Indians. Woodbine quickly induced some Indians aboard the British vessels on May 20. The following day Corporal James Denny and Sergeant Samuel Smith of the marines were set ashore to instruct the warriors in the use of small arms. A loghouse was erected upon Vincent Island, stores were landed, and ammunition distributed.²⁰

The base was then extended up the Apalachicola River. On May 25, Woodbine reached Prospect Bluff, where he accepted from the local Indians power to direct operations. He urged them to spare the lives of any American prisoners in the forthcoming campaigns. A start was made upon erecting a fort with a powder magazine. Since provisions for the Indians, including flour and red paint, were inadequate, an important feature of the bluff was the existence there of the trading store belonging to John Forbes and Company of Pensacola. It was eventually seized, and its caretakers, Edmund Doyle and William Hambly, entered Woodbine's service as interpreters. Nevertheless, there were neither field pieces nor the supplies necessary to begin an offensive against Fort Mitchell, eighty miles upriver, and the Indian parties had to be content for some time with their capture of one Wilson, an American "spy."²¹

Predictably, the advent of the British was welcomed, particularly by three groups, the Seminoles, the Red Stick Creeks, and many of the Negroes. The Indians and Negroes who first rallied around Woodbine were mainly Seminoles, under the old chief Thomas Perryman, and Cappachamico, head of the Mikasuki Seminole band. The chiefs were pleased to support the

20. Hugh Pigot, April 13, 1814, CP, 2328, 1-2; Pigot to George Woodbine, May 10, 1814, *ibid.*, 3-6; Pigot to James Denny and Samuel Smith, May 21, 1814, *ibid.*, 9; Pigot to Cochrane, June 8, 1814, Admiralty Papers, Public Record office, London (hereinafter cited as ADM), class 1/folio 506/pp. 394-99.

21. Woodbine to Pigot, May 25, 1814, CP, 2328, 14-15; Boyd, "Events at Prospect Bluff," 74-75; Woodbine to David Hope, May 31, 1814, CP, 2328, 13.

campaign against the Americans. The hostility of the Seminoles to the United States, as well as the attraction of British presents, arms, and provisions, guaranteed immediate support for Woodbine. The agent was also aware of the recalcitrant Red Sticks, who, destitute and unarmed, sheltered about Pensacola. They were unable apparently to obtain supplies from either the Spaniards or John Forbes and Company, the Indian traders. Consequently, a young warrior called Yellow Hair was dispatched by Woodbine to Pensacola to carry the news of the British landing to the followers of Francis and McQueen. There was an immediate response. McQueen, with twenty-five men, left for Apalachicola by boat. Durgan with a party of twenty, and other groups, followed shortly afterwards. Francis found passage to Apalachicola on a British schooner, and as word spread, numbers of Negroes fled from American plantations to join the British standard.²²

An estimate of the Indian forces in alliance with the British at this time reveals the continued hostility of the Seminole and Red Stick bands to the United States. Woodbine assessed his support from villages along the upper Apalachicola River as: Yawolla, ten warriors; Tamathea or Tamathla and Ochesee, 150; Tochtohuli, 100; Oaketee Ockanee, 250; Saockulo, fifty; Fowl-town, 300; Euchee, twenty; Tallasee, thirty; Canholva, fifteen; and Emasee, fifty, for a total of 975 warriors. To these were added the men of other Seminole and Creek villages: the Chihaw Lower Creeks on the upper Flint River, 400; the Indians at Red Ground, twenty; Cheskee Tallosa, sixty; Kivah Rawon and Cedar Creeks, 100; Mikasuki Seminole, 700; the Tallasees, 200; and the Pensacola Red Sticks, 800. In all there were 3,255 men, of whom 2,800 were immediately ready to take up arms. While these estimates included some boys between the ages of ten and fourteen, they were not disconcerting to the British, who believed that only some 1,200 Creek warriors remained faithful to the Americans.²³

The forces enumerated by Woodbine represented the survivors of the Indian bands who had already tried their

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22. Woodbine to Pigot, May 25, 1814, *ibid.*, 12-13; Woodbine to Hope, May 31, 1814, *ibid.*, 13; Toulmin to Jackson, June 22, 1814, Bassett, *Correspondence to Jackson*, II, 9-11; letter from Pensacola, June 8, 1814, *ibid.*, 7; John Gordon to Jackson, July 20, 1814, *ibid.*, 17-18.
23. Woodbine-Pigot information, CP, 2326, 151-59.

strength against the Americans, and it was possible that others might later join them. An attempt was made to sow disaffection among the Creeks who, under Big Warrior, had remained friendly to the United States and whose strength the British estimated to be some 1,200 men. These Indians, however, had not yet been alienated from the Americans by the Fort Jackson treaty, which lay in the future, and the bitterness which they felt to the Red Sticks as a result of the Creek civil war had not been forgotten. More important, they had witnessed the futility of nativist resistance to the United States and were shrewd enough to realize the danger of committing themselves to the British while the Americans remained in control of the south.

At the same time, even the "progressive" Creeks were disturbed by the repeated encroachment upon Indian land, and they were willing to court the British. Woodbine dispatched emissaries to the main Lower Creek towns of Coweta and Cussita, conveying the message of pan-Indianism that had once belonged to Tecumseh. The Creeks, he said, should unite with the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Cherokees against the Americans. Meetings were held in the Creek country, and thanks were returned to the British for the presents that had been received. It was acknowledged that the unification of the tribes had long been the cherished desire of the Creeks and that they had never ceased their fidelity to the British crown and their claims upon British protection. But for the time being, that was as far as they were willing to go.²⁴

The Indians assembling at Apalachicola, in the meantime, were amenable to British suggestions. On May 28 Woodbine harangued the local Seminoles, emphasizing the strength of the British king and his determination to help the Indians. "He wants to protect all Indians," the warriors were told, "and to make them into one family that they may unite and drive the children of the bad spirit out of their lands and hunting grounds." But the war must be fought according to the standards of British humanity, and rewards were offered for prisoners delivered to the soldiers.²⁵ The chiefs signed a bizarre document

24. Creek Nation to Cochrane, CP, 2328, 18-19; Benjamin Hawkins to John Armstrong, July 13, 1814, *American State Papers*, 38 vols. (Washington, D.C. 1832-61), *Indian Affairs*, Class II, 2 vols., I, 860.

25. Woodbine to the Indians, May 28, 1814, CP, 2328, 15.

pledging themselves to preserve the lives of captives: "In the name of all the chiefs of the Creek Nations now assembled in arms against the Americans we promise to spare the lives of all the prisoners taken, whether man, woman or child, and to give them up to Captain Woodbine of the Royal Marines who has informed us that they would be a gratefull [*sic*] present to our Father King George."²⁶

The Indian response to Woodbine convinced Pigot that if sufficient stores could be arranged the tribesmen could become an important military force. Forty pistols, powder and ball, eleven barrels of cornpowder, drums, a launch and equipment, 100 pounds of tobacco, seventy-five blankets, sixty gallons of wine, a coat, and an epaulet were unloaded, and Pigot left Apalachicola carrying Seminole addresses to Cochrane. He left Woodbine, Denny, and Smith behind to work with the Indians. He ordered Captain Nicholas Lockyer of the sloop *Sophie* to take under his command the *Childers* and *Shelburne*, make contact with the Pensacola Red Sticks, and maintain a supply from New Providence to Apalachicola.²⁷

Cochrane was no less enthusiastic than Pigot, whose report he forwarded to the Admiralty together with his own observation that if 3,000 British troops were landed at Mobile, and were joined by the Indians, Jean Lafitte's Baratarian privateers, and the Spanish, they "would drive the Americans entirely out of Louisiana and the Floridas."²⁸ To follow up Pigot's mission, the admiral organized an expeditionary force of 114 men, two howitzers, and a field piece to convey to Apalachicola 300 suits of clothing, 1,000 stand of arms, and other provisions for the Indians.²⁹ In an exhortation to the chiefs, Cochrane explained that "your Father King George will not suffer his Indian Children to be made Slaves of by his rebellious Subjects" and that the men and arms had been sent to support them. He contended that the United States would leave the Indians "not one foot

26. Thomas Perryman and Cappachamico, pledge, May 28, 1814, *ibid.* These chiefs were Seminoles, but at this time the Seminole bands regarded themselves as part of the Creek Nation.

27. CP, 2326, 160; Pigot to Nicholas Lockyer, June 11, 1814, CP, 2328, 24-25; Thomas and William Perryman, Cappachamico and other chiefs to Cochrane, 1814, ADM/1/506/402-03; Pigot to Cochrane, June 8, 1814, *ibid.*, 394-99.

28. Cochrane to Admiralty, June 20, 1814, ADM/1/506/390-93.

29. *Ibid.*, July 23, 1814, ADM/1/506/478-79.

of land . . . to the Eastward of the Mississippi” and that the message must be circulated to the Negroes of Georgia and the Carolinas and to any Indians friendly to the Americans. Significantly, Cochrane referred to the large British forces being prepared for the attacks on the American seaboard and added that, in the event of a peace, “your rights will not be forgotten.” These promises were to be important to the Indians, who would, in time, expect the British to fulfill them.³⁰

On June 30 Woodbine was appointed auxiliary captain of the Corps of Colonial Marines, of which the expeditionary force to be embarked was the basis; the balance would be recruited from loyalists and Negroes. To command the expedition, Cochrane selected from his flagship, *Tonnant*, Major Edward Nicolls of the Royal Marines, a man of attested gallantry, known as “Fighting Nicolls.” He has been described by one historian of the marines as “possibly the most distinguished officer the corps ever had.”³¹ In July 1814 Nicolls was ordered to place himself at the head of the irregular operations in the American South and was empowered to raise 500 men as a colonial regiment in support of the Indians. During the next four years, Nicolls developed a close relationship with the Indians, and he became their most consistently outspoken white champion.

His instructions enjoined him both to raise and command a colonial regiment and to instruct, assist, and direct the Indians in military matters. He bore with him a copy of Pigot’s report and of Cochrane’s proclamation to the natives which would serve as letters of introduction. Cochrane permitted Nicolls considerable freedom of action, providing he refrained from acts of hostility to the United States within Spanish territory, except in self defense. The troops and stores were embarked at New Providence aboard the *Hermes* (Captain William Henry Percy), and the *Carron* (Captain Robert Cavendish Spencer), largely upon the orders of Governor Cameron. Cochrane had Cameron

30. Cochrane to Indian chiefs, June 29, 1814, ADM/1/505/163-64.

31. P. C. Smith, *Per Mare Per Terram: A History of the Royal Marines* (St. Ives, Huntingdon, 1974), 45. A sketch of Nicolls is contained in *ibid.*, 45-47. See also William James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6 vols. (London, 1878), III, 197-99, 291-96, IV, 221, 347, 431; Admiralty *Navy Lists* (London, issues between 1814 and 1864); Cochrane to Woodbine, June 30, 1814, CP, 2326, 190-91; Nicolls, Memorial, 1817, WO/1/144/419-22; Nicolls, Commission, July 4, 1814, CP, 2326, 192-93.

informed that Britain's only intention was to "preserve the Indians from being destroyed by the United States." The admiral, in his proclamation, had promised the Indians two field pieces, 2,000 stand of guns, and 1,000 swords, and Nicolls drew upon Cameron for two long twenty-four pounders, launches and flat-boats, belts, fowling pieces, powder flasks, flints, sabres, buttons, jackets, epaulets, vermillion, and \$100 worth of presents.³²

Before Nicolls reached Apalachicola Bay in August 1814, a new development had increased the prospects of the Indians' engaging the American forces, and they were, themselves, the cause of the changing circumstances. Andrew Jackson, district commander of the American troops, had viewed with alarm the resurgence of the Indian cause. He complained to Governor Mateo González Manrique of Pensacola that the British had been allowed to mobilize upon Spanish soil against the United States, and that the Spaniards themselves were harboring refugee Red Sticks. McQueen and Francis, Jackson maintained, should be surrendered to the Americans. In view of the aggressive attitude of Jackson and the Americans to both the Creeks and the Spaniards in recent years, these aggrieved protestations failed to impress Manrique.³³ Nevertheless, the governor was alarmed. The solution to the problem was not easy to find. While the Spanish were too weak to successfully contest the United States, they feared that an attempt to improve their position might cost them any remaining American goodwill. Confronted by the threat from Jackson, but unwilling to act in any way that might antagonize the Americans, they vacillated. Governor Manrique refused to sever connections with his Creek allies and sent appeals for help to his superior, Apodaca, at Havana, but he shrank from too vigorous a defense of Pensacola. Apodaca, on his part, was willing to allow Nicolls's Indians and British to operate as they desired, provided that they recognized Spanish control of St. Marks, St. Augustine, and Pensacola, but he refused to give direct aid.³⁴

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32. Cochrane to Nicolls, July 4, 1814, ADM/1/506/480-85; Cochrane to Admiralty, July 23, 1814, *ibid.*, 478-79; Cochrane to Cameron, July 4, 1814, CP, 2328, 30; Nicolls to Cochrane, July 27, 1814, *ibid.*, 54-55; Cochrane to William Henry Percy, July 5, 1814, ADM/1/506/486-87.
33. Jackson to Mateo González Manrique, July 12, 1814, Bassett, *Correspondence of Jackson*, II, 15-16; Gordon to Jackson, July 20, 1814, *ibid.*, 17-18; Manrique to Jackson, July 26, 1814, *ibid.*, 20-21.
34. Cameron to Ruis de Apodaca, July 29, 1814, CP, 2328, 40; Percy to

Unaware of the frustrations to be imposed upon them in their dealings with the Spaniards, the British were determined to employ their Indian allies, if necessary, in a resolute defense of Pensacola. Learning of the apprehensions of the Spanish governor there, Woodbine, at Apalachicola, abandoned his plans to attack an American post, Fort Hawkins, and set his forces in motion towards the Spanish town. Sergeant Smith, who had been given the local rank of lieutenant, and the Seminole leaders, Thomas and Benjamin Perryman, were instructed to march from Apalachicola to Pensacola with 300 men, while Woodbine embarked with the stores on the *Sophie* and the *Cockchafer* to arrive at his destination on July 28.³⁵

When Nicolls arrived at Prospect Bluff in August, therefore, Woodbine was absent, although Smith and Denny were drilling Indians in the adjacent countryside and other natives were daily arriving to receive provisions and arms. For the first time Nicolls was awakened to the animosity many of the destitute Indians bore the United States. Commenting upon one group of eighty who arrived at the Bluff, he wrote, "such objects I never saw the like of, absolute skin and bone, but cheerfull [*sic*] and resolved to do their utmost against the common enemy. An old man told me, when I asked him how far it was to where the enemy were, and if he new [*sic*] the way to lead me to them, he said it was seven days journey to them [about 300 miles] that he could not miss the way for it was marked by the graves of his five children." However, attention was now pivoted upon Pensacola, and Nicolls did not remain at Prospect Bluff. Leaving some arms there, he sailed for the Spanish town, arriving there on August 24 and manning one of the forts.³⁶

The arrival of Nicolls at Apalachicola had marked a further advance in the fortunes of the Indians hostile to the United

Cochrane, August 4, 1814, *ibid.*, 43; Nicolls, August 4, 1814, *ibid.*, 52-53; David Hope to Cameron, July 29, 1814, CP, 2338, 47; letter from Havana, August 8, 1814, Arsène Lacarrière Latour, *Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814-15* (Philadelphia, 1816), Appendix 2, v-vii.

35. Woodbine to Lockyer, July 30, 1814, CP, 2328, 39; Woodbine to Smith, July 21, 22, 1814, *ibid.*, 33-34; Woodbine to Cochrane, July 25, 1814, *ibid.*, 35-36; Woodbine to Cameron, July 26, 1814, *ibid.*, 37; Woodbine to Cochrane, August 9, 1814, *ibid.*, 56-57.

36. Nicolls to Cochrane, August 12, 1814, *ibid.*, 59-61; Percy, September 9, 1814, *ibid.*, 74-80.

States. Their requests had been partly responsible for bringing the British to Apalachicola, and the advent of Woodbine and Nicolls helped them satisfy their immediate needs of food, clothing, and arms. There were also prospects of reversing the military position in the south. Excited by the thought of major British conquests and the promise of being included in any peace settlement, the Indians saw a possible opportunity to regain their lost territories and to expel the rapacious American invaders. Nor was their confidence in the British entirely misplaced. Cochrane had remonstrated with his government on behalf of the Indians in June 1814, and on December 7, 1814, reiterated his concern: "The imbecility of the Spanish Government in West Florida and their natural jealousy leave the Americans every opportunity of encroaching upon the Indians, and as it appears to be the object of the American Government, to cut off all communications between the Indians and Great Britain, by driving the Creeks out of their country and possessing both sides of the Apalachicola, I trust that in any future negotiations of a pacific nature, stipulations will be made for repossessing the Indians of the Territory they have been deprived of."³⁷

Not the least important consequence of the British intervention, therefore, was the renewed hope and the fillip it gave to the nativist morale. Cochrane received a proclamation from Nicolls, McQueen, Francis, Cappachamico, and Hopoy Mico which voiced their intention to "live or die free of which we have given hard proof by choosing to abandon our Country rather than live in it as slaves." They described the Spanish as "weak, frail friends," but the Indians had been impressed with British verve: "since your sons came here . . . we walk like men in their streets."³⁸

If the arrival of the British had stiffened the resolve of the Indians, it was not, by itself, sufficient to win over to the nativists those tribesmen who had been willing to accept American domination. The battle lines remained largely as before, the difference being simply that the belligerent Seminoles and surviving Red Sticks could now call upon the British,

37. Cochrane to Admiralty, December 7, 1814, ADM/1/505/150-51; Cochrane to Admiralty, June 22, 1814, ADM/1/506/343.

38. Peter McQueen, Francis, Cappachamico, and Hopoy Mico to Cochrane, September 1, 1814, ADM/1/505/165-66.

as well as the Spanish, for support. Their morale and prospects had improved, but military superiority in the south still remained firmly with the United States. That being so, the Creeks under the Big Warrior, the Choctaws, the Chickasaws, and the Cherokees continued overtly to remain friendly to the Americans. If they were to align with the nativists, a major military breakthrough by the British would be necessary. There are reasons to believe that had the British achieved such a success most of the southern Indians, despite the machinations of American agents, would have joined their Seminole and Red Stick brethren. Much restrained discontent existed among the tribesmen, and it was enhanced in the summer of 1814 by the harshness of Jackson's Indian policy.

To some extent the extremity of Jackson's dealings with the Indians reflected his concern at the implications of the British arrival at Apalachicola. As early as July, after receiving definite news of the landing, Jackson induced the United States to re-appraise its plans to disband the militia. He argued that Pensacola should be occupied since it provided a haven from which hostile Indians might raid American settlements;³⁹ Jackson issued an ultimatum to the remaining recalcitrant Creeks, demanding that they surrender by August 1.⁴⁰ At Fort Jackson on August 9 he imposed upon the tribe his treaty, seizing about half of their land in order to separate the Indians from their potential allies, the Spaniards. The belief that the treaty of Fort Jackson would cement the Indians in friendship to the United States was, perhaps, a cynical one. On August 10 Jackson recommended that food and clothing be distributed to the neutral Creeks, "or necessity will compell them to embrace the proffered friendship of the British. . . . To clothe the whole number will cost a considerable sum; but this sum would be very inferior to the Value of the territory ceded to the United States; in addition to which I may observe, that the cession has made them our friends, and will in future effectually prevent their becoming our enemies."⁴¹

Unable, however, to understand the form of friendship that deprived them so unjustly of about half of their land, even the

39. Jackson to Armstrong, July 24, 1814, Bassett, *Correspondence of Jackson*, II, 19-20; Jackson to David Holmes, *ibid.*, 18-19; Jackson to Armstrong, July 30, 1814, *ibid.*, 22-23.

40. Jackson to John Coffee, July 17, 1814, *ibid.*, 16-17.

41. Jackson to Armstrong, August 19, 1814, *ibid.*, 24-26.

pacific Creeks grew restless. The Big Warrior, who had held fast to the Americans throughout the Creek war, was regarded with suspicion by Jackson's colleagues. The general even demanded a liberal policy to be pursued with the Choctaws, hitherto considered as a neutral or friendly tribe, to check the growth of dissension.⁴² While Jackson alternated a cool hand of charity with an iron fist, Indians were reported to be "pouring" into the British camps for arms. The Big Warrior established amicable relations with the Seminoles and was alleged to have "cut" with the Americans; plans were afoot to reconcile him with the Red Sticks. Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw delegates contacted Nicolls, and some Shawnees from the north relayed the news that "they are coming to join us right through the enemy's country. The chiefs all believe it but it appears very improbable to me. . . . When I asked one of their messengers what they did for provisions he replied most seriously that in their first attack they destroyed 500 of the Americans and barbecued [*sic*] the fattest of them and since that they never were in want."⁴³ There were, therefore, constant demands upon the British for supplies. At Apalachicola British vessels unloaded provisions and arms for transportation in shallow boats up the river to Prospect Bluff where Lieutenants Mitchell and Sergeant were strengthening the fort there. Ships also visited Pensacola. Yet at both places it was necessary to send out parties of Indians to forage, and on September 4 one group attacked a house near Mobile, killing or capturing a white man and three Negroes. The incident prompted Jackson to demand the seizure of Pensacola and the construction of an American fort upon the Apalachicola.⁴⁴

The Treaty of Fort Jackson probably pushed many wavering Indians towards the nativists and the British, and it multiplied the resentment of others. Cochrane and Nicolls appeared to be the only immediate means whereby lost lands might be regained, but, notwithstanding this, if an intertribal alliance was to be

42. *Ibid.*, August 5, 1814, *ibid.*, 30-31; Jackson to Rachel Jackson, August 28, 1814, *ibid.*, 35; W. C. C. Claiborne to Jackson, August 29, 1814, *ibid.*, 35-36; Big Warrior to Hawkins, August 25, 1814, *ibid.*, 36; James Monroe to Jackson, September 5, 1814, *ibid.*, 43; Jackson to Monroe, October 14, 1814, *ibid.*, 72-74.

43. Nicolls to Cochrane, August 12, 1814, CP, 2328, 59-61. The reference is presumably to the battle of Frenchtown, January 22, 1813.

44. Jackson to Monroe, September 5, 1814, Bassett, *Correspondence of Jackson*, II, 42; Jackson to Manrique, September 9, 1814, *ibid.*, 44-56.

consummated, the necessity for British victories in the field was paramount. Unfortunately, their first attempt to both display their own martial prowess and to employ their existing Indian allies degenerated into a humiliating fiasco. To strengthen his hold upon the Gulf coast, Nicolls attempted to capture Mobile, a garrison with only some 158 fit men at the time of his attack.⁴⁵ At Pensacola Nicolls had at his disposal a number of men from his colonial marines, a few British vessels, and the Indians. The latter were daily increasing. They arrived as destitute refugees, many in so poor a condition that they were not immediately serviceable as a military force. It was estimated in August by Captain Lockyer that 1,000 Indians were at Pensacola, of whom 700 were warriors, Woodbine placed their strength even higher at 2,000, of whom 800 were fighting men. Some of these Indian forces had come from Apalachicola. Their chiefs were McQueen, Francis, John of the Attassees, Old Factor of the Euchees, Hopoeth Mico of the Four Nations, and Colonel Perryman of the Seminoles. It is probable that they were respectably armed. Lockyer distributed six cases of arms and eight kegs of powder to the Pensacola Red Sticks, and munitions had also been ferried from Apalachicola.⁴⁶ A setback, however, to Nicoll's attempts to recruit men for an assault upon Mobile occurred at the beginning of September when Lockyer failed to win the allegiance of the Baratarian pirates under the command of the Lafitte brothers.⁴⁷

About 190 Indians participated in the attack upon Mobile on September 12-15, 1814; 130 warriors were on board the four British ships and sixty were ashore with Lieutenant Castle. During an engagement between the vessels and the batteries of Fort Bowyer both Percy and Nicolls, aboard the *Hermes*, were wounded. Nicolls lost the sight of his right eye. Nor more successful were Captain Robert Harvey and a shore party, who advanced on September 14 with a howitzer to within 800 yards of the fort but who were compelled to retreat before heavy American fire. The following day the vessels stood in while

45. Jackson to Monroe, September 17, 1814, *ibid.*, 50-51.

46. Lockyer to Cochrane, August 12, 1814, CP, 2328, 67-68; Woodbine to Cochrane, August 9, 1814, *ibid.*, 56-57; Nicolls, expenses, enclosed in Nicolls to John Barrow, August 21, 1815, WO/1/143/123-27.

47. John Sugden, "Jean Lafitte and the British, Offer of 1814," *Louisiana History*, XX (Spring 1979), 159-67.

the troops approached along the beach to fire upon Fort Bowyer with the howitzer. The latter expended all its available shells and case shot without success, and an attempt was made to storm the American positions by landing parties from the boats supported by Indians on the shore. When these efforts also proved futile, the whole British and Indian force fell back to Pensacola. Their performance had been a lamentable one; they had lost the *Hermes*, which ran ashore, and thirty-two men killed and thirty-seven wounded aboard the ships. Scant casualties— four killed and five wounded— had been inflicted upon the enemy. Indian participation in the affair seems to have been minimal.⁴⁸

The reverse at Mobile deprived the British of an opportunity to advance their cause among the uncommitted Indian tribes, but it was scarcely significant compared with the importance attached to the defense of Pensacola. This Spanish town had been a traditional prop of Creek independence of the United States since the post-revolutionary time of Alexander McGillivray. It had supplied ammunition and shelter to the Red Sticks in their war of 1813-1814, and its capture could not fail to impress Indians throughout the south. It became increasingly clear that the Americans would make an attempt against Pensacola, and the debacle at Mobile served to increase the necessity for Jackson to do so. Aware of the weakness of the Spaniards, he was prepared to force the issue with Governor Manrique. On August 24 Jackson repeated his allegations that the Spanish were harboring Indians hostile to the United States.⁴⁹ Manrique, in reply, recalled recent American aggression against Spain's possessions and declared the Treaty of Fort Jackson to be void, a matter that would be taken up with his home government in Spain.⁵⁰ Jackson was unimpressed. He mobilized his militia, which included, significantly, 700 Choctaws, and eventually marched upon the town. An admonition of October 21 from Secretary of State James Monroe ordered the general not to take "measures which

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48. Nicolls to Cochrane, August 12, 1814, CP, 2328, 59-61; Percy to Cochrane, September 16, 1814, *ibid.*, 83-87; Robert Harvey to Nicolls, September 20, 1814, *ibid.*, 91; Cochrane to Admiralty, December 7, 1814, ADM/1/505/150-51; list of casualties, *ibid.*, 161-62.
49. Jackson to Manrique, August 24, 1814, Bassett, *Correspondence of Jackson*, II, 28-29.
50. Manrique to Jackson, August 30, 1814, *ibid.*, 37-40.

would involve this Government in a contest with Spain" but arrived too late to interfere with the expedition.⁵¹

The British and Indian participation in the defense of Pensacola proved to be both ineffective and fraught with difficulties. Provisioning the large numbers of Indians assembling there was perennially embarrassing, for, although some supplies were brought in by sea, most had to be purchased locally and shortages and profiteering drove up prices. Difficulties were constantly encountered in procuring clothing, blankets, needles, vermillion, ammunition, salt, and food. Woodbine lacked sufficient ready cash and found himself dredging his private resources and borrowing to meet the outlay, and, since American supplies were gradually stifled, Nicolls reported the necessity of smuggling flour into Pensacola.⁵² British inability to meet all the accounts of the Pensacola merchants immediately did not improve their relationships with the local residents, but a more contentious matter still was Nicolls's recruitment of slaves to the fury of the slaveholders. The blacks had not rallied to the British standard as readily as had the Indians, and only about eighty of them were at this time assembled at Prospect Bluff. Others were with Nicolls at Pensacola, and some of them were claimed as the property of local dignitaries, such as the Indian trader John Forbes. Since the British had announced on August 26 and August 29 that neutral rights would be safeguarded, and Nicolls was present at Pensacola as an ally of the Spaniards, there was logic in the complaints of Forbes and other slaveowners that they had been poorly treated.⁵³ It is impossible to determine how far the Negroes had been impressed by Nicolls, or whether they were simply enlisting with the British to take advantage of their standing offer of land in the colonies open to slaves volunteering for service. Whatever the truth of the matter, however, it held important implications for Indian resistance in the south, because during the ensuing decades the communities of largely

51. Monroe to Jackson, October 21, 1814, *ibid.*, 79-80; Jackson to Monroe, October 26, 1814, *ibid.*, 82-83.

52. Woodbine to Nicolls, October 3, 1814, CP, 2328, 95; Woodbine to Nicolls, September 27, 1814, *ibid.*, 93; Woodbine accounts, *ibid.*, 100, 107; Nicolls to naval commissioners, October 1814, *ibid.*, 102.

53. John Forbes and thirty-three Spanish inhabitants to Manrique, March 1815, *ibid.*, 148-51.

free Negroes located in the Seminole country were to be principal forces in the fight against tribal removal.⁵⁴

The Negro issue at Pensacola intensified difficulties which had already developed among the Indians, the British, and John Forbes. The Red Sticks charged that Forbes had so stifled supplies of ammunition to Indians during the Creek war that they had been compelled to retreat to Pensacola. This was all the more irritating, since lands on the Apalachicola River had been ceded to Forbes's company by Seminoles and Creeks in 1804 and 1811 conditional upon Forbes's operating an Indian trade with regulated prices. Under this front, the warriors alleged, Forbes had attempted to settle Indian land. In addition to the native grievances, the British had evidence that Forbes was now committed to a south dominated by American rather than British, or even Spanish, suzerainty, although his company continued to operate out of Pensacola. One partner, James Innerarity, was, in 1816, major of the American town of Mobile and colonel of the Mobile militia, and he was in regular contact with his brother, John Innerarity at Pensacola. In an intercepted letter of 1814 to Doyle and Hambly at Apalachicola, it was revealed that Forbes himself, in St. Augustine, had urged his employees to dissuade the Indians from joining the British. It was comparatively easy, therefore, for the Indians and the British to regard the Forbes company as a source of espionage and as an obstruction to their efforts.⁵⁵

The problems with Forbes and other Pensacola residents did not end when the British eventually departed. At that time Nicolls made efforts to settle debts with the local merchants, and in February 1815 Cochrane appointed a committee to investigate and liquidate claims upon the British. However, the admiral declared that he had no power over any Negroes except those actually taken by the British Marines; he assumed no responsibility for those still with the Indians. This did not appease all slaveowners, and Forbes and Company continued to agitate

54. Kenneth Wiggins Porter, "Negroes and the Seminole War, 1817-1818," *Journal of Negro History*, XXXVI (July 1951), 249-80; Porter, "Negroes and the Seminole War, 1835-1842," *Journal of Southern History*, XXX (November 1964), 427-50.

55. Owsley, "British and Indian Activities," 118-19; Boyd, "Events at Prospect Bluff," 61-65; Indian chiefs to British government, March 10; 1815, WO/1/143/147-50; Nicolls to Cochrane, March 1816, WO/1/144/151-53.

upon this account and was able to obtain the arrest and imprisonment of Woodbine at New Providence in October 1815 on charges of appropriating slaves. As late as 1854, John Innerarity was claiming indemnification for forty-five slaves from the British. Such discontent was probably due in part to the attempt of the British after the war to fulfill their obligations to the enlisted Negroes. Although an effort was made to persuade the latter to return to their former masters, they were offered the choice of enlisting in the West Indian Regiments or of taking small pieces of land in the West Indies as free settlers. Alternatively, they might remain at the fort at Prospect Bluff, or on the Suwannee River, or live with the Indians. To the chagrin of Innerarity and his colleagues, many of the Negroes preferred these courses to returning to their masters.⁵⁶

More important than these disputes, however, in the defense of Pensacola, was the friction between Nicolls and Governor Manrique. Strained relations between the two made any concerted effort impossible. Manrique was unwilling to antagonize Jackson unnecessarily realizing his weak position in the event of an American attack. He sought to retain control of the defense of Pensacola: whereas Nicolls and Captain James Alexander Gordon of the *Seahorse*, who arrived with the *Mars* and the *Shelburne*, demanded a more aggressive approach to the problem. The Spanish, Nicolls reported, were "slumbering amidst the threatened storm," but, apart from launching weak Indian sorties against American forces which flitted about the area, there was little he could do without more cooperation.⁵⁷ In an attempt to reverse the lethargy in the defense, the British, somewhat arbitrarily, interfered with Manrique's supervision of the preparations to resist Jackson's army. On November 2, they threatened to evacuate their forces unless Fort Barrancas

56. Nicolls to Gordon, November 7, 1814, CP, 2328, 114; British public notice, March 9, 1815, *ibid.*, 165; claims of Forbes and others for Negroes, *ibid.*, 172-79; Cochrane to John Wilson Croker, February 25, 1815, ADM/1/508/570-71; Cochrane to Robert Cavendish Spencer, George Taylor, and Robert Gamble, February 17, 1815, *ibid.*, 572-74; Cochrane to Pulteney Malcolm, February 17, 1815, *ibid.*, 562-63; Nicolls to Hawkins, April 28, 1815, WO/1/143/161-62; WO/1/144/155-70; "Documents Relating to Colonel Edward Nicholls and Captain George Woodbine in Pensacola, 1814," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, X (July 1931), 51-54; Wright, "Note on First Seminole War," 569; Boyd, "Events at Prospect Bluff," 72, 74.

57. Gordon to Cochrane, November 18, 1814, CP, 2328, 199-11; Nicolls to Apodaca, November 9, 1814, *ibid.*, 103-04.

and the harbor entrance were placed under the joint control of Manrique and Nicolls.⁵⁸ In reply the governor explained that "it was not in the power of the Governor to declare war."⁵⁹

On November 3-5, the Indians and their families were moved across Pensacola Bay to a place of greater safety, and the next day the Americans opened fire upon Fort St. Miguel, near the town, partly manned by the British. Jackson called upon the Spaniards to surrender and while Manrique replied that he would repel any attack upon the town, his hand was weakened by the attitudes of his British allies, who believed that a successful defense was no longer possible. Gordon brusquely informed the governor that 600 Indian warriors had been sent to Apalachicola, and that "the enemy had already got possession of a post that he [Manrique] should have defended, that from his conduct, I was certain he had betrayed his trust, and as it was my duty to provide for the safety of the troops and the ships under my orders, I should destroy the Barrancas and the Fort on Santa Rosa, embarking the Spanish troops who choose to come off whenever I saw the enemy in possession of the town. By my direction the fort on Santa Rosa was destroyed that evening."⁶⁰

Pensacola was stormed by Jackson's force on November 7; little resistance was offered. The following day Nicolls sent away the Indian rear guard, 200 Spanish soldiers were embarked from Barrancas, the guns were spiked, surplus arms and stores destroyed, and the fortifications blown up. The squadron remained in the harbor only long enough to cover the retreat of the Indians. Then it left with all but one of the ships sailing for Apalachicola with the British and Spanish forces. Because the British vessels were busy elsewhere, Manrique's soldiers did not leave Apalachicola and return to Pensacola until the summer of 1815.⁶¹

58. Nicolls and Gordon to Manrique, November 2, 1814, ADM/1/505/71; Nicolls and Gordon to Manrique, October 11, 1814, CP, 2328, 96; Nicolls to Apodaca, November 9, 1814, *ibid.*, 103-04.

59. Gordon to Cochrane, November 18, 1814, *ibid.*, 109-11.

60. *Ibid.*; Manrique to Jackson, November 6, 1814, Bassett, *Correspondence of Jackson*, II, 93.

61. Gordon to Apodaca, November 9, 1814, ADM/1/505/169-70; Gordon to Cochrane, November 18, 1814, CP, 2328, 109-11; Jackson to Monroe, November 14, 1814, Bassett, *Correspondence of Jackson*, II, 96-99; Cochrane, February 17, 1815, ADM/1/508/556-61.

Jackson's occupation of Pensacola represented the second defeat for the infant British-Indian alliance, and a more serious one than Mobile. It strongly indicated the military preeminence of the United States, and must have counteracted the headway which the British and their Indian allies had made among the neutral tribes. Seven months earlier, the fall of Pensacola would have been disastrous for the nativists, since it had been the major source of succour for Francis and McQueen's Red Sticks. In November, however, Apalachicola offered an alternative, especially as the position was being gradually strengthened. The British, supervised by Lieutenant Christie of the Royal Artillery, completed their fort at Prospect Bluff on the east bank of the river, and another fort was built at the forks of the Apalachicola. The immediate consequence of the fall of Pensacola, therefore, was a transfer of the Indian strength to Apalachicola, where they continued to assemble and arm. Jackson was disturbed by the concentration, but an American expedition against the Indians under Major Uriah Blue was not successful.⁶²

In November Nicolls's principal objective was to maintain a force which could collaborate with Cochrane's invasion fleet, then assembling in the West Indies. At Apalachicola three companies of Negro Colonial Marines had been formed, and a fourth was in the process of organization. There was still hope of harnessing the neutral Creeks, for whom £500 worth of presents were being prepared, and the Cherokees, who received British arms. It is not inconceivable that the arrival in the Gulf of Mexico of Cochrane's forces at the end of the month encouraged more Indians to join the British. On December 22, 1814, for example, the 1,100 warriors, 450 women, and 755 children at Apalachicola were joined by 500 newcomers, "several wavering towns" having "lately joined us from the American Lines," and early in January "two different Indian tribes from the neighbourhood of the American lines," some 1,100 men, arrived.⁶³ Probably there were over 2,000 Indian fighting men gathered at the Bluff at the time, although British

62. Nicolls to Cochrane., August 12, 1814, CP, 2328, 59-61; Boyd, "Events at Prospect Bluff," 71-73; Jackson to James Winchester, November 22, 1814, Bassett, *Correspondence of Jackson*, II, 104-07.

63. Robert Henry to Cochrane, December 22, 1814, CP, 2328, 126; William Rawlins to Cochrane, January 16, 1815, *ibid.*, 136-37; Nicolls to Cochrane, December 3, 1814, *ibid.*, 117-18.

estimates held that 3,551 warriors were available for service. Of these 1,421 resided on or near the Apalachicola River, 800 were Red Sticks, 400 were Chihaw Lower Creeks, 760 were Seminoles or Mikasuki, and 170 were Negroes from the area eastwards of the Flint and the Apalachicola rivers. None of the neutral tribes had come over to the British, although it is possible to argue that the Choctaw were substantially with the Americans. The most promising recruits were still the Big Warrior Creeks, who were believed to have 2,540 warriors, of whom some 1,300 had been with the Red Sticks during the Creek war.⁶⁴

During this period the relationship between the nativists and Nicolls and Woodbine matured into one of mutual affection. Working daily with the Indians, the two British officers developed a respect for their allies which stands in stark contrast to the bigoted arrogance with which they were regarded by many British leaders.⁶⁵ Among the chiefs at Apalachicola who were frequently in British company were McQueen, Francis, John, Old Factor, Hopoeth Mico, Perryman, Cappachamico, and Hopoy Mico; the latter two, both Seminoles, had remained at Prospect Bluff during the operations at Pensacola. Cappachamico and Perryman were reported much annoyed with John Forbes, and with other Indians, confiscated the company's property at the Bluff and rescinded the land grants made earlier to the traders. In particular, the "brave and faithful old Chief" Cappachamico, as Nicolls called him, bore such a grievance against Forbes that he vowed his death. It was this warrior, who, with Perryman, Francis, and others, visited Cochrane's flagship, the *Tonnant*, when it arrived in Apalachicola Bay late in 1814, and who, in company with Hopoy Mico, Francis, and some colleagues, was entertained aboard the *Erebus* when it arrived in the bay in January 1815.⁶⁶

For all their understanding, however, Nicolls and Woodbine, like most white men who met Indians, did not doubt that aboriginal society was inferior to that of their own. A philanthropic sentiment was present. Woodbine, for instance, proudly

64. "Return of Muscogee or Creek Indians," WO/1/143/174-75.

65. For example, compare Mahon, *War of 1812*, 352, with Jane Lucas de Grummond, *The Baratarians and the Battle of New Orleans* (Baton Rouge, 1961), 68-69.

66. Nicolls to Cochrane, December 3, 1814, CP, 2328, 117-18; David Ewen Bartholomew to Cochrane, February 6, 1815, *ibid.*, 145; Nicolls, expenses, enclosed in Nicolls to John Barrow, August 21, 1815, WO/1/143/123-27.

declared that "the lessons of humanity, inculcated in the minds of our aggrieved red brethren have not been thrown away." As he confided to Nicolls, "Their having given up unhurt to yourself all the prisoners captured by them since your arrival, makes me feel not a little proud in having been the first instrument of inducing them to lay aside the tomahawk and the scalping knife." The warriors were even willing to "liberate their slaves, tho' they were to lose what they cost them." "The Indian character," he believed, "has been much mistaken and has been most unjustly stigmatized as bloody and ferocious. You have been long enough among them to observe many most amiable traits in them, which only want the fostering hand of instruction and the light of Christianity to mature. You often said that with a little trouble and expense these our loyal brethren might be civilized. Be assured, Sir, it is the truth and a very few thousands expended on that laudable object would insure to Great Britain thousands of most faithful and obedient subjects whose loyalty has stood unshaken to our Sovereign [in] spite of all the allurements held out to them by the Americans."⁶⁷ Patronizing as many of these remarks may have been, they reflect a recognition by both Nicolls and Woodbine of qualities in the Indians missed by many contemporaries.

Inevitably, the concentration of men at the Bluff posed the usual problem of supplies. Considerable quantities of provisions and munitions were required. The *Alceste*, for example, landed thirty-seven cases of arms and casks of flints, five bales, nine cases, four casks, eighteen bundles, ten cradles, and four bags of "sundry stores," 200 barrels of ball cartridges, 1,600 sand bags, three cases of tools, seventy-five shovels, and other implements.⁶⁸ In November the *Seahorse* and the *Childers* deposited stores, three six-pounder pieces, and \$4,000; \$3,000 was for the use of Woodbine and the balance for Nicolls.⁶⁹ The attrition was particularly severe upon food supplies. In December twelve barrels of flour were consumed each day, and in times of acute stress Nicolls was compelled to send the warriors into the woods to hunt.⁷⁰ Even the river exacerbated the difficulties, for the

67. Woodbine to Nicolls, October 27, 1814, CP, 2328, 145.

68. List of goods aboard the *Alceste*, *ibid.*, 108.

69. Gordon to Cochrane, November 19, 1814, *ibid.*, 111-12.

70. Nicolls to Cochrane, December 3, 1814, *ibid.*, 117-18; Rawlins to Senior Officer, Pensacola, January 16, 1815, *ibid.*, 138.

ebbs in the Apalachicola obstructed the shallow-draught vessels which conveyed provisions to Prospect Bluff, and the bar in the bay sometimes necessitated the lightening of the victualling ships before they could pass towards the river mouth. Thus, the *Erebus*, which arrived off St. George's Island on January 22, 1815, was not able to shift supplies up the Apalachicola until the twenty-eighth.⁷¹

Nevertheless, a formidable force of men was assembled and maintained at Prospect Bluff, and their use was planned as part of the British invasion of the south. On December 5, 1814, Cochrane and Major General John Keane issued a proclamation to the Indians asserting that the war aims of the British included "the restoration of those lands of which the People of Bad Spirit have basely robbed them [the Indians]" which was to act as a clarion call for battle.⁷² The Indians were to harrass the Georgian frontier and to link up with Admiral George Cockburn, who was operating upon the Atlantic seaboard against Florida and Georgia, while Cochrane himself struck at New Orleans. Later, in February, it was envisaged that they might act in a diversionary role by attacking Fort Stoddert on the Tombigbee River and threatening Mobile. Unfortunately, although, as late as January 1815, Prospect Bluff was strengthened by the addition of two long sixes and a company of the West India Regiment, the forces there were used in a fragmentary and ineffective manner. During the period November to February, fifty Mikasukis moved south to attack the frontier, Woodbine tried to make contact to the northeast with Cockburn, Nicolls took fewer than 100 Seminole, Creek, and Choctaw warriors to participate in the abortive British attack upon New Orleans, and some men were sent towards Mobile to cooperate with General John Lambert's troops there. Nothing of importance was achieved by any of these parties.⁷³ Worse still, the major British invasion of the south misfired. In December and January General Edward Pakenham's army was disastrously defeated at New Orleans, and

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71. Bartholomew to Cochrane, January 31, 1815, *ibid.*, 142; Rawlins to Cochrane, December 21, 1814, *ibid.*, 122.
 72. Cochrane and John Keane, proclamation to the Indians, December 5, 1814, WO/1/143/159.
 73. Cochrane to John Lambert, February 3, 1815, ADM/1/508/566-69; Cochrane, February 14, 1815, *ibid.*, 535-38; Nicolls to Cochrane, December 3, 1814, CP, 2328, 117-18; Bartholomew to Cochrane, January 31, 1815, *ibid.*, 143.

while Cockburn raided the coasts in January, and Lambert's force captured Fort Bowyer the following month, no major progress had been made before hostilities between Britain and the United States finally came to an end.

At the close of the War of 1812, therefore, the Indian service with the British had been singularly unsuccessful. Large numbers of Seminoles and Red Sticks had assembled to fight their American foes, and although they had loyally accepted British direction, they were witness to a series of reverses: the repulse at Mobile, the loss of Pensacola, and the rout at New Orleans. The warriors themselves had hardly been in battle, and their losses were trivial. "I have had 4, 8, and 13 of them killed in different affairs," wrote Nicolls more than a year later.⁷⁴ In February 1815, the Americans may have appeared far from secure, but they had preserved their control of the south, and in such circumstances the Seminoles and the Red Sticks could expect little support from the other Indians who were more amenable to the United States.

At best, the nativists could claim to have been rescued from distress and to have received food and arms. But their lands were still in the hands of their enemies, and their ability to maintain their independence was almost as precarious as it had been before the British arrived. Nevertheless, there were still those promises made by Cochrane that the Creeks would not be forgotten in the event of peace. If the British had failed the Indians militarily, it remained to be seen if, by diplomacy, their pledges could be fulfilled.

When Admiral Cochrane had first written in June 1814 to Whitehall, arguing that the Indians should be included in a peace, he was preaching to the converted. As early as August 29, 1812, General Isaac Brock, who owed so much to Tecumseh and his followers in the campaign which saved Canada from invasion that year, had urged the British government to protect his Indian allies in peace negotiations, and by the end of 1812 he had obtained from Earl Bathurst, colonial secretary, a promise to that effect. The lesson was reinforced by the Canadian fur trade interest. It agitated for the preservation of Indian hegemony over the lands of the lakes and the northwest which would afford the traders, access to that prime hunting area. In 1814, when the war in Europe ended, such ideas seemed feasible;

74. Nicholls to Cochrane, March 1, 1816, WO/1/144/139-42.

Britain would be free to concentrate its resources towards a military victory sufficient to warrant the imposition upon the United States of a settlement that would protect the Indian lands. Catching this mood, in May and June interested parties clamoured in the British press for the creation of an Indian buffer state in the northwest.⁷⁵

However, Viscount Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary, was in no position to ask prolonged military operations of a war- and tax-weary Britain. While he hoped that the 1814 campaigns would weaken the hand of the United States, he feared that an extensive war would raise opposition to his government at home. Moreover, he had, of course, little if any commitment to the Indian cause. Nevertheless, he instructed his three commissioners negotiating with the American diplomats at Ghent to insist "as a *sine qua non* of peace" upon "an adequate arrangement" of Indian interests. This, he suggested, might be obtained by both Britain and the United States guaranteeing "the Indian possessions as they shall be established upon the peace, against encroachment on the part of either state," thus creating between Canada and the United States a buffer which would reduce, he believed, tension between the two countries.⁷⁶

The Americans were, naturally, astonished by such suggestions when the peace negotiations opened in Ghent in August 1814, and the British commissioner, Henry Goulburn, coupled the idea of the barrier state with the *sine qua non*. Indeed, as late as January 1814, James Monroe had been proposing his own solution to British and American friction over the Indians by means of a British cession of Canada.⁷⁷ By August, the Americans

75. Isaac Brock to Liverpool, August 29, 1812, William Wood, ed., *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812*, 4 vols. (Toronto, 1920-28) I, 506-09; Brock to George Prevost, September 18, 1812, *ibid.*, 592-94; George Clifford Chalou, "The Red Pawns Go to War: British-American-Indian Relations, 1810-1815" (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1971), 139, 188-89; Bradford Perkins, *Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812-1823* (Berkeley, 1964), 64, 82-84; Charles M. Gates, "The West in American Diplomacy, 1812-1815," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXVI (March 1940), 502; Fred L. Engelman, *The Peace of Christmas Eve* (London, 1962).

76. Castlereagh to William Adams, Lord James Gambier, and Henry Goulburn, July 28, 1814, Charles W. Vane, ed., *Correspondence, Despatches and Other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of Londonderry*, 12 vols. (London, 1848-54), X, 67-72.

77. Monroe to the American commissioners, January 28, 1814, James P. Hopkins and Mary W. M. Hargreaves, eds., *The Papers of Henry Clay*, 5 vols. (Lexington, 1959-63), I, 857-62.

were on the defensive, but their commissioners undoubtedly considered the idea of an Indian barrier state, which would pose a threat to the expansion of the United States, as preposterous. It would restore to the Indians a recognition of their sovereignty over the lands they occupied, and it would impeach American jurisdiction over the northwestern territory, concepts satisfactorily conceded to the advantage of the United States by the British in 1783. Moreover, since the Americans were determined to settle the northwest, the creation of the barrier state would amount to a virtual cession of territory by the United States. As described by Goulburn on August 9, the Indian land would not be alienable either to Britain or the United States, and Castlereagh was persuaded to consider the Greenville treaty line of 1795 as a basis for discussion of boundaries. Although the American diplomats lacked instructions which would enable them to deal with the matter, they expressed contempt for the British proposals. Henry Clay, one of the American commissioners, referred to "the absurdity, to say the least of it, of Great Britain attempting, without powers, to treat for savage tribes, scattered over our acknowledged territory, the very names of which she probably does not know."⁷⁸

On August 25 the American commissioners rejected the conditions of the Indian buffer state and British control of the lakes, leaving Britain with the alternatives of climbing down over the Indian issues or of risking what Castlereagh termed an "imprudent" military campaign.⁷⁹ Lord Liverpool, the British prime minister, doubted that his government could guarantee inalienable Indian lands, since the tribes themselves might wish to sell territory to the United States. Concerned that the peace negotiations would be ruptured, he suggested a modification to the *sine qua non* which established it in its final form.⁸⁰ It would certainly have been difficult to justify to the British public the maintenance of the war on a question so remote to them as the fate of the American Indian. Sir James Mackintosh, for one, expressed agreement with the Americans, and stated in the

78. Henry Clay to Monroe, August 18, 1814, *ibid.*, 962-68; Castlereagh to the British commissioners, August 14, 1814, Vane, *Papers of Castlereagh*, X, 86-91.

79. Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, August 28, 1814, *ibid.*, 100-02.

80. Liverpool to Henry Bathurst, September 14, 15, 30, 1814, Francis Bickley, ed., *Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst* (London, 1923), 286-89, 294-95.

House of Commons that it was impossible to contemplate prohibiting land sales "from the savages." It would, he suggested, "arrest the progress of mankind" and "condemn one of the most favoured tracts of the earth to perpetual sterility." His views were similar to those of one of the American commissioners, John Quincy Adams.⁸¹

Article 9 of the final treaty was the crucial item. "The United States of America," it read, "engage to put an end, immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom they may be at war at the time of such ratification, and, forthwith, to restore to such tribes or nations respectively, all the possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in 1811, previous to such hostilities. Provided always that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against the United States of America, their citizens and subjects, upon the ratification of the present Treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly."⁸² Its implications for the southern Indians were evident, even though the British diplomats envisaged that they were working on the behalf of the northern tribes alone. The Treaty of Fort Jackson of August 9, 1814, had already been declared by the nativists and the Spaniards to be null. Now, by international treaty, the United States also invalidated Jackson's dispossession of the Creeks, since, by Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent, the Indians were to be restored "all the possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in 1811."

Cochrane received news of the peace in February 1815, but he remained ready to resume operations if the treaty was not ratified. On February 14 he wrote Nicolls, requesting him to advise the Indians to cease hostilities and await the consummation of the treaty and the consequent restoration of their lands. Various precautions were, in the meantime, to be taken to ensure the safety of the Indians at Apalachicola. The munitions, presents, and stores were to be turned over to them, and the warriors might be permitted to retain the field guns if they considered them necessary for their defense. Nicolls's marines,

81. *Parliamentary Debates* (London, 1815), XXX, 529-30; Allan Nevins, ed., *The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845* (New York, 1951), 131, 133.

82. *Parliamentary Debates*, XXX, 216-17.

the coloured colonial marines, and the company of the 5th West India Regiment at the Bluff were not to be withdrawn until the peace was finally concluded. In addition, General Lambert was asked to place a British regiment and two more West India regiments at Apalachicola, and the ships were to remain in support.⁸³ In March additional supplies of corn were sent to the Indians in the *Norge* and the *Meteor*. That military campaigning was not yet considered inconceivable is indicated by a scale of allowances devised only a little before this time to provide inducements to the Indian chiefs.⁸⁴

The Indians and some of the British seem to have been sufficiently naive to believe that the Americans would restore the lands "ceded" in 1814, but from this delusion they were rapidly awakened. On April 28, 1815, Nicolls, who had remained at Apalachicola after the troops were withdrawn, felt obliged to protest to the American agent, Benjamin Hawkins. He enclosed a copy of Article 9 and complained that a few days previously a number of Americans had attacked a Seminole town of Chief Bowlegs, killing a man and wounding another, and stealing cattle. The Indians, however, had refrained from any acts hostile to the United States, and, indeed, had resolved to communicate with the Americans as little as possible. Consequently, Nicolls warned the latter not to encroach upon Indian territory or to communicate directly with the natives, and to evacuate the lands Jackson had sequestered as guaranteed by Article 9. To emphasize the point, Nicolls enclosed an Indian pledge, signed by Hopoeth Mico, Cappachamico, and Hopoy Mico, in which the Indians, declaring themselves "a free and independent people," gave their promise to abide by the treaty.⁸⁵

Unfortunately, Nicolls's tone was likely to aggravate rather than to placate the American temper, and his letter was treated

83. Cochrane to Nicolls, February 14, 1815, ADM/1/508/531-32; Cochrane, February 17, 1815, *ibid.*, 556-61; Cochrane to Pulteney Malcolm, February 17, 1815, *ibid.*, 562-63; Cochrane to John Lambert, February 17, 1815, *ibid.*, 564-66.

84. Malcolm to Nicolls, March 5, 1815, Foreign Office Papers, Public Record Office, Kew, England (hereinafter cited as FO), class 5/folio 139/p. 181; Cochrane, instructions to Nicolls, March 9, 1815, *ibid.*, 185; Scale of Allowances Proposed to be Given to the Indians when Assembled to Aid in Operations against the United States, 1815, CP, 2330, 171a.

85. Nicolls to Hawkins, April 28, 1815, WO/1/143/161-62; pledge of Hopoeth Mico, Cappachamico, and Hopoy Mico, April 2, 1815, FO/5/139/187.

with derision. Hawkins commented that the Indian signers were Seminoles, not Creeks, rather speciously, since the former tribe had lost lands on the lower Chattahoochee and the Flint as a result of the Fort Jackson treaty, and Jackson himself resented the continued interference of the British agents and the "bare faced effrontery" of the letter. As a result, Nicolls again wrote Hawkins on May 12, complaining that while one of the Indians had executed a tribesman for stealing cattle belonging to the United States, Chief Bowlegs's village had once more been attacked by American filibusters, and two people had been murdered. Notwithstanding, he continued, he had the previous day arranged for four chiefs in different parts of the Indian country to be designated upholders of the law and to accept responsibility for its maintenance. In view of this, the Americans should evacuate the lands of the Indians according to the Ghent treaty. More antagonistic was the tactless announcement by Nicolls that he had furnished the Indians with arms and ammunition for their defense and had prepared an offensive and defensive treaty between Britain and the chiefs which was to be taken to London for ratification.⁸⁶

The new "treaty" was an attempt to provide for the needs of both Nicolls and the Indians, and it proclaimed also its value to British interest generally. With the war over, Nicolls faced the prospect of unemployment with half pay, and he had neither received his salary for the last year nor a confirmation of the pay and allowances offered him by Cochrane when he was appointed to the provincial rank of colonel of the colonial regiment. Furthermore, service with the Indians had enjoined severe expenses which had eroded Nicolls's personal resources. The cost of his entertainment of leading chiefs alone, up to December 7, 1814, had amounted to \$1,952, of which Cochrane had repaid \$500 in February 1815. As late as August of that year, however, Nicolls was in debt to the extent of £442. To banish these embarrassments, he hoped to remain in the south as an Indian superintendent, representing British interests, and, from the confiscated land formerly occupied by Forbes and Company, to administer a profitable Indian trade.⁸⁷

86. Jackson to Hawkins, August 14, 1815, Bassett, *Correspondence of Jackson*, II, 214-15; Nicolls to Hawkins, May 12, 1815, WO/1/143/165-66.

87. Nicolls to Bathurst, May 5, 1817, WO/1/144/417-18; Nicolls, Memorial, *ibid.*, 419-22; expenses enclosed in Nicolls to John Barrow, August 21,

The treaty was drafted at the British fort on the junction of the Chattahoochee and Flint rivers on March 10, 1815, and signed by thirty chiefs, including Hopoeth Mico, Hopoy Mico, Cappachamico, and Francis. The Forbes grants were declared invalid, and the British were asked to provide trade through, the Alabama, Apalachicola, and St. Marys rivers. The Indians swore obedience to the British, and denounced sales of native land without British consent. They offered to grant territory to any subjects of Britain sent to stay with them. The chiefs promised to "do our best to protect and defend them in their lands and property."⁸⁸

There can be no doubt that the chiefs feared the loss of British support, especially as famine, accentuated by the large numbers of Red Stick refugees in Seminole country, was still present. The document also drew attention to some of their earlier grievances predating the Creek war of 1813, such as the wagon road blazed through the Indian land from Hartford, Georgia, to Mobile, and the activities of Creek Chief William McIntosh. The latter, the Indians stated, had been sent by the Creeks to remonstrate with the Americans over the road and the encroachments upon the Tombigbee, Coosa, and Alabama rivers, but he had been bribed and had sold a large tract about the Oconee and the Ocmulgee rivers to the United States.⁸⁹ Nicolls had shown little discretion in detailing the trade agreement to Hawkins, because the Treaty of Fort Jackson, which the Indians considered annulled, had itself been concocted as a device to separate the Creeks, by a land cession, from interference by the Spaniards. To demand the restoration of those territories and in the same breath to provide further evidence for the necessity of the cession was the ultimate folly. Couched in such a truculent manner, and furnishing further grounds for suspicion of the Indians, Nicolls's communications only served to reinforce the political expediency of the Treaty of Fort Jackson, and the Americans found it convenient to ignore Article 9.

After one more attempt to protest at the running of the Fort Jackson line, Nicolls, accompanied by Francis, his son, his in-

1815, WO/1/143/123-27; Nicolls to Barrow, August 24, 1815, *ibid.*, 131-33; Wright, "Note on First Seminole War," 570-71.

88: Indian agreement, March 10, 1815, WO/1/143/147-50.

89. *Ibid.*, William McIntosh was concerned in a land cession to the United States in 1805.

terpreter, and his servant, who had been deputized by the Indians to place their complaints before the British government and to give a calumet of peace to the prince regent, left for England. Early in August Nicolls installed the Indians at his home, Durham Lodge, near Eltham, Kent, and then hurried to London, where he arrived on the evening of August 14. He solicited an interview with Bathurst, but there was little response apart from an order from the earl that some pistols be presented to Chief Francis for his trouble. In a detailed letter, Nicolls explained that the chief had been delegated to present a communication to the British government on behalf of the southern Indians. Various needs of the natives were articulated, including winter clothing for the visitors, the desire for an Indian trade and a communication line with the British in the West Indies through Apalachicola, and the wish of Francis that his son remain in England to receive an education. Probably hoping to invoke ministerial responsibility, it was stated that before the Creek war the Red Sticks had obtained from the governor of Canada a letter urging them to commence the war but that none could read it.⁹⁰

It appears that Nicolls was also canvassing for monetary rewards; according to a memorial to Bathurst, in which he itemized the remuneration which the leading chiefs and agents should receive. Hopoeth Mico, "the young king of the Four Nations," he hoped, would be awarded £300 and the half pay of a major, £146 per annum. This last perquisite should also be bestowed upon Cappachamico and the Mikasuki, Hopoy Mico. Francis and Talmuchees Hadjo (presumably McQueen) were each worth £300 and the half pay of a captain, £95.16.3 per annum. Pensions of £63.17.6 per annum, the half pay of a lieutenant, it was suggested, should be assigned to each of six other chiefs, and to First Lieutenant William Hambly of the Colonial Battalion of Black Marines, head interpreter, and to Lieutenant Castle. Nine other interpreters should each receive £40 and Woodbine, £95.16.3 a year. Finally, rewards of 5,831 each of hoes, axes, and

90. Nicolls to Hawkins, June 12, 1815, WO/1/143/151; Nicolls to John Philip Morier, September 25, 1815, *ibid.*, 137-39; expenses of Nicolls; *ibid.*, 141; Nicolls to John Wilson Croker, August 15, 1815, *ibid.*, 103; Nicolls to Bathurst, August 1815, *ibid.*, 107-08.

knives were requested for the Indians and the issuance of a license for regular trade.⁹¹

To these appeals the government turned a deaf ear, although on March 12, 1816, Cochrane himself wrote in support of the Creeks, highlighting the disparity between the Fort Jackson and Ghent treaties, and explaining that he had not known of the former agreement when Captain Robert Cavendish Spencer had finally withdrawn the troops. The Red Sticks, he stated, could not be bound by a treaty they had not signed. Eventually, in the early summer of 1816, Francis did obtain an interview with Bathurst. He was accompanied by one Faden as interpreter, since Nicolls was ill, but received little more than sympathy. Although the chief received handsome presents during his visit, the central aims of his mission had been frustrated.⁹² Fired as he was by an almost fanatical hatred of Americans, he could not induce the British government to enforce the stipulations made on behalf of the Indians in the Treaty of Ghent, nor bring them to underwrite the establishment of a permanent British trade with the southern Indians which would have enabled them to remain independent of the United States. The shallow altruism which had characterized the cabinet's Indian policy was at last exposed, and further attempts by Francis to obtain a hearing do not appear to have been successful. Nicolls fared the worse for the visit, for he entertained the Indians at his house during the whole period of their stay in England at great personal expense, and he was compelled eventually to memorialize the treasury for relief from a debt of £378.2.6 in 1817.⁹³

Francis did not, however, sail for the West Indies until De-

91. Nicolls, Memorial to Bathurst, 1815, CP, 2575, 120-21.

92. Cochrane to Bathurst, March 12, 1816, *ibid.*, 140-41; Nicolls to Cochrane, July 26, 1816, *ibid.*, 157; letter to Henry Goulburn, May 13, 1816, WO/1/144/263. A list of presents considered suitable for the Indians (*ibid.*, 21-28) refers to two ploughs and two harrows in addition to numerous agricultural and domestic utensils, blankets, and cotton. Some of these items, axes, spades, shovels, scythes, hammers, grindstones, rakes, hoes, and nails, were shipped out for Francis, according to J. Barker to George Harrison, January 2, 1817, *ibid.*, 409. In addition the three Indian delegates received suits, sabres, dirks, rifles, and a few agricultural and household instruments while they were in London (Nicolls, expenses, WO/1/143/141).

93. William Pole to Bathurst, August 16, 1816, WO/1/144/309-10; Nicolls to Bathurst, enclosing memorial, May 5, 1817, *ibid.*, 417-22. Francis's attitude is revealed in Nicolls, December 19, 1815, CP, 2328, 182, which states: "He (Francis) swears he will kill every American in the province as soon as he returns."

ember 30, 1816. In September of that year, when he was preparing to leave, Nicolls attempted to retrieve more from the visit by requesting Bathurst to supply funds for the education of the chief's son in England, and eventually he managed to procure a sum of £100 which was to be given to Francis by Governor Cameron at New Providence.⁹⁴ The Creek's ensuing departure marked a further retreat of the British on the matter of the Indian allies, and the point was underlined by the cabinet responses to protests lodged by Indians at Apalachicola even before Francis had left London. Early in 1816 a memorial, allegedly from some of the head chiefs of the Choctaw, Creek, and Cherokee, was sent to Cameron pleading for British interference in the question of their rights as guaranteed by the peace. Significantly, the three signers included, at last, the leaders of the hitherto pro-American Creek faction, including Big Warrior (Tustennuggee Thlucko) and Little Prince. Bathurst seemed disposed to act upon the complaint. He forwarded it to the foreign office, observing that the Indians possessed a claim to British intervention, and he instructed Governor Cameron to inform the Indians that the British minister in Washington would raise the matter with the United States.⁹⁵

Nothing, apparently, was done, however, and the inactivity brought two Indian deputies to the Bahamas in January 1817, reporting that the Americans had destroyed the fort at Prospect Bluff and were building posts upon Indian land, while the warriors lacked muskets, ammunition, and British help. Although their message was passed through the usual channels to the foreign office, neither it nor further representations of the Indians for a trade with the West Indies or even the removal of the Creeks to another British colony appear to have accomplished anything.⁹⁶ With the refusal of the British to uphold the provisions made for the Indians in the Treaty of

94. Nicolls to Goulburn, December 21, 1816, WO/1/144/399-400; Nicolls to Goulburn, January 7, 1817, *ibid.*, 403-04; Nicolls, September 24, 1816, *ibid.*, 347-48; Bathurst to Cameron, January 11, 1817, FO/5/127/151.

95. Cameron to Bathurst, March 23, 1816, *ibid.*, 142-44; Goulburn to William Hamilton, May 17, 1816., *ibid.*, 145; Bathurst to Cameron, June 8, 1816, *ibid.*, 147.

96. Indian chiefs, December 19, 1816, *ibid.*, 157-58; Cameron to Bathurst, January 10, 1817, *ibid.*, 153; Goulburn to Hamilton, June 26, 1817, *ibid.*, 155.

Ghent, the War of 1812 among the southern Indians may be said to have come to an end.

British promises to the Indians that their rights would not be ignored in the event of a peace had come to nothing. At the time of the so-called first Seminole war of 1818 a final appeal was made to the British through Alexander Arbuthnot, a trader from Nassau, New Providence, then residing with the southern Indians. According to the wishes of the chiefs, especially "King Hatchy," but presumably also Francis, who "has been called by his people to put himself at their head" and was camped "at Spanish Bluff" with 1,000 to 1,200 men, mainly Red Sticks, word was sent to Cameron, Charles Bagot, and Nicolls that the Indians were in desperate need of assistance.⁹⁷ Nicolls, in particular, was stung by the American execution shortly afterwards of his "noble" friend Francis, and he tried hard to persuade his government to intercede on behalf of the natives but without success.⁹⁸ For the cabinet the affair became nothing more than another passing incident.

In resigning their interest in the Indian problem, the British signalled the passing of aboriginal America east of the Mississippi. The expansion of the United States could have been arrested only by a bulwark of overwhelming power, one which, conceivably, only the British, with the aid of large numbers of Indians, would have been capable of establishing. Without Britain's aid, Indian confederacies could not hold the west; their efforts to do so were gallant, but futile. Within a few decades, in both the north and the south, the remnants of the once-proud tribes were dispossessed and removed to areas west of the Mississippi.

It is possible that the dispossession of these Indians might have been deferred had Britain and her native allies enjoyed greater military fortune in the War of 1812. In the northwest, Tecumseh and his warriors had helped contain the American offensive for over a year with few British troops to support them, while in the south the Creeks had employed thousands of American soldiers before their defeat at Horseshoe Bend in March 1814. In both theatres, the principal nativist strength had been broken before the arrival of the major British forces in 1814. Had the

97. Alexander Arbuthnot to Nicolls, January 30, 1818, FO/5/139/203-04.

98. Nicolls, June 27, 1818, *ibid.*, 173.

maximum Indian and British power in the north and the south coincided, and greater success attended some of their efforts, it is possible that a defeat of sufficient magnitude might have been inflicted upon the Americans to have at least delayed the dis-possession of the Indians.

The result, in the final reckoning, would have been the same. It is true that many of the British officers had learned to like and sympathize with the Indians, men such as General Isaac Brock, the Indian agent Matthew Elliot, Cochrane, Nicolls, and Woodbine, the men who knew them best. But no nation would, of course, have been prepared to commit the resources that would have been necessary to preserve the Indian homelands, not even Britain, which owed so much to the natives for the defense of Canada. The British, no less than the Americans, adhered to the principles of economic and population growth and territorial expansion which had no place for aboriginal America. Given the proximity of the aggressive nations of America and Europe, bent upon fulfilling "manifest destiny," the Indian might, briefly, be able to capitalize upon international rivalries to his advantage, but the ultimate preservation of his homeland was not possible.