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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

ADVISOR HANDBOOK

FOR

COUNTERINSURGENCY



HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

1. Purpose

This manual provides the U.S. Army advisor to host country forces a ready reference document on doctrine and techniques which are most frequently employed in countering latent, incipient, and active insurgency.

2. Scope

a. Tactics and techniques which are most frequently employed by advisors and host country military forces at all levels where the directives of the national government are translated into plans and operations.

b. Support operations such as fire support, air support, military civic action, intelligence, counterintelligence, and psychological operations with particular emphasis on planning and communications.

c. Relationships between the Army advisor and other members of the U.S. country team (USAID, USIS, etc.).

d. To make this text useful to advisors involved in counterinsurgency operations regardless of where these operations may occur, the doctrine, tactics, and techniques contained herein are broad in scope and involve principles applicable to many and varied locales.

e. This manual is applicable for nonnuclear environ-

ments. However, when modified in accordance with current publications and official dictionaries that provide guidance for nuclear field operations, the principles included herein may be applied in nuclear environments.

f. Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded direct to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Va., 22060.

CHAPTER 2

ADVISOR RELATIONSHIPS

Section I. THE UNIT ADVISOR

3. General

a. The U.S. Army advisor assigned to host country regular military units in the context of this manual is referred to as the *unit advisor*.

b. The unit advisor uses his advisory staff personnel—

(1) As his own staff.

(2) To advise and assist counterpart personnel in the conduct of the full spectrum of counterinsurgency operations being conducted in his area of responsibility (ch. 3).

(3) To advise and assist, to include coordination and control on the use of U.S. resources (in conjunction with USAID, USIS, etc.).

c. Unit advisors will assist their counterparts, when appropriate, by serving as liaison with *U.S. support elements*. Accordingly, they must have a working knowledge of—

(1) The Air Force tactical air control system.

(2) The U.S. Army air request net as it is integrated with the U.S. Air Force and host country air request net.

(3) The capabilities of the U.S. Special Air Warfare Force.

(4) The counterinsurgency capabilities of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

(5) The capabilities and limitations of U.S. Army aviation.

d. Advisory staff officers at subordinate levels normally will act as staff officers for their own U.S. advisory detachment and as advisors to their staff counterparts.

e. Orders to host country forces or agencies cannot be given by U.S. advisors. Senior advisors, when conducting inspection trips without their counterparts, cannot use subordinate advisory personnel to "order his unit" to take action. Such action must be implemented through the counterpart chain of command.

4. Organization

a. The advisory structure should parallel the appropriate national force organization.

b. A type unit advisory structure is contained in figure 1. Modify this type structure as necessary to meet operational requirements.

Section II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE AREA ADVISOR

5. General

a. The U.S. Army advisor assigned as an advisor to host country government officials below the national level, in the context of this manual, is referred to as the *administrative area advisor*. The *civil administrator*, as used in this text, refers to host country government executives below the national level.

b. The civil administrator's most critical task is to retain, or to reclaim, the allegiance of the civil population.

c. The administrative area advisor advises the civil administrator on the employment of host country military and paramilitary forces which are under the jurisdiction of the civil administrator. At times, he may be the sole U.S. representative in the area, and may be required to advise on *civil* as well as military matters (excluding political affairs). Special guidance on such matters normally will be forthcoming from higher headquarters.

d. The civil administrator normally functions in all of the roles outlined below.

(1) Political leader of his area.

(2) The full gamut of political, economic, psychological, and sociological activities.

(3) Internal security.

(4) Law enforcement.

e. Many host country, U.S. (including USAID), international, and private agencies operate in countries to meet the economic, sociological, and political aspirations of the population.

f. The establishment of an Area Security Coordination Center (ASCC) is of primary importance to coordinate their diverse activities and to utilize the resources available (para. 8).

6. Organization

a. *Military Activities.*

(1) The civil administrator may control police, paramilitary, and possibly regular military forces. His responsibilities may range from police intelligence and civic action in early Phase I insurgency through regular




Figure 1. Type advisory structure (division).

combat and total defense of embattled districts in Phase III insurgency.

(2) The advisor and the advisory staff assume advisory responsibility for—

(a) Regional defense.

(b) Suppression of insurgency.

(c) Procurement and employment of direct U.S. support.

1. Individual skills.

2. Units.

3. Materiel.

b. Nonmilitary Activities.

(1) The functions of public safety, public works, health, and administration as well as finance; agriculture, education, trade and supply, and industrial management are normally the responsibility of USAID. USIS is responsible for information programs.

(2) As the U.S. military representative on the ground, the administrative area advisor programs and recommends allocation of resources provided through the Military Assistance Program and other programs. These resources are often applicable in support of military civic action. For example, in isolated areas where road transport is difficult or nonexistent, helicopters can carry tools, supplies, and survey teams, and evacuate sick and hardship cases.

(3) The advisor must *coordinate his military civic action program with the USAID effort*. USAID funding can furnish installable assets while MAP supported troops and equipment can perform the work.

(4) In areas where no USAID representative is permanently assigned, the administrative area advisor

may be designated to assist in the implementation of USAID functions.

(5) The civil administrator's military and paramilitary forces can provide specialized psychological warfare and civic action teams. The administrative area advisor must assist his counterpart in his primary task of influencing the population through the proper employment of these teams.

(6) In remote areas advisory personnel must learn to use all available means to promote military civic action and learn to identify and evaluate existing or potential causes of discontent.




Figure 2. Type administrative area advisory structure.

CHAPTER 3

COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Section 1. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

7. General

a. Programs. The counterinsurgency effort consists of three primary program groupings—

(1) *Environmental improvement.* For details of implementation, see section II.

(2) *Population and resources control.* For details of implementation, see section III.

(3) *Counter guerrilla operations.* For details of implementation, see section IV.

b. Basic Considerations.

(1) Programs for countering insurgency must all be completely integrated throughout planning, development, and execution.

(2) Counterinsurgency must be initiated *as early as possible*. An escalating insurgency becomes increasingly difficult to defeat.

(3) Intelligence and psychological operations are vital parts of all programs.

(4) Effective local government is vital to carry effective counterinsurgency programs to the local populations.

8. Command and Control

The advisor should ascertain the organization for

counterinsurgency within his area and where none exists should induce his counterpart to establish such an organization. At all levels, counterinsurgency planning and direction should be accomplished through area security coordination centers (ASCC).

a. The ASCC are composed of elements of—

(1) All host country forces and agencies.

(2) Assigned U.S. advisory personnel.

b. The heads of ASCC should be military or political chiefs.

c. A civil-military advisory committee (CMAC), composed of representatives from the area's major economic and social groups and activities, in each ASCC provides communication with and participation of the local populace, and serves as a sounding board to reflect the progress of the counterinsurgency effort.

9. Allocation of Resources

a. Normally, private foreign corporations, host country private enterprises, and U.S. governmental activities cooperate in local counterinsurgency programs. Non-military personnel supervising U.S. Government efforts (USAID, USIS), may be assigned at major subordinate levels of government, and often, visiting technical representatives will operate at lower levels. The administrative area advisor must coordinate his efforts and those of the U.S. government nonmilitary representatives. In the absence of civilian advisors, the administrative area advisor may be directed to monitor the execution of programs initiated but not supervised by other U.S. Government agencies.

b. Host country and U.S. (USAID, USIS) civil resources are devoted to executing economic, social, psychological, and political programs. Military resources will often be employed to augment and sometimes to substitute for civil resources in executing these programs. This is called military civic action.

Section II. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT

10. General

a. In developing nations, it is the local administration in contact with the villagers which principally bridges the gap between the remote and sometimes impersonal national government and the people. To the extent that this administration is able to satisfy the aspirations of the people and to the extent that it creates the image of a responsive and capable government, the openings for subversion will diminish. This is accomplished through civic action. Military participation is accomplished through military civic action. The advisor must be ready to propose military civic action projects based on the capabilities of the unit advised and must be prepared to give guidance on the techniques of applying these capabilities in accordance with an overall counterinsurgency plan. To perform these functions the advisor must be aware of the following objectives, principles, concepts, and checklist. Prior to implementation of military civic action projects, coordination with USAID must be accomplished to avoid duplication of effort and to insure that adequate resources and technical assistance are made available.

b. The objectives of environmental improvement programs are to—

(1) Make substantial contributions to national development.

(2) Gain the support, loyalty, and respect of the people for their government.

11. Principles of Operation

a. With the objective of conserving resources and developing an integrated economy, all projects must proceed within the framework of a coordinated plan.

b. Projects must conform to guidance issued through command and advisory channels.

12. Concept of Operation

a. Host country military forces, over and above their usual mission of suppressing insurgency, contribute to environmental improvement through military civic actions to improve local social, cultural, and economic conditions.

b. Military civic action projects must be based on the capabilities of the units recognizing that—

(1) Troops are present in areas where other government agencies may not function.

(2) Troops often are in contact with peoples whose relationships with the central government may have been tenuous and who are ripe for subversion.

(3) Military and paramilitary forces have comparatively modern equipment often not available to the local population.

(4) Military units normally are well-supported logistically and have good communications.

(5) Military personnel have knowledge and skills such as preventive medicine, engineering, and commerce not found in all areas that may be applied toward improving the environment.

(6) Military officials can create a favorable government image by fair dealings such as adequate compensation for locally procured rations and transport, and respect for individual rights.

(7) Through contact with people, troops may discover underlying factors causing discontent.

(8) In some countries, the military may have been the principal tool of government oppression. The use of the military in civic action should improve their image.

13. Resources Available

a. Many programs, such as harvesting or road improvement, can be undertaken by military units possessing little more than a labor pool. Others require more sophisticated equipment, but most MAP-supported military forces, even combat battalions, contain at least a modicum of signal, transport, medical, and engineer capability.

b. Military civic action and military service in general is a two-way street.

(1) The soldier learns his responsibility toward the community.

(2) When a soldier from one area works with a civilian from another, there is an exchange of ideas and understanding and national unity is enhanced.

(3) A soldier learns skills which will be useful later on in his home village after discharge.

(4) Soldiers who possess special talent, such as carpentering, teaching, and electrical repair, have an opportunity to maintain their skills and at the same time break critical skill bottlenecks if these skills are not available in the village.

c. Personnel should be screened to identify individuals who possess skills in—

- (1) Farming.
- (2) Education.
- (3) Electrical repair.
- (4) Carpentry.
- (5) Automotive repair.
- (6) Linguistics.
- (7) Others.

d. Following is a checklist of possible activities which can be undertaken by various units or individuals:

(1) *Food, agriculture, natural resources.*

(a) Insect and rodent control.
(b) Reclaim land (clear areas for farms and markets).

(c) Grading operations to prevent soil erosion (irrigation, drainage).

(d) Planting, thinning, and harvesting of forests.

(e) Construct compost pits.

(f) Construct animal pens.

(2) *Industry and commerce.*

(a) Assess and develop sand and gravel resources for road construction and repair.

(b) Construct housing and buildings.

(c) Encourage establishment of small retail business, new products. Improve marketing facilities, practices.

(3) *Communications.*

(a) Install, operate, maintain telephone, telegraph, radio systems. Install loudspeakers for public announcements.

(b) Operate emergency communications centers, especially during disasters.

(c) Construct postal facilities.

(4) *Public utilities.*

(a) Power production and distribution (water wheels, windmills, steam, electric, gasoline, animals).

(b) Public storage facilities.

(c) Support blacksmith facility. Organize sawmill operations.

(d) Organize central public hand tool facility.

(e) Organize, support village department of sanitation.

(5) *Transportation.*

(a) Construct, repair, improve roads, bridges, railway equipment, wharves, harbors.

(b) Construct, repair, improve, operate airfields and helicopter landing pads.

(c) Remove people from disaster areas.

(d) Small boat construction.

(e) Transportation safety (directional markers for roads, waterways).

(f) Construct intermediate pickup shelters.

(6) *Health sanitation.*

(a) Improve preventive medicine standards (safe water supply, food decontamination measures, disposal of human and animal waste; insect and rodent control, immunization requirements and procedures,

elimination of dangerous animals, and control of disease in domestic animals).

(b) Improve treatment standards (establish and operate dispensary units, outpatient clinics and hospitals, employ roving medical teams, establish medical evacuation systems).

(c) Improve medical training standards.

1. Initiate training for all military personnel in sanitation, personal hygiene, and first aid.

2. Educate the civilian populace regarding preventive medicine measures.

3. Encourage advanced training of medical personnel.

(7) *Education.*

(a) Provide basic and technical education to military.

(b) Construct schools (use military facilities until schools are completed).

1. Provide instructors for schools, basic and technical (train teachers).

2. Provide instructional materials (audio-visual equipment, movie halls).

3. Teach literacy courses (night school programs).

4. Village libraries.

(8) *Public administration.*

(a) Provide guidance in police, fire protection, civil defense.

(b) Establishment of village council.

(c) Supervising services listed above.

(d) Flood control.

(9) *Community development, social welfare, housing.*

(a) Provide for planning, surveying, supervision for schools, civic centers, churches, orphanages, medical centers, etc.

(b) Sponsor worthy projects, such as children's shelters.

(10) *Civil information.*

(a) Organize hamlet/village meetings.

(b) Posters, wall newspapers.

(c) Organize, indoctrinate key communicators.

(d) Supervise publishing local newspapers, newsheets.

14. Other Resources Available

There are many organizations and extensive resources available to aid developing nations, and the advisor should not overlook the aid these organizations may provide. Such agencies include—

a. Host Country.

(1) *Commercial.* Host country business enterprises may exist which sponsor public relations programs, including environmental improvement activities. Normally, the representatives of the U.S. country team or the advisor's counterpart can furnish information concerning these organizations.

(2) *Nonprofit.* Variable from country to country; e.g., Red Cross, Red Lion, etc.

b. United States.

(1) *Government.*

(a) U.S. Agency for International Development (or USOM).

- (b) MAAG/Mission.
- (c) U.S. Information Service.
- (d) Peace Corps.

(e) Regional programs such as Alliance for Progress (Latin America).

(2) *Commercial*. U.S. business enterprises such as petroleum companies, import-export companies, etc., often engage in environmental improvement activities through community relations programs.

(3) *Nonprofit*. There are over 200 agencies of this type (in coordination with counterparts, advisors may contact local USAID representatives who can provide specific information or secure it from: Technical Assistance Information Clearing House of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc., 44 East 23d Street, New York, N.Y., 10010). Examples are—

- (a) Missionaries.
- (b) Foundations.
- (c) Charitable organizations.

15. Advisor Responsibilities (Environmental Improvement)

The advisor, in conjunction with the local USAID representative, should monitor the application of the following principles. The counterpart should understand them, give each careful consideration, and provide the advisor an assessment of program development.

a. The Civic Action Element.

(1) *Communication*. Through the counterpart, the advisor must get his ideas and intentions across. A plan to develop a potable water supply must include a means to explain the connection between potable

water and health. Programs can be advertised through—

- (a) Community meetings.
- (b) Contests.
- (c) Informal lectures.
- (d) Demonstrations.

(2) *Image of the government team.* In many areas, relations between rural villagers and the government have not always been satisfactory. The government team should—

- (a) Establish rapport with the people.
- (b) Speak their dialect.
- (c) Understand their culture.
- (d) Be sympathetic.
- (e) Select projects of real interest to the people.

(3) *Demonstration.* The villagers should be shown dynamically how a program works.

(4) *Participation.* The villagers should participate voluntarily in a plan in order to—

(a) Instill in them a feeling of ownership and responsibility.

(b) Learn how the system functions to keep it operational after the government team leaves.

(5) *Traditions.* Projects should be adapted to local traditions and customs by the delegation of authority to local leaders and observing local taboos which do not materially conflict.

(6) *Environment.* The local environment should be used to advantage. In soil erosion projects, use only areas which are slightly eroded, where improvements will not be difficult and the chances of failure are diminished.

(7) *Timeliness*. Big work projects should be initiated during seasonal unemployment, not during harvest time.

(8) *Flexibility*. Projects should be altered if unforeseen conditions arise.

(9) *Continuity*. Confidence that the government intends to see it through must be instilled. Material and guidance should be continuous.

(10) *Maintenance*. The people should be left with the means, the know-how, and the interest to maintain the project. Spare parts should be available after initial government assistance leaves.

b. Population factors. The population factors inherent in local culture can affect the project. These should be recognized and turned to advantage.

(1) *Motivation*.

(a) *Felt need*. The project should be something that the villagers themselves want.

(b) *Practical benefit*. Benefits must be readily apparent as in the case of improved or new crops which bring a higher market value.

(c) *Prestige emulation*. Villagers may accept a program because they wish to emulate more successful or prestigious members of the community.

(d) *Competition*. Groups may strive to improve their status *vis-a-vis* other groups, clubs, villages, or families.

(e) *Reward*. A civic action project must provide immediate rewards.

(f) *Novelty*. A project may be accepted or rejected, either because it is impressive, or because it is suspect and fearsome.

(2) *Traditional culture.* Rural traditions are resistant to change and often will work against the project. Some of these factors and examples of countermeasures are—

(a) *Social structure.*

1. *Role of the individual.* Individuals influence a proposed improvement. For instance, although women are not traditionally included in village institutions, a cooperative endeavor formed without them may fail because they feel their interests are being ignored and consequently may withhold their support.

2. *Kinship.* It may be possible to form an institution, such as a cooperative, around a family group.

3. *Ethnic group.* Ethnic minorities may have separate cultures and traditions and consequently require special efforts if they are to be integrated into a regional effort. It may be advisable to assign functions within the project according to the existing status framework. Efforts to rupture suddenly the existing social system may lead to overwhelming opposition.

4. *Political group.* It will be necessary to work through the existing political structure. *In any case, the authority of the legally constituted government must not be undercut.* The advisor must take into account traditional and respected leaders who may not necessarily be government appointees. It may be possible to include village elders or headmen on the planning council.

5. *Vested interests.* Individuals will react favorably or unfavorably depending on whether the project will benefit or hinder their situation. A middle-

man, for instance, would probably oppose the formation of a cooperative.

6. *Religious fraternity.* The advisor should consider soliciting aid from local religious orders or individuals in selling the project.

(b) *Economic pattern.* Projects should be planned according to the capability and availability of local labor. Easily trainable technicians in rural areas generally are not available, nor is it easy to attract technicians into areas where living conditions are substandard.

(c) *Beliefs.* Religious and supernatural beliefs exert powerful influences and must be taken into account.

(d) *Recreation pattern.* Projects must not inadvertently interfere with cherished local pastimes.

(e) *Consumption pattern.* Products must fit reasonably well into the local consumption pattern.

(f) *Value system.* Projects must not transgress traditional beliefs of the right or wrong.

c. *Monitoring the Program.* Official progress checks should be made. A responsible host country official should be designated to assume responsibility, and he and the facility should be subjected to periodic inspections. Neither the advisor nor this counterpart should be satisfied to defer all projects until the arrival of specialized aid. They should make the most of what they have. Progress should be compared with such items as—

- (1) Preplanned budget.
- (2) Time scheduling.
- (3) Technical specifications.

16. Advisor Check List (Community Analysis for Military Civic Action)*a. Community Map.*

(1) Obtain a map of the area or the community. If no map is available, draw one to scale.

(2) Indicate road network (include main and secondary roads).

(3) Show location of religious institutions, schools, community hall, market place, etc.

(4) Indicate distances to adjacent communities.

(5) Describe what determines the center of the community, and what factors are most important in giving the community its identification.

(6) Describe the relation of the community as to the political, trade, school, and religious areas with that of the adjoining communities.

(7) Describe the weather and terrain features directly affecting the location or life of the community.

b. History (as it affects the present situation).

(1) Natural crises in the history of the community.

(2) First settlement.

(3) Incidents giving rise to conflicts or cooperation in the community.

(4) Immigration and emigration.

(5) Outstanding leaders and famous citizens in the community.

c. Population.

(1) Census.

(2) Occupations.

(3) Ethnic groups if applicable.

d. Communication.

(1) Transportation (roads, water, rail, air).

(2) Electronic (telephones, radio, telegraph, television).

(3) Printed material (newspaper, posters, magazines).

(4) Mail facilities.

(5) Connections with other communities.

(6) Degree of self-sufficiency or isolation.

e. Community Integration. What groups or individuals are independent of the local government; e.g., groups or individuals directly responsible to an outside or higher government? What effects do these have on the community; what is the attitude of the local citizens to these individuals?

f. Economic Situation.

(1) Natural resources.

(2) Industries.

(3) Agriculture (crops and products, markets ownership and tenancy). Who are the landlords? Are they in the community or absentees?

(4) Are there any local merchants? What is their influence on the community?

(5) Professional (teachers, doctors, ministers).

(6) Credit associations and their relations to the community.

(7) Relative economic status of the people (debt, savings, taxes).

g. Religious Situation.

(1) Number, make-up, attitude, and membership of each sect.

(2) Buildings and equipment.

(3) Church schools.

(4) Clash or cooperation with other groups.

h. Educational Organizations.

(1) Schools (number, size, territory served, buildings, equipment, libraries).

(2) History (how and by whom were schools constructed).

(3) School activities and relation to the community.

i. Voluntary Organizations.

(1) Number, types, composition of membership, equipment, activities, and their relation to other phases of community life.

(2) Farmers' Co-ops (4-H type organizations, home economic organizations).

(3) Other occupational groups.

j. Recreational Facilities.

(1) Organizations for recreation (community buildings, athletic clubs, soccer teams, ball fields and courts).

(2) Traditional forms of and local attitudes toward recreation needs.

k. Health.

(1) Physicians, health workers, nurses.

(2) Public and private health organizations, national and international (hospitals, dispensaries, clinics, school health program).

(3) Health status of the people. Prevalence, incidence; and types of diseases.

l. Political Situation.

(1) Political structure and government (solidarity or strife and causes).

(2) Dominant personalities.

m. Community Activities, Customs, and Ideals.

(1) Community events other than religious observances.

(2) What are the community customs or traditions (taboos or social disapprovals)?

(3) Activity characteristics and pastimes.

(4) Ideals. What are the community's attitudes on progress?

n. Leadership.

(1) Dominant leaders. Family control.

(2) Is leadership democratic or autocratic?

(3) What is being done to develop new leaders?

(4) Attitude of people toward new leaders.

o. Community Organization.

(1) What is being done to integrate the community?

(2) What are the needs for community organizations?

p. Status of Law and Order.

(1) Organization and capabilities of law enforcement agencies.

(2) Police techniques.

(3) Crime rate and trend.

(4) Unusual enforcement problems.

Section III. POPULATION AND RESOURCES CONTROL

17. General

a. The insurgent's primary target is the people; therefore, counterinsurgency must separate the insurgent from the people and their resources.

b. Population and resources control is implemented as required to support and to complement the programs

of environmental improvement and counter guerrilla operations. The advisor must be knowledgeable of the tasks, principles, concept, and techniques of population and resources control in order to advise his counterpart on their implementation.

c. The primary objectives of population and resources control are to—Identify and neutralize the insurgents, their organization, their activities, and influence.

18. Principles of Operation

a. Civil control measures are basically police functions. Civil police should initiate controls because—

(1) They are best suited by training and experience.

(2) Their area orientation results in a closer relationship with the local population.

(3) They permit military forces to concentrate on offensive counter guerrilla operations.

b. Where local police are incapable, local paramilitary forces, including home guards, village militia, and police auxiliaries are organized and trained as reserves.

c. Military forces are used only as expedients since extended assignment to this duty detracts from their main mission of counter guerrilla offensive operations.

d. Continuous psychological operations are mounted to—

(1) Counter the effects of insurgent propaganda.

(2) Create a favorable governmental image.

(3) Relate controls to the security and well-being of the population.

e. Control measures must—

(1) Be

(counterparts should be advised not to improvise unauthorized measures).

(2) Be tailored to fit the situation (unwarranted measures will do more harm than good).

(3) Be capable of enforcement.

(4) Apply the minimum force required to achieve the desired result.

(5) Be lifted as the need diminishes.

(6) Be instituted in as wide an area as possible to prevent by-passing or evading.

(7) See section I, chapter 4, for intelligence requirements.

f. Special considerations must be given to acquiring adequate communications equipment to support control operations (para. 45).

19. Concept of Operation

A control program may be developed in six phases—

a. Defending the area.

b. Cordon and search.

c. Screening and documenting the population.

d. Establishing internal security.

e. Organizing internal security, intelligence and defense activities, and forces.

f. Conducting public administration, to include resources control.

20. Defending the Area

Defense begins concurrently with, or immediately subsequent to, offensive operations. Since a district contains several villages, hamlets, and larger communities, the entire political administrative unit, as well as each

individual community, eventually must be defended. In areas under insurgent influence, it will be necessary to construct defenses around existing hamlets and concentrate rural populations into defensible population units. Normally, this will be accomplished concurrently with counter guerrilla warfare, environmental improvement, and population and resources control programs.

a. Defended Hamlets.

(1) Defended hamlets may be constructed if—

(a) Less restrictive measures have failed to eliminate population support of the guerrilla.

(b) Government forces have been unable to provide defense or internal security.

(c) The population must provide their own defense to release military forces to conduct counter guerrilla warfare.

(d) They are required as bases from which to mount operations.

(2) Advisors can assist in the development of the defended hamlet by—

(a) Coordinating requests for USAID support with appropriate USAID area representatives.

(b) Providing assistance and advice in the following areas:

1. Planning hamlet defenses to include provisions for support.

2. Organizing, training, and equipping hamlet defense forces.

3. Insuring that military defense forces are provided until such time as local defense forces are adequate and are supported by regional paramilitary and military forces.

4. Military civic action projects based on self-help.

5. Implementing control techniques (curfews, alert and warning systems, systems of identifying both friendly and guerrilla forces).

6. Establishing local government by organizing hamlet civil-military advisory committees, electing hamlet officials, etc.

b. Relocation.

(1) Relocation, the most severe of the restrictive measures, is accomplished when—

(a) Wide dispersion of the population prevents effective defense, internal security, and control.

(b) Requirements exist to evacuate or populate selected areas.

(2) Advisors can contribute to the implementation of this technique by providing assistance in the following areas—

(a) Psychological operations to condition the population for relocation.

(b) Defense during relocation. If relocation is combined with the defended hamlet technique, the advisor can further assist, once relocation is completed, by participating as indicated in section II, chapter 3.

(c) Logistical requirements, such as subsistence, medical assistance, and transportation, to facilitate movement and relocation of populations and possessions.

21. Cordon and Search

a. Frequently utilized by counterinsurgency forces conducting a population and resources control mission

against small centers of population or subdivisions of a larger community.

b. Sufficient forces to effectively cordon off the target area and to thoroughly search target areas, to include areas below surface level, must be provided.

c. Ample time must be allocated to conduct thorough search and interrogation of residents of affected areas.

d. Operation should be rehearsed thoroughly whenever possible.

e. Firm but fair treatment must be the rule. Every effort must be made to avoid any incident which results in unnecessarily alienating the people.

f. Cordon and search forces should contain augmentation in the form of psychological warfare, civic action, and specialist interrogation teams to further the effectiveness of such operations.

g. Cordon and search operations may be conducted as follows:

(1) *Cordon.* Individual communities are cordoned off.

(*a*) Disposition of troops should—

1. Facilitate visual contact between posts within the cordon.

2. Provide for adequate patrolling and immediate deployment of an effective reserve force.

(*b*) Priority should be given to—

1. Sealing the administrative center of the community.

2. Occupying all critical facilities.

3. Detaining personnel in place.

4. Preserving and securing all records, files, and other archives.

(c) Key facilities include—

1. Administrative buildings.
2. Police stations.
3. News media facilities.
4. Post offices.
5. Communications centers.
6. Transportation offices and motor pools.
7. Prisons and other places of detention.
8. Schools.

(2) *Search.*

(a) The system for immediate search and seizure should be carefully documented in SOP and implemented by trained personnel. Search operations should be carried out prior to or concurrent with screening.

(b) A search SOP should provide for the following:

1. Search teams of squad size.
2. One target assigned per team.
3. Room searches conducted by individuals or two-man teams.

4. Room-search teams armed with pistols; all other personnel armed with automatic weapons.

5. Pre-search coordination.

(a) Between control personnel and screening team leaders.

(b) Study of lay-out plans.

(c) Communications, i.e., radio, whistle, and hand signals.

(d) Disposition of suspects.

6. On-site security.

(a) Guard entrances, exits, to include roof, halls, corridors, and tunnels.

(b) Missions for reserve.

7. Room search.

(a) Search occupants.

(b) Immobilize occupants with one team member.

(c) Search room with other team member.

(d) Place documents in a numbered envelope and tag individual with a corresponding number.

8. Security duties. Search teams are provided security for screening operations and facilities.

22. Screening and Documenting the Population

Screening and documentation include—

a. Systematic identification and registration.

b. Issuance of individual identification cards containing—

(1) Picture of individual.

(2) Personal identification data.

(3) Fingerprint(s).

(4) An official stamp.

c. Family group census cards, an official copy of which is retained at the local police agency, containing—

(1) Picture.

(2) Appropriate personal data.

d. Frequent use of mobile and fixed check points for inspection, identification, and registration of documents.

e. Preventing counterfeiting of identification and registration documents by laminating and embossing.

f. Programs to inform the population of the need for identification and registration.

23. Establishing Internal Security

Internal security measures consist of—

- a.* Intra-community perimeter guard.
- b.* Fixed posts at critical facilities.
- c.* Road blocks.
- d.* Foot and motor patrols.
- e.* Reserves.
- f.* Restricted access to such installations as city hall, police headquarters, radio and TV stations, and newspaper offices.

(1) Passes required in addition to personal identity cards.

(2) Special passes provided to selected personnel who are necessary for the health and welfare of the population.

g. Pass-issuing offices not collocated with sensitive installations.

24. Organization of Law Enforcement, Intelligence and Security Activities

The following police services should be provided:

- a.* Police command group.
- b.* Records and communications division.
- c.* Patrol division.
- d.* Detective division.
- e.* Laboratory facilities.
- f.* Identification facilities.
- g.* Prisoner custodial facilities.

25. Public Administration (Including Resources Control)

a. General. Public administration at local levels is normally of the executive type. It is at this level that resources are managed and controlled. After screening has been completed, action must be taken for continuation of governmental functions, and the following factors should be considered:

(1) The combining of internal security and defense activities under a public safety office.

(2) The employment of population surveillance (overt and covert) based on area coverage to include—

(a) Overt surveillance, the responsibility of the police patrol division, and conducted with conventional police procedures, using the officer on the beat as the lowest official of government in contact with the public. Police patrols—

1. Frequently vary routes and movement to avoid establishing a predictable pattern.

2. Should not be limited to the confines of the community but should include adjacent areas.

3. Must be coordinated with the activities of military and paramilitary forces to avoid duplication of effort and confusion.

4. Use military dogs to contribute to overall effectiveness.

(b) Covert surveillance, a *collection* effort, the responsibility fixed with the intelligence/security division or with the detective division of the police department. Covert techniques, ranging from application of sophisticated electronics systems to informants should include—

1. Informant nets. Reliability of informants should be verified. Protection of identity is a must.

2. Block control or the division of a community or populated area into zones where a trusted resident reports on the activities of the population. If the loyalty of block leaders is questionable, an informant net can be established to verify questionable areas.

b. Movement Control. Movement control of personnel and goods can be established by requiring passenger and cargo manifests, fuel rationing, trip tickets, and route clearances. Contraband must be clearly defined and made known to the general public. Techniques include—

(1) *Individual travel passes.* Travel passes issued on a one-time basis permitting the holder to go to a certain point or points and return can be used in conjunction with the movement of specified goods listed on a manifest.

(2) *Check points.* Check points should be both fixed and mobile and points at which both vehicular and pedestrian traffic is checked and searches conducted.

(a) *Fixed check points.*

1. Are established in open country and on high ground to decrease vulnerability.

2. Have turn-off space to avoid traffic congestion.

3. Are established on routes which make it necessary for traffic to pass through the check point.

4. Are established a reasonable distance apart to avoid unnecessary inconvenience to the population.

(b) *Mobile check points.*

1. Are used in conjunction with fixed check

points to prevent traffic from evading the fixed point.

2. Can be established with surprise and rapidity.

3. Should have characteristics of fixed check points.

c. Curfew and Blackout.

(1) Curfew and blackout is resorted to only in conditions where extraordinary measures are indicated and is based on analysis of all factors, to include—

(a) Effects.

(b) Objectives.

(c) Enforceability.

(d) Duration.

(e) Proclamations and explanations required.

(f) Intelligence value.

(2) The key objectives of curfew are—

(a) To screen military movements and other activities during critical phases of operations.

(b) To prevent movement which might be useful or helpful to the insurgent forces, especially before interim public order has been established.

(c) To restrict movement within specific hours throughout a specified area or community or to restrict movement to specific routes during specific time periods.

(d) To permit government forces to identify and take action on the assumption that the only person moving in a designated area within the specified hours is an insurgent.

(e) To disrupt the insurgents' communication or support systems insofar as they are based on use of the community.

(f) To deceive the insurgent.

(g) To deter the assembly of crowds.

(3) Curfews are usually imposed during the hours of darkness which is when the insurgent normally operates and should not be associated with planned military or police operations in such a manner as to tip-off the operation.

(4) Public announcement of curfews and black-outs should include—

(a) Periods of time and areas in which citizens may circulate to take care of their needs.

(b) Categories of persons who may be excepted from the restrictions.

1. The hours in which they may circulate to perform their functions.

2. Systems to control the number, identity, and special documentation of persons so excepted.

d. Resources Control Measures. Blanket application of resources control measures without sufficient requirement causes more harm than good; these measures should be applied selectively. They include—

(1) Forbidding civilians to enter without permission any place locked or placed under guard.

(2) Ordering that all weapons and radio sets be surrendered.

(3) Ordering that designated categories of persons identified with the insurgent, cadre, or guerrilla organizations be apprehended.

(4) Ordering civilians to report all unexploded bombs, shells, and other explosives.

(5) Ordering cameras to be turned in.

(6) Controlling all raw material and livestock which could be of value to guerrilla forces.

(7) Controlling propaganda sources and distribution.

(8) Establishing price and monetary controls and a rationing system.

(9) Control of medical facilities and drugs.

(10) Evacuation of designated areas to forestall acts of collaboration.

(11) Denial and destruction operations against insurgent installations, materiel, and crops.

e. Interim Public Order. Measures to protect the population in extraordinary situations include—

(1) Burial of civilian and animal dead.

(2) Ordering that all government and guerrilla dead be reported but not molested.

(3) Ordering that all strange civilians or unknown refugees report to counterintelligence units for investigation.

(4) Frequent checks to insure that local authorities run their communities honestly, efficiently and quietly, set prices, establish a rationing system, distribute food and, if appropriate, provide accommodations for refugees.

(5) Censoring communication media such as radio, telephone, mail, telegraph, and keeping close surveillance of nontechnical communication systems where appropriate.

26. Port, Border, and Travel Security

Port, border, and travel security operations consist of the special application of security measures to control

airports, seaports, land and sea frontiers, international air boundaries, and all nonmilitary travel into and out of an area of operations.

a. Port Security. Ports serve as entries or exits for personnel; documents and materiel; therefore, they become focal points for travel control. These facilities are primary insurgent targets and must be protected against sabotage. A port facility normally will be under the control of civil port authority.

(1) Port security may be provided by harbor or port police, paramilitary forces, and military police, and requires close coordination and cooperation between military and civil authorities. Counterintelligence personnel assist in establishing and maintaining security measures and consider the following:

- (a) The port facility itself.
- (b) Nearby communities.
- (c) Port employees.
- (d) Insurgent subversive activity focused on the port.
- (e) The ships in port.
- (f) Seamen serving aboard ships who may be serving as insurgent couriers or agents.

(2) Port security objectives include the following:

- (a) Secure and neutralize insurgent intelligence targets.
- (b) Coordinate counterintelligence measures, intelligence targets, and security controls with other interested agencies.
- (c) Conduct counterintelligence surveys and inspections.
- (d) Survey adjacent towns or areas.

- (e) Monitor security measures.
- (f) Investigate port employees in coordination with civil police.
- (g) Assist in examining ships.
- (h) Maintain a "Black List" of known or suspected insurgent agents or collaborators who might use the port or live in the area.
- (i) Assist in screening ship crew and passengers.
- (j) Recommend security measures for fishing or harbor craft control.
- (k) Conduct necessary liaison with all interested agencies.

b. Border Security. Border security and control in counterinsurgency operations is designed to prevent insurgent forces from using adjacent countries as sanctuaries.

(1) *Subsidiary objectives.* The following are related subsidiary objectives of border security and control:

- (a) Preventing sabotage and espionage by excluding agents.
- (b) Apprehending or neutralizing insurgent couriers.
- (c) Neutralizing propaganda and subversion by excluding foreign funds and literature.
- (d) Preventing undesirable persons (political, military leaders) from escaping or re-entering.

(2) *Planning considerations.* Border security and control plans should provide for the following:

- (a) Authorized road and rail crossing points along the frontier.

(b) Border control posts at authorized crossing points to—

1. Identify persons attempting to cross.
2. Enforce restrictions on the movement of goods and currency.

(c) Border patrols to apprehend anyone trying to evade border control regulations.

(d) Control of persons residing near borders to include restricted zones.

(e) Interrogation and disposition of suspects.

(f) Control of refugees and displaced persons who try to cross the border.

(g) Liaison with border control authorities of neighboring countries.

(h) Recommendations concerning personnel required and their training.

(i) Normal civilian traffic should be disrupted no more than necessary to meet security requirements.

(j) Whenever expedient, separate crossing points for military and civilian traffic may be designated.

(3) *Use of informants.* It is ideal to have informants—

(a) On both sides of the border to pick up information concerning routes, participants, and time of planned border crossings.

(b) Acquainted with blackmarket operators. (Invaluable in discovering border control violations because of the connection between blackmarket, international smuggling, and espionage.)

27. Advisor Responsibilities

In conjunction with the USAID area representative(s), advisors can assist counterparts in—

a. Developing appropriate population and resources control plans.

b. Developing training programs for population and resources control forces.

c. Recommending personnel for participation in USAID public safety schools.

d. Coordinating plans and requests for materiel support control activities.

e. Inspecting, monitoring, and submitting recommendations to improve overall effectiveness of control activities.

(1) *Preparation for initiation of control.*

(a) Select, organize, and train population and resources control police, paramilitary forces, etc.

(b) Develop psychological operations to help win the confidence of the people and establish a base of political allegiance.

(c) Coordinate control activities through the ASCC.

(d) Refine and establish defense and internal security systems.

(e) Intensify intelligence activity and psychological operations, particularly aimed at uncovering and eliminating insurgent cadre.

(f) Implement control measures on movement of resources and personnel by block warden systems.

(g) Establish and refine systems of coordination and communications with other organizations.

(2) *Establishing maximum control.* Continued guerrilla success, combined with a resultant increase in willing or unwilling population support, will dictate

intensifying control measures applied. In such situations, the following measures can be used:

(a) Establish defended hamlets and relocate population (as a last resort).

(b) Intensify the measures outlined in *e*(1) above.

(c) Initiate and publicize amnesty and rehabilitation programs.

(d) Offer rewards for capture of insurgent cadre.

(e) Adopt and publicize lenient treatment for informers.

(3) *Relinquishing control.* As counterinsurgency succeeds, population and resources control should decrease. *Relinquishment of control should be offered to the population as an incentive for their cooperation.* Controls should be lessened in two stages—

(a) *Stage A.* Reduce intensity of controls.

1. Continue general area controls but reduce such operations as raids, ambushes, and cordon and search.

2. Pass primary responsibility for control to police and paramilitary units, phasing out military police participation.

3. Continue intelligence activities.

4. Accelerate environmental improvement, supported by psychological operations, to eliminate the causes of insurgency and resurgence of insurgent strength.

(b) *Stage B.* Reduce controls to a minimum.

1. Lessen individual restrictions and block warden systems.

2. Continue controls on resources and population movements.

3. Reduce paramilitary unit operations to a standby basis; however, continue organization and training activities.

4. Continue intelligence and psychological operations.

5. Emphasize environmental improvement and building a solid base of political allegiance.

f. Imposition of control measures during any phase will result in the capture and detention of insurgents, sympathizers, suspects, and other violators as well as the confiscation of contraband and other critical material. Provisions for handling, accountability, and disposition should include—

(1) Local detention and interrogation facilities.

(2) Circumstances of capture documented and recorded in local police files for analysis of trends and patterns.

(3) Captured insurgents and others properly referred for prosecution or, in some instances, for rehabilitation.

(4) Confiscated material should be fully identified, including circumstances of confiscation, safeguarded and turned over to the appropriate authority when requested.

g. Amnesty, pardon, rehabilitation, a system of rewards, and re-education play distinct and significant roles in an effective population and resources control program. Reward programs are implemented after necessary legislation is adopted. Payments are provided for information, capture of guerrilla leaders, and turn-in of guerrilla weapons and equipment. Insurgent defectors

can be profitably used in psychological operations directed toward the population to counteract insurgent propaganda. Amnesty and rehabilitation programs should include—

(1) Provisions to allow disaffected members of the population to revert to the support of the government without undue fear of punishment for previous anti-government acts wherever possible.

(2) Just, equitable, and scrupulously observed execution of the programs aimed at causing disaffection among the insurgent and his supporters.

(3) Rehabilitation of former insurgents and their supporters through a program of re-education.

Section IV. COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

28. Objectives

The primary objective of counter guerrilla operations is to neutralize and eliminate the guerrilla insurgent and, together with population and resources control measures, establish an environment in which political, social, and economic progress is possible. A detailed discussion of counter guerrilla operations may be found in FM 31-16.

a. Offensive Operations.

(1) Gain and maintain contact with the guerrilla.

(2) Harassment operations may assist in locating and fixing the guerrilla. Operations of this type will prevent the guerrilla from resting and reorganizing, will inflict casualties, aid in gaining detailed knowledge of the area of operations, and cause the guerrilla to expend his limited resources.

(3) When a guerrilla force has been located, every attempt to encircle the force should be made, even if piecemeal deployment is required. Normally, such operations require that the counterguerrilla force be much larger than the guerrilla force (figs. 3 through 5 and FM 31-16).


(4) When contact is made with a guerrilla force, the probable reaction of the guerrilla force will be to inflict the maximum casualties on the regular force without becoming decisively engaged, and then flee the scene of action. This method of operation dictates that military forces operating against guerrilla forces be particularly adept in the conduct of pursuits (FM 31-16).

(a) The unit that makes the initial contact with the guerrilla force will require rapid augmentation to maintain pressure against the fleeing force, envelop it, and eventually effects its destruction. These augmentation (reaction) forces should be given the highest priority for use of available transport to insure their delivery to the scene of action as soon as possible.

(b) The pursuit force is organized into two elements, the direct pressure force, and the encircling force(s) (includes blocking force). The direct pressure force pursues the enemy and maintains constant offensive pressure on him as he withdraws. The encircling force(s), employing superior mobility (preferably by using airmobile or airborne forces), conducts local envelopments (single or double) to cut him off and destroy him (fig. 6).

(5) Area ambush is an effective counterguerrilla technique. The area ambush consists of the primary ambush element which triggers the ambush, supported



RESERVE UNIT




RESERVE UNIT

Figure 3. Initial encirclement.


RESERVE UNIT.




RESERVE UNIT.

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Figure 4.—Contraction of encirclement.




Figure 5. Reduction of encircled guerrilla force.




Figure 6. Pursuit.

by smaller ambush groups which cover all likely routes of withdrawal. Once the ambush is triggered, the smaller ambush groups open fire as the guerrilla force attempts to withdraw from the area.

b. Defensive Operations.

(1) Defense is oriented on the location of the community or installation rather than upon the most favorable terrain. Since defense of the specific community or installation is paramount, plans for withdrawal to rearward positions are de-emphasized.

(2) Surveillance and security measures must be coordinated for 24-hour operations. The provisions for perimeter defense, as discussed in FM 7-11, are particularly applicable in defense of communities or installations against guerrilla attack when regular counter-guerrilla forces are preparing and conducting the defense. When using local paramilitary forces, training must instill the necessary confidence and ability to provide an adequate defense for a community under attack until supporting forces can be delivered or until troop reinforcements can arrive.

(3) By prearranged standing operating procedure (SOP) to include communications, forces, and fire support, larger communities and the surrounding smaller ones mutually assist in the defense of one another until other support or reinforcements arrive.

(4) In areas where offensive operations have been conducted to eliminate guerrilla control of the population, regular military forces will be required to assume the responsibility for defense of the liberated community until adequate local defenders can be trained and equipped.

(5) Detailed planning for security of column movement must consider (also, see sec. I, ch. 4)—

(a) *Mounted.*

1. Column cover if available. Coordination with supporting air units to include a thorough understanding of how air support will be utilized to assist the mounted column both in preventive measures and close combat operations including counterambush actions.

2. Fire support. All air and ground fire support elements within range of the route of the mounted column must take measures to insure close and continuous fire support. Fire planning, to include registration, must be as complete as time allows. Continuous communications must be assured to include airborne radio relay if necessary.

3. Individual and unit SOP of maneuver for preventive action and counterambush action.

4. Prepositioning of security elements along the route.

5. Possible use of airmobile hunter-killer teams.

6. Assistance available from friendly units occupying positions along or adjacent to the route.

(b) *Dismounted.* Security for movement when dismounted presents several considerations which are different from security for mounted columns. These include—

1. The need for secrecy which may preclude air cover.

2. Restrictions on registration of artillery and the inability to plan concentrations when the route cannot be determined in advance.

3. Flank security is easier for dismounted movement, particularly if ground or air transportation can be used to position security elements.

4. Silent movement of dismounted columns, particularly at night, can allow security elements to locate ambush forces.

5. Extended formations which allow part of the column to be in position to maneuver against an ambush force that strikes a different part of the column.

29. Advisor Check List (Counter guerrilla Operations)

a. Concentrate on elimination of the guerrilla, not on terrain objectives.

b. Maintain the offensive in all kinds of weather (do not bog down during the rainy season—limited offensive operations are preferable to a passive attitude).

c. Designate priorities of effort to provide guidelines for allocation of counter guerrilla forces.

d. Get counter guerrilla forces out of garrisons, cities, and towns; off the roads and trails into the environment of the guerrilla.

e. Plan for and use all resources (both regular and special units).

f. Avoid establishment of semi-permanent patrol bases laden with artillery and supplies that tend to tie down the force (special attention to prevent mobile units from becoming semi-fixed).

g. Emphasize secrecy and surprise. Plans should provide for—

(1) Effective and secure communications.

(2) Constant indoctrination of the individual soldier.

(3) Variation of methods and the use of unorthodox tactics and techniques to avoid establishing patterns.

h. Assign areas of responsibility to commanders.

i. Emphasize that command and staff action should include—

(1) Centralized planning of small-scale decentralized tactical operations.

(2) Emphasis on unity of command.

(3) Training programs which stress developing the offensive spirit, physical stamina, and a desire to seek out the guerrilla and destroy him.

(4) Extensive contingency planning for employment of reserve forces.

(5) Detailed coordination of the intelligence collection effort accomplished by—

(a) Coordination with civil and paramilitary intelligence nets.

(b) Creating informer nets with the local population.

(c) Thorough interrogation of prisoners and suspects.

(d) Detailed planning and coordination of activities with civilian officials in any area of operations where the civilian population is concerned.

(6) Incorporation and monitoring of military civic action into the operational plan by—

(a) Planning for, and augmenting a plan of military civic action, propaganda, and population control to recover population under insurgent influence.

(b) Requesting and distributing supplies for resettlement of population.

(c) Training paramilitary forces for security

operations and insuring continuous support for these forces.

(7) Detailed integration of combat support and combat service support functions (especially aerial supply) into all tactical planning (ch. 4).

(8) Judicious application of the minimum destruction concept in view of the overriding requirements to minimize alienating the population. (Bringing artillery or air power to bear on a village from which sniper fire was received may neutralize guerrilla action but will alienate the civilian population as a result of casualties among noncombatants.)

(9) Consideration of the use of all means of mobility, to include aircraft, tracked and wheeled vehicles, boats, animals, and porters.

(10) Providing for the rapid collection and dissemination of all available information and intelligence so that counter guerrilla forces can take immediate action to destroy the fast-moving guerrilla (difficult but a must) (sec. I, ch. 4).

(11) Communications requirements to include—

(a) Offensive and defensive requirements for AM, FM, SSB.

(b) Air to ground; FM, UHF, or VHF for—

1. Ambushes.
2. Patrols.
3. Convoys.
4. Raids.
5. Emergency.
6. Medical evacuation.

(c) Fire support plans.

(d) Emergency nets in various regions.

Section V. CLEAR AND HOLD OPERATIONS**30. General**

The clear and hold operation is a focus of the three primary counterinsurgency programs, supported by intelligence and psychological operations, on a specific geographical or administrative area or *portions* thereof. The tactics and techniques used to conduct clear and hold operations are treated throughout this advisor guide. The clear and hold operation is concentrated in a specific high priority area experiencing overt insurgency and has the following objectives:

- a. Creation of a secure physical and psychological environment.
- b. Establishing firm government control of the population *and* the area.
- c. Gaining *willing* support of the population *and* their participation in the governmental programs for countering insurgency.

31. Planning Considerations

- a. Clear and hold operations should expand outward from a secure base, such as an urban industrial complex whose population support the government effort and where military forces are in firm control.
- b. No area or its population which has been subjected to the intensive organizational efforts of a subversive insurgent organization can be won back until—

(1) A commander, responsible for the clear and hold operation, is allocated sufficient military forces clearly superior to the insurgent guerrilla force known and suspected to be in the area or immediately available in an adjacent area.

(2) Sufficient nonmilitary resources are allocated to effectively carry out all necessary environmental improvement and population and resources control operations within the area.

(3) The guerrilla has been cleared from the area.

(4) The insurgent hard-core organization and its support structure has been neutralized or eliminated.

(5) A governmental organization, to which the local population gives *willing* support, has been established to replace that of the insurgents.

32. Implementation

The clear and hold operation is characterized by execution of four generally overlapping stages, i.e., preparation, clearing, holding, and consolidation.

a. Preparatory Stage. The preparatory stage, during which inventory, assessment, and planning is conducted, is characterized by the following major actions:

(1) Selection and delineation of a specific area to undergo clear and hold operations (accomplished at the national or lower level based on national objectives).

(2) Designation of chain of command and formulation of concept of operation.

(3) Collection of data and information on the area of operations (area assessment).

(4) Estimate of resource requirements, both military and nonmilitary.

(5) Preparation of clear and hold operations plan. During preparation of the plan, consideration to many factors will be given, included in which are the following:

(a) Emergency legislation, to provide a legal

basis for population and resources control measures, legality of use of armed forces, etc.

(b) Key points which may require establishing static defense posts.

(c) Police forces and paramilitary forces requirements and organization.

(d) Coordination, to include provisions for joint training and operations, involving military, police, paramilitary, intelligence, psychological, and civilian administrative agencies and forces.

(6) Psychological preparation of the population of contiguous areas to explain the necessity for these operations.

b. Clearing Stage.

(1) This phase, characterized by counterguerrilla operations and population and resources control operations, is designed to—

(a) Deny the insurgent organization the capability to function in the area.

(b) Establish the physical presence of government military and population and resources control forces throughout the area.

(c) Establish firm security in the area under the protective shield of government forces.

(2) The clearing stage can be initiated by sweep-type operations to either disperse or force reaction by major guerrilla elements within the area of operations. Once this has been accomplished, a combination of offensive small unit operations, such as area saturation patrolling, area ambushes, and other techniques as contained in section IV, chapter 5, are initiated.

(3) Repressive and retributory actions against the

general population in the area must not be condoned. A characteristic of all counterinsurgency operations is firm and impartial treatment whenever and wherever possible since often it will be impossible to identify the insurgent at the onset of operations.

(4) Population and resources control forces introduce surveillance and restrictive control measures as necessary (sec. III).

c. Holding Stage.

(1) Operations during this phase are designed to—

(a) Establish firm government control over the area *and* the population therein.

(b) Develop a local capability for area security.

(c) Establish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent apparatus.

(d) Develop a dependable network of informants.

(2) Major actions occurring during this phase include—

(a) Designating and allocating area-oriented regular military forces to continue offensive military operations in the area. Other regular military forces who participated in clearing stage actions are now released or are assigned to carrying out other parts of the counterinsurgency effort in the area.

(b) Introduction of elements of other agencies of the government, as the area achieves a more secure status, to begin carrying out environmental improvement programs. Resources to support these agencies and their operations should be introduced, as needed, at this time.

(c) Thorough population screening to determine insurgent elements and to uncover local leadership.

(d) Area surveys, assisted by local leadership, to determine resources and precise and current needs of the area and its people.

(e) Motivation of population, by such actions as environmental improvements, designed to psychologically condition the population and induce them to participate in the reconstruction of the area and in the defense of *their* area against attack by guerrillas (sec. II and III).

(f) Government support to those willing to participate in reconstruction, based upon their needs and upon the principle of self-help, wherever possible, and willingness to defend what they accomplish.

(g) Training of local paramilitary forces, including arming and involving them in one or more successful operations against guerrillas.

(h) Establishing a communications system tying the area into a larger secure communications system.

(i) Progressive efforts, such as formation of youth clubs, participation of population in election of local leadership, participation in community-sponsored environmental improvement and other projects, to develop national consciousness and rapport between the population and its government.

d. Consolidation Stage.

(1) During this stage all activities of the clear and hold operations are expanded and accelerated with the objectives of—

(a) Turning primary responsibility for local security and government over to the local population

as soon as they are capable of accepting such responsibility.

(b) Maintaining complete security.

(c) Continuing the reconstruction effort with support being provided, as necessary, from local or government resources, or a combination thereof.

(d) Continuing development of national consciousness and the local political base willingly supported by and participated in by the local population.

(2) The redeployment of the bulk of the area-oriented counter guerrilla force to carry out operations in adjacent or other high priority areas occurs during this phase. However, redeployment *must not* take place until local paramilitary forces are capable of providing local security. Further, a general reserve force must be constituted that can respond swiftly to guerrilla attacks which are beyond the capability of local or regional forces. A national level reserve force such as airmobile, airborne, or marine units may be made available to provide assistance.

e. Other Considerations. The attainment of clear and hold operations objectives requires considerable expenditures of resources and time. The advisor and his counterpart must be prepared for a long-term effort. Based upon experiences in insurgency-stricken areas in which clear and hold operations, or similar type operations, have been conducted, *several years* may be required to achieve complete and enduring success.

33. Advisor Checklist (Operations Plan, Clear and Hold Operations)

See appendix II.

CHAPTER 4

SUPPORT

Section I. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

34. General

In a Phase I counterinsurgency situation intelligence and counterintelligence requirements will be developed at the national level. However, since certain elements of intelligence and counterintelligence activities launched during Phase I will appear during Phase II and Phase III, general guidance in these areas is provided in the Advisor Check List (Intelligence and Counterintelligence) (para. 37). During a Phase III counterinsurgency situation, intelligence activity, as tactical activity, is essentially the same as for conventional-type military operations. The majority of special requirements and peculiarities with which advisors will be faced will appear in Phase II insurgency and will primarily concern counter guerrilla operations. Some of these are as follows:

- a. Requirement for rapid collection and dissemination.
- b. Requirement for augmentation of organic intelligence personnel and equipment.
- c. Knowledge of the area of operations must approach that of the guerrilla force.
- d. Terrain analysis and selection of avenues of approach, to include consideration of the most likely ave-

nues of approach of the guerrilla, must include effects of the weather on visibility, trafficability, and men and equipment.

e. The selection of objectives in counterguerrilla operations is based not only on consideration of the conventional military aspects of terrain but includes consideration of the sociological, political, economic, psychological, and logistical aspects of the area of operations.

f. Detailed knowledge of guerrilla tactical doctrine and the insurgent organization is essential.

g. The area of operations to include its civil populace is the most prolific source of information.

h. An increased number of collection agencies will be required (FM 30-5).

i. Collection planning must be more elaborate and detailed.

j. Collection techniques as contained in FM 30-18 (U) must be employed in order to obtain information of significance.

k. *Timely* dissemination of intelligence is of the utmost importance.

l. Effective counterintelligence measures are critical to successful operations.

35. Advisor Intelligence Functions

a. General. The advisor must be thoroughly familiar with various intelligence and counterintelligence organizations and techniques. The adaptation of these techniques must be based upon known methods of insurgent operations. Tactics of a set pattern invariably play into the hands of the insurgents.

b. Functions. The following are functions which the advisor normally will fulfill:

(1) Assist in establishing an operations center within the ASCC for coordinating the civil-military overall intelligence effort within his counterpart's area of responsibility (see para. 8 for discussion of ASCC).

(2) Establish work-level relationship with his military counterpart for collection of intelligence and for planning and conducting operations.

(3) Maintain liaison with local police and other intelligence agencies responsible for countersubversion operations against insurgent underground political organizations in the area.

(4) Provide intelligence support to U.S. advisors working at other levels.

(5) Establish secure and reliable communication channels.

(6) Prepare daily summary reports dealing with insurgent activity within the area (include psychological vulnerabilities).

(7) Assist counterpart in developing effective techniques and procedures for the collection and *rapid dissemination of tactical intelligence*.

(8) Assist counterpart in establishing appropriate military security controls to prevent penetration and sabotage.

36. Treatment of Prisoners

a. Article 3, common to each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, requires that captured insurgents be treated humanely. This article forbids violence to life and person, in particular, murder, mutilation, and tor-

ture. Likewise, it is forbidden to commit outrages upon personal dignity, *to take hostages*, and to pass sentence and carry out executions without prior judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by civilized people. U.S. forces capturing insurgents are required to observe these rules. Advisors will encourage their counterparts to do likewise.

b. Advisors may find that prisoners are treated and interrogated far more harshly than could be tolerated in the U.S. Army. When such treatment is advised against, advisors may be told that the prisoners are accustomed to such hardship and that a lesser degree of treatment will not affect them at all. Still, the advisor should emphasize the fact that the standard of treatment is not determined by what the prisoner is used to but by Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. In addition, other facts to be remembered are—

(1) Advisors must not become involved in atrocities. Advisors should explain this to counterparts and further explain that they must report to their superiors any atrocities of which they have knowledge.

(2) Captured insurgents should be interrogated initially at the lowest level possible for information of immediate tactical value, and forwarded to higher headquarters for more detailed interrogation.

(3) An interrogation must produce valid information. Information or a confession furnished by a prisoner is of no intelligence value if he provided what his interrogators wanted to hear, simply to terminate the interrogation.

(4) The loss of a prisoner, whatever the justifica-

tion, is a loss of a very valuable intelligence source (FM 30-15 and FM 30-17).

37. Advisor Checklist (Intelligence and Counterintelligence)

(ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS WILL BE CLASSIFIED. MAKE NO ENTRIES ON THIS CHECKLIST.)

The following checklist provides basic guidance, a reminder, and a source of reference identification for the advisor on intelligence and counterintelligence matters (items pertaining to activities to be pursued during all three phases of counterinsurgency are included):

a. Obtain and study the area study for the assigned area.

b. Obtain and study the most recent area assessment for the area.

c. Compare the two and attempt to detect the trend of changes.

d. Carefully evaluate all information (divorced from opinion) pertaining to—

(1) The advised G2/Intelligence Section, their operating procedures, their effectiveness, and reason for any lack of effectiveness.

(2) Personalities of counterparts, their personnel, their commanders, and any other persons with whom business is routinely conducted. Problem areas and the reasons for their existence should be explored.

(3) Chain of command and communication channels of the staff section and unit advised. Determination of communication adequacy to provide rapid dissemination of intelligence.

(4) Projects initiated by predecessors which have not been completed.

(5) Projects which the advisors predecessor believes should be initiated.

(6) Advisor communication channels.

(7) Reference material available (local and non-local).

(8) Other intelligence agencies that may be operating in conjunction with counterparts.

(9) Prepare and maintain a list of EEI and insurgent indicators such as—

(a) *Insurgent infiltration of village or installation.*

1. Increase numbers of vendors, workers, applicants for employment.

2. Frequent visits of relatives from distant or neighboring communities.

3. Strangers seeking to join paramilitary force or seeking employment without recruitment.

4. Several specific individuals leaving village on many or regular occasions.

5. Known or suspected insurgents or individuals of unknown allegiance contacting inhabitants or members of paramilitary force.

6. Pilfering.

(b) *Attack of village or installation.*

1. Initiation of propaganda lectures (usually conducted 5–15 km from village or installation).

2. Small probes by recon patrols.

3. Firing on or ambushing local security patrols.

4. Indication of insurgent force movement or shift of location.

5. Increasing or larger recon actions.

6. Quiet period, threats of attack, propoganda directed at village.

7. Kidnapping of inhabitants.

8. Rumor based on fact or fantasy of populace about an attack.

9. Unexplained departure of local officials.

(c) *Area being used as an infiltration route.*

1. Crops grown away from immediate vicinity of village.

(a) Crops grown in areas not under friendly control.

(b) Food caches or way stations located in area.

2. Foot paths and trails circumventing population centers (villages, camps, installations).

(a) Unusual amounts of broken branches and debris.

(b) Undergrowth beaten down on trails and in fields.

(c) Signal markers or signs.

3. Abandoned camp sites.

4. Adequate water supply. Year-round water supply located near trails or cache sites.

5. Game animals.

(a) Adequate to support small groups.

(b) Small animal traps and snares in use.

6. New or transient enemy units sighted or reported.

7. Absence of man traps, foot traps, and spikes.

8. Lack of insurgent combat action along route.

(d) *Known or suspected sympathizers, individuals, groups, and villages.*

1. Apparent freedom of movement of individuals or entire village population.

2. No security for workers in fields.

3. No fear of insurgents.

4. No insurgent action against village or village inhabitants.

5. Trails leading from village to known or suspected insurgent areas.

e. In the execution of an intelligence function, certain procedures must be followed in order to accomplish the necessary planning, recording, and reporting. In U.S. Army intelligence these functions have been formalized in prescribed plans, files, and reports. While it is not necessary that counterparts exactly follow the U.S. Army procedures in this field, the basic principles are necessary and must be followed, to the appropriate degree, at all levels of intelligence. The following check list of selected items is provided to assist in advising counterparts in these functions:

(1) Collection Plan (formerly Collection Worksheet) (FM 30-5).

(2) Intelligence SOP (FM 30-5).

(3) Journal (FM 30-5).

(4) Intelligence Workbook (formerly Intelligence Worksheet and G2 Worksheet) (FM 30-5) (fig. 7).

(5) Counterintelligence Workbook.

(6) Situation Maps (FM 30-5).

(7) Intelligence Files (FM 30-5).

(CLASSIFICATION)	(CLASSIFICATION)	(CLASSIFICATION)	
<p>SAMPLE GUIDE INTELLIGENCE WORKBOOK FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY</p>	<p>1. ENEMY OPERATIONS</p> <p>a. Units</p> <p>(1) Guerrillas (2) Political (3) Underground (4) Others</p> <p>b. Method of Operation</p> <p>(1) Tactical (2) Political (3) Propaganda (4) Logistics (5) Sabotage, Assassination, etc.</p>	<p>f. Propaganda g. Subversive</p> <p>5. TARGETS & LOCATION</p> <p>a. Command & Tactical Units b. Paramilitary Units c. Political Cells d. Propaganda Cells e. Supply Installations & Caches f. Manufacturing Facilities g. Lines of Communications & Supply h. Psychological Vulnerabilities</p>	
	<p>2. CIVILIAN POPULACE</p> <p>a. Sympathies</p> <p>(1) Hostile (2) Friendly (3) Neutral</p> <p>b. Contributing Factors for Hostile Sympathies</p> <p>(1) Economic (2) Hate (3) Fear</p> <p>c. Environmental Improvements</p> <p>(1) Political (2) Economic (3) Social</p>	<p>6. EFFECTS OF WEATHER & TERRAIN</p> <p>a. Military Operations b. Political Activities c. Economic Factors d. Sociologic Factors</p> <p>7. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS</p> <p>a. In-Country b. Third Country</p>	
	<p>3. THIRD COUNTRY OPERATIONS</p> <p>a. Units b. Personnel c. Command d. Organizations e. Logistics f. Training Area & Programs g. Other Support Operations.</p>	<p>8. RECRUITING & TRAINING</p> <p>a. Military/Guerrilla</p> <p>(1) In-Country (2) Third Country</p> <p>b. Political</p> <p>(1) In-Country (2) Third Country</p> <p>c. Others</p> <p>(1) In-Country (2) Third Country</p>	
	<p>4. ORGANIZATIONS</p> <p>a. Political b. Military/Guerrilla c. Paramilitary d. Command e. Logistical</p>	<p>9. MISCELLANEOUS</p>	
	(CLASSIFICATION)	(CLASSIFICATION)	(CLASSIFICATION)

Figure 7. Sample guide intelligence workbook for counterinsurgency.

- (8) Spot Reports (FM 30-5).
- (9) Intelligence Report (INTREP) (FM 30-5).
- (10) Supplementary Intelligence Report (SUP-INTREP) (FM 30-5).
- (11) Intelligence Summary (ISUM) (FM 30-5).
- (12) Periodic Intelligence Report (PERINTREP) if appropriate (FM 30-5).
- (13) Weather Forecasts, Reports and Summaries (FM 30-5).
- (14) Analysis of the Area of Operations (FM 30-5).
- (15) Intelligence Estimate (ch. 4, FM 30-5).
- (16) Intelligence Annex (FM 30-5).
- (17) Counterintelligence Estimate (FM 30-5).
- (18) Counterintelligence Measures Worksheet (FM 30-5).
- (19) Counterintelligence Plan (FM 30-5).

f. Does the counterpart have an aggressive counterintelligence program? (FM 30-17).

(1) *Defensive.*

(a) Is information that would be of value to the insurgent limited to those who actually require it? How?

(b) Do individuals having access to such information understand and practice security precautions for its protection?

(c) Is access to those areas where sensitive information or important materiel is located positively controlled?

(d) Are on-line and/or off-line encryption systems available and used in transmitting sensitive information? What is the source of such systems?

(e) Are communications personnel instructed in proper communications procedures? Do they follow them?

(f) Are personnel having access to sensitive information or areas investigated to detect hostile agents or unreliable persons? How effective is the investigation? Is it designed to detect family ties or other pressure points that would make the individual susceptible to hostile pressure?

(g) Are security inspections of military installations conducted at regular intervals?

(h) Are periodic security lectures conducted?

(2) *Offensive.*

(a) Does the counterpart have a clandestine (activities conducted in such a way that secrecy or concealment is assured) counterintelligence program?

(b) Does the degree of coverage provide reasonable assurance of his gaining knowledge of hostile intelligence, subversive or sabotage activity anywhere within his area? Are all sources exploited?

(c) What means of communication are employed between his office and his sources? Do the communication media jeopardize the security of the source? Of the operation?

(d) What is the expected elapsed time from acquisition by a source to receipt of his report by the counterpart? From issuance of instructions to a source to receipt of the instructions by the source? Does this elapsed time allow for successful reaction by friendly forces?

(e) What means do counterparts employ to establish the reliability of the source? Do they consider

the reliability or lack thereof in evaluating the information?

(f) What means do counterparts employ to evaluate the accuracy of information received from the source?

(g) What means do counterparts employ to protect operations against—

1. Double agents (agents working for both sides)?

2. Dual or multiple agents (agents reporting to two or more agencies of the same government, thereby confirming their own information)?

3. Paper mills (agents fabricating their information)?

g. Does the counterpart have a clandestine intelligence program? (FM 30-18.)

h. Are factors that favor the insurgent target considered in the intelligence and counterintelligence program?

i. Are effective measures utilized to protect the clandestine agent's identity? (FM 30-17 and FM 30-18.)

Section II. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

38. General

PSYOP should support counterinsurgency programs—

a. *Before Implementation.* By influencing the people's thoughts toward elements of the program. In environmental improvement an example of this would be a PSYOP educational program about mosquitoes and malaria before spraying the village.

b. During Execution. By influencing the people's thoughts along desired lines as the mission progresses. In population and resource control, an example would be a PSYOP program that convinces the people that curfews are the result of guerrilla activity, and not the act of an oppressive government.

c. After Completion. By solidifying the people's thoughts favorably toward the government. In counterinsurgency operations, an example would be a local "victory" parade or rally following a guerrilla defeat by local self-defense forces.

39. Advisor Check List (Psychological Operations)

a. Integration. Be certain PSYOP are integrated into counterinsurgency programs at all levels by all host country government personnel and agencies.

b. Intelligence. Be certain PSYOP programs are based on intelligence that is—

(1) *Accurate.*

(a) Confirm intelligence. For example, do the police reports agree with the military that check points are not a sore spot with the people? Do newsmen agree with educators that a certain tribal group has a particular taboo?

(b) Be alert to statistics or glowing accounts of progress which may be presented because they are nice to hear.

(c) Stress the need for honesty in PSYOP intelligence reporting. Explain that PSYOP programs will be fitted to the facts in furthering the aims of the recognized government.

(2) *Timely.*

(a) Do not delay the dissemination of information because of the requirement to prepare lengthy written reports.

(b) Go out and make personal contacts.

(c) Explain PSYOP intentions to intelligence collection agencies.

(d) When PSYOP programs uncover intelligence information, insert it into intelligence channels.

(e) Evaluate established PSYOP efforts in light of new intelligence.

(f) Adjust or discard outmoded PSYOP programs.

(3) *Meaningful.* Do not waste time gathering data which cannot be exploited because of host country restrictions.

c. Implementation. (FM 33-5.)

(1) *Resources.*

(a) Make a survey of all equipment and personnel who can contribute to the PSYOP effort (typewriters, loudspeakers, movie equipment, mimeograph machines and operators).

(b) Pinpoint amateur artists, linguists, newsmen, and maintenance personnel.

(2) *Mission analysis.*

(a) Study the overall mission.

(b) Determine what PSYOP means can best support it.

(3) *Target analysis.*

(a) Study the entire target audience in the area of operations.

(b) Select those local leaders who are *susceptible*

to PSYOP efforts, and who will be *effective* in passing the message to others.

(4) *Psychological objectives.* Determine what changes in attitude or behavior should be accomplished among the target audience to support the overall mission.

(5) *Themes.* Themes present the psychological objective to the target audience in the most palatable manner possible. Good themes are—

(a) *Timely.* The fighting effectiveness of government forces should be emphasized after a victory, not during a withdrawal.

(b) *Consistent.* A long standing theme that emphasizes complete religious equality can be destroyed by a short term one that provides extra privileges to a specified sect.

(c) *Credible.* Truth alone does not assure credibility because truth is not always believed.

1. Monitor PSYOP programs that make lavish abundant promises of future affluence.

2. Adjust the themes to the specific target audience.

(6) *Media.* Media are employed to disseminate themes to the people. In developing areas primitive communication modes are the rule, not the exception. In many instances, the media employed will have to counter the efforts of the insurgent propagandist.

(a) *Skits and shows.*

1. Use entertainers when available. Include local performers in anticommunist roles.

2. Use guerrilla defectors if possible in on-stage satire of their past life. Timid or cooperative

ex-guerrillas can effectively destroy the myth of guerrilla invincibility.

(b) *Radio.*

1. Receivers donated to a community should be for the benefit of all and not the sole property of the trustee.

2. Receivers can be used in conjunction with loudspeaker systems to encompass the entire village into a listening audience.

3. Community receivers are a prestige item and if necessary may be distributed as a mark of village merit.

(c) *Printed matter.*

1. Mass leaflet air drops are wasteful. Concentrate on villages, trails, and watering sites.

2. Stress the importance of a rapid and routine newsheet delivery system. The door-to-door approach is desirable.

3. Host country personnel may tend to become discouraged if their propaganda leaflets are not avidly read by recipients, and thus look upon these efforts as useless.

4. Never disseminate candy, cigarettes, or other items with English inscriptions without first acquiring an exact translation in host country language. If there is no misunderstanding the gift as a medical or health item, then distribution is permissible.

(d) *Motion pictures.*

1. Examine all existing U.S. and host country motion picture activities for integration and cross support. Built up areas may be receiving over attention at the expense of outlying villages.

2. Rural audiences take great delight in motion pictures. These audiences are undemanding in plot and subject matter. Mix subtle propaganda themes with entertainment. Avoid political harangues.

3. Film production should be decentralized and oriented on local items of interest if possible.

4. American type "home" movies are popular.

(e) *Loudspeakers.*

1. Survey all loudspeaker equipment in the area of operations. Keep it moving.

2. Use them at every opportunity in events such as parades and rallies.

3. Attempt to keep addresses short, pointed, and appropriate.

(f) *Face-to-face persuasion.*

1. Use persuasion, not argument.

2. Keep your approach audience-centered. Think as they do. Avoid antagonism.

3. Use audience feed-back to adjust or to substantiate your original approach.

d. *Information.* The host country may not have a staff system that parallels that of the U.S. Army. Be prepared to assist in the following areas if requested:

(1) *Troop information programs.*

(2) *Military dependent information programs.*

(3) *Government information activities.*

(a) It may be necessary to serve in a liaison role between host country government news agencies and the USIS for supplies, equipment, and advice.

(b) On occasion, influence may have to be brought to bear to cause host country armed forces to

make distribution of civilian handbills and newsheets into threatened areas.

e. Innovation. Innovate freely but conform to framework of the overall PSYOP plan. If something appears that will work, consider it, plan carefully, and it probably will.

(1) *Rallies.* Rallies are popular in developing countries.

(a) Include introductory music, singing, speeches, and films.

(b) Try for an emotional setting to include flags, portraits of leaders, and "plants" in the audience.

(2) *Information centers.* Central locations where events can be conducted on a periodic basis are valuable.

(a) Public theaters, gymnasiums, or other large buildings are examples.

(b) Do not overlook the importance of simple bulletin boards if nothing else is available.

(3) *Contests.* Contests can be used to facilitate the dissemination of propaganda quickly and at little expense.

(a) Short essays by high school scholars and posters by elementary students are examples.

(b) Offer prizes.

(c) It may be necessary to promise anonymity to the winners.

(4) *Field expedients.* Use any amateur artistic talent available.

(a) Posters hand drawn with crayon on wrapping paper frequently have more local impact than do finished national level products.

(b) Banners made of cheap cloth and ordinary oil paint are effective.

(c) Billboards can be constructed in market places using locally procured material.

(5) *Slogans*. Spontaneous slogans often arise which elicit great emotion. Seize and exploit them.

(6) *Symbols*. Symbols that are suggestive and simple are best. The two-fingered version of "V" for victory is an example.

Section III. COMBAT SUPPORT

40. General

a. This part of the advisor handbook is directed toward all advisors who find themselves with combat support responsibilities.

b. The combat support which may be available in counterinsurgency operations includes—

- (1) Artillery.
- (2) Tactical air support.
- (3) Army aviation.
- (4) Engineer.
- (5) Signal.
- (6) Chemical.
- (7) Intelligence.
- (8) Psychological warfare.
- (9) Navy and marine.

41. Field Artillery

a. *Mission*. Support normally will be given to small-scale combat operations which may vary in size from squad to possibly a regiment (—). The artillery commander is the principal advisor to the force commander

on all fire support matters. Similarly, within the advisory structure, U.S. Army artillery officers must assist the U.S. advisor of maneuver units at all levels on fire support matters. Activities to be supported may include—

- (1) Clear and hold operations.
- (2) Patrols.
- (3) Ambushes.
- (4) Counterambushes.
- (5) Village or community defense.
- (6) Reserve units in an alert status.
- (7) Suppressive fires for airmobile operations.

b. Organization. Flexibility in structuring artillery organizations for task assignments is critical in counter-insurgency operations.

c. Weapons Capabilities and Characteristics.

(1) These weapons characteristics have a major impact on artillery employment techniques in counter-insurgency operations.

	<i>Wt (lbs)</i>	<i>Max range (km)</i>	<i>Min range (high angle)</i>	<i>Max rate of fire rds/min</i>
M30, 4.2 mortar	654	5.9	0.8	10
M116, 75mm Pack How.	1,440	8.8	3.1	6
M101A1, 105mm How.	4,980	11.0	1.0	10
M102, 105mm How.	3,100	15.0	1.0	10
M114, 155mm How.	12,700	14.6	2.3	4

(2) The fire plan for a hamlet or village defense where supporting weapons include the above, should also include crew served weapons such as 60mm and 81mm mortars. Direct fire weapons, such as machine guns and grenade launchers, should be employed.

(3) The light weight of the 4.2" mortar and the 75mm howitzer, as compared to the 105mm or 155mm howitzer, may be the deciding factor in the selection of supporting artillery for mountain and jungle operations or for those areas with few or no roads.

(4) Maximum effective ranges of weapons will be an important consideration when planning artillery support of patrols or surface convoys.

d. Techniques.

(1) *Employment.*

(a) To provide effective artillery fire support, artillery is employed to—

1. Provide maximum area coverage with available weapons.
2. Support combat operations as a primary mission.
3. Support security and village defense forces as a secondary mission.

(b) In order to provide maximum coverage, single gun deployment will frequently be the rule rather than the exception. For this reason, additional personnel should be trained in fire direction control procedures.

(2) *Mobility.* As a minimum, artillery must be as mobile as the supported force. In addition to normally associated prime movers, many other means of mobility are available.

(a) *Boats.* The landing craft, utility/personnel can be used for artillery up to and including the 105mm howitzer. Load muzzle first in order to facilitate unloading.

(b) *Helicopters.* The 4.2" mortar, 75mm howitzer, and the 105mm howitzer can be lifted by most helicopters. Provisions for ammunition resupply should be granted priority when utilizing helicopters as a mode of artillery transport. (para. 43.)

(c) *Armored personnel carriers (M113-M59).* The 4.2" mortar and the 75mm howitzer can be transported by this vehicle.

(3) *Requests for fire.*

(a) *Forward observers.* The use of forward observers is vital, especially in areas where maps are marginal, survey is difficult, and the population is friendly. Defensive concentrations must be fired-in, and at periodic intervals refired, to check validity since advanced gunnery techniques are rarely employed. Important considerations for fire direction—

1. Provide at least one trained artillery FO with each company-size combat unit.

2. Selected Army aviation pilots should be trained in the adjustment of artillery fire.

3. Provide trained FO in aircraft to support large scale operations.

4. A minimum of one individual in each rifle platoon or patrol should be trained in adjusting and obtaining artillery fire.

5. Selected individuals in paramilitary units and village defense forces should be taught a simplified method of requesting and adjusting artillery fire.

(b) *Simplified method of adjusting artillery.* One such technique is the "colored quadrant." Essentially, it is a round board with each quadrant painted a different color, i.e., red in the 1st quadrant (0-90 de-

greens), white in the 2d quadrant, blue in the 3d quadrant, and yellow in the 4th quadrant. The round board is then permanently mounted in the village and oriented to a north-south line, and hamlet defenders can call for fire using a color direction indicator. This technique requires close coordination with artillery units, and as many prefired concentrations as possible. More sophisticated methods can be devised depending on the time allowed for training and the receptability of instruction. Any technique will require reliable and responsive communications.

(4) *Harassing and interdiction fires.*

(a) Harassing fires are employed against insurgents to restrict movements, inflict casualties, lower efficiency and morale.

(b) Interdiction fires are employed against targets such as assembly areas, crossroads and bridges that are to be denied to the insurgents. This type of fire frequently is used during hours of darkness and requires the expenditure of large quantities of ammunition.

(5) *Selection and preparation of positions.*

(a) Positions should afford 6400 mil firing capability.

(b) Positions should be selected to facilitate direct fire missions.

(c) Avoid masking artillery when positioning it in or near built-up areas.

(d) Although position security is a primary consideration, the ability to perform the mission is always paramount.

(e) Alternate position areas should be selected to add to the flexibility of the employment of artillery.

(6) *Coordination and control.*

(a) *General.* The advice on coordination of fire support furnished by U.S. units is an inherent responsibility of the senior U.S. artillery adviser. In host countries, artillery commanders at battalion, division, and higher echelons exert little or no influence over artillery fire control and maneuvers beyond the initial stages of operational planning. This is due to the fact that artillery elements support many small unit operations simultaneously with platoons and, in rare instances, batteries. Once operations are underway, coordination is conducted at battery or platoon level.

(b) *Communications.* Numerous communication means are available.

1. Artillery fire and liaison channels.
2. Command communications links.
3. Airborne or ground radio relay.
4. Village defense radio channels.
5. Commercial telephone systems, if available.
6. Prearranged visual signals.

(c) *Advisory problem areas.*

1. Language barriers.
2. Differing military backgrounds.
3. A tendency on the part of tactical commanders to personally direct artillery or other supporting fires.
4. Frequent use of fire-for-effect without first adjusting on target.
5. Failure to request and provide for forward and/or aerial observers for combat operations.
6. Fire requests must be evaluated from their

psychological effect as well as their physical effect on the populace and the insurgents.

7. When the insurgent is intermingled with the populace, positive identification of each target is mandatory.

8. A lack of roads in rough terrain, or inundated terrain, may tend to discourage counterparts from displacing artillery to best accomplish the mission.

e. Supply and Maintenance.

(1) Standard logistic procedures will apply; however, problems of delivery and distribution become more difficult.

(2) All methods of surface transportation and air delivery should be exploited.

(3) Maintenance should receive more than normal emphasis.

(4) The advisor must be prepared to devote considerable time to this effort.

f. Planning Factors. When advising a host country counterpart in the planning of an operation that includes artillery, insure that the responsibilities enumerated below are clearly defined.

- (1) Answers call for fire from ----
- (2) Establishes liaison with ----
- (3) Establishes communication with ----
- (4) Has as its zone of fire ----
- (5) Furnishes forward observer(s) ----
- (6) Displaces on order of ----
- (7) Has its fires planned by ----

42. Tactical Air Support

a. Employment. Allocation of tactical air support

is controlled at the highest echelon to insure optimum utilization.

b. Organization. Organization of the host country air force may follow the USAF pattern. Armament available normally will include: machine guns, rockets, bombs, napalm.

c. Command and Control. Request channels for tactical air support are similar to U.S. request channels.

(1) Forward Air Controllers (FAC) are allocated to maneuver units.

(2) In the absence of a FAC tactical air support can be directed by—

(a) Artillery forward observers.

(b) Aerial observers.

(c) Army air guides.

(3) Communications (para 45).

d. U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Support.

(1) U.S. Air Force may provide tactical air support. Basic doctrine for employing USAF resources in counterinsurgency is in chapter 6, AFM 1-1.

(2) USAF Special Air Warfare Forces have the following responsibilities:

(a) Conduct air operations as part of a U.S. force.

(b) Conduct air operations in conjunction with host country forces.

(c) Participate as instructors or advisors to host country air force.

(d) Special air warfare operations include—

1. Assault airlift.

2. Utility airlift.

3. Psychological operations.

4. Civic actions.
5. Close air support.
6. Reconnaissance.

(e) USAF air liaison officers assigned at division, or equivalent, operational level provide—

1. Coordination and planning assistance on tactical employment of U.S. and host country air forces.
2. Information on capabilities and limitations of U.S. and host country air forces.
3. Detailed information on rules of engagement that apply.

(f) Tactical Air Control System (TACS). This system is employed to control—

1. Counterair.
2. Interdiction.
3. Close air support.
4. Tactical air reconnaissance.
5. Airlift operations.

(a) Air Force Forces Command Post (AFFCP)—usually in close proximity to the army command post.

(b) Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). The operations center of the AFFCP providing coordination with ground forces in preplanned missions and centralized control of the force (established at highest level).

(c) Direct Air Support Center (DASC). Established probably at corps, or equivalent, level. Highly mobile, provides fast reaction to ground force requirement for tactical air support.

(d) Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). Located at battalion, or equivalent, level. Consists of

an air liaison officer (ALO), a forward air controller (FAC), and communications personnel and equipment. TACP collocates with the fire support coordination center (FSCC).

(e) Forward Air Guides may augment FAC. Forward Air Guides are host country army personnel trained in the FAC techniques of guiding aircraft in delivery of ordnance on target.

(f) U.S. Army Aviation Aerial Fire Support (para. 43).

43. Army Aviation

a. *General.* Army aviation can provide support to U.S. and host country forces in five functional areas—

- (1) Command and control.
- (2) Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
- (3) Mobility (maneuver).
- (4) Aerial fire support.
- (5) Logistics.

Aviation support is classified as combat support and




Figure 8. Tactical air control system.

combat service support. A detailed discussion of U.S. Army aviation organization, operations, tactics, techniques, and employment may be found in FM 1-100 and FM 57-35. Army aviation advisors have the same advisor relationships to counterparts as ground advisors.

b. Missions. Typical missions which can be performed by U.S. Army or host country aviation are as follows:

- (1) *Combat support.*
 - (a) Hunter-killer operations (eagle flight).
 - (b) Command and control (aerial command posts).
 - (c) Reconnaissance and surveillance (visual, photographic, infrared, radar).
 - (d) Target acquisition.
 - (e) Conduct of fire (aerial artillery OP).
 - (f) Battlefield illumination.
 - (g) Armed aerial escort.
 - (h) Snoop flights (*f*(1)(*c*)5 below).
 - (i) Airdrop (pathfinders, paratroopers, equipment and supply).
 - (j) Airmobile operations.
 - (k) Outpost relief or withdrawals.
 - (l) Smoke laying.
 - (m) PSYOP loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet dissemination.
 - (n) Search and rescue.
- (2) *Combat service support.*
 - (a) Liaison and courier service.
 - (b) Logistics supply and resupply.
 - (c) Aeromedical and PW evacuation.
 - (d) Wire laying.

- (e) Radio relay.
- (f) Administrative troop movement.
- (g) Military civic action.
- (h) Message drop and pickup.

c. Host Country Aviation. Host country aviation units may be similar to U.S. Army aviation organizations. The advisor should insure that his counterpart has requested host country aviation support whenever possible.

d. Capabilities and Limitations.

(1) The advisor can get information on unit capabilities and limitations from the U.S. aviation commander, his representatives, or the army aviation liaison officer.

(2) Aircraft capabilities and limitations to include useful load, cruise speed, endurance, type of fuel, and takeoff distance are found in appendix IV and V.

(3) Night and conditions of restricted visibility should not be allowed to totally restrict movements by air.

(4) IFR flights can be executed if the proper equipment has been installed in the aircraft and at ground stations.

(5) Several limiting factors pertaining to operations conducted in various types of terrain must be considered in planning aviation support.

(a) Jungle operations.

1. Reconnaissance will be limited because of jungle vegetation.

2. Navigation is difficult due to lack of adequate air navigation facilities, accurate maps, and the limited number of well-defined reference points.

3. Lack of suitable landing areas.

4. Aircraft require considerable more maintenance due to moisture and corrosion of component parts and electrical systems.

5. High temperature conditions restrict the load-carrying capabilities of aircraft.

(b) *Mountain operations.*

1. Navigation is difficult due to lack of adequate air navigation facilities, accurate maps, and the limited number of well-defined terrain features.

2. Lack of suitable landing areas.

3. Atmospheric conditions and altitude requirements restrict the load-carrying capacity of aircraft.

4. Air turbulence conditions.

5. Early morning fog and cloud cover conditions prevalent in these areas restrict visibility.

(c) *Desert operations.*

1. Navigation is difficult due to lack of prominent land marks and terrain features.

2. Maintenance, landing, and take-off problems are magnified due to blowing sand.

3. High temperature conditions restrict the load-carrying capabilities of aircraft.

(d) *Inundated and swampy areas.*

1. Limited landing areas for fixed wing aircraft.

2. Difficulties in selecting landing areas for rotary wing aircraft.

3. Maintenance requirements increase due to moisture and corrosion.

e. Control of Army Aviation Resources.

(1) In Phase II operations, control is vested at the lowest level of command that has a continuing need.

(2) In Phase III operations, control is vested at the highest levels of command commensurate with effective employment.

(3) Usually, the U.S. Army senior advisor has operational control of U.S. Army aviation resources.

(4) Host-country aviation is controlled by host country commanders, with the U.S. advisor providing advice on its employment.

(5) The U.S. Army aviation unit commander has command and control over his unit.

(6) Normally, the senior infantry commander will be appointed as the task force commander.

(7) Army aviation, though centrally controlled, should be decentralized to the lowest element having a continuing requirement for aviation support. Priority of aviation support is usually established by local directives and generally is as follows:

(a) Combat support missions.

(b) Commitment of reserves and resupply.

(c) Aeromedical evacuation.

(d) Supply.

(e) Liaison; command visits.

(f) Courier.

(g) Administrative flights.

(h) All other combat service support missions.

(8) Request channels.

(a) Advisory channels.

(b) Counterpart channels for aviation support parallel advisor request channels.

(c) Requests for army aviation support are forwarded to the aviation units.

f. *Combat Support.* Typical combat support missions are listed in b(1) above. Major elements of aviation combat support are airmobile operations, aerial fire support, and command and control.

(1) *Airmobile operations.* These are operations in which the combat forces and their combat equipment move by air, under the control of a ground force commander, to engage in ground combat (FM 57-35, para 43h, and app III). Airmobile operations are particularly useful in difficult terrain and as blocking forces for providing rapid deployment of forces in areas where road nets are poor and guerrilla ambush actions may delay or prevent the movement of forces.

(a) General considerations for airmobile operations for the advisor are—

1. Thorough familiarization with aviation unit airmobile operation SOP's.

2. Insure operational coordination between subordinate advisors, U.S. and host country aviation units, and host country forces.

3. Timely and accurate planning information to assist in developing the ground tactical plan in order to permit U.S. advisors, commanders, and planners to—

(a) Evaluate requirements.

(b) Evaluate current intelligence.

(c) Make recommendations on employment of aircraft.

4. Plans are prepared in the following order—

(a) Ground tactical plan.

(b) Landing plan.

(c) Air movement plan.

(d) Loading plan.

(b) Specific considerations for airmobile operations—

1. Intelligence. Timely and accurate.

2. Landing areas. Close to objective. Security precautions may preclude extensive reconnaissance; hence, exact landing zones may have to be selected by flight and ground commander upon arrival in objective area.

3. Flight routes. Avoid using same approach and departure routes if multiple lifts are required.

4. Flight altitudes. May be nap-of-the-earth, tree top or higher, depending on terrain, enemy observation, and anti-aircraft capability.

5. Observation aircraft may be used as spotter aircraft to vector airmobile forces to the objective area or landing zone.

6. Armed escort aircraft can provide aerial fire support en route to the objective and on the flanks and rear of the landing zone during the critical landing time.

7. Aerial fire support provided by armed helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft can extend and complement the fires of the ground forces during ground combat operations.

8. Equipment failure will require that spare aircraft be available to replace those which abort and cannot proceed with the mission.

9. Weather conditions are important considerations. Low ceilings may prevent close air support. Worsening weather may prevent reinforcement, resup-

ply, or aerial fire support throughout all phases of the operation.

10. Troop orientation. Changes in landing direction due to enemy situation, terrain, or wind conditions may change the direction troops must move after dismounting. A method of troop orientation—

(a) Pilot briefs crew chief on landing directions and direction troops must deploy.

(b) Crew chief uses large card with diagram of aircraft and grease pencil to indicate direction troops must deploy.

11. Staging area(s) should—

(a) Be of sufficient size to accommodate aircraft, troops, refueling, and rearming locations.

(b) Allow orderly and adequate spacing of troops for loading.

(c) Be a safe area for rearming armed helicopters.

12. Loading plan insures distribution of key personnel throughout the flight.

13. Insure troops are trained in rapid loading and unloading and in the procedure for orientation of movement towards the objective or assembly areas in landing zone.

14. Insure call signs and frequency are known, that pyrotechnics and other visual signals are coordinated, and that radios are in operating condition.

15. Insure that ground forces elements are properly and clearly marked for easy identification from the air.

16. Insure provisions are made for prisoner of war evacuation by aircraft.

17. Insure that aero-medical aircraft are available and that medical support is available in the staging area.

18. Procedures for downed aircraft should be contained in the aviation unit SOP. The advisor must be familiar with these procedures. Some procedures are—

(a) In loading zone—Passengers secure the downed aircraft until it is repaired, destroyed, or evacuated.

(b) En route to landing zone—Troop-carrying aircraft may be directed to land nearby to assist and secure the downed aircraft. Other aircraft will be made available to evacuate survivors and sensitive equipment. Armed air cover may be desirable.

(c) In landing zone—Crews will stay with the aircraft. Proper disposition of aircraft will be made when the tactical situation permits.

(d) Personnel in aircraft forced down in hostile territory, if not recovered immediately, will move to predesignated pickup points or secure areas.

(c) Specific factors and considerations for certain combat support missions—

1. Hunter-killer operations (eagle flight) or raids. Teams consist of a small fighting force of platoon strength or more with appropriate number of transport helicopters plus a platoon of armed helicopters. Three methods of employing hunter-killer teams are—

(a) Search and kill. One or more aircraft act as decoys, find the enemy, and the entire force attacks.

(b) Search of predetermined area.

(c) Reaction force or pursuit force in conjunction with other airmobile or ground operations. Hunter-killer operations require careful coordination and reliable communication between all elements. These forces should be trained to fight together.

2. Armed aerial escort may be provided for airmobile, rail, vehicular, or river craft columns.

3. Target acquisition and target marking. Identification of hostile targets is one of the most difficult tasks in a counterinsurgency situation. Positive identification of hostile targets is of paramount importance. Targets may be marked from fixed or rotary wing aircraft by—

- (a) Rockets with smoke.
- (b) High explosive.
- (c) White phosphorous.
- (d) Smoke grenades.
- (e) Circling over.
- (f) Making low passes.
- (g) Machine gun tracer fire.

4. Reconnaissance. Route reconnaissance, specific search, area photographic, visual and imagery reconnaissance can be provided by army aviation. The advisor should insure that his counterpart has made a parallel request for aerial reconnaissance support. Host country aerial observers normally are provided to the supporting aviation unit.

5. Snooper flights. Snooper flights are armed aerial reconnaissance missions performed by two or more aircraft; ground troops are not transported in the aircraft. They are particularly effective at last or first

light and should be used to flush out suspected guerrilla activity.

6. Airdrop (pathfinder, paratroop, combat equipment).

7. Coordination with artillery. Army aviation can provide aerial platforms for artillery observers and assist in the rapid displacement of artillery pieces. Conversely, artillery units can provide suppressive fires for airmobile operations.

8. Battlefield illumination. Army aircraft, both fixed and rotary wing, are capable of providing continuous flare illumination for periods of up to one and one-half hours per sortie. When requesting battlefield illumination, it is important—

(a) That the call sign and frequency of the requesting unit be furnished to the army aviation supporting unit.

(b) That an estimation be made of how long the illumination will be required.

9. Reserve forces.

(a) The parent unit's most rapid means of deploying its reserve force is generally by aircraft.

(b) Planning factors for staging and deploying a combat assault for airmobile operations also apply for reserve forces.

(c) Reserve forces should be collocated with supporting air transport helicopters.

(d) Weapons and compatible ammunition should be loaded aboard the same aircraft.

(e) Supplies and equipment should be prestocked and all necessary preplanning accomplished prior to the commitment of the reserve force.

10. Day and night combat and security outpost relief. Outpost relief during daylight hours is conducted in the same manner as combat assault operations. Night outpost relief is a much more complicated maneuver.

(2) *Aerial fire support.* Armed helicopter support may be the most rapid means available for bringing firepower to bear on the insurgent. Armed helicopter aerial fire support may be planned in advance, or be on call. Check local SOP for request procedures. Immediate aerial fire support may be provided if the armed helicopter unit has been assigned to a tactical unit for a specific operation.

(3) *Command and control.* Army aviation can provide the advisor with the means for control of coordinated ground attacks. See figure 26 for an example of an airmobile command post.

(4) *Psychological operations.* The use of army aircraft in support of psychological operations activities for propaganda dissemination includes leaflet distribution and loudspeaker operations. In addition, the appearance of host country and U.S. Army aircraft may have a positive effect on the local populace.

(5) *Search and rescue.* Search and rescue operations, although normally associated with the rescue of air crews and recovery of downed aircraft, also encompass the rescue of other troops and personnel. The advisor should, as early as possible, learn and understand the SOP that pertains to search and rescue, and evasion and escape procedures.

g. Combat Service Support. Combat service support missions are typically administrative and logistical in

nature. A listing of representative missions is included in *b(2)* above. The requesting procedures are similar to the requirements stated for combat support. Specific factors and considerations for certain combat service support missions—

(1) *Liaison and courier service.* Because of the decentralized nature of counter guerrilla operations, advisors and their counterparts must travel great distances to coordinate and control their units.

(2) *Supply.* High priority supplies such as ammunition, medical supplies, and food may require immediate movement by air. The aircraft commander is responsible to determine the maximum payload weight that can be moved by that particular aircraft under prevailing conditions. Appendix IV lists additional planning data for use of army aircraft.

(a) Prior to arrival of aircraft—

1. Organize loads by size, weight, and priority for ease of loading and unloading.

2. Brief personnel as to specific tasks in loading the aircraft.

3. Insure that an interpreter is available to assist the aircrew and cargo-handling personnel.

4. Notify the personnel at destination of the expected arrival time to enable them to provide ground security and rapid unloading of cargo from the aircraft.

5. Insure that related items should be kept together and loaded on the same aircraft.

(b) Upon arrival of the aircraft—

1. Coordinate with the flight leader.

2. Assist in the supervision of the loading.

(3) *Medical Support.* U.S. air medical ambulance detachments may be available. In addition, the host country may have aeromedical evacuation aircraft. However, all U.S. Army aviation units do have the capability of transporting or evacuating wounded and injured personnel.

(4) *Wire Laying.* Army aviation can assist in laying wire over difficult and hazardous terrain. Because of the slow speed of wire-laying aircraft, the need for armed aerial escort must be considered.

(5) *Airborne Radio Relay.* Army aircraft may be used effectively as radio relay stations to assist in maintaining contact over great distances.

(6) *Troop and Personnel Movements.* Administrative or combat service support troop movements should be as carefully planned as combat assault operations. The advisor and counterpart should accomplish the following:

(a) Insist that other means of transportation be investigated prior to requesting aviation support.

(b) Inform the aviation unit of the total lift requirement, pickup area, and destination.

(c) Assure that only authorized personnel, supplies, and equipment are allowed to move by army air transportation.

(d) Establish priorities for movement of military and civilian personnel.

h. Advisor Check List (Support of Tactical and Non-tactical Operations).

(1) Reference FM 57-35 and FM 31-16.

(2) Brief counterpart and other advisors on U.S. and host country aviation support available, to include

capabilities, limitations, request procedures, and priorities of use.

(3) Evaluate aviation support requests, preplanned and immediate.

(4) Insure that the U.S. senior advisor or commander having operational control of U.S. aviation resources is advised as early as possible of required support.

(5) Coordinate with the airmobile force commander in the detailed planning of airmobile operations.

(6) In the framework of supporting unit SOP, establish a free exchange of information between supported, supporting units, and other advisory elements.

(7) Insure that appropriate SOI and SSI are made available to aviation support units.

(8) Critique aviation support missions to assist in refining procedures and to emphasize effective employment of aircraft.

(9) Maintain adequate fuel stockage and dispensing facilities to support current and future operations.

44. Engineer

a. General. The engineer advisor should encourage his counterpart to use host country resources before requesting assistance from USAID, or U.S. military engineer support. The relationship between engineer advisors and host country engineer counterparts are the same as advisor/counterpart relationships treated in this text. The advisor may find it necessary to employ the technical skills and capabilities of the engineer units of the host country forces in order to provide the construction necessary for projects supporting environmental im-

provement programs. However, the advisor must stick to fundamentals and avoid the more advanced techniques and procedures, particularly those that are incompatible with requirements imposed by limitations of terrain, road nets, size of host force, and mobility. Every advisor must be fully alert to the possibilities of improvisation in the event that standard equipment is not available.

b. Construction Units.

(1) Organized normally as battalions or separate companies and are self-sustaining.

(2) The mission of the construction battalion is to construct roads, bridges, buildings, airfields, water supply facilities, and other projects in support of counterinsurgency operations.

(3) Engineer units may be further subdivided because of the size and location of projects.

(4) The advisor should encourage adherence to the basic principles of planning and organization.

(5) The advisor must encourage improving the capabilities of the unit through on-the-job training.

(6) Support for paramilitary forces and local villages may include small engineer units for the construction of—

(a) Sanitation facilities.

(b) Housing.

(c) Medical facilities.

(d) Cantonment areas.

(e) Farm-to-market roads.

(7) *Only those projects which contribute to the overall counterinsurgency operation should be undertaken.*

c. General Construction Tasks. See section II, chapter 3.

(1) During the planning stage of a construction project, the engineer advisor should review—

(a) Logistical problems.

(b) The adequacy of the plans for civic action projects.

(c) The proficiency status of the construction troops, and whether further technical training is required.

(d) The possibility of employing expedient construction techniques and devices.

(e) Principles of equipment utilization and capabilities.

(f) The applicability of the records and procedures for recording and reporting work progress.

(g) The measure conversion factors (fig. 9).

(2) The advisor should be knowledgeable in the fundamental construction techniques such as—

(a) Rough carpentry.

(b) Expedient construction devices and methods such as—

1. Fabricating bricks and blocks from local clays.

2. Constructing drainage facilities with logs and stakes.

3. Constructing buildings using straw roofs, bamboo framework, adobe siding, without steel nails and drift pins (figs. 10 and 11).

4. Rigging and lashing techniques.

5. Constructing expedients for jetted or driven




Figure 9. Measure conversion factors.

wells (fig. 12); filtration gallery; and small water supply reservoirs.

d. Military Engineer Tasks.

(1) *Field fortification.*

(a) Emphasis on protection should be more

from direct fire weapons rather than blast from heavy artillery, large explosives, and bombs.

(b) Requirements for overhead construction and dispersion should be planned.

(c) Considerations should be given to interconnecting trench-type fortifications around small fixed installations.

(d) Local resources when available should be used for revetments to reduce logistical requirements.




Figure 10. Adobe construction.




Figure 11. Insulation against extreme heat by earth-covered roof.

(e) The advisor should suggest prefabrication of components of field fortifications for ready availability when required.

(2) *Obstacles.*

(a) Emphasis should be placed on antipersonnel obstacles rather than antivehicle obstacles because insurgent forces normally have few if any vehicles.

(b) Installation of minefields and barbed wire should be considered whenever applicable.

(c) Consider utilizing impenetrable brush and nuisance items, such as sharpened stakes or nails or other impaling devices.





Figure 12. Expedients for jetted and driven wells.

(d) Consider installing man traps, such as camouflaged pits with sharpened stakes at the bottom and impaling devices (figs. 13 and 14). Care and consideration must be exercised to prevent friendly local inhabitants from being injured by such devices.

(e) Construction of *watch towers* and moats have proven valuable to provide warning of attack and restricting infiltration.

(f) Natural obstacles should be used whenever possible.

(g) Reliance should not be placed on such natural obstacles as swamps, cliffs, and rivers.

(3) *Booby Traps.*

(a) Improvised booby traps (FM 5-31) can be used as warning devices for local security.




Figure 13. Camouflaged pit with sharpened stakes.




Figure 14. Sample impaling device.




Figure 15. Three-strand rope bridge.

(b) They can be effectively installed to kill infiltrators.

(c) Items such as clothing, ammunition, medical supplies (prime targets of guerrilla pillage) can be booby trapped.

(d) Antipersonnel mines should be employed extensively in conjunction with defensive systems. (*Plant, record, mark, and report.*)

(e) Provide sufficient safety measures to avoid killing friendly civilians.

(4) *Demolitions.*

(a) Demolitions can be used to improve mobil-

ity of tracked vehicles by the reduction of steep banks or dikes.

(b) They are effectively used to destroy tunnel entrances and cause collapse of underground hiding places.

(c) In inundated areas, they can be effectively utilized against guerrillas hiding underwater (using a small breathing straw).

(5) *Bridges, ferries, and rafts.*

(a) Bridges may be constructed of steel, concrete, lumber, logs, or rope (fig. 15).

(b) Depending upon the time and materials available, bridges vary from permanent multilane to very crude, expedient types (fig. 16).

(c) Bridges should always be provided protection against floating mines by upstream floating mine barriers.




Figure 16. Typical improvised bridge.




Figure 17. Expedient trestles.

(d) Maximum use must be made of hand labor and such techniques as gin poles, tripods, shears, boom derricks, cableways, expedient pile drivers and trestles (fig. 17).

(e) Raft construction often will be of locally available materials and improvised. Examples are shown in figures 18, 19, and 20.

(6) *Routes of communication.*

(a) Construction excludes final road surfacing (this might be performed by civilian contractors).

(b) Road surfacing expedients such as ches-paling mats, bamboo mats, planks, corduroy, and log tread roads should be considered when necessary (figs. 21 and 22).

(c) Conduct frequent reconnaissance of the road trace, proper shaping and ditching, and the rapid construction of bridges and culverts (fig. 23).

(7) *Small boat operations.*

(a) Inundated areas present special problems in counterinsurgency operations.

1. Roads and bridges are usually of low vehicle capacity.

2. Guerrilla forces can restrict the movement of attacking elements by destroying the few existing bridges.

(b) Engineer boat platoons can improve the mobility of tactical counterinsurgency forces.

1. Engineer boat platoons may comprise thirty to fifty personnel each, with half as many small boats.

2. Boats found to be most practical are the small shallow-draft craft of the U.S. Army assault boat variety.




Figure 18. Expedient ferry using native boats.



Figure 19. Expedient ferry using brush-filled canvas.

3. Assault boats, powered by 25–40 hp outboard motors, are capable of carrying 10 to 15 infantrymen in addition to the engineer crew of two.

4. Engineer boat platoons may be assigned to a nondivisional engineer group or battalion or attached to the divisional engineer battalions.




Figure 20. Expedient raft construction.







Figure 21. Laying a chespaling road.



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METHOD OF INTERLACING



POSITION OF SIDE ELEVATION

Figure 22. Construction details for bamboo mats.





Figure 23. Log culvert.

5. Small boat operations require command emphasis on boat and outboard motor maintenance.

6. Advisors assigned to a boat platoon or larger unit should emphasize to counterparts the importance of boat and outboard motor maintenance.

(8) *Airlanding facilities.*

(a) Air delivery of supplies and troops may demand extensive construction and repair of airlanding facilities.

(b) Suitable landing zones must be reconnoitered.


(c) Landing pads may be constructed on swamp or marsh areas by building platforms of locally available materials (figs. 24 and 25).

45. **Communication**


a. General. Responsive and reliable communications are essential when conducting counterinsurgency operations. Detailed communication planning is more critical in counterinsurgency operations because of the combined and joint operations frequently conducted by various U.S. and host country military and paramilitary forces. The variety of communication equipment found in the host country, especially radio, requires special measures be taken to insure compatibility of equipment. A communication survey must be conducted by the advisor to determine types of equipment available, status of training of personnel, and communications networks currently in operation. He should be familiar with general guidance in FM 24-1 and specific instruction on radio techniques in FM 24-18.



SURFACE PLATFORM



ROUGH GROUND PLATFORM



SWAMP OR SHALLOW WATER PLATFORMS

Figure 24. Helicopter landing pads.






Figure 25. Elevated helicopter landing pad.

b. Planning Guidance.

(1) Tailor communications systems to meet operational requirements.

(a) Command.

(b) Administration.

(c) Intelligence.

(d) Logistics.

(e) Air-ground.

(2) Establish alternate systems to provide flexibility.

(3) The nature of counterinsurgency requires extensive use of radio communications.

(4) Use wire and cable where practical.

(5) In addition to the host country communication nets, establish a parallel U.S. advisor net.

c. Special Communication Requirements. Special operational and technical considerations are required for the following counterinsurgency operations:

(1) *Close air support.*

(a) Ascertain whether supporting aircraft and ground forces have compatible radio equipment. Provide for alternative means of communication when equipment is not compatible.

(b) Direct exchange of radio sets between participating units may be required.

(c) Plan an airborne command post equipped with a variety of radios (VHF, UHF, FM, AM) for control and relay purposes (fig. 26).

(2) *Artillery fire support.*

(a) Radio equipment with the ground forces must be able to net with supporting aircraft or an alternative means of communication must be established.




Figure 26. Type airborne command post (communications).

(b) Forward observers must be provided portable radios that net with supporting aircraft radios.

(c) Plan for the use of airborne communication command posts.

(3) *Patrolling.*

(a) Special consideration should be given to using portable AM and SSB radio sets which have greater operating ranges.

(b) Procedures must be developed that will permit the patrol to transmit periodically to the patrol base.

(c) An airborne radio relay, stationed on a schedule, is an effective means of making radio contact with distant patrols.

(d) Special antenna configurations may be planned to extend the range of low-power tactical HF, AM, and VHF FM radio sets (figs. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, and 35).

(e) During patrol activities, take time to erect proper antennas to enhance the communication capability.

(f) Relocate the patrol after a radio transmission to avoid detection by hostile forces.

(g) Base camp (unit) should continuously monitor the patrol radio frequency.

(4) *Convoy security.*

(a) Plan responsive and reliable communications.

(b) Convoys or ground forces must be equipped with at least one or more radio sets capable of maintaining contact with the operations base (headquarters).

(c) Utilize AM and SSB sets when available.

(d) When AM or SSB radios are not available, provide aircraft and airborne radio relay.

(e) The fire support coordination center (FSCC) must continuously monitor the radio frequencies utilized by the moving ground forces.




Figure 27. Improvised center-fed half-wave antenna.

OP FRQG	ANT LENGTH INCL LEAD-IN
2000-2200 KCB	245.5 FT
2200-2400	228.0
2400-2550	210
2550-2700	193
2700-2900	177.5
2900-3100	163
3100-3200	151.5
3200-3900	139
3900-4300	122
4300-4900	107.5
4900-5300	93.0
5300-6000	85.5
6000-7500	73.5
7500-8400	63.0
8400-9000	57.5
9000-9900	53.0
9900-12000	46.0




Figure 28. End-fed long-wire antenna hasty installation (type AT-101/102) for HF sets.




Figure 29. Ground plane RC-292 type for FM sets.




Figure 30. End-fed long-wire hasty installation (type AT-984) for FM sets 20-80 MCS.




Figure 31. Ground plane jungle antenna (field expedient).

(5) *Offensive operations.*

(a) Communications for offensive operations normally consist of a command net, fire support net, air support net, and a net with base camp (headquarters).

(b) Establish communications with adjacent units.

(c) Plan to utilize an airborne command post for joint and combined operations (can also serve as a radio relay between the ground forces and the fire support element).

(d) Establish direct communications between tactical air elements and fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft if an airborne command post is available.

(6) *Defensive operations.*

(a) Plan the same basic communications for defensive operations as for offensive operations.

(b) Establish a security net to provide a means to transmit requests for reinforcements, fire support, or information pertaining to guerrilla movements. The security net must include all governmental echelons; for example, hamlet, village, district (fig. 32).

d. Radio Operating Techniques.

(1) Counterinsurgency environments are characteristic of adverse terrain conditions which tend to reduce the normal operating capability of radios.

(2) The following field techniques can assist in providing reliable communications.

(a) Antennas should be located in a clear area, preferably on high ground.

(b) Correctly orient antenna(s).




Figure 32. Type host country communications security nets.




Figure 33. Balloon-type support for vertical antenna for AM or FM radio sets.




Figure 34. Vertical half rhombic antenna 20-60 MCS.




Figure 35. Yagi antenna twin lead or coax affixed to bamboo to provide higher gain for FM sets.

(c) Install special-type antennas to extend the range of AM/FM sets.

(d) Attempt to install AM or SSB long wire antennas so that no vegetation touches the antenna.

(e) Doublet antennas should be installed at least 7 to 15 feet above the ground for best results.

(f) Install a counterpoise to provide a better antenna system and a more effective ground.

(g) Insure that adequate provisions have been made to provide proper power source(s) for the duration of the operation.

(h) Frequency assignment and control must be carefully planned.

e. Training.

(1) Communications personnel must be thoroughly trained to achieve and maintain the desired state of proficiency.

(2) Individuals must be trained to operate more than one type of radio set.

(3) Formal individual training should be programmed in the military school system.

f. Maintenance and Supply. A periodic inspection by the commander or his representative should be made to determine status of maintenance and supply conditions

(1) Insure that adequate spare parts are on hand.

(2) Maintain operable test equipment and see that personnel are familiar with its operation.

(3) Insure that follow-up action has been initiated on over-due requisitions.

(4) Command emphasis must be exercised on the requisitioning, storage, and use of dry batteries.

(5) Batteries should be stored in a cool and dry area.

(6) Insure that an adequate supply of crystals for radio equipment is available for all authorized radio sets.

(7) Crystals for alternate frequencies should also be available.

46. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Support

a. General. Countries in receipt of U.S. military aid normally have a MAAG present to supervise and administer the military assistance program. Depending on the activities of the particular MAAG, it may be a joint or uniservice effort.

b. Relationships. Close coordination is necessary in order to derive maximum benefit from the experience and support these services can provide the advisory effort. Relationships between these forces and U.S. Army elements normally are conducted on a basis of coordination as defined in directives from the commander of the appropriate unified command.

c. Participation. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps units and personnel are capable of participating in all facets of the counterinsurgency program.

(1) In the field of military civic action they can provide the following:

(a) Aircraft for airlift operations.

(b) Ships and boats for sealift and rescue missions.

(c) Augment the medical assistance program.

(d) Equipment, personnel, and special teams

(advisors) for construction and operation of port facilities, airfields, railroads, bridges, etc.

(e) Seabees (construction battalion personnel), technical assistance, survey teams.

(2) In the field of military training and operational assistance, the following actions can be undertaken:

(a) Establish and operate schools to train naval and river forces.

(b) Provide technical assistance (advisors).

(c) Furnish mobile training teams (MTT) to train, advise, and assist host country naval and river forces.

(d) Furnish operational assistance such as—

1. Advisors for naval and marine units.

2. Ships to include naval armaments.

3. Aircraft for combat support, surveillance, and other operational missions.

Section IV. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

47. General

a. Definition. As used in this manual, the term “combat service support” embraces assistance in the logistics and personnel functions. The advisor is not expected to plan or execute these functions, but he is expected to advise his counterpart concerning them.

b. MAP. The U.S. generally provides certain supplies and equipment through the Military Assistance Program (MAP). USAID funds may also be made available to military forces for civic action. Combat service support is concerned only with MAP supplies

and equipment. However, coordination at all levels of advisory effort will be required to insure that the military and civil assistance efforts complement one another. Documentation is vital to the MAP because the current year's usage is a major part of the basis for next year's MAP supplies. Insist that adequate documentation, warehousing, and inventory procedures are used.

c. Security of the Logistic System. Insurgent forces will conduct determined attacks against logistic installations, including routes and means of transport, in an effort to strip away the logistic system. Against fixed installations they rely chiefly on sabotage. Against moving forces, convoys and individuals, they employ ambushes. Adequate protection must be provided the logistic system to avoid immobilizing counterinsurgent forces.

48. Advisor Check List (Combat Service Support)

a. Supply. Do not expect to find the host country logistics system patterned after the U.S. Army system. The job of the advisor is not to change the system but insure that the basic supply and maintenance functions are performed effectively. The following are general principles:

(1) Plan well in advance to see that units are equipped with minimum essential supplies (avoid overloading).

(2) Advise host country forces to live off the land where economy permits; insure that they pay for food and supplies.

(3) Use air or water transportation when land

transportation is impracticable. Local procurement of supplies will reduce transportation requirements.

(4) Emphasize unit distribution whenever possible.

(5) Stock selected expendable supplies at secure locations to provide a more responsive supply system. Dispersed stockage will facilitate support of units in remote areas.

(6) Resupply tactical units from nearest operational base. When necessary to use aerial resupply, pre-stocked supplies at the departure airfield will prove economical. Do not allow the counterpart to become over reliant upon aerial resupply.

(7) Emphasize the coordination of supply missions with all interested agencies.

(a) Requester.

(b) Supplier.

(c) Transporter.

(d) User.

(8) Evacuate captured insurgent supplies to include military items, food, animals, and medical supplies. These supplies can supplement military and civil stocks.

(9) When evacuation of captured materiel is not feasible, it must be destroyed. Always presume captured insurgent materiel to be booby trapped or contaminated.

(10) If host country troops are given a money allowance to procure their own food, be certain that they do not succumb to the temptation to "capture" food from sources not clearly identified as insurgent.

(11) Insist on a rigid control of supplies and equipment. Recommend disciplinary measures for cases of negligence.

b. Maintenance.

(1) See that maintenance practices are taught to carefully selected maintenance personnel.

(2) Stress preventive maintenance.

(3) Use mobile maintenance teams to assist, not only in training for user and organizational maintenance, but also for on-site direct support maintenance as well.

(4) See that direct support units or elements provide rapid maintenance support at each static security post or combat base.

(5) Insist on timely maintenance inspection and evacuation and on follow-up measures.

(6) Encourage controlled cannibalization of equipment when such procedures are authorized.

(7) Integrate maintenance into all training and operations plans.

c. Transportation.

(1) Use local procurement of transportation best suited to the situation such as rafts, river boats, pack animals, and porters. Under certain circumstances, aircraft may be the only effective means of transportation.

(2) Aerial resupply plans should include—

(a) Security for landing or drop zone.

(b) Designating primary and alternate zones.

(c) Appropriate air-ground communications (equipment and personnel).

(d) System for expediting unloading and refueling.

(e) Cache system of aviation POL for emergency uses.

d. Administration. When confronted with personnel functions, the counterpart must be cautioned to observe the following points:

(1) Avoid the temptation to use excessive manpower for housekeeping details.

(2) Reward heroic and meritorious service promptly.

(3) Treat AWOL and other violations of discipline with appropriate legal authority. Guide the counterpart in corrective leadership techniques.

(4) Be alert to other situations which could adversely affect morale. For example, the regular delivery of personal mail, payment of troops, care of dependents, as well as leave and pass policy warrant close attention.

e. Military Police.

(1) Military police functions and responsibilities in a counterinsurgency environment differ principally from conventional operations in that military police may become involved directly with civil controls and enforcement of emergency regulations. This would be true in those cases where small communities have limited or no police resources for enforcement and maintenance of law and order. In addition to their normal functions, military police in counterinsurgency place special emphasis on circulation control, physical security, civil disturbances and riot control, prisoner handling, food and other resources control, organization and operation of a police intelligence system within a civilian community, and other specialized techniques for control of civilians.

(2) Military police can provide plans, advice,

training, and supervision to civil police personnel in population and resources control measures, technical police operations, and investigations.

f. Medical Service.

(1) *Program.* The medical service program initiated in a counterinsurgency situation has some or all of the following objectives:

(a) Provide for the health and treatment of military personnel.

(b) Relieve suffering from disease or injury and improve the health of the populace.

(c) Initiate an acceptable medical system which can be maintained and continued by the host country.

(2) *Planning.* As a minimum, the medical service plan should include—

(a) A preventive medicine program.

(b) Education in hygiene and sanitation.

(c) Training for all health workers.

(d) Treatment for patients.

(e) A medical supply program.

(f) A medical evacuation system.

(3) *Categories.* The three broad categories of a medical program include—

(a) *Training.*

1. Become acquainted with the level of medical training for both military and civil host country personnel.

2. Aim to improve conditions and train more efficient medical workers.

3. Encourage emergency medical training for all military personnel.

4. Emphasize the need for advanced medical training for qualified personnel of the unit.

5. Health workers should be selected from their own village.

6. All health workers should be trained initially by the host country.

7. Supplementary training to health workers can be provided by—

(a) U.S. medical civic action agencies.

(b) Host country medical teams.

8. Training of the population should be conducted on a continuous basis by the village health workers and mobile medical teams. Instructions can be provided through—

(a) Animated motion pictures.

(b) Leaflets and photos.

(c) Personal demonstrations.

9. Medical training programs must be closely coordinated among all advisors (Army, USAID, USIS, others) and civil authorities. Each mutually supports the other.

(b) *Treatment* (see techniques below).

(c) *Preventive medicine* (see techniques below).

(4) *Techniques.*

(a) *Aid station or dispensary.*

1. Locate near the center of operational area.

2. Several important factors for medical facility sanitation are water source, waste disposal pit, and private latrine.

3. Equipment should include table for patient examination, means for boiling water, desk and chairs,

cabinet or shelves for instruments, basin for washing, and cups of the disposable type.

(b) *Medical evacuation.*

1. Be familiar with the host country medical evacuation system.

2. Recommend medical evacuation plans for civilian personnel when applicable.

3. Medical evacuation plans should be coordinated with all concerned agencies and include all available means (air, ground vehicles, animals, human litter bearers, water, and communication system(s)).

(c) *Sanitation.*

1. Persuade the populace to keep thoroughfares clean, burn or bury rubbish, and rake areas under living quarters.

2. Proper authorities should destroy homeless pets and dangerous animals (investigate local laws, customs, and effect on population prior to implementation).

3. Take appropriate action against diseased animals (report them to veterinary personnel).

(d) *Water supply and treatment.*

1. Untreated water can cause hepatitis, typhoid fever, cholera and dysentery, and many other diseases.

2. Untreated water. Boil for at least 5 minutes prior to use.

3. If water purification tablets are used, one tablet per quart of water is sufficient (two tablets if water is cloudy). Allow water to stand for 30 minutes before drinking.

4. Recommend the construction of wells as re-

quired. A well should be a minimum of 100 feet from any possible source of contamination. Surface drainage should be away from the well site.

(e) *Food supply.*

1. Cook thoroughly to destroy disease organisms.

2. Fruits and vegetables. Disinfect thoroughly (FM 21-10).

3. Milk produced locally must be boiled for 1 minute prior to consumption.

(f) *Dental measures.*

1. Stress individual training concerning mouth cleanliness.

2. Toothbrushes should be made available and demonstrated.

3. Where necessary, substitute toothbrushes with branches cut to a correct size; flatten one end by soaking, then chew it.

4. Demonstrate the techniques of massaging gums. The most prevalent oral disease in the world originates with gums and contributes to eventual loss of teeth.

(g) *Waste disposal.*

1. Assist in the construction of latrines and encourage their use.

2. When human waste is necessary for fertilizer, advise the possibility of having a villager contract to collect and treat it in a common latrine.

3. Insist that collectors of waste use covered containers.

4. Remove garbage from living areas at least once daily.

5. Designate one area for the burning and burying of garbage.

(h) *Insect and rodent control.* Particular problem areas are—

1. *Control of mosquito breeding.* Eliminate standing water by removing temporary water containers, control plants and debris bordering water bodies, and spray all appropriate areas with 5 percent residual DDT once weekly.

2. *Fly control.* Spray latrines, garbage and water disposal pits with 5 percent residual DDT bi-weekly. Issue fly swatters to the populace and encourage their use.

3. *Flea and louse control.* Spray all dwellings with 5 percent residual DDT, especially walls and floors. Individuals must bathe frequently and apply louse powder.

4. *Rodents.* Establish control with traps and rodenticide bait mixed with cornmeal, ground rice, or cereal. Insure protection of the civilian populace and domestic animals when using poisoned bait.

(i) *Immunization.*

1. Mass immunization may be necessary to suppress epidemics.

2. Normally, large-scale immunization will be directed by the highest echelon of command.

CHAPTER 5

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

49. Purpose

The subjects discussed in this chapter concern supporting operations, tactics, and techniques which are common to the counterinsurgency operations described in other chapters and are the primary responsibility of no one service or branch.

50. Scope

Guidance pertaining to training, terrain, individual and small unit actions, and certain special operational considerations is included.

Section II. MILITARY TRAINING

51. General

a. Military training may not be popular, not accepted, and not recognized as important by the counterpart. The advisor will have to sell training and insist upon the development of sound training programs.

b. The program should be capable of easy attainment and be supervised. The counterpart may argue that his organizations—

(1) Have been trained formally a year or two ago; therefore, do not need further instruction.

(2) Have been in combat and have gained constructive credit for formal training which they have not had.

(3) Have other missions which do not permit them to undergo training which, after all, is only a secondary requirement.

c. The advisor must determine the counterpart's training responsibilities and encourage him to plan and conduct training programs as a matter of high priority.

52. Advisor Check List (Operational Readiness Training)

a. Units once trained do not "stay trained" without continued operational readiness training. Issuing and using equipment without pre-instruction or periodic familiarization over a given period of time does not insure proficiency. Encourage counterparts to program time between operations for operational readiness training. Include such subjects as—

- (1) Leader training.
- (2) Marksmanship.
- (3) Small unit exercises.
- (4) Maintenance supervision.
- (5) Troop information.
- (6) Critiques of officers and NCO actions in past operations.

(7) Rehearsals for future operations. (For example, host country forces and other authorized users of U.S. aviation support must be trained in the use of these assets and receive briefings and actual training with aircraft in safety measures (internal and external), enplaning, orientation for landing, deplaning; securing landing zones, and marshaling activities.)

b. Establish informal training centers to fulfill the requirements for continuous training of units, rotating them through the centers in short cycles. Elaborate training centers with permanent staffs and TD materiel should be discouraged.

c. Employ mobile training teams (MTT) from either external or internal resources when new weapons or tactics are introduced. Where the state of unit training is poor, initiate basic training by combined U.S.-host country MTT.

d. Concentrate on training unit leaders to train their units. Abandon this technique for more effective training methods (centers) at the first practical opportunity.

e. Estimate the training requirements by observing the unit in combat operations. Squads that habitually miss targets at 100–200 meters range, fail to provide security during movement and other operations, or that are ambushed an inordinate number of times, need training.

f. Units, on a rotational basis, may be trained in a national training center by national cadres. Encourage the counterpart to support the scheduling of all units into these training centers for training and refitting.

g. Assist the counterpart in establishing training programs and policies for his units. See FM 31–22, 31–16, and 21–5 for type training programs and policy.

h. Guard against the tendency of the counterpart to withdraw units from scheduled training cycles for less necessary assignments. This disrupts the effectiveness of the training effort. Emphasize the need for continuous training and encourage counterparts to make maximum use of these training opportunities.

i. Counterparts may have responsibilities for provid-

ing military and nonmilitary training to military, paramilitary, police, and other civilian forces. The advisor will have to coordinate training operations with other U.S. advisors, advisors who function in the various fields of internal security, psychological operations, agricultural improvement, medical service, and others.

j. There may be a reluctance on the part of the chiefs of the various host country activities to share training and other resources with their colleagues. Advise the counterpart to request resources and to approve requests to use the scarce training resources which he controls.

k. Instill in the counterpart the desire to use training ammunition, films, and aids which are available. Unless close control is exercised, training ammunition will be added to operational ammunition and be lost to the training effort.

l. Show counterpart units how to construct and use field expedient training facilities. A cleared zone or cleared hillside, with some stakes, cardboard for targets, and a little organization provide an excellent field firing range.

m. The advisor, his counterpart, and his counterpart's staff must visit and actively supervise subordinate unit training.

n. The purpose of the advisor is to aid and assist his counterpart. This is military teaching-*training*. An established, effective training program is a most precious contribution to leave to the advisor's counterpart and to the advisor's successor.

o. Techniques used to enhance training of host country forces:

(1) Use of training records for evaluating training results.

(2) Artillery capabilities demonstration by a mobile training team coupled with on-the-job training for infantry combat leaders in observed fire procedures.

(3) Use of timely post exercise critiques.

(4) Construction of an insurgent village including caches and booby traps to be used as the objective in problems.

(5) Use of reaction ranges to teach soldiers to shoot quickly and accurately.

(6) Inclusion of previously taught subjects for reemphasis in training preparation.

Section III. SPECIAL TERRAIN

53. General

The terrain will be "special" only to the advisor. The host country soldier has probably lived and worked in the particular environment all his life. Tactics require certain modifications to fit these special situations.

54. Characteristics of Jungle Operations (FM 31-30)

a. Jungle varies in locale from mountains to low-lying swampy areas.

b. Terrain and climate limit movement, observation, fields of fire, communications, and control.

c. Cover and concealment are excellent, thus increasing the possibility of achieving surprise.

d. Objectives include trails, navigable rivers, high ground, and communications centers. These features are difficult to identify because of inferior maps and limited visibility.

- e.* There is a reduced capability to acquire targets.
- f.* Security elements are essential to prevent surprise.
- g.* Jungle terrain is ideal for the employment of small unit actions.
- h.* Employment of heavy infantry weapons and artillery (to include heavy mortars) is greatly hampered by weight and bulk, reduced observation and fields of fire, and poor trafficability.
- i.* Logistics are characterized by rapid deterioration of supplies, difficulty in movement, the importance of keeping units resupplied, the need for practicing supply economy by every individual, and the problems of evacuation.
- j.* Airmobile and airborne units and air lines of supply facilitate jungle operations (para. 43*d*(5)(*a*)).
- k.* Increased importance of personal hygiene.

55. Characteristics of Mountain Operations (FM 31-72)

- a.* Vegetation varies from jungle to bare slopes.
- b.* Terrain retards and restricts mobility, reduces the effect of firepower, and makes communication difficult.
- c.* Objectives include heights which dominate lines of communications, mountain passes, roads, and railroads.
- d.* Within altitude capabilities, helicopters are valuable for moving both personnel and equipment (para. 43*d*(5)(*b*)).
- e.* Increased reliance must be placed on high angle fire weapons.
- f.* Aerial reconnaissance and observation facilitate mountain operations.

56. Characteristics of Desert Operations (FM 31-25)

a. Military operations depend on control of limited sources of water.

b. Since desert regions provide great freedom of movement, highly mobile forces, ground and air, may play a dominate role in operations (para. 43*d*(5)(*c*)).

c. Operations and movement at night are facilitated.

57. Characteristics of Operations in Inundated Areas

a. Inundated areas vary from continuous inundation to "paddies" which are under water during certain seasons.

b. Fields of fire and communications are generally excellent.

c. Terrain limits foot and motor movement but is ideal for employment of water-borne and heliborne forces (para. 43*d*(5)(*d*)). In this regard, heliborne forces must have some means of transportation once they are landed.

d. The difficulty of positioning artillery can be overcome by the use of helicopters and boats. This also may increase the requirement for tactical air support (para. 42).

e. Any military operation in inundated areas must stress the principle of surprise.

f. Tracked vehicles may be used effectively, though careful reconnaissance must be made of sites for entry, leaving, and crossing.

g. There is a reduced capability to acquire targets. Heavy reliance must be placed on aircraft for reconnaissance.

h. Water routes are a primary means of transportation and communication.

i. The lack of cover and concealment on waterways can be offset by night movement and by traveling close to the stream banks.

j. Units moving by boat can carry far more weapons and equipment than can foot elements, but commanders must insure that adequate means are available to move and use the equipment after debarkation.

k. Plan for sufficient security personnel to remain with boats.

l. Logistics are characterized by the difficulties of re-supply and the problems of evacuation. This can be overcome by the use of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft for air drops and air landings.

Section IV. INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL UNIT ACTION

58. Patrolling

a. General. Application of patrolling doctrine and techniques must be geared to meet the activities of the guerrilla, and the special problem of extricating him from the civilian population. Emphasis should be placed on insuring that patrols are well briefed, are carrying only essential equipment, and are physically fit.

b. Patrols Techniques of Major Importance.

(1) *Saturation patrols.* Saturation patrols are conducted by lightly armed, small, fast-moving units and provide for thorough area patrol coverage. In addition to serving as a method to harass guerrilla forces, this technique provides the host country force with the following:

(a) An opportunity to gain an intimate knowledge of the area of operations.

(b) A form of reassurance to loyal government supporters and others among the civil populace that protection and security are of major concern to the government.

(c) An opportunity to hinder and often to uncover the guerrilla.

(d) An instrument through which information of the guerrilla can be obtained.

(e) *In the event the guerrilla elects to withdraw, he must be vigorously pursued*, and effective population control measures must be brought to bear.

(2) *Airmobile hunter-killer team.* A type combat patrol transported in utility helicopters with armed escort helicopters; employed as a quick reaction force (para. 43f(1)(c)).

(3) *Mobility.* Consider all means available to the counterpart for increasing patrol mobility to include: wheeled vehicles, tracked vehicles, waterborne vehicles, aircraft, and animals.

59. Counterambush

a. *General.* Guerrilla elements rely on the ambush as an effective means of acquiring needed materiel and gaining local superiority over the larger, better-equipped government force. Successful ambushes are demoralizing, and it is imperative that host country troops be well-trained in counterambush techniques (FM 31-16). The following check list will assist in providing guidance to counterpart forces.

b. *Advisor Check List (Counterambush).*

(1) Vary the routine or schedule of convoys and troop movements. Avoid patterns. Reconnaissance and security parties must be well forward of the convoy. Intra convoy radio communications are mandatory.

(2) Vary the formation. Change the location of communications, leaders, and automatic weapons. These are prime targets.

(3) Interrogate the local civilians.

(4) Request aircraft column cover, route reconnaissance, and tactical air support.

(5) Identify likely ambush sites. Plan to avoid or bring maneuver and fire support to bear on them.

(6) Provide for all-around security.

(7) Emphasize noise and light discipline.

(8) Use alternate routes for return trips (patrols, convoys, liaison and inspection parties).

(9) Plan multiple routes for relief or reinforcement of positions under attack.

(10) Consider use of scout dogs with security elements.

(11) Insure training of soldiers in Immediate Action (FM 31-30).

(12) Consider establishing convoy protection units.

(13) Communications (para 45).

60. Evasion and Escape (E and E)

a. Capture.

(1) The nature of the advisor's duties exposes him to a high risk of capture by insurgents. Therefore, it is important that the advisor have a clear understanding of the Code of Conduct.

(2) Normally, capture means harsh treatment, to include physical torture in conjunction with intense interrogation and inadequate food and water.

b. Rescue and Recovery Procedures.

(1) All U.S. and host country assets and capabilities must be utilized to assist U.S. and host country personnel, or other selected individuals, in avoiding capture and in escaping from hostile to friendly areas.

(2) When flying over terrain under the control of guerrilla forces, adhere to established procedures (check local SOP).

(3) Establish standard operating procedure (SOP). For example, if a position is overrun, or an aircraft crash-lands and individuals are forced to evade capture, detailed guidance on safe areas and subsequent exfiltration should be provided.

c. Advisor Check List (Evasion and Escape). ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS WILL BE CLASSIFIED. MAKE NO ENTRIES ON THIS CHECK LIST.

The following check list is provided to assist in evaluating existing SOP for E and E programs and to assist in making recommendations:

(1) Be familiar with evasion and escape doctrine contained in FM 21-77 and FM 21-77A.

(2) Establish an E and E SOP (in conjunction with next higher headquarters).

(3) Is everyone briefed on the SOP for the area or the operation?

(4) What capability does the military unit(s) possess to assist escapees or evaders?

(5) What nonmilitary resources are available within the immediate vicinity that can be utilized to assist escapees or evaders?

(6) Are the following evasion and escape assets available?

(a) Survival kits.

(b) Known and selected friendly villages.

(c) Pickup points.

(d) Communications links.

(e) Identification systems.

(f) Caches (food, weapons, clothing, etc.).

(7) Include in SOP provisions for orientation of ground forces and aircraft pilots and passengers on routes, prominent terrain, and other evasion and escape information.

61. Survival

a. Failure to survive in remote areas usually is the result of ignorance and inexperience rather than the result of actions taken by an enemy force. The art of survival is difficult at best even in an area devoid of hostile troops. Therefore, the advisor must develop plans and procedures for use in the event of attack by the enemy force, and he must also recognize the weather and terrain as a potential enemy and prepare accordingly.

b. Preparation for survival must begin before the actual need arises. Available to all personnel are field manuals on Evasion and Escape (FM 21-77, 21-77A) and Survival (FM 21-76). The few hours spent reading these manuals could very well mean the difference between life and death.

Section V. MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS**62. Airborne Operations**

a. Airborne infantry units may be assigned the primary mission of combatting guerrilla forces, or airborne infantry battalions or rifle companies may be attached to infantry units conducting counter guerrilla operations.

b. If airborne infantry are attached to an infantry unit assigned a primary counter guerrilla mission, the airborne unit normally will be retained as all or part of the reserve of the unit to which it is attached. If so, the following considerations apply:

(1) *Alert aircraft.* Ground alert of sufficient troop transport aircraft to airlift these forces is maintained 24 hours a day.

(2) *Company teams.* Each airborne rifle company is reinforced with fire support and logistical support necessary to accomplish its mission.

(3) *Observation aircraft.* One observation aircraft with a pilot and observer or a combat control team is maintained on 24-hour alert by the appropriate level of command.

(4) *Supply.* Each airborne unit should maintain a ready status.

(a) Basic load(s).

(b) Prescribed load(s).

(c) Fighting loads (individual equipment required for combat).

(d) Existence loads (individual equipment required to exist in a particular environment).

c. Airborne forces employed in counter guerrilla operations normally will drop on small drop zones. In

cases where no drop zone is available, troops may be dropped in shallow inundated areas, on a beach, or in the jungle. The following measures are taken to insure a satisfactory drop pattern when using a small drop zone:

(1) *Unit integration.* Aircraft are loaded tactically so platoons and squads land as units.

(2) *Drop formation.* Aircraft formations which will provide a narrow pattern and facilitate rapid delivery are employed.

(3) *Delivery.* If possible, complete delivery of personnel load of each aircraft is made during one pass over the drop zone.

63. Airmobile Operations (para. 43f(1))

64. Chemical Defoliation and Crop Destruction

a. General. Defoliation and crop destruction operations are planned at the national level. However, requests for such operations may originate at the lowest operational level.

(1) The advisor at the operational level must be prepared to support the plan with an accurate description of the target area, recommendations for a PSYOP approach to the local population, and a recommended time of attack.

(2) The time of attack is based on such factors as—

(a) Defoliation operations achieve maximum results when conducted immediately following a rainy season.

(b) Crop destruction operations must be conducted before the target plant develops its fruit but late enough in the growing season to prevent replanting.

(3) Requests for chemical defoliation and crop destruction are forwarded through host country military channels for approval at the national level.

b. Defoliation Methods.

(1) *General.* Defoliation usually is achieved by aerial spray from either fixed or rotary wing aircraft. Defoliation runs are made with large fixed wing aircraft; inaccessible areas are covered with helicopters.

(2) *Effects.*

(a) Discoloration of the target generally takes places within several days; complete defoliation will depend upon the target plant but occurs within 3 months.

(b) Optimum effects can be obtained by performing the mission during the plant's most rapid growing period which, in tropical areas, immediately follows a rainy season. Decreased effects and prolonged reaction time result when these operations are carried out later than several months after the end of the rainy season.

(c) Defoliated areas must be periodically surveyed to insure that all growth has been killed and re-growth has not begun.

(3) *Targets.*

(a) Targets to be considered for defoliation operations include trees or jungle adjacent to communication routes, villages, and military outposts which provide the insurgent sufficient concealment for ambush, sabotage operations, or an avenue of approach (or escape).

(b) Defoliant may also be sprayed on minefields surrounding military outposts to maintain clear fields of fire.

c. Crop Destruction Methods.

(1) *General.* Crop destruction operations generally are characterized by numerous small targets. Both aircraft and portable sprayers may be employed to disperse the chemical. Helicopters normally are used in mountainous areas.

(2) *Effects.*

(a) Plant death, evidenced by discoloration, is achieved within several days. One attack of a target area is sufficient to kill a food crop for a particular growing season.

(b) Permanent destruction of a growing area is not obtained with the standard chemical nor will it affect plants in the immediate area that have not been sprayed.

(c) Food crops such as manioc (tapioca), sweet potatoes, rice, and other grains can be successfully destroyed.

d. Special Considerations.

(1) The chemical used in these operations affect virtually all plant life. The possibility of friendly crops being damaged must be considered and cash settlement of damage claims must be prompt to avoid discontent.

(2) Defoliation and crop destruction operations are conducted by the host country. U.S. assistance may be provided in all phases of these operations except the execution.

Section VI. ADVISOR TECHNIQUES

65. Information and Advice

This compendium of information and advice concerning advisor relationships is provided to assist advisors in their assignments.

a. The host country government probably has been in existence only a short time and the administrative machinery is still feeling its way.

b. Become knowledgeable in the national socio-political military organization and in their interrelationships including personalities, political movements, forces involved, and social drives.

c. National policy, economy, customs, and education often dictate procedures which we consider inefficient and uneconomical. Avoid an arbitrary attitude toward these procedures. Understand them before recommending changes.

d. The advisor does not command his counterpart's organization.

e. The advisor is a guest in a foreign country. There may be an agreement between the U.S. and the foreign government which spells out his status with respect to local law. It may provide for full diplomatic immunity, or it may provide very little immunity. It is essential that he have a full understanding of his status under this agreement. In the absence of any agreement, he is subject to all local laws and jurisdiction of the local courts. Assuming that he has full diplomatic immunity, he is nevertheless expected to observe local law. He remains subject to U.S. federal law, including the Uniform Code of Military Justice and federal income tax law. The advisor may also be subject to certain taxes of the state of his domicile. If captured by guerrillas, the advisor will observe the Code of Conduct. As a captive, the advisor is entitled to humane treatment under the provisions of Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

f. U.S. policy states that it is his obligation to support

the established government just as he supports his own.

g. The advisor must respond to established U.S. policy transmitted through the advisory system. If the same U.S. policy is not transmitted by advisors to the governmental chain at every echelon, the advisory effort suffers.

h. The advisor uses the advisory chain of command to obtain necessary guidance and assistance. His success is measured, not on how many guerrillas are captured or killed or hamlets constructed, but rather on his ability to impress his counterpart with the need for aggressive implementation of the counterinsurgency program. Advice should be rendered first orally, then in written form, then if still not accepted, reported in writing through advisory channels. In many cases, it is not counterpart stubbornness which prevents advice from being heeded, but host country or U.S. policy conflicts at higher levels. If the higher U.S. echelons are aware of the problem, they can take appropriate action with the host country government to align policy.

i. To preclude any adverse effect on the counterpart, the advisor should resist developing a "we-they" complex toward his higher (U.S.) headquarters and the (U.S.) staff officers who come to the area to gain information and closer contact with operations. While they may not endure as many hardships, they are, in most cases, performing as demanding duties as those assigned to the advisor.

j. The advisor should study his counterpart's personality and background, and exert every effort to establish and maintain friendly relationships. He attempts to learn about the personal lives of the people with whom he works, and demonstrates his interest in national cus-

toms, language, and history. His ideas will be more readily accepted if he shows an understanding of their aspirations and problems.

k. The advisor who tries to oversell himself to his counterpart will arouse suspicion and delay acceptance. Time spent developing a healthy relationship will pay off later.

l. The advisor should realize that people desire recognition and understanding; they seek security, like to contribute, and to belong.

m. A careless word or action on the part of the advisor can cost the U.S. cooperation built at considerable cost.

n. Stress mutual advantages of good military-civil relations. That is military civic action at its best.

o. Stress the use of proper channels at all echelons. Keep the counterpart informed of advice given to his subordinates, and keep subordinate advisory personnel informed.

p. Stress the consequences of mistreating suspects or prisoners.

q. The advisor must impress upon his counterpart that an integrated economic, social, political, military and paramilitary effort is required to counter insurgency.

r. Persuade officials to pass information automatically—up, down, and laterally.

s. Encourage initiative and inventiveness. The host country official may follow orders to the letter. Even if a modified course of action subsequently appears to be more appropriate, he may not deviate (or request permission to deviate) from his original instructions. The advisor can encourage his counterpart to request changes in orders when the need is obvious, and encour-

age him to be receptive to such requests from his subordinates. Self-confidence must be developed in the subordinate, and the senior's confidence in the judgment of his juniors must also be built.

t. Encourage strengthening *esprit* to sustain forces in adversity.

u. If the counterpart is senior in grade to the advisor, he should be treated accordingly.

v. Since many cultures have casual attitudes toward time, the advisor can emphasize its efficient use by being punctual at all meetings, and by making allowances in budgeting time and planning meetings.

w. Keep abreast of activities. Keep in close contact with political chiefs, commanders, and staff officers to obtain information.

x. Participate actively in military, social, and athletic functions.

y. Encourage frequent inspections. Host country officials often are reluctant to inspect, relying on reports to evaluate effectiveness. It may be necessary for the advisor to convince his counterpart of the value of direct knowledge and frequent inspections to determine actual conditions.

z. The advisor can teach by example, but he should not continue to do the job. Persuade the responsible official to learn to do it.

aa. The advisor should set a good example in dress, posture, and conduct, as well as in professional knowledge and competence, and keep physically fit.

ab. The advisor must develop a sense of identity with the counterpart unit or area to the degree that he feels

a personal responsibility for its activities, maintaining perspective.

ac. The advisor should seek to spend maximum time at the scenes of activity so the people know and trust him. Time permitting, he attempts to learn the language and volunteers to teach English.

ad. The advisor's suggestions and recommendations must be within the counterpart's capability to carry out.

ae. The advisor need not give up his efforts to analyze the host country counterinsurgency programs because they are in a foreign language. He should get an interpreter and determine the details.

af. The advisor should not be afraid to advise against a bad decision, but he should do it in the same manner he would recommend a change of action to an American official whom he respected and with whom he worked on a daily basis.

ag. He should not hesitate to make "on-the-spot" recommendations to his counterpart.

ah. The advisor should not become the counterpart's "agent" in disputes with U.S. agencies, fighting his problems for him and blindly representing his views, requirements, and his desires for funds, arms, or equipment.

ai. Advisors should not make promises which they cannot or should not fulfill.

aj. Advisors should look for the real sources of influence on their counterparts outside of the administrative structure within which they operate.

ak. Do not present too many subjects at one time or prolong unnecessarily the discussion of any one subject.

al. Do not accept “yes” at its face value; “yes” may mean only that the person understand what has been said (it also may be used to cover a failure to understand), *not* that the counterpart “buys” the recommendation.

am. Before advancing important ideas, brief the interpreter and let him consult a dictionary. No matter how well prepared, the advisor will be at a disadvantage if his interpreter is not briefed, even if presenting a written plan. The advisor should recognize that many interpreters have marginal abilities.

an. Advisors should present recommendations carefully, in detail, and adequately supported. The statement that the U.S. does a certain thing a certain way is generally not sufficient to convince counterparts. An explanation of the advantages inherent to the proposal is more effective.

ao. Advisors should praise part of what their advisees do or plan. Then, if there is criticism, it should be couched tactfully as improvements to the counterpart’s plans.

ap. If it is necessary to make a recommendation which might imply criticism of host country policy, advisors should do so in private.

aq. Exercise patience in dealing with counterparts.

ar. To assure full understanding, difficult, important business should be transacted directly with counterparts. Important documents should be prepared directly with counterparts so that they can adopt, translate, and issue them “as is.”

as. After planting ideas, counterparts should be allowed to take the credit if they are accepted and well

executed. Satisfaction is found in the overall result.

at. As time goes on, advisors may think they are doing all of the "bending." This is not necessarily true. Counterparts may well be meeting advisors halfway.

au. Advisors should maintain a sense of humor; they will discover their counterparts.

av. If one cannot accept a social invitation, regrets should be expressed based on the local custom.

aw. Amenities should be exchanged and observed with host country civil and military officers prior to and after discussing official matters.

ax. Recommendations that require immediate decisions should be avoided. Counterparts should be allowed to exercise their prerogatives, because one of their greatest fears is that they will appear overly dependent upon advisors. Choose appropriate times and places to offer advice.

ay. Subordinates should be used to lay the groundwork at their levels for new ideas.

az. Advisors should do homework thoroughly. Little advising is done during operations, most of it being done in the preparation phase.

ba. Advisors should not accept information from counterparts with blind faith. It must be checked discretely and diplomatically—but checked.

bb. A project should not be rejected because the advisor will not be in the country long enough to complete it. It should be started and sold to successors.

bc. Counterparts should not be allowed to substitute the advisory chain of command for theirs.

bd. Advisors should keep an account of major events to support reports, establish subject background, and to orient successors. A good filing and suspense system

is a must. Requirements for records security must be considered.

be. Advisors should appreciate their counterpart's workload. The counterpart will be unable to spend the entire day with the advisor; although he will probably never indicate this. Advisors should make themselves available always, but time must be given to counterparts to perform their duties.

bf. Advisors must avoid personality clashes between host country civil or military officials.

bg. Advising works both ways. Advisors should set an example and ask their counterpart's advice; they will get many good ideas from him.

bh. A subject under discussion should be approached from different directions and with different words until it is known that the advisor is understood. The advisees will seldom admit that they do not understand.

bi. Advisors should practice moderation in their consumption of alcoholic beverages.

bj. From time to time, advisors should invite counterparts to mess for social functions.

bk. No matter how familiar advisors are with counterparts, they should refrain from "backslapping." People generally feel this to be a personal affront.

bl. Counterparts, like all people, may resist change and sometimes resent new ideas.

bm. Advisors should be *aware* of, but not become *involved* in the counterparts' routine problems. Advisory emphasis should be placed on the overall effort.

bn. Advisors should strive to earn the counterparts' respect.

bo. Advisors should respect their counterparts' ability.

bp. Advisors should avoid harassing counterparts for status reports. They will begin to avoid advisors, and information will become increasingly difficult to get.

bq. Advisors should, at all costs, avoid giving the impression that everything is all wrong. In some cases, it may take a month or more to sell one idea. The most pressing problems which are within the advisors' and their counterparts' capabilities to correct should be corrected first.

br. The highest military standards must be observed.

bs. The loss of emotional self-control must be guarded against. The loss of the advisors' dignity and the counterparts' loss of face will destroy advisor effectiveness.

bt. *Of primary importance to the advisor is that he maintain flexibility in his planning and operational advice.*

66. Changes and Comments

This manual should be constantly updated by the advisor based on documented experiences. Recommendations for changes or comments to improve the manual are solicited (para. 2f).

APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

1. General

In addition to the definitions of terminology contained in AR 320-5, the following words, phrases, and abbreviations are used in this manual (advisor handbook) with the meanings indicated. There has been no attempt to relate the terms one to the other.

2. Terms

a. Area Assessment. The prescribed collection of specific information to confirm, correct, refute, or add to previous intelligence of the area acquired from area studies and other sources.

b. Area Oriented. A term applied to military personnel or units, whose organization, mission training, and equipping are based upon operational deployment to a specific geographical area. Area oriented personnel have a working knowledge of the language, customs, politics, sociology, and geography of the area.

c. Area Security Coordination Center (ASCC). A composite headquarters at various administrative levels at which counterinsurgency operations are coordinated. It is composed of military, political, police, paramilitary personnel and representatives of government bureaus.

The ASCC plans, coordinates, and provides overall direction of the counterinsurgency effort in its area of responsibility.

d. Area Study. A study of a political or geographical area including its history, geography, language, and general culture.

e. Capital Formation. The accumulating of assets, resources, sources of strength, or advantages utilized to aid in accomplishing an end or furthering a pursuit.

f. Civil-Military Advisory Committee (CMAC). A group composed of influential local citizens and military/police representation which participates in the counterinsurgency planning activity of the ASCC. Civilian membership consists of those individuals having significant influence over and/or interest in the welfare of the local population. In the planning operation the CMAC, which meets on call, contributes advice and guidance particularly with regard to those matters directly affecting the local population (population and resources control; civic actions, etc.).

g. Cordon and Search. Generally considered to be a police technique used in conjunction with the population and resources control program, it involves establishing a perimeter (cordon) to prevent entrance to or exit from an area to be searched for personnel or materiel.

h. Counterpart. The advisee. The person to whom operational assistance is rendered as a matter of assigned duty.

i. Country Team. The country team generally consists of a senior member of each governmental agency located in the country. The head of the country team is

the chief of the diplomatic mission (Ambassador or other principal U.S. diplomatic officer). Host country actions are aided and assisted (advised) by the U.S. country team within the context of the (U.S.) Country Overseas Internal Defense Plan which is the coordinated U.S. Government plan for providing advice and assistance.

j. Disease Vector. An agent (usually an insect) capable of transmitting a disease from one human or animal to another, either mechanically or biologically by playing a specific role in the life cycle of the disease organism.

k. Environmental Improvement. A general reference to that element of the counterinsurgency effort designed to improve the economic, social, political, and psychological aspects of the national environment. It encompasses national and community development programs to include civic actions.

l. Free Area. Predesignated and publicized areas into which selected weapons such as bombs, rockets, napalm, artillery, etc., may be discharged without prior, specific coordination, or regard to damage of materiel or population.

m. Host Country. In the context of this handbook, a nation to which military and civilian representatives of another nation are accredited under the provisions of an international agreement to undertake economic and military assistance programs to prevent or defeat insurgency.

n. Levels of Intensity of Insurgency.

(1) PHASE I—This phase ranges from circumstances in which subversive activity is a potential threat, latent or incipient, to situations in which subversive in-

cidents and activities occur with frequency in an organized pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity.

(2) PHASE II—This phase is reached when the subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized GUERRILLA WARFARE or related forms of violence against the established authority.

(3) PHASE III—The situation moves from Phase II to Phase III when the insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement (MOBILE WARFARE) between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority.

o. Nation Building.

(1) The overall objective of increasing the viability of a nation through effecting programs of economic betterment and social progress through such activities as engineering construction, transportation and communications improvements, including roads, railroads, bridges, telecommunications facilities, airfields, and port facilities. Military resources applied to those efforts is denoted by the term military civic action.

(2) The building of the basis of national power, political and social as well as economic and military, through external assistance and internal labors, so that a nation gains the assets to establish, protect and expand its stature as a sovereign state in a free world.

p. Operational Assistance. This includes small unit advisors, instructor personnel, training units, and necessary equipment which may be provided by the United States to a host country's counterinsurgency efforts.

q. Pacification (Planning, Operations). Although

not used in the manual, this is a term which has been used in various books, articles, and other civilian writings to indicate those activities associated with clear and hold operations described in paragraphs 30–33 of this manual.

r. Population and Resources Control. That aspect of the counterinsurgency effort designed to control human and material resources. Objectives of this effort are to sever the relationships between the population and the guerrilla, identify and neutralize the insurgent apparatus and activities within the population, and create within the population a secure physical and psychological environment.

s. Public Information Programs. Includes the conduct of information activities with the objectives of keeping the public fully informed, gaining public understanding, support of government counterinsurgency activities, and public confidence in the government.

t. Rapport. 1: Relation; esp.: relation characterized by harmony, conformity, accord, or affinity.

u. Tactical Marking of Friendly Troops. Use of pyrotechnics, panels, and discreet lighting for prudent marking of friendly troop positions and facilities in areas of enemy proximity.

APPENDIX II

ADVISOR CHECKLIST (OPERATIONS PLAN, CLEAR AND HOLD OPERATIONS)

Copy No. _____

HQ _____

Location _____

Date _____

Message Ref No. _____

OP PLAN _____

References:

1. SITUATION.

- a. General. Give a brief description of the area of operations.
- b. Weather and Terrain. Describe briefly the predominant nature of the terrain and how seasonal weather changes affect operations.
- c. Insurgent.
 - (1) List organizations, strengths and locations of units, auxiliaries, and cadre and describe the nature of recent activities.
 - (2) State known objectives, capabilities, and intentions and describe major vulnerabilities.
- d. Host Country.
 - (1) Population.

- (a) State the *attitudes* of population and what influence the insurgent has over them. Describe briefly the *effects* of current insurgent activity on the people in the area of operations.
- (b) State the attitudes and competence of local officials.
- (c) Estimate and confirm by area photo coverage the number of families affected by the operation.
- (d) Conduct ground reconnaissance, when feasible, of new defended hamlet sites.
- (e) State population estimates.
- e. Military, Paramilitary, and Police Forces.
 - (1) List military and paramilitary and other forces which influence the plan.
 - (2) Give general location, unit size, and current mission of forces in the area, and indicate those which will be available to support the operation.
 - (3) List units which have been allocated for the operation from outside the area of interest or from general reserve.
 - (4) List Navy, Marine, and Air Force support available for the operation.
- f. Civilian Forces.
 - (1) List those economic, political, psychological, intelligence, civic action cadres, and other representatives of national or provincial agencies now at work within the planned area of operations.
 - (2) Indicate those cadre who can be made avail-

able to extend the civil effort by reorganizing teams now at work.

(3) State what other representatives of national or local agencies have been made available for the operation.

(4) Estimate the number of local civil servants and other assistants available to support the operation.

g. Other Forces. Describe any known national intelligence activities, psychological operations, economic or civic action organizations, or commercial projects in the area of operations the activities of which should be included within the operation for coordination.

h. Assumptions.

2. MISSION.

State specific objectives, purposes, and tasks to develop a certain number of defended hamlets in a given area, defend and secure lines of communications; deny support of the insurgent by establishing strict population and materiel control, defend, secure, and consolidate control of the population following offensive and defensive operations against the insurgent; establish control vital to the extension of military operations in a critical area, etc.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operation. Explain how military and civilian forces and other resources are to be used to carry out the operation. Include phasing of large operations.

b. Answer questions as to the who, what, when, where, how, and why of the operation.

- c. Develop scope of the operation.
- d. Develop appropriate EEI.
- e. List the most important objectives in order of priority.
- f. Operational Tasks.

(1) General. This paragraph states how specific resources available will be used.

(2) Military. Outline use of military forces. State specific reconnaissance and support missions required (such as aerial photo coverage and leaflet missions).

(a) State force numbers and types required based on insurgent concentration and other critical factors.

(b) State steps necessary to obtain firm commitment for use of military forces.

(c) State how long forces are required.

(d) State requirements for air and naval support.

(e) State when and where forces are required in relation to D-Day.

(f) State additional training required.

(g) Outline recommended adjustments of troop dispositions that might increase the forces available.

(3) Paramilitary. See 1e above.

(4) Police, Auxiliaries, and Hamlet Defenders. See 1e above.

In addition—

(a) State police auxiliary relationships to youth and other organizations and how many are available.

- (b) State training and equipment requirements for police auxiliaries at earliest possible date so that they will be ready to assume defense of their own villages and hamlets.
 - (c) State requirements for training and equipping the forces to be raised for local internal security and defense. Estimate when these forces will be prepared to receive equipment and training. Point out any special considerations in their control or use.
 - (d) State coordination requirements with intelligence agencies *for possible assistance in auxiliary training and equipment.*
- (5) Civilian. See 1f above.
- (a) State organization of political action cadre.
 - (b) State requirements for newly trained teams to coincide with phases of operations.
 - (c) State equipment, other supply requirements for these teams, and state where teams will get supplies and equipment—local budget or come equipped?
 - (d) State labor requirements to be established to assist teams in economic development and civic action projects such as forest clearance, foot bridge construction, building of individual houses, moat, parapet, and fences.
 - (e) Estimate how long teams will be required and how long they will remain in each hamlet.

- (f) State what liaison has been established with host country ministry of civic action to obtain quotas for training or quotas for student output.
 - (g) Outline the plan for using civilian economic development, PSYOP, political action, and civic action cadre, indicating where they will be used and what tasks they will perform.
 - (h) Outline projects assigned to technical personnel or representatives of national, private, and provincial agencies who may not be members of the cadre teams assigned.
 - (i) Outline requirements for additional economic development, political action, civic action, or other cadre and state what qualifications they must have and what they are to do.
 - (j) Explain steps taken to provide additional cadre and state training requirements.
 - (k) Outline the need for technical assistance to the cadre teams.
 - (l) State the type of emergency assistance, community or individual, proposed for the people and indicate the magnitude and the time over which it will be required.
 - (m) Outline measures essential to achieving the objectives of the plan.
- (6) PSYOP. Outline proposed PSYOP themes, activities, or techniques applicable.
- (a) Recommend targets and information activities.

- (5) State local materials available (bamboo, etc.) that can be used in lieu of materials that must be requested from military or other agencies.
- (6) State detailed emergency assistance needs of the community or individuals because of relocation operations, or other conditions in the area of operation.
- (7) Estimate the detailed immediate civic needs of each village or hamlet affected.
- (8) Estimate phased requirements for food, seed, clothing, shelter, tools, and medical supplies (these supplies to be available in the vicinity of hamlet sites prior to the operation).
- (9) Outline reception plan for people at new sites if relocation is undertaken.
- (10) Estimate amounts and types of transportation available for relocation of people and belongings.
- (11) Estimate funds available for compensation for individual property damage and injuries. (Insure funding and budgeting for emergency assistance is complete and available for timely release when needed.)
- (12) State community facilities available at sites.
- (13) State additional facilities required such as—
 - (a) Medical dispensary and technicians, to include maternity clinics and midwives.
 - (b) Spraying of area and inoculations.
 - (c) School buildings, teachers, and supplies.
 - (d) Community houses.

- (e) **Information Centers:** In addition to propaganda, means will be available for news items of general interest.
- (f) **Wells and sanitation facilities.** If wells are dug, technical assistance and labor may be required.
- (14) **State arrangements for clearance title action for plots given the people.**
- (15) **State amounts of land clearance and moats, parapets, roads, etc., construction required.** Estimates of bulldozer work must be included in budget because of the requirement to pay for their use.
- (16) **State required agricultural assistance.**
 - (a) **Outline agriculture situation.**
 - (b) **State the requirement for farmer access to agricultural credit programs and what special loans will be necessary.**
 - (c) **State requirements for crop and livestock disease and rodent control.**
- (17) **Economic and technical.** Estimate magnitude of economic or technical assistance essential to area rehabilitation and development. Include such items as insect and rodent control, land clearance, fertilizing, road and bridge repair, construction and drainage.
- (18) **Miscellaneous.**
 - (a) **State support required from CARE and other similar agencies.**
 - (b) **State support required from other sources not mentioned previously.**

- (c) Explore possibilities of Third Country support.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

- a. Outline procedures for control of resources and direction of effort.
- b. Explain peculiarities of the local situation which may affect lines of authority or methods of operation.
- c. State command structure.
- d. State coordination made with Navy and Air Force for their support and planning assistance.
- e. The following communications channels will be established:
 - (1) Communications from field locations to higher headquarters.
 - (2) Administrative: From local level to national agencies.
 - (3) Logistics. From field locations to supporting Log Command for requisitioning and receiving MAP and other supplies.
 - (4) Operational: For requesting emergency assistance in case of attack.
- f. Communications.
 - (1) State status of USAID radios.
 - (2) State requirements for communications between all echelons of civil administration (e.g., hamlet to village to district).
 - (3) State training requirements for civilian communication personnel.
 - (4) State requirements for the military communication system to back up civilian systems.

APPENDIX III

ADVISOR CHECKLIST (SUPPORT OF AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS)

This checklist is based on the five paragraph operations order and contains planning considerations to assist planning groups involved in airmobile operations.

1. Situation

- a. Enemy.
- b. Unit being supported.
- c. Coordinating officers.
 - (1) Unit.
 - (a) Host country.
 - (b) U.S. advisor.
 - (2) Senior advisor.
 - (3) Aviation unit.
 - (4) Intelligence officer.
 - (a) Host country.
 - (b) United States.
- d. Tactical air support.
- e. Supporting artillery fires in area.
- f. Copy of unit operations orders and overlays.
- g. Effects of weather.

2. Mission

3. Execution

- a.* Concept of operation.
- b.* Missions.
 - (1) Number of troops to be lifted.
 - (2) Number of reserve troops to be lifted as required, distance, and the number of landing zones.
- c.* Maps.
- d.* Coordination instructions.
- e.* Description of routes, landing zones, times.
- f.* Armed aerial escort requirements.
- g.* Airfield security (includes landing zones).

4. Administration and Logistics

- a.* Fuel requirements.
- b.* Ammunition.
- c.* Special equipment.
- d.* Medical support to include medical evacuation.
- e.* Rations.
- f.* Methods of indicating direction of attack.
- g.* Observers.
- h.* Maintenance support.
- i.* Parking and landing areas.

5. Command and Signal

- a.* Pyrotechnics and panels (tactical marking of friendly troops, enemy targets, and tactical landing areas).
- b.* CP location (friendly ground troops).
- c.* Medical evacuation of location markings.
- d.* Command relationships for specific operation.
- e.* Channels of advisor communications for specific operations.

APPENDIX IV
PLANNING DATA FOR USE OF ARMY AIRCRAFT

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Aircraft	Unit	O-1 observation "Bird Dog"	OV-1A observation "Mohawk"	U-6A utility "Beaver"	U-1A utility "Otter"	CV-2B cargo "Caribou"	UH-1B utility "Iroquois"
Height door above ground.	In....	46	46	45½	27
Usable length cargo compartment.	In....	76	152	28' fwd 32' aft	60
Width of floor.....	In....	48	60	73	92
Height of cargo compartment.	In....	51	60	74	54
Cargo space.....	Cu. ft.	125	243	1, 150	146
Door, width by height.	In....	39 x 40	46 x 45	73 x 74	49 x 48
External cargo....	Lbs...	500	4,000	1,000	3,500
Passengers.....	1	4	9	32	8
Litters and ambulatory.	0+1	2+3	4+3	20+2	3+0
Internal payload when A/C has full fuel.	Lbs...	111	304	935	1,500	4,140	2,570
Normal cruise speed.	Kts...	87	190	105	100	156	104
Endurance hrs plus min.	4+30	1+55	5+30	8+30	7+10	1+10
Type fuel.....	115/145	JP-4	115/145	115/145	115/145	JP-4

Aircraft	Unit	UH-1D utility "Iroquois"	UH-19 utility "Chickasaw"	UH-21C cargo "Shawnee"	CH-34C cargo "Choctaw"	CH-37 cargo "Mojave"	CH-47A cargo "Chinook"
Height door above ground.	In. . . .	32	30	38	34	36	30
Usable length cargo compartment.	In. . . .	92	120	240	164	364	366
Width of floor	In. . . .	97	66	50	59	87	90
Height of cargo compartment.	In. . . .	54	60	62	70	87	78
Cargo space	Cu. ft.	220	300	422	363	1, 252	1, 462
Door, width by height.	In. . . .	74 x 48	48 x 48	45 x 59	52 x 48	87 x 72	90 x 78
External cargo	Lbs. . . .	4, 000	2, 000	5, 000	5, 000	8, 000	16, 000
Passengers	12	6	20	12	23	33
Litter and ambulatory.	6+0	5+0	12+0	8+0	24+0	24+3
Internal payload when A/C has full fuel.	Lbs. . . .	2, 290	1, 200	2, 880	3, 600	6, 200	11, 970
Normal cruise speed.	Kts. . . .	104	80	78	85	86	130
Endurance hours plus minutes.	1+50	3+30	2+45	2+45	1+05	1+45
Type fuel	JP-4	115/145	115/145	115/145	115/145	JP-4

APPENDIX V

**LANDING AND TAKE-OFF DATA FOR LIGHT AND
MEDIUM AIRCRAFT**





Figure 36. Climb and glide ratios, light and medium aircraft.




Figure 37. Approach/take-off clearance (rotary wing aircraft).

Approach/take-off.

1. There should be at least one path of approach to the LZ measuring 75 meters in width.
2. A rotary wing aircraft is considered to have a climb ratio of 1 : 15.
3. Take-off and departure from the LZ may be along the same path used for the approach; however, a separate departure path as free from obstacles as the approach path is desired.




Figure 38. Landing zone, medium and light aircraft.

Figure 38—Continued

Landing zone, medium aircraft (night operations)

Landing zone, light aircraft (night operations)




Figure 39. Landing zone for rotary wing aircraft.

Figure 39—Continued

1. An area of 50 meters in diameter cleared to the ground.
2. An area beyond this, surrounding the cleared area, 20 meters wide and cleared to within 1 meter of the ground.
3. The completed LZ is thus a minimum of 90 meters in diameter.




Figure 40. Marking of landing zone for use by rotary wing aircraft marking.

Figure 40—Continued

1. LZ for rotary wing aircraft are marked to—
 - a. Provide identification of the reception committee.
 - b. Indicate direction of wind and/or required direction of approach.
 - c. Delineate the touchdown area.
2. Equipment and techniques of marking are similar to those used with fixed wing DZ—lights or flares at night, smoke and panels in daylight.
3. An acceptable method of marking is the “Y” system. This uses four marker stations.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

HAROLD K. JOHNSON,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

J. C. LAMBERT,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

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CRD (5)	Co/Btry (5)
COA (5)	USACDCCAG (10)
TIG (5)	USACDCCSSG (10)
TJAG (5)	USACDCIAS (25)
TPMG (5)	USACDCSWCAG (50)
CofCh (5)	USACDCEC (20)
TSG (5)	USACDCNG (10)
CofEngrs (10)	USACDCCISG (10)
OPO (5)	USAWC (30)
USACDC Agcy (5) ex- cept	USACGSC (30)
USACDCMSA (20)	NWC (5)
USACDCMPA (10)	ICAF (5)
USACDCCAA (25)	AFSC (5)
USACDCSWA (25)	USMA (5)
USACDCCEA (10)	Br Svc Sch (10) except
USCONARC (10)	USAAVNS (100)
USAMC (10)	USAINTS (100)
USACDC (37)	USAJFKCENSPWAR (20)
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OS Maj Comd (20)	Mil Msn (5)
LOGCOMD (10)	USATAC (15)
MACV (5000)	

NG: State AG (3); Units—Same as Active Army except allowance is one copy to each unit.

USAR: Units—Same as Active Army except allowance is one copy to each unit.


For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50.



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