

# ARMY TALKS




## U.S. Foreign Policy



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**EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES ARMY**



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Airways of Tomorrow (map) .. .. .	4
U.S. Foreign Policy .. .. .	5
How America Grew (map) .. .. .	10-11
Preparation .. .. .	16-17
Questions for the Discussion .. .. .	18
Letter from Gen. Devers .. .. .	19

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**ARMY TALKS:**—The PURPOSE of ARMY TALKS is to help American officers and enlisted personnel become better-informed men and women and therefore better soldiers.

ARMY TALKS are designed to stimulate discussion and thought, and, by their very nature, thus may often be controversial in content. They are not to promote or to propagandize any particular causes, beliefs or theories. Rather, they draw upon all suitable sources for fact and comment, in the American tradition, with each individual retaining his American right and heritage so far as his own opinion is concerned.

THEREFORE, the statements and opinions expressed herein are not necessarily verified by, nor do they necessarily reflect the opinions of, the United States Army.

THE SOURCE OF MATERIAL must therefore be made clear at each discussion. All written material appearing in this publication has been written and edited by uniformed members of the Army and/or Navy, except where it is stated that a civilian or other outside source is being quoted.

## ***Foreword***

**S**TILL near the top of the best-seller lists is Walter Lippmann's book, with a sale of 750,000 copies. It has been attacked and defended by aspirants to the presidential nomination and has been quoted in Senate debates.

All over America today people are arguing about what our post-war policy toward the rest of the world should be in one of the greatest public debates in our nation's history. It is a sign that democracy can still work in the way it is intended to work and that the plain citizen can still determine national policy if he will think and worry and argue with his neighbors until he has decided what it is that he wants.

With a perfect sense of timing Walter Lippmann produced his book just when this national debate was becoming intense. While the book's outstanding success doesn't in itself show that the people agree with the author, it does indicate that they find his arguments important—his ideas well worth discussing.

This book, even in its present abbreviated form, is an ideal subject for discussion. It is clear, well-reasoned and positive in its conclusions. No one should accept what it says on faith; but no one should reject its recommendations unless he has found opposing arguments which will meet the test of public discussion.



# Airways of To-morrow



# ARMY TALKS



## EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

### U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

AS the climax of the war finds the people of the United States approaching a national election, we must face the fact that for nearly 50 years the nation has not had a settled and generally accepted foreign policy. Our failure to form such a policy will, though we defeat our enemies, leave us dangerously exposed to deadly conflict at home and to unmanageable perils from abroad.

In foreign relations, as in all other relations, a policy has been formed only when commitments and power have been brought into balance; when men admit that they must pay for what they want and that they must want only what they are willing to pay for. This is the forgotten principle which must be restored to the first place in American thought if the nation is to achieve the foreign policy which it so desperately wants.

#### Our Foreign Commitments

The United States opened a new chapter in its history by making its first vast foreign commitment in 1823, when President Monroe declared that, at the risk of war, the United States would thereafter resist the creation of new European empires in the Western Hemisphere. The prohibition was directed at the Holy Alliance

(Spain, France, Russia and Austria). This momentous engagement was taken by President Monroe, after he had consulted Madison and Jefferson. They approved it only after Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, had assured the American Minister that Britain and the British navy would support the United States.



Unfortunately, however, the education of the American people in the realities of foreign policy the understanding with

Britain, which preceded Monroe's Message, was never avowed. To this day most Americans have never heard of it. Yet as a matter of fact the two governments very nearly made a joint declaration.

We came to believe that the immense obligation to protect the Western Hemisphere, and consequently almost any other obligation we chose to assume, could in the nature of things

be validated by American forces alone. Because the informal alliance with British sea power was concealed, and was displeasing to their self-esteem,

*This issue of ARMY TALKS presents excerpts from the recent book of Walter Lippmann, "U.S. Foreign Policy." It was prepared by the ARMY TALKS section through the courtesy and assistance of the London editorial staff of Readers' Digest.*

the American people lost the prudence so consistently practised by the Founding Fathers, of not underestimating the risks of their commitments and of not overestimating their own power.

### The United States Enters the Pacific

With this misunderstanding of the nature of foreign policy, the United States extended its commitments far beyond the wide limits of the Monroe Doctrine and proceeded to expand into the Pacific. In 1867 Seward bought Alaska from Russia. In 1878 a coaling station was established at Pago Pago in Samoa. In 1893-1898 the Hawaiian Islands were annexed. The war with Spain gave us Guam and the Philippines.

From the day when Admiral Dewey sailed into Manila Bay until the day when General Wainwright surrendered Corregidor, the United States never made a sustained and prudent, or remotely adequate, effort to bring these

immense obligations and its power into balance.

President Theodore Roosevelt did realize that the new departure called for new measures. So he insisted upon digging the Panama Canal in order that the navy could be concentrated rapidly in either ocean. He persuaded Congress and the people to support the construction of a modern navy.

### We Needed Friends

He knew that we also needed friends and virtual allies—allies against the rising imperialism of Germany and later on against the rising imperialism



of Japan. For that reason he never allowed disputes about China to alienate the United States from Great Britain.

Theodore Roosevelt had, therefore, the elements of a genuine foreign policy. But these rudimentary beginnings were not carried forward by his successors.

### Wilson Decides to Intervene

The mental habits of Theodore Roosevelt's immediate successors—Taft and Wilson—were formed in the period of illusory isolation which had lasted from 1823 to 1898. Neither promoted the preparation of armaments in time of peace.

Because of this the United States went to war in April, 1917, for reasons which were never willingly or accurately avowed. President Wilson based his decision to intervene upon the legal objection to unrestricted submarine warfare and upon a moral objection to lawless and cruel aggression. But these superficial reasons for the declaration of war would never have carried the day if a majority of the people had not recognized intuitively that if Germany won, America would have to live in a perpetual state of alert military preparedness.

### U.S. Would Have Accepted League

And when the war was over, the nation would almost certainly have accepted the League of Nations in some form if President Wilson had been able to demonstrate that the League would perpetuate the security which the military victory had won. Mr. Wilson failed to make this demonstration.



## There Are Three Mirages

"The Mirage of Peace." In examining our national prejudices, we may begin by asking ourselves whether peace is the supreme end of foreign policy. Merely to ask the question would have sounded shocking a short while ago. At the moment, it is obvious that the survival of the nation in its independence and its security is a greater end than peace.

The course of events from the seizure of Manchuria in 1931 to the invasion of Poland in 1939 has proved how the pacifist ideal in Great Britain, France and the United States permitted and even encouraged the ambitions of the aggressive states. It led to the policy of so-called appeasement, which led to the surrender of the Rhineland and Czechoslovakia. What was surrendered by our allies in the name of peace became the strategic Foundation upon which Hitler prosecuted his war.

### Even Pacifist Countries Have to Fight Anyway

We may call this the vicious circle of pacifism. In the name of peace the nation is made weak and unwilling to defend its vital interest. Finally, with its back to the wall, the pacifist nation



THE THREE MIRAGES.

has to fight nevertheless. But then it fights with its own armaments insufficient and with its alliances shattered.

"The Mirage of Disarmament." In the interval between the two great wars the United States sought to promote peace by denouncing war, and by promoting disarmament. The Disarmament movement was tragically successful in disarming the nations that believed in disarmament, in dissolving the alliance among the victors of the first World War, and reducing them to almost disastrous impotence on the eve of the second World War.

"The Mirage of No Entangling Alliances." The hard core of resistance to the formation of foreign policy has been the popular objection to alliances. This prejudice rests, so most of us were brought up to believe, upon the teaching of the Founding Fathers of the Republic.

### "Fathers" Welcomed Allies

Yet as a matter of fact the words and acts of the Founding Fathers show that they were only too pleased to have allies whenever they thought it would serve the national interest. In the War of Independence Washington rejoiced when Franklin succeeded in making an ally of France.

How then did we come to think that alliances were contrary to the example of the Founding Fathers, and therefore alien to the purest American tradition? The reason is simple. For 75 years after the adoption of the Monroe Doctrine, the unavowed but none the less actual British-American community of interest which supported it worked on the whole so well that we were unconscious of the implied alliance.

## SUMMARY

*The Monroe Doctrine was our first announcement of Foreign Policy. It was based on British*

*sea-power, but most Americans failed to realize that. Without a force of our own which could back up our acts, the United States went into the Pacific. The United States rejected the League of Nations because the need for it had never been adequately explained. Three mirages, the mirages of peace, disarmament, and "no entangling alliances," form the "vicious circle of pacifism."*

Unfriendly foreign critics of the Monroe Doctrine have called it the cloak of United States imperialism. Domestic critics have occasionally argued that the commitment was too extensive, and that it should be contracted to the line of the Amazon River and the bulge of Brazil. But the American people saw in 1940 that if we acquiesced in the establishment of Germany or Japan south of the Amazon we should be confronted with a direct menace to the security of the regions north of the Amazon. The presence of hostile land-based air power in South America, and the command of sea and air communications from Europe and Africa across the South Atlantic, would have placed the United States permanently and dangerously on the defensive.

Thus, our true defensive region is North and South America.

### **Unchallenged British Power Propped Up American Policy**

During the 19th century British seapower had unchallenged command of the approaches to the Americas. It was therefore possible for the United States to assume that Britain would provide the primary strategic defense by restraining the trans-oceanic powers, and that ours was the secondary obligation of defending the territories of the two Americas.

As soon, then, as Britain no longer ruled all the oceans—which was after about 1900—our own strategic doctrine ceased to be adequate. The immense coast line of the two Americas cannot be defended by standing guard on the beaches, or even by a navy based upon the Americas, and, therefore, compelled to let the enemy decide where and when he would strike.

### **U.S. Defenses are Abroad**

The Strategic defenses of the United States are not at the three-mile limit in American waters, but extend across both oceans and to all the trans-oceanic lands from which an attack by sea or by air can be launched. American security at sea has always extended to the coast line of Europe, Africa and Asia. In the new age of air power it extends beyond the coast line to the airdromes from which planes can take off.

### **U.S. Policy Tied to Europe**

This enables us to state the fundamental conception upon which the foreign policy of the United States must be formed.

Between the New World and the Old there is an ocean of sea and air. The two Americas are, in relation to the rest of the world, islands in this ocean.

The greater part of the inhabited portion of South America, below the bulge of Brazil, is at present more easily accessible by sea, and in some respect by air, to and from Europe and Africa than it is to and from the United States. Among the great powers, the nearest neighbours of the United States are Britain, Russia and Japan. They are also, with the exception of Germany, the principal military powers of the modern world.

The relations of Britain, Russia, Japan and the United States have since



about 1900 regulated, and will for the predictable future regulate, the issues of peace and war for the New World. Germany bears upon the New World as the enemy or as the ally of the other great powers who are our nearer neighbors. In both World Wars American neutrality became impossible when Germany threatened to become our nearest neighbor by conquering Britain.

It is necessary to fix clearly in view these naked elements of our position in the world.

Since South America contains no principal military power which can defend it, we must regard the defense of South America as a vital interest. It is a commitment which can be challenged only by one of the great powers of the Northern Hemisphere, and the fulfilment of our commitment depends upon whether in our relations with the great powers, our friends outweigh our foes.

### **Early Isolation an "Accident"**

It is nothing but an illusion, fostered by the false reading of history, which has led so many to think that America has ever been able to stay out of any great war in which there was at stake the order of power in the oceans which surround the Americas. The people who live on this continent have, from the beginning of their history, been involved in the relations of war and peace among the great powers which face the same ocean. It has been merely an accident that for more than a hundred years after Monroe the order of power was so stable that Americans forgot that it existed.

### **The Order of Power**

For a hundred years between Waterloo and the invasion of Belgium there existed in the world an order of power which was good enough to prevent a great war. There were localized, limited, short wars, but

there was no general and total war. Over this order Great Britain presided by means of her unchallenged command of the sea. Within this order Germany, Japan, and the United States developed into great powers.

### **World Power Redistributed**

By the turn of the century the old order no longer corresponded with the true distribution of power in the world, and there began the cycle of twentieth century wars. During this period none of the great states has been able to form a workable foreign policy. One and all they misjudged the forces with them and the forces against them.

In 1914 Germany, with no ally except rapidly decomposing Austria-Hungary, went to war with all the great powers. This insured her defeat. Germany realized her error, and in 1939 she thought she had corrected it. She had made alliances with Italy and Japan, two of her former enemies, and a pact with a third, Russia; and she carefully cultivated the isolationism of the fourth, America.


### **Germany Won at Start**

#### **But Fell Into Same Errors**

Thus she inaugurated her second war under auspicious circumstances, and won rapid, spectacular, and cheap victories. But then she fell into the error she had sought to avoid. Instead of wooing the vanquished, she infuriated them. Instead of placating the neutrals, she menaced them: Russia by invading her, America by threatening South America and by promoting the alliance with Japan. This brought into being the great coalition which will destroy Germany's power.


The foreign policy of Japan during this same period consisted in antagonizing all her neighbors and making only one ally—Germany, which was not a Far Eastern Power.

# TERRITORIAL GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES



TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF THE UNITED STATES, DURING THE 19TH CENTURY. CHART REVEALS THAT ALTHOUGH WE GAINED TERRITORY, WE LOST THE ORIGINAL 13 COLONIES. CHART REVEALS THAT ALTHOUGH WE





TH CENTURY, IS SHOWN BY ABOVE MAP. INSERT DEPICTS GROWTH  
 HAD NO CLEAR-CUT POLICY, WE DID BECOME A WORLD POWER.

The foreign policy of England, France, and the United States was nearly as disastrous. At the armistice in 1918 they constituted a combination so strong that they had within their reach the means to construct a new order of power. But they did not do this. On the contrary they dissolved the combination. First they ostracized Russia, being more concerned with the passing danger of an ideology than with the permanent order of power.

### New Aggressors Organize

Then they isolated themselves one from the other. The new combination of the aggressor states was formed without opposition. At Munich Hitler compelled Great Britain and France to separate themselves from Russia. The United States meanwhile had persuaded itself, by passing the Neutrality Act, that it must be separated from Britain and France while it became increasingly embroiled with Japan.

To be isolated is for any state the worst of all predicaments. To be a member of a combination which can be depended upon to act together and, when challenged, to fight together, is to have achieved the highest degree of security which is attainable in a world where there are many sovereign national states.

### We Can't "Lick the World"

The area of our commitments in the New World is very nearly half the surface of the globe, yet the potential military strength of the Old World is enormously greater than that of the New World. The total combat power that can be mobilized by Britain, Russia, Germany, Japan, China, France, Italy, Poland, the Central European and the Balkan countries is overwhelmingly superior to the best we could mobilize alone.

Thus we must safeguard the future by founding our foreign policy on the


undeniable necessity of forming dependable alliances in the Old World. If America should reject all alliances, then we must expect the other powers to combine for their own security.

## SUMMARY

*Unfriendly critics have called the Monroe Doctrine "American imperialism." When Britain, about 1900, no longer actually ruled all the seas, our earlier strategic doctrine became inadequate. In both world wars American neutrality became impossible when Germany threatened to conquer Britain. Germany made allies of Italy and Japan, trying to avoid her errors of 1914-1918, but falling into them by infuriating instead of placating the vanquished nations and by invading Russia. The United Nations nearly made equally grave errors.*

### A British-American Connection

What alliances must the United States seek to form?



Let us examine first the project of a British-American alliance.

When we consider the region which the United States must defend, we find that Britain is established within that region as well as outside of it. Canada is in the geographic center of this region. The only land highway to Alaska passes through Canada. All



the short air-ways to Europe and Asia pass over Canada. Thus the geography of air power links the leading dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations inseparably with the United States.

But aircraft taking off in North America must be able to land outside of North America—somewhere in Europe, Africa, and Asia. So without the use of advanced air bases across the oceans, American air power cannot be developed effectively.

### Alaska Will be Air Center

At the utmost, American air power, with assured use of air bases only in North America, would be condemned to waiting for the enemy to strike.

For Alaska, destined to be one of the greatest air centers of the future, the use of the land highway across Canada, and the command of the seas from our Pacific coast are absolutely indispensable.

In regard to Greenland, or a more advanced air base in Iceland, the support of American air power depends upon sea communication. On one side of that sea lane lie the Dominion of Canada and the British Isles. The security of the Northern approaches to the American continent is inseparably related to the sea and air power of Britain.

### South America Defense Hinges On British-Controlled Bases

The strategic defense of the whole South American continent as it faces the Atlantic is likewise dependent upon sea and air communications, commanded by the outposts of Great Britain.

We find the British power projected to Bathurst and Freetown in West Africa. Gibraltar com-

mands the Mediterranean entrance. Capetown commands the southern entrance from the Indian Ocean. The Falkland Islands command the southern entrance from the Pacific Ocean around Cape Horn. Thus the region which we must defend can be attacked only from the region over which Britain commands all the approaches by sea.


### Britain-U.S. Interests Linked

Moreover, because the defense of Canada, the greatest of all the British dominions, is inextricably bound up with the defense of the Western Hemisphere the British vital interest and the American vital interest are complementary and inseparable. Britain must go to the defense of the Americas or the British Commonwealth of Nations would dissolve. America must go to the defense of the United Kingdom or run the mortal risk of letting a hostile power establish itself in the Western Hemisphere.

### Russia and the U.S.

The story of Russian-American relations is an impressive demonstration of how unimportant in the determination of policy is ideology, how compelling is national interest. In a classic paper Mr. DeWitt Clinton Poole has shown that Americans have never liked "the governments the Russians have permitted to rule over them." They have disliked the Czarist autocracy and they have disliked the Soviet Dictatorship. The Czars returned the compliment by regarding the American democracy as a bad revolutionary example.

Nevertheless, Russia and the United States have usually, each in its own interest, supported one another in the critical moments



of their history. They have never had a collision which made them enemies.

### Russian Relations Are Vital

The crucial question of the epoch we are entering is the relationship between Russia and that Atlantic Community in which Britain and the United States are the leading military powers.

It is plain that our grand objective must be a settlement which does not call for a permanent military intervention in Europe to maintain it.

A settlement which could be maintained only by aligning American, and therefore also British, military power against Russia in Europe would set the stage inexorably for a third World War in Europe and in Asia as well. Russia and the Atlantic Community have, therefore, a profound common interest in a European settlement which will maintain itself without bringing them into conflict. The objective test of whether there is to be peace or war will be whether the borderland between Russia and the Atlantic states is settled by consent or by pressure, dictation and diplomatic violence.

### Soviets Couldn't be Isolated

We cannot agree again to the conception of the Versailles settlement, which treated the border region as a military barrier, as the cordon sanitaire, between Russia and the rest of Europe. The barrier has no military value. Germany broke through it easily. Russia could break through it easily.

With Russia in Asia our relations will become, after the destruction of Japanese power, direct and of the highest consequence. Alaska is nearer to Siberia than it is to the United States. The shortest airways from America to China is to be one of the principal airways of the future, then

the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Russia are the four nations which will control those airways.

### The U.S. and China

The United States has since 1899 been committed to the task of fostering



the development of China, and opposing her dismemberment into spheres of imperialist influence. The issue which precipitated war in 1941 was the refusal of the United States to give Japan a free hand in the conquest of China.

In the course of events the United States became committed to the conviction that China should cease to be a colony and should become an integrated and independent power, in fact, a great military power.

### Eastern Picture Changing

In Eastern Asia there will then be Russia, our nearest neighbor, and China, for whom we have waged a great war to insure her the chance to become the great power which her numbers, her resources, and her ancient culture make it possible for her to become.

The emergence of China will change the whole order of power within which lie the Philippines, the Indies, Australasia, Malaya and the immense



and awakening subcontinent of India. We cannot know now what a great Chinese power in this region of the world portends. All we can do is to act on the assumption that the conditions which for half a century have made the integrity and security of China a vital interest of the United States will, as China becomes a great power, make the security of the United States a vital interest to China.

### The Nuclear Alliance

We have seen how for more than a century, whenever our vital interests were at stake, American foreign relations have always been primarily our relations with Britain, with Russia and with China. In the conduct of American foreign policy our position has been solvent, our power adequate to our commitments, in so far as we were in essential agreement with these three states.

Here then, founded on vital interest which has been tested and proved in the course of generations, is the nuclear alliance upon which depends the maintenance of the world order in which America lives. Combined action by America, Britain and Russia is the irreducible minimum guarantee of the security of each of them, and the only condition under which it is possible

even to begin to establish any wider order of security.

Only by the formation of this nuclear alliance can American foreign policy be said to have balanced our commitments with a safe margin in reserve. And American foreign relations must be made solvent before the United States can afford to issue any more promissory notes.

### SUMMARY

*British and American world interests are geographically inseparable. Political alliance is necessary from the standpoint of military security, and in the interests of commercial development, particularly air power. Russian-American relations have always been good in spite of political differences. Dealings between the two nations will assume greater proportions after the elimination of Japanese power in Asia. Future relations depend upon the satisfactory settlement of boundaries in Europe. The emergence of China as a world power will be the fulfilment of long-term American policy. This emergence, and combined action by the United States, Britain and Russia are the guarantee of future world order.*





# Preparation

**T**O most of us the very words "Foreign Policy" have a vague symbolic meaning and are usually placed among the choice phrases which we think the men in the State Department like to consider as their own. Furthermore, to many of us, especially those who are from the Central States, the whole idea of the need or reality of a foreign policy is away from the business of daily living, or was, until December 7, 1941.

For years—only once recently interrupted, by war in 1917-1918—we had continued to live in the midst of our own people, surrounded by plains or rivers or mountains which we could term our own, and knowing that a friendly place called Canada was somewhere on one side of us and that an amiable nation known as Mexico was rather far away on the other. Possibly to those of us who lived nearer the coast the fact and nearness of other nations and our relationships with them achieved a less shadowy substance. However, whether in New England or in California, there were many intelligent citizens who had little interest and less concern with the people across the waters.

In his introduction to the English edition of Mr. Lippmann's book, Mr. D. W. Brogan says: "It is directed to converting the American people to the realization of the fact that there is an American problem, a problem that affects the United States and the rest of the world. That problem is the existence or the non-existence of an American foreign policy. A great many Americans do not think that the United States needs a foreign policy; she is far enough away from the warlike continents of Europe and Asia, strong enough, rich enough to do without one. Doing without a policy is, of course, a policy. It is a policy based on the premise that American geographical isolation is still adequate and American strength sufficient for America to gaze on the warring continents from a position of material (and moral) superiority."

But, to use a well-worn sentence, "Times have changed and the world has grown smaller." We in the United States, whether we wish it or not, are no longer far away from the other countries of the world, and perhaps what is more easily made apparent, they are no longer far away from us. Even if we would, we could not remain untouched by their economic successes and failures, or by



their political and military ambitions. We are rapidly and surely becoming a part of the world at large. Mr. Lippmann in his book makes it clear that our earliest statesmen had far greater insight into this reality than had our later statesmen. Moreover, with clear and steady logic he makes it a matter of established fact that, while trading on the shrewd foresight of Jefferson and Monroe, the statesmen who took the helm in the latter years of the 19th century proceeded to expand our commitments while failing to form a definite policy which could care for these added commitments. In other words, while increasing the need for a foreign policy, they resolutely failed to produce one.

Whatever our individual views may be it is certainly the part of common sense to be as well informed as possible in matters which not only concern our present but which from now on must concern our future. No one of us can with any degree of satisfaction or self-assurance close his mind to the setting of the United States as pivotal in a world of nations. It behoves all American citizens, whether in the Army or not, to know of the foreign policy of our country, to make a study of its failures and achievements and to arrive at as fair an opinion of its position as we can. Then, and then only, can we feel that we are fulfilling the high position demanded of any member of a democratic community today.

No effort could be made to reproduce Mr. Lippmann's book in its entirety in ARMY TALKS. But for some time the editors pondered a reasonable way whereby the essence of what Mr. Lippmann has said could be placed before the men in the Army. Finally, it was decided to cut the digest from the Readers' Digest to suitable proportions, and let them talk the thing out for themselves.

**T**HE discussion leader will need to prepare himself on this topic with as much care and thoroughness as possible, always remembering that he is embarking upon waters which have many times proved treacherous to the best minds of their times. If he can secure a well-qualified speaker with a sound knowledge of foreign affairs—which he may do in the person of an officer on the post—he can make an outstanding occasion of it. The speaker should be an American, no matter what his qualifications, and there is no reason why any discussion leader should feel hesitant or incompetent to carry it himself. One way of starting the discussion is to go over the foreign policy of the present administration, pointing out its progress and achievements. Another way is to stay with the text and gear the questions and discussion closely to it. A copy of the book itself published in an English edition by Hamish Hamilton at six shillings, or a copy of The Readers' Digest of July, 1943, will be valuable to have on hand. Herbert Agar's "A Time for Greatness" and Wendell Willkie's "One World" are titles which though previously mentioned are well worth noting in this connection. A good map of the world should be placed on view. The following questions may prove helpful :



# QUESTIONS

## FOR THE DISCUSSION

### INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS

**Q. :** What is meant by a foreign policy ? Why is it advisable or essential ? Why more so today than in years gone by ?

**Q. :** How is it that the U.S. has survived for nearly a half century without a settled foreign policy ? Is that a true statement of the facts ?

**Q. :** Why is it important that we as citizens should be informed about U.S. Foreign Policy ? What can we do about it ?

**Q. :** Do other nations in the world have foreign policies ? Have they had them for a long time, as for example, Germany, Japan, Russia, Italy, England ? Do their people know what they are—have they had any part in forming them ?

### QUESTIONS FOUND IN THE TEXT

**Q. :** What is a foreign commitment ? (p. 5.)

**Q. :** What was the first foreign commitment of the U.S. ? (p. 5.)

**Q. :** What is an alliance—formal, informal ? (pp. 5-6.)

**Q. :** Why did President Theodore Roosevelt insist upon having the Panama Canal dug ? (p. 6.)

**Q. :** What were the vital reasons for the U.S. entry into the first World War in 1917 ? (p. 6.)

**Q. :** Is peace the supreme end of foreign policy ? (p. 6.) If not, what is ? (p. 7.)

**Q. :** Were the Founding Fathers of the U.S. willing to have entangling alliances or not ? (p. 7.) What is the evidence of history ? (p. 7.)

**Q. :** Why could the U.S. in the 19th century assume that British sea power provided a primary strategic defense ? (p. 8.)

**Q. :** What are the strategic defense lines of the U.S. today in the 20th century ? (p. 8.)

**Q. :** Why do the relations of Britain, Russia, Japan and the U.S. regulate the issues of peace and war for the New World ? (pp. 8-9.)

**Q. :** Is it true or an illusion that the U.S. could and can stay out of any great war in which were at stake the order of power in the oceans surrounding the Americas ? (pp. 9-12.)

**Q. :** What is the greatest degree of security attainable by a single nation in the world of nations today ? (p. 13.)

**Q. :** How can an understanding of U.S. Foreign Policy affect the American soldier's attitude toward pride in service and a sense of personal participation ; a knowledge of the causes and progress of the war ; a better understanding of our allies ; and an interest in current events and their relation to the war and the establishment of the peace.

The topic in the next issue of ARMY TALKS will be Difficulties of Allied Operations. For additional copies apply to your Special Service Officer.



**HEADQUARTERS  
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS  
UNITED STATES ARMY**

AG 091.711 CG

29 November, 1943.

SUBJECT: Anglo-American Relations.

TO: The Commanding General, Services of Supply, ETOUSA.

1. The program outlined in my letter of October 15, 1943, subject: Anglo-American Relations, provides for exchange visits of small parties of personnel between United States and British units. It is desired that hospitality exchange visits between individual officers and enlisted men after duty be also encouraged, as such informal visits during off-duty hours tend to establish a mutual understanding between British and American personnel.

2. In this respect, it has been agreed with the appropriate British authorities that entertainment on extravagant lines will be discouraged. The giving of elaborate meals and expensive drinks, therefore, will not be practised by either British or American messes.

3. As the British are issuing similar instructions to avoid expensive entertainments, there need be no fear that British guests will interpret simple and informal hospitality as a lack of courtesy or respect.

4. The serving of meals and drinks should not necessarily be the primary purpose of these exchange visits. It is suggested that food and drink on a modest scale could also be provided when games, discussions, and debates between British and American personnel have been arranged.

**JACOB L. DEVERS,**  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army.  
Commanding.

WAR OFFICE,  
45, Eaton Square  
London, S.W.1.  
23 Dec., 1943

DAE/BM/120(A.E.1).

Command Education Officer,  
All Home Commands (including A.A. Command),  
London District,  
Northern Ireland.

Reference War Office memorandum, number as above, dated 2nd December, 1943.

It has been represented that, to supplement civilian lecturers supplied by Regional Committees for Education in H.M. Forces, U.S. units would like to have occasional lectures by British Army personnel on non-operational subjects like the Empire and current affairs.

It has been arranged that the U.S. formations requiring such lectures should approach the nearest British formation direct with a request that they may be supplied, if available.

Staff Officers (Education) should do their best to meet any such requests.

**J. E. NELSON,**  
Lieutenant Colonel,  
for Director of Army Education.

