

ARMY TALKS



LEND-LEASE *Weapon for Victory*



Restricted

ARMY TALKS is a classified official publication of the United States Army in the European Theater of Operations. The material contained herein may not be quoted or republished, in whole or in part, nor may it be communicated, directly or indirectly, to persons not authorized to receive it, except by authority of the Commanding General, ETOUSA.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES ARMY

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY

RPF/JKM/obe

AG 353 MGC

29 August, 1943

SUBJECT: Education in Military and Current Affairs

TO: Commanding General, V Corps

1. In the training of the American soldier the purely military and technical aspects are usually stressed. It is essential, however, that in addition, the soldier be mentally prepared for battle. He must know and understand the vital necessity for the successful conclusion of the war.

2. To assist in accomplishing this end, it is desired that you establish within the elements of your command a weekly Education Program to instill in all military personnel the following:

- a. Confidence in the command.
- b. Pride in service and a sense of personal participation.
- c. Knowledge of the causes and progress of the war.
- d. A better understanding of our allies.
- e. An interest in current events and their relation to the war and the establishment of the peace.

3. To further these ends, each separate unit commander will arrange to have matters of current interest as designated in paragraph 2c, d and e above, and matters of leadership and confidence in the command as indicated in paragraph 2a and b above, discussed periodically within his command. Such discussion should be by company commanders personally or by selected Officers and NCO's from the command as deemed best by the unit commander. It is desired to make it clear that the proper presentation of this material is a command function, and should be handled as such. You are authorized to devote one (1) hour of training time per week to this program.

4. The Special Service Section, SOS, ETOUSA, will prepare and distribute the material for such weekly discussions, maintaining in their discretion a reasonable balance between the significance and progress of military events and current events, relations with our allies, etc. This material will be dated and delivered sufficiently in advance for consideration by the staffs concerned at least two days before ultimate use.

5. Direct communication between your headquarters and Special Service Section, SOS, ETOUSA, is authorized in conducting this program.

6. In order to make the plan effective it will be necessary to provide and train an Education Officer of suitable rank in your headquarters, and in each of your subordinate headquarters down to and including divisions.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

RICHARD P. FISK,
Lt. Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

It is suggested that the discussion leader call this matter to the attention of his Commanding Officer.

ARMY TALKS

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

LEND-LEASE, WEAPON FOR VICTORY

SUPPOSE my neighbor's house catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him put out the fire.

"Now what do I do? I don't say to him before that operation, 'Neighbor, my garden hose cost me \$15; you have to pay me \$15 for it.'"

The President Warns

The President of the United States was talking to the reporters. It was December 17, 1940. At the time he spoke, the most terrible conflagration the world had ever seen was already raging. It had started in 1931 with a small fire in Manchuria that seemed far away and of no great concern to the rest of the world. Then in 1937, the fire of Japanese aggression broke out again with new fury.

As the world crisis steadily deepened in the 'thirties we were faced even more clearly with the brutal fact that there were three nations in the world determined on aggression. With the benefit of hindsight, we Americans can now see, of course, that had

we and the other democracies been willing to stop Japan in 1931, Italy in 1935, and Germany in 1936, by force if necessary, we would have been spared the necessity of fighting the greatest war in history.

U.S. Couldn't Escape

But it was hard for us, then, to accept the fact that there were powerful nations in the world bent on a course of unlimited conquest—by deceit, by treachery, by economic and political infiltration, and finally by force of arms.

When the President said in 1937 that if the aggressors really got going, **"Let no one imagine that America will escape, that America may expect mercy, that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked,"** most Americans, I think, knew in their hearts that this was so. But like the people of Britain and France, we hated the idea of war so profoundly that it was a slow, difficult process to wake up to the facts. Not until late in the spring of 1940, when Britain was left alone

in mortal danger and the control of the Atlantic was in the balance, did we Americans finally make up our minds to prepare ourselves against attack.

This issue of ARMY TALKS consists of an excerpt from the book, Lend-Lease, Weapon For Victory, by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., first Lend-Lease administrator and now Under-Secretary of State in Washington. It describes how the United States realized that danger threatened, and of the steps which were taken both before and after Pearl Harbor.

Now in December, 1940, the United States was faced with another brutal fact. Britain, China and the other nations battling the Axis could not get enough arms from this country to keep on fighting unless we became something more than a friendly seller on a business basis.

It Was Like A Fire

The solution which the President proposed to the nation at his press conference on December 17, 1940, was embodied in his story of the garden hose; we should act as a nation in the way that an individual American would act if a raging fire had broken out in other houses nearby. We should send all the equipment we could possibly spare from the building of our own defenses to our neighbors who were already fighting the blaze. **We would defend our own home by helping them to defend theirs.**

As for the settlement, that could wait until the danger had passed, and we could take stock of how we and our neighbors stood. The proposal was the essence of what we now call "Lend-Lease."

Nazis Hit At Poland

Hitler's forces smashed into Poland, and two days later, in accordance with their treaty obligations against this new aggression, France and Britain came to Poland's support. The President first proclaimed the neutrality of the United States and placed an embargo on all shipments of arms to any of the

belligerent nations, as he was required to do by the Neutrality Act. Then he called Congress to meet in special session in order to reconsider the arms embargo.

Agreement On Arms

Those who wanted to amend the Neutrality Act differed on how far American security might require us to go in order to prevent an Axis victory, but they agreed that as a minimum we should permit England and France to buy arms here for cash and carry them away in their own ships. A Gallup poll taken after the war began in September indicated that about 60 percent of the people were in favor of "cash-and-carry," and the votes in Congress to end the embargo

reflected that division. **On November 4, 1939, "cash-and-carry" became law.**

Three days later a British purchasing Commission was established in the United States. The French combined their separate purchasing agencies. There was a rising tide of French and British orders. Three times as many orders were placed for planes by the French and British in the first half of 1940 as in all of 1939—over 8,000 planes and 13,000 engines.

Head Start For Plants

As Secretary of War Stimson said in a letter to Senator George in February, 1941, while the Lend-Lease Act was being debated: "You will realize that without the

You can heighten the men's interest in the topic of this Army Talks by explaining that Lend-Lease is a subject of current discussion back home right now.

A bill to renew the Lend-Lease act for one year beyond June 30 has been pending in Congress. (Congress never gave the President a blanket go-ahead on this thing, but keeps a check on it by authorizing him to proceed from year to year, so Congress can stop Lend-Lease if it sees fit.)

Your men's interest will be sharpened if you can help them to feel that they are taking part in it.

head-start given industry by these foreign orders we would at the present time be in a very grave situation as to the plants and facilities which we now need for the present emergency."



When I started to work in Washington in May, 1940, it seemed to me that while **"cash-and-carry"** had been of aid to the nations fighting aggression, up to this point, it had helped our own defenses a good deal more.

The first detachments of the survivors of Dunkirk came ashore at Dover on May 29, 1940. Left on the roads at Dunkirk and on the beaches were all their tanks, their trucks, their artillery and most of their lighter weapons as well.

Not Enough Weapons Even For Home Guard

There were not enough arms left in the United Kingdom to re-equip them, much less to provide arms for the Home Guard being mobilized with all possible speed. An urgent message came to the White House from Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Could anything be done to send more arms at once for the defense of England and what was left of France—if France held out?

Orders went out from the White House for action. The only possible sources of guns and planes for immediate shipment were our own Army and Navy stocks.

A dozen ships sailed from

Gravesend Bay and Baltimore with guns for Britain before the end of June. Another 15 freighters sailing between July 1 and August 1 took what was left.

A million empty hands reached

eagerly for the rifles as Hitler hesitated across the Channel. They went to men who almost literally had no arms at all in the most critical hour of Britain's history since the Spanish Armada sailed into the English Channel.

Shipments Meant We Realized Own Danger

Most important of all, perhaps, was the promise implicit in these shipments—that America saw in Britain's imminent danger the imminence of danger to herself.

The most fundamental issue had been stated by the President on June 10, 1940: "We will pursue two obvious and simultaneous courses; we will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation; and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense."

By December, 1940, a majority of the American people, I believe, had made up their minds that it was in our national interest to continue the flow of arms to nations fighting the Axis. The


promise of material aid to keep Britain in the fight was day by day being translated into a definite plan. But the machinery for carrying out that plan had still to be devised.

The most immediate problem was one of dollars. By the end of 1940, Britain's war chest of dollars was down to almost two billion, and of this nearly a billion and a half was already pledged to pay for war goods ordered in United States but not yet paid for. By the middle of December new British contracting in the United States had practically stopped.

Weapons, Not Money, Was The Real Need

To meet the dollar problem we could have made loans to Britain, as we had made loans to our Allies in the last war. At first glance, it was a simple and convenient solution, but in reality it was loaded with trouble. We in the United States had discovered after the last war how unworkable loans were when the war-debt problem brought economic dislocation and disastrous misunderstandings between allies who should have been standing together to keep the world at peace. **A fixed money debt would create the same difficulties all over again.**

There was another important reason for not making loans. **The crux of the matter was not dollars; it was planes, guns and**



ships. To put aid to the countries holding the Axis in check on a commercial basis would inevitably hamper us in achieving our real objective—to get enough weapons to the battlefronts to stop aggression before it reached the Western Hemisphere.

Arms Pool Suggested

As the march of aggression continued abroad, the country was coming to appreciate more fully the imminence of the threat to us if Britain should collapse. But a plan for furnishing her the arms she needed had still to be agreed upon. When the President returned from the Caribbean on December 16, 1940, he was ready to make a proposal to the American people.

"Now, what I'm trying to do is to eliminate the dollar sign." That was the heart of the proposal.

Then the President explained his solution in simple terms. Our factories were turning out munitions. The British were buying some of them; we were buying the rest. From now on, the United States government should place all the contracts for munitions to be manufactured in the United States. If we needed them when they came off the line, we would use them ourselves. If we decided that they "would be more useful to the defense of the United States if they were used in Great Britain than if they were kept in storage here," we could "either lease or sell the

materials, subject to mortgage, to the people on the other side."

"The defense of the United States," and not dollars, was henceforth to determine where our weapons were to go.

Then the President summed up our national policy in a world of aggression: **"We must be the great arsenal of democracy."**

Within three hours after he had signed the Lend-Lease Act on the afternoon of March 11, 1941, the President issued two directives putting the Lend-Lease program in motion.

Directive Number One declared **the defense of Great Britain vital to the defense of the United States.** Directive Number Two, also dated March 11, declared the defense of Greece vital to the defense of the United States.

SUMMARY

When the war broke out in Europe, feeling began to rise in the United States that, in national self-interest, the nations fighting the Axis should be aided. At first

the Neutrality Act had made the sale of arms to any belligerent unlawful. This Act was amended to permit cash-and-carry purchases, which worked to favor the Allied Nations, but soon proved inadequate. It was not enough to lend the hard-pressed British the money with which to make further purchases. A system was needed whereby aid could more effectively and immediately be given. On March 11, 1941, the Lend-Lease Act met this need and America became "the arsenal of Democracy."

In what way was America's own war preparation speeded by Cash-and-Carry, and later Lend-Lease? Why was it deemed inadvisable to lend friendly powers the money with which to purchase American arms? What Allied military disasters spurred the desire of the American people to give Britain every possible assistance? Is an understanding of the beginnings of Lend-Lease important to a general knowledge of the causes and progress of the war?

Germans Invade The Soviet

Lend-Lease and Russia. Envoys to Soviet. "Reverse Lend-Lease" is born. Why the other side of the ledger is often overlooked. What our Allies provide—and where.

The first Lend-Lease transfers had little effect on the fighting in March and April, 1941. We had too little to send, and we could not get it there fast enough. But the inauguration of the Lend-Lease program had an enormous effect on the future course of the war. For the first time, the nations fighting

the Axis were assured of a flow of arms with which to carry on the struggle—a flow that would not dry up but, as the President was later to say in a Lend-Lease report to Congress, would "accelerate from day to day, until the stream becomes a river, and the river a torrent, engulfing this totalitarian tyranny which seeks to dominate the world."

There was one emergency in the spring of 1941, however, that we were able to meet by using the new \$7,000,000,000 Lend-Lease appro-

priation. This was the need for food of the British people, whom Hitler was seeking to starve into surrender by submarine warfare.

U.S. Food Saved U.K.

Between April 16 and December 25, 1941, Lend-Lease food shipments tided Britain over her most serious food crisis of the war.

The event which had the greatest effect upon the planning and administration of the Lend-Lease program, however, was the Nazi attack of June 22, 1941, upon the Soviet Union. As the vast battles on the Russian front proceeded, they caused a major revolution of earlier planning for the Lend-Lease program and greatly expanded its horizons.

Aid from the United States to the Soviet Union began outside the Lend-Lease program. In the beginning, neither the American public nor the Government was

ready for a declaration that the defense of the U.S.S.R. was vital to the defense of the United States. Furthermore, we had little we could send to the Soviets at once. We were straining every nerve to get the program of Lend-Lease aid to Britain and China to the point where deliveries in substantial amounts could begin.


Red Mission In U.S.

A Soviet military mission arrived in Washington after a flight via Archangel and England. They were completely confident that the Red Army would not be smashed that summer and that it would be even strong enough to seize the initiative when winter came. This was brave talk at that time, with the Red Army reeling back across the Ukraine and White Russia.

It was, however, General Marshall's unhappy task to convince the Soviet envoys that the United

DISTRIBUTION OF LEND-LEASE EXPORTS BY AREA OF DESTINATION

MARCH 1941 - OCTOBER 1943



States just did not have fleets of planes and tanks, stacks of guns and bombs, and great reserve stocks of machinery and raw materials to send to Russia. No doubt they expected to find that we had begun to mobilize our productive resources. They had begun to mobilize their production shortly after Hitler came to power in 1933. They did not understand our position as an island continent surrounded by seas that had been under the control of friendly powers for more than a century, and the effect this had upon our thinking and our preparations.

It was decided to send a combined Anglo-American mission to Moscow to work out a long-range supply program for the Soviet on a really large scale.

Supplies For Reds

At Moment Of Need

On October 30, 1941, 10 days after the return of the mission from Moscow, the President dispatched an historic message to Premier Stalin. The battle for Moscow was at its height. The Nazis were in Mozhaisk, well past Borodine, where Napoleon over a century before had won the battle that gave him Moscow. The Red Army was striving desperately to prevent the closing of the pincers that threatened the capital city on both sides. To the north, Leningrad was encircled and apparently doomed. To the south, Marshal Budyenny's armies had been cut to pieces, the Ukraine was lost and Kharkov had fallen.

Soviet casualties totalling more than 1,500,000 men were admitted. Over the radio Stalin called upon his people for another supreme effort to save Russia.

On that day the President told Premier Stalin that he had examined the record of the Moscow Conference and that :

"All of the military equipment and munition items have been approved, and I have ordered that as far as possible the delivery of raw materials be expedited. In an effort to obviate any financial difficulties immediate arrangements are to be made so that supplies up to one

The purpose of Lend-Lease was summed up in this manner by Edward Stettinius, former administrator, in an anniversary broadcast March 11:


"Through Lend-Lease and Reverse Lend-Lease we are making certain that all our weapons are used where they will hit the enemy the hardest, regardless of which country produces them or whose forces employ them against our common enemy."

billion dollars in value may be effected under the Lend-Lease Act. I propose that the indebtedness thus incurred be subject to **no interest and that the payments of the U.S.S.R. do not commence until five years after the war's conclusion and be completed over a 10-year period thereafter.** The President indicated that the payments would be in raw materials and other commodities.

Stalin Sends Thanks

On November 4 Stalin replied : "Your assurance that the decisions of the conference will be carried out to the limit is deeply appreciated by the Soviet Government."

The special terms for the repayment of the billion dollar credit agreed upon in this exchange of telegrams are no longer in effect. They were superseded on June 11, 1942, by the terms of the Master



Lend-Lease Agreement concluded with the Soviet Union. Under the agreement, our Lend-Lease arrangements with Russia were put on the same basis as those with Great Britain and China.

Defense Of Russia Called Vital To U.S.

The exchange of communications between the President and Stalin was made public on November 6, and on the following day, the 24th anniversary of the Russian Revolution, **the President officially declared the defense of the Soviet Union vital to the defense of the United States.** The fate of Moscow was still in the balance, but Russia had from us the assurance that the productive power of this country was squarely and firmly on her side, and on a grand scale.

Formality At Start

In 1942, we and the Russians were just beginning to learn to work together as allies. It would be foolish to pretend that our relations with Russia were at the beginning as frank and as intimate as our relations with Britain and China. We did not ask the Soviet for the detailed information about their army and about conditions inside their country which we expect from other Lend-Lease countries. Immediate and

complete pooling of information from the start was hardly to be expected in the face of our lack of mutual confidence in the years before.

We must evaluate the intimacy of our relations with our Soviet allies, I think, not by comparing them with our relations with other nations which have been on close terms with us for many decades, but rather in terms of the distance we have travelled in the little more than two years since Germany attacked Russia. Viewed in these terms, both of us have come a long way in a very short time. We have both seen how closely our national interests are linked together.

Russians Make Good Impression In Talks

I think our experience at Lend-Lease in dealing with these men has been the same as that of other American officials who have had close and frequent contact with the Russians. When a conference begins, they get right down to business and quickly show themselves to be tough-minded. They are very serious in manner. Often they seem reserved at first, but give them plain, honest, hard-headed talk, and they will return the favor. The longer we work together, the better we understand each other.

SUMMARY

Lend-Lease food shipments were run through the U-boat blockade to Britain in 1941. The Russians asked for aid when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, but none could be given at first. Commitments to Britain and China had to be fulfilled. American production was not yet rolling. An Anglo-American mission to Moscow clarified the Russian needs. On October 30, 1941, the Soviet Union was promised military equipment under Lend-Lease, when the defense

of that country was declared vital to the defense of the United States. Russian-American relations, at first confused, began to improve.

How did the American position differ from that of Russia in the matter of war preparation in 1941? What was the military situation in Russia at the time Lend-Lease arrangements were concluded with Stalin? What hampered American dealings with the Soviet Union primarily? Do you believe that Americans are gaining a better understanding of their allies through Lend-Lease dealings?

We're Told: "Help Yourself"

As U.S. Forces in Britain grew larger, British supplies became more and more important. Britain's contribution is not as easily seen as ours—but it is there just the same. Congress gets the tally-sheet. Details of the trade.

Reverse Lend-Lease went into action before the formalities could be worked out. Then, late in February, the Master Lend-Lease Agreement with Great Britain set down the over-all policy.

"The United Kingdom," it stated, "will continue to contribute to the defense of the United States of America and the strengthening thereof and will provide such articles, services, facilities, or information as it may be in a position to supply." **Besides continuing to fight our enemies, the British would help supply our American forces on a full Lend-Lease basis.**

In the months that followed, this broad general principle was translated into actual working arrangements. As more American forces reached the British Isles, procedures

were worked out under which we could obtain equipment and supplies that were available in the United Kingdom merely by going to British procurement officers and asking for them.

During the second half of 1942, the size of our forces in the British Isles grew very rapidly as we prepared for the North African invasion and built up our Eighth Army Air Force for its part in the bombing of Germany. **Reverse Lend-Lease grew with equal rapidity**, although neither the people back in the United States nor even the American boys in Britain, I think, had any conception of its real extent.

The reasons why Reverse Lend-Lease tended to be overlooked are simple. The fighting weapons of American forces are produced almost entirely in American factories. If the British were making tanks for us and turned over 3,000 of them, it would be easy for an American soldier to count them and say, "The British are certainly giving us

a lot of stuff," just as we say it about ourselves when we send 4,000 planes to Russia. But we make all of the tanks and practically all of the planes, guns and other weapons for the American forces, and we make many of them for the British forces in addition. It is true, of course, that the British have given us hundreds of Spitfires and other fighter planes, together with quantities of bombs and artillery. But these are the exceptions. When we see our men in the British Isles, almost all of them have American guns, tanks and planes. It is natural to ask: **What can Reverse Lend-Lease really amount to?**

The answers to that question lie in these fundamental logistical facts: armies do not just miraculously appear on the fighting lines with their tanks and guns; airplanes are not the only equipment an air force needs; and a navy does not fight with ships alone. Guns, tanks, planes and warships are the striking power, but they are only a part of the business of war.

British Navy Helps

Reverse Lend-Lease begins, as a matter of fact, as soon as our men leave their country for Britain. A large proportion of our troops have crossed the Atlantic on British transports, and the British Treasury has paid the charter hire. The escorting cruisers and destroyers have been assigned principally from the British Navy,

for the bulk of our own naval strength has been in the Pacific.

Even Contribute Bikes

Outside of the regular run of Army supplies, Reverse Lend-Lease covers a multitude of little items that help make life easier for our soldiers in Britain— thousands of bicycles requested by our Air Force so the ground crews can get around the big air bases—faster; radios for our men to listen to American programs; all the printing expenses of *The Stars and Stripes* and *Yank*; musical instruments for soldiers' bands; athletic equipment for soldiers; recreation centers in British ports for American sailors and merchant seamen.

The first over-all picture of

Reverse Lend-Lease in Britain was given to us in Washington by Lieutenant Colonel George A. Spiegelberg, recorder of the United States Army's Purchasing Board in the European theater, who came to Washington to testify during the Congressional hearings on the extension of the Lend-Lease Act in January, 1943. He brought with him huge bound volumes which contained a complete record of Reverse Lend-Lease in the British Isles from June 1 to the end of December, 1942. **There were literally thousands of pages, and every page had a long list of supplies which had been furnished to our forces.**

For the House Foreign Affairs

The United States and Britain have spent about the same amount of money on Lend-Lease aid to the United Nations.

Figures on Lend-Lease expenditures through the end of 1943, which are later than the ones used by Mr. Stettinius in his book, show that the United States spent about 11 billion dollars on Lend-Lease to all allies. Of this, about 6½ billion dollars represents aid to Britain.

Britain through the same period spent more than 10 billion dollars on Lend-Lease to the United Nations, of which more than 1¼ billion dollars represents aid to the U.S.

Committee he picked out a few categories as samples. Beginning with "A," the Engineer Corps list ran through such items as asphalt, batteries, blackout cloth, cement, coal, and so on down through the alphabet to wire, barbed wire, sewing wire, rope wire and woven wire. For the Quartermaster Corps there were accommodation stores, bakeries, blankets, bleach, camouflage, candy, canned heat, canteens, and then, skipping to the end of the alphabet, soap, tents, towels and warehouse equipment. The Signal Corps list began with aeriels and ended with wave meters. Ordnance began with ammunition and ended with torpedo tubes.


USAAF Gets 'Chutes

The Air Force received not only airplanes, but parachutes, dinghies for forced landings at sea, new

plexiglass noses for bombers, de-icing equipment, clay pigeons in astronomical numbers for gunnery practice, high altitude heated flying suits, and the famous British steel vests for fliers, made by a company that was making swords in the days of Queen Elizabeth. Then there was a long "Miscellaneous List" as well, with such items as smoke generators, acetylene, eye shields and gas detectors. Some of the orders were in the hundreds of thousands; others were for a dozen or less.

First Balance Sheet

Lt. Colonel Spiegelberg brought back the first full list of the Reverse Lend-Lease supplies that we had received in Britain and an over-all estimate of the amount of shipping that would have been required if we had brought them all from the United States. It added up to





The importance of Reverse Lend-Lease will become clearer when you use the diagram above as a guide to build a crude display, consisting of two packing cases labelled as above. Where such material cannot be obtained, reproduction of the diagram on a blackboard will serve.

1,121,787 ships' tons, the equivalent of over 370 full shiploads. This figure did not include any of the construction materials the British had used in building airfields, barracks, and other facilities for our forces, which came to more than another million and a half tons. These were impressive figures, and they have since gone much higher.

We are receiving Reverse Lend-Lease in many other parts of the world—in Australia, New Zealand, India, the Fijis and other Pacific

Islands, Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere. I have told the British story in such detail only because it is there that Reverse Lend-Lease has been most extensively developed. The same willingness to make everything possible available to us with a similar saving of American dollars is to be found in other allied countries where our troops are stationed. We have signed special Reciprocal Aid Agreements with Australia, the Fighting French, and later the French Committee of



UPPER MAP SHOWS how the United States strikes at its enemies—using Lend-Lease as a mutual United Nations force for victory. **Lower map depicts** what the United States would have had to face except for the agreements by which we sent munitions, even before our men were trained. Copy them on a blackboard or sheet of paper to dramatize the point.

National Liberation in North Africa, with New Zealand, Belgium, and the Netherlands, as well as with the United Kingdom. Other agreements are being negotiated as more of our troops are sent to other parts of the world.

Russia And China Give Needed Aid

Even Russia and China, which have suffered tremendous losses fighting on their own soil, have given us war supplies and services. The Chinese turned back to us as a gift all the P-40 pursuits which remained of those they had bought from us, and they have turned over gasoline from their precious reserve stocks to our 14th Air Force in China. We have had no troops in Russia, but when American vessels have put into North Russian ports, the Soviet Union has met all their expenses—fuel, food and other ship stores, medical care, and any needed ship repairs.

Extend Reverse Pact

It was also during the summer of 1943, after the British had completed dollar payments on most of their 3,600,000,000 dollars' worth of pre-Lend-Lease contracts in this country, that they agreed to extend the principle of Reverse Lend-Lease to include many raw materials and foodstuffs shipped to the United States. Until then they had needed dollars in exchange to pay for supplies ordered from American manufacturers before Lend-Lease, in anticipation of their future dollar income.

Now the United States will receive without payment from the United Kingdom and its colonies, rubber, rope fibers, chrome, asbestos, tea, coconut, oil, cocoa,



and many other raw materials and agricultural products formerly purchased by United States Government agencies. Whenever British ships are used to bring these supplies to this country, they will be carried free of charge. Similar Reverse Lend-Lease agreements with other countries of the British Commonwealth covering raw materials and foodstuffs are being negotiated.

All United Nations Join Supply Sharing

The fact that we have received Reverse Lend-Lease in substantial volume only from the Nations of the British Commonwealth does not mean that our other allies are not doing their full part to help us toward victory. **The contribution which each of the United Nations is pledged to make toward common victory is set forth clearly in the Declaration of United Nations: "Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war."**

Our other allies have surely lived up to this pledge as well. Russia has been fighting on her own soil for two years; China for six. Both nations have sacrificed millions of

lives and suffered the occupation and devastation of many of their greatest cities and millions of acres of their best land. Because we have given them more Lend-Lease aid than they have given in Reverse Lend-Lease aid to us, we do not say that we have done more than they have against our common enemy. We know that they are putting into this war every bit as much of what they have as we are.

Cost Of Lost Lives Can't Be Easily Set

It is all the same war. Who can say which of us has given most of what we had to give? We cannot measure their lives against our dollars, or their pounds or rubles against our lives. We cannot balance the cost of a ruined city against the cost of a thousand tanks, or the courage of the Underground in Europe against the courage of American boys in New Guinea and the courage of their mothers at home.


Unshown By Ledgers

It would be impossible, indeed a sacrilege, to attempt to balance such a ledger. All we can ask now is that all of us—we and the other United Nations—put everything we have into winning the war in the ways that circumstances and our strength make possible. That is a combination which will balance out in victory.

The United States has put into Lend-Lease about 12 cents out of every dollar that we have spent to fight this war. By the middle of 1943—two years and four months after Lend-Lease began—the total cost of our Lend-Lease aid amounted to 12,900,000,000 dollars, and that figure has since

been going up at the rate of a little more than a billion dollars a month.

This is the simplest measure of Lend-Lease—the number of American dollars that we have spent



to produce the goods and provide the services that we have made available to our fighting allies. But it gives only a hint of the real meaning of our aid, for we are not winning the war with dollars. **The victories of the United Nations are won by fighting men using planes, tanks, ships and guns.** In the last analysis, the measure of our Lend-Lease aid must be found in extra striking power on the battlefronts against our enemies.

This is the breakdown, then, of the 12,900,000,000 dollars total of Lend-Lease aid—6,200,000,000 dollars' worth of planes, tanks, guns, ammunition, ships, trucks, and other

fighting supplies ; 2,500,000,000 dollars of raw materials and industrial equipment ; 1,900,000,000 dollars of food and other agricultural products ; 2,000,000,000 dollars of shipping, ship repairs, factories and other services. **We provide these things under Lend-Lease, because they fight for our cause just as our own soldiers do.** A Luftwaffe bomber is no less out of the fight because the American gun that shot it down was manned by a Russian. A base in New Guinea is no less captured because some of the American tanks that blasted out the Japanese were manned by Australians.

Do We Get Worth ?

We Americans are a hard-headed people, however, and the average American will naturally say to himself: "**12,900,000,000 dollars is a lot of money. Have we got our money's worth ?**"

I think that we have in more than double measure. The total impact of Lend-Lease on our economy has been relatively small. The dividends it has paid have been enormous. We are, it is true, drawing heavily upon our national resources to fight this war, mostly to arm and equip our own fighting men, but also to aid our allies. **If we had not had Lend-Lease, however, if Britain had gone under, Hitler had isolated Russia, Japan had completed the conquest of China, and finally we in the Western Hemisphere had stood alone against an Axis-dominated world, who can measure the expenditure of men and of our material wealth we would have had to make if our liberties were to survive ?**

The methods of political collaboration necessary to achieve collective security have still to be worked out. It will not be an easy task. But with the United Nations as a foundation we can accomplish it. This is a responsibility that the people, the Congress and the President — all of us — will share together for our country.

Lend-Lease operations, as we know them now, will some day draw to a close, but we know already that the principle of mutual aid in mutual self-interest that is embodied in the Lend-Lease Act must live on. **Today there is more unity of purpose and of action among freedom-loving peoples than ever before. In that unity we can find the strength to build a peaceful world in which freedom and opportunity will be secure for all.**

SUMMARY

Reverse Lend-Lease was formally set up in February, 1942. Few people outside of government realized the scope of this plan. Reverse Lend-Lease often begins with the transporting of American troops in British ships, under British naval escort. It includes literally thousands of living necessities and war supplies. Reverse Lend-Lease is in effect on fighting fronts in other parts of the world.

Does the wise manner in which Lend-Lease has been administered increase confidence in our government ? Should American soldiers be interested in the workings of Lend-Lease ? Do they appreciate the extent to which this program is affecting the course of the war, and will affect the establishment of the peace ?



Preparation

ONE of the most vital factors in the strategy of the United Nations is Lend-Lease. It is a strategy which applies to all theaters of this war. Lend-Lease was adapted out of the necessity of pooling the resources of freedom-loving nations and using these resources where they would count most in defeating the enemy. It is a new strategy. If Hitler had known that this strategy was going to be used against him, he might well have hesitated to start this war. But, in part because Lend-Lease is new, and in part because it is still being extended, most of us know little about it. Ask the man next to you what Lend-Lease means to him. He will probably reply: "That's the way the Russians get tanks," or "That's one of the ways the United States is supplying her Allies." These statements are true, but only part of the truth. It is the purpose of this issue of ARMY TALKS to help us learn the root of the matter. Our knowledge of what Lend-Lease is and how it works is fundamental to the winning of the war and the establishment of the peace.

This issue of ARMY TALKS is taken verbatim from the book on Lend-Lease by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., first Administrator of Lend-Lease, and now Under-Secretary of State.

Vol. I, No. 5 of ARMY TALKS, "How Lend-Lease Works," should be reread by discussion leaders in connection with this issue.

Following are suggestions to discussion leaders in preparing for the second discussion of this topic:—

1. Read over carefully the issue of ARMY TALKS entitled "How Lend-Lease Works." (Vol I, No. 5.)
2. Jot down the factual information available there.
3. Study the present issue in the light of these facts.
4. On a blackboard set up the charts included.
5. Spread out the map, so as to indicate the sea lanes along which Lend-Lease operates.
6. Emphasize the point that Lend-Lease works both ways—that the U.S. is on the receiving as well as the lending end.

7. Specify some commodities which we get from England—construction materials, buildings, air fields, food, ships; from Russia—fuel, food, medical care, repairs, ships' stores.
8. Stress the saving in time, banking and international understanding that Lend-Lease provides.
9. If you have a member of the group who has made a study of Lend-Lease, ask him to make a brief talk on the facts at the beginning of the discussion.
10. Keep in mind always that the function of the discussion leader is to stimulate discussion. He is to guide questions and answers and to summarize the trend of comment. He is to maintain a neutral and undominating position. He is Chairman.

The questions that follow are prepared with both issues of ARMY TALKS in mind.



QUESTIONS FOR THE DISCUSSION

- Q. What is Lend-Lease? Why is Lend-Lease?
- Q. How is it determined who gets what and when under Lend-Lease?
- Q. What effect does Lend-Lease have on your daily life in the Army in the ETO? Does it make any difference in what you eat, how you sleep, where you are stationed?
- Q. Has Lend-Lease cost the U.S. more than it has Great Britain? China? Russia?
- Q. Why is it impossible to judge who is benefiting most?
- Q. What makes Lend-Lease valuable to all the United Nations?
- Q. How does Lend-Lease speed up the efficiency of the war effort?
- Q. Will Lend-Lease prove to be a factor in post-war international cooperation.

If your copies of ARMY TALKS are not reaching your unit in sufficient number, get in touch with the field representative of Stars and Stripes.



REECAP

REECAP is a house organ of Special Service Division. It is distributed through command Special Service Officers to each Special Service Officer of units down to and including regiments, separate battalions or similar organizations. If you are not receiving REECAP regularly, communicate with your Command Special Service Officer. Brief descriptions of Special Service activities in your command which you think will be of interest to other Special Service Officers are invited by the Editor. Communications should be addressed to Editor, REECAP, Stars and Stripes, APO 887, U.S. Army.

ARMY TALKS :—The PURPOSE of ARMY TALKS is to help American officers and enlisted personnel become better-informed men and women and therefore better soldiers.

ARMY TALKS are designed to stimulate discussion and thought, and, by their very nature, thus may often be controversial in content. They are not to promote or to propagandize any particular causes, beliefs or theories. Rather, they draw upon all suitable sources for fact and comment, in the American tradition, with each individual retaining his American right and heritage so far as his own opinion is concerned.

THEREFORE, the statements and opinions expressed herein are not necessarily verified by, nor do they necessarily reflect the opinions of, the United States Army.

THE SOURCE OF MATERIAL must therefore be made clear at each discussion. All written material appearing in this publication has been written and edited by uniformed members of the Army and/or Navy, except where it is stated that a civilian or other outside source is being quoted.

