

ARMY TALKS




An Army is Quite a Thing



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EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES ARMY



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ARMY TALKS :—The **PURPOSE** of **ARMY TALKS** is to help American officers and enlisted personnel become better-informed men and women and therefore better soldiers.

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ARMY TALKS



EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

AN ARMY IS QUITE A THING

THE ultimate objective of an army is to impose its collective will on the enemy. But its first mission is to exist at all. Its first problem is to feed and clothe and shelter itself, and to be able to move itself from one place to another. Most people think of an army as expending its energy in fighting the enemy. Actually, most of an army's energy goes into keeping itself alive and in being; and in getting itself to where a very small portion of its numbers can fight an equally small portion of the enemy's total army.

Only A Few Fought

As soon as we won in Tunisia, we had no place for our army to fight the Reichswehr. But even when Rommel's armies were still terrible, a surprisingly small portion of the Allied "armed forces" in Africa was engaged in fighting them. And of those who are entitled to battle stars on their ribbons, only a small fraction were killing in the literal sense. Even the killers spent most of their time — I would guess an average of twenty-two hours out of twenty-four — in housekeeping for themselves, and in moving from one place to another.

Yet the whole effect of the army is as integrated as the shaft and the head and the point of the tip of a spear.

A human being is such a frail thing that he cannot live more than a few days without both food and sleep. Nature is still his real enemy even though he takes his eternal struggle with her for granted. So the army as a whole must survive against nature before it can harm a single enemy by even so much as a scratch on the finger. The business of surviving and moving itself from one place to another is ninety per cent. of the army's business, and unless it does this well it is not an army.

The army solves its problems of surviving by two dull words: organization and standardization—and an enormous personal effort and submergence to the individual will to the collective welfare.

Organization Is Key

The organization of the army begins with its smallest unit. To learn it, consider the Infantry, the basic arm which all other elements support, and make a mental multiplication table.

The smallest unit in the Infantry is the squad. Squads at various times and for various purposes have been of different sizes, but the standard today is 12 men. From there on up use the multiplication table, always adding the sup-

This issue of ARMY TALKS is based on an excerpt from the notable book, "The Battle is the Pay-off," by Major Ralph Ingersoll. The author, a noted New York journalist and editor, enlisted in the first World War at the age of 17 and enlisted again in the present conflict. He took part in the Tunisian campaign as a captain in the Engineers.

porting arms and services — Artillery, Engineers, Quartermaster, etc. Three squads and a headquarters make a platoon; three rifle platoons, a weapons group and a headquarters, make a company; three rifle companies together with a weapons company and headquarters, make a battalion; three battalions, with heavy weapons, headquarters and supply companies, make a regiment; three regiments, with artillery, engineers, other services and a headquarters, make a division; two or more divisions, with supporting troops and a headquarters, make a corps; two or more corps, with supporting troops and a headquarters, make an army. A nation may have as many armies as it has the men to create, and all the armies together plus some other elements make up THE Army.

[The triangular pattern is designed to afford maneuverability in successive echelons.—Ed.]

The individual soldier at the base of this pyramid, in theory, has one sole responsibility: to be obedient to the authority of the army. This authority is vested successively in the commissioned officers of the army, and in turn and in part to the non-commissioned officers—the sergeants, the corporals, the privates-first-class, each in his own sphere.

For each unit in the army, from the company up, there is an officer of an

appropriate rank, who is absolutely and completely and finally responsible for everything that goes on in his unit. He must see that it is properly fed, clothed and sheltered, and even its state of mind is his responsibility. These unit responsibilities are linked together in what is called the chain of

command. It leads from the platoon lieutenant up through the commanding officer of the company to the commanding officer of the battalion, etc. The commanding officer is always referred to as the C.O., until the rank of general is reached, and then he may be called the C.G., the commanding general.

The theoretical rigidity of this chain of command is not always understood by the public—the completeness with which the C.O. is

responsible, as long as he is C.O., until he is “relieved of his command.” A colonel cannot explain away the defeat of his regiment by putting the blame on, say, one of his captains. He, and he alone, is responsible for all the units under his command. If one of his captains fails, the blame is still his. He is guilty of “an error in judgment” in putting the wrong captain in command.

Captains and lieutenants are known as company officers; majors, lieutenant-colonels and colonels are field officers. From the lowest field officer commanding—the major—upward in the chain

ENDLESS DISCUSSION takes place in countless Nissen Huts, billets or barracks over how the Army is organized. Most soldiers know in infinite detail how their own outfit is set up. Many of them have inaccurate information on other types of units.

IN THIS issue of *ARMY TALKS*, Maj. Ingersoll gives the answers to many a Day Room argument. With this copy in his hands no GI will be forced into the position of closing his argument by saying:

“AW, YOU’RE NUTS,” and retiring into the tattered pages of an old magazine or mystery story sent from home. Better still, if he has the facts firmly fixed in his mind, he’ll be in an even better position to speak with authority on matters concerning the formation of the Army in which he serves.

THE MAN who knows the answers—who carries the book in his head and not in his “B” bag—has taken the first step in fitting himself for promotion to a position of leadership.

of command, each commanding officer may have the service of a staff. Staff officers are advisors to commanding officers. They are without authority in the chain of command.

All the advisory—the staff—functions of the army are grouped into four parts: Part 1 is Administration and Personnel, Part 2 is Intelligence, Part 3 is Training and Operations, Part 4 is Supply. Many a feature story and magazine article has listed these functions by number, but they slip easily from the layman's memory. Nevertheless, they are the warp and woof of the Army's organization.

S And G Numbers Mean Jobs-Men

The numbers one to four have one of two letters in front of them—S or G. S1, S2, S3 and S4 refer to the staff functions of units smaller than a division. G1, G2, G3 and G4 refer to the staff functions of divisions, corps and armies. Until you are thinking of the army in terms of its Gs you are not thinking accurate military thoughts.

Next: any one of the four Gs (or Ss) is two things: it is at one and the same time a function and a man, who is responsible for the function. It is a function, a man, and, in staffs of any size, a section of assistants, officers and men, and their files and office paraphernalia and the place on the map where they work. Thus, G1 is a man whose function is to advise the commanding officer on matters of administration and personnel.

What The Gs Represent

There are the four Gs—and there is the Adjutant and the Adjutant General's great organization. It is the Adjutant's job to carry out the personnel policies which have been established by the commanding officer on the advice of

his G1. The Adjutant keeps the records, classifies the personnel, publishes the orders, etc., etc., and a great many more etceteras.

So the commanding officer of any unit larger than a company is served by five men who may or may not have assistants to help them. He is served by the Adjutant and G1 as above, by G2 in matters relating to military intelligence, by G3 on how his unit should be trained and how it can best operate to achieve its mission in the field, and by G4 on its supply problems. Each staff function will have a different mission when in garrison and when in field. G3's duality of mission is the clearest: G3 is the schoolmaster at home, the maker of battle plans on the field.

What "The Staff" Does

The efficiency of any unit will depend on its staff—on whether G1 picked the right men to recommend for assignment, on whether G2 is really intelligent about the enemy's strength and movements, on how sound G3's training doctrines were and how effective and imaginative are the battle plans it recommends; if the supply system breaks down, G4 has been giving bad advice.

Unit's Efficiency A Staff Problem

But remember, before you go on, that the Gs are advisers only. They are not links in the chain of command and they administer only their own sections, if they have any. You may hear a soldier criticize a battle with some such speech as this: "The plan was all right but the intelligence was not good. We ran into a battery that wasn't on the map." He was praising the work of G3 and damning G2, for the commanding officer, while he is solely responsible, had obviously to



rely on the knowledge and wisdom of his staff in writing his orders.

That's enough about army organization for a moment. I feel like telling a story, and this is one of my favourites about the landing in North Africa.

SUMMARY

An army's first problem is survival. It meets this problem by organization and standardization. The smallest unit of organization is the squad; the largest, the army. Each unit from the company upward has an officer of appropriate rank who is completely responsible for its conduct and welfare. This responsibility proceeds in the chain of command to the highest officer, who is responsible for all the units under his command. The individual soldier, understanding the unit breakdown of the United States Army, cannot help having a sense of personal participation in its whole effort. He may take pride in being the basic element in so vast an organization.

May a soldier have greater confidence in command, knowing it is served by a staff of specialized officers?

How is army organization like the multiplication table?

What purpose does the "chain of command" serve?

What is the soldier's sole responsibility under the army system?

Honor is not a well-known word amongst American doughboys. Yet honor has been known to stop an armored column dead in its tracks;

not honor in general but the personal honor of one man in particular. There were no reporters present, and his name, age and address were not recorded. But it happened, truly and exactly as I record it, one night in Morocco.

The armored column was American. It was a full division strong and had landed the day before. Its mission was to proceed inland from the coast to parry a blow that was expected from up Marrakesh way. Its encounter with honor took place about one o'clock in the morning, just as it wound into the foothills of the Atlas Mountains.

Armored Division Is 15 Miles Of Steel

Now an armored division in column formation is a fierce thing. Closed up for battle, it stretches fifteen miles of solid steel and fire power. It can blow a good-sized town off the map in thirty minutes. Yet, honor pinned it to the ground, held it choking and roaring with its motors idling for three precious hours in an enemy country in the first phase of an historic invasion. Had there been more resistance in Marrakesh when it got there the next day, it might have lost the battle. Credit honor, with an assist to sentiment.

Problem For General

The general in command of the armored column was a very active sort of man, bluff, aggressive, short and sturdy of stature and red of face. He is a brilliant soldier and his men adore him. He rides into battle with them in a jeep with the top down, accompanied only by his aide who drives if he is not

so impatient that he takes over the wheel himself.

At the moment it began, the general had thus jounced through the inky black, in and out of the gutter, to the rear of his column, just to be sure that all was well there. The rear of a fifteen-mile column moves characteristically in long waits and short rushes to catch up.

Was His Force Being Ambushed?

Therefore, it was some time before the general realized that there was something unnatural about this particular wait. In such close proximity to the enemy there was, of course, radio silence. So it was some time before he diagnosed the wait not as minor traffic trouble but as something more important. Fifteen miles, he suddenly thought, my God, maybe with all this noise of running motors I can't hear the firing! Maybe we have made contact! Maybe we are being ambushed.

Take Wild Jeep Ride

The general's aide has been under fire many times and he did not get his job by being a timid man, but he recalls no terror like the terror of that ride up to the front end of the column with his suddenly alerted commanding general. As the long steel column had halted, it had crushed up upon itself on a narrow road so that there were places where not even a jeep could wedge between a stalled M1 tank and a steep embankment. In such emergencies, the general would climb the bank and proceed on through the woods, "bouncing," the aide swears, "from tree to tree."

Thus came Sheridan to the battle fifteen miles away, ten miles away, five miles away—but as he approached the battlefield there was not more noise to greet him, but less. For here the

drivers of the mighty tanks and the fierce tank destroyers, resigning themselves to the wait which was now stretching into its third hour, had shut off their motors and climbed out to gossip in whispers by the roadside. And against this new silence, after the throbbing of the motors and the clanking of the treads, there was still no sound of gunfire to account for the halted column.

Halt In Wooded Pass

The general and his aide covered the last few miles. The front end of the column was stuck into a densely wooded mountain pass. They swung around the last sharp turn and this is what they saw: One 23-ton M1 tank and, just beyond, a semicircle of American officers and men, their helmets silhouetted in the bright light of a lantern shining from just ahead of them. The general leapt from his jeep and strode through the group. The officers and men were silent, for they had long since exhausted words.

What They Found Was One-Man Block

Beyond them and in the centre of the road there stood—as he told me the story, the general enumerated the items, counting on his fingers:

One rock, almost round, about three feet in diameter.


One lantern, kerosene, sitting on rock.

One soldier, French, aged seventy-five, with snow-white beard, and across his faded tunic, row upon row of ribbons from each of which hung a medal.

One rifle, 1870 Government issue, in hands of said poilu, its butt resting on ground.

"And what," asked the general, halting before this tableau, "what the hell is this?"

THE GROUND FORCES ★



UNITED STATES ARMY

**CHIEF GENERAL
OF STAFF
OF THE ARMY
AND FORCES**

**CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMY
AND FORCES**

**DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF**

SECRETARIAT



GENERAL STAFF (GSE)

**G-3
OPERATIONS
AND
TRAINING**



**G-4
SUPPLY, CONSTRUCTION
TRANSPORTATION
AND EVACUATION**



**REQUIREMENTS
DEVELOPMENT, PUBLICATIONS,
ORGANIZATION & EQUIPMENT
PERTAINING TO THE ARMS**



GENERAL STAFF

**GROUND
QUARTER-
MASTER**



**GROUND
SIGNAL
OFFICER**



**GROUND
BUDGET & FISCAL
OFFICER**



**GROUND
CHEMICAL
OFFICER**



COMMANDS

**MOUNTAIN
TRAINING
CENTER**



**AIRBORNE
COMMAND**



**DESERT
TRAINING
CENTER**



**REPLACEMENT
AND SCHOOL
COMMAND**



The old soldier with the beard squared his shoulders and answered firmly but respectfully, "Monsieur, c'est un road block *symbolique*."

"And why, may I ask," said the general, whose French was still adequate, for he had learned it well in the last war, "why is it there?"

One Old Soldier Represented Nation

"It is there," said the old man proudly, "because I am guarding it. I represent the honour of the French Army. It is not possible to permit the invasion of French soil without resistance. So you see, Monsieur, I resist."

"It is true," the old man continued, "I can only resist symbolically. But I resist"—and letting his eye rove sternly over the semicircle of American officers—"and I resist not unsuccessfully, Monsieur. There is no argument by which these men can persuade me not to resist."

The general had learned more than the language in France. Slowly and thoughtfully he walked around the stone to the old man and with affection and respect he put his arm around his shoulder. "Old one," he said, "I am glad I have seen what I have seen. But this matter is not as difficult as you imagine. It is now clear to the whole world that you have done your duty. It is very late, and I can assure you—for I am the commanding general of this column—that you may now go back to your bed and sleep in peace."

Solution Is Found

Tears of gratitude for such understanding came into the old man's eyes. He grasped the general's hand. "No, no, Monsieur, now I cannot go. You have made it impossible."

"But . . . but why?" asked the commanding general.

"Because," said the old man,

drawing himself up again, "I have inconvenienced an army that was once the ally of France. I must now stay and help you to remove the symbolic road block."

"It would not," said the general with just a slight catch in his voice, "be fair to these men of mine, who are so young and so anxious to serve. They will remove the road block, Papa, they will remove it for you."

French Honor Satisfied

And so it was that the road block *symbolique* was at last pushed to one side and the motors roared and the mighty steel juggernaut rolled on, passing a spot that should forever be a shrine to the honor of France—and to the fine sensitiveness of the American soldier in foreign parts.

And now to get back to the army as an organization:

Think of the army as a pyramid of commanding officers, each wholly responsible for the men and officers under his command, and each surrounded by a group of at least four advisers, one for each of the basic advisory functions.

Staff Officers Aid C.O.

In addition, the C.O.s who command units as large as divisions will have additional advisers. They, too, will be staff officers, on the C.O.s special staff. (GI, 2, 3 and 4 are called his "general staff.") The divisional commanding officer may have a score of special staff officers. The chaplain and the head of his military police will be on his special staff, so will the engineer officer, the signal officer, the senior medical officer, the special adviser on artillery, etc. He may hear any or all before he commits his final decisions to orders.

Each commanding officer is as responsible to the next higher com-



manding officer as he is responsible for his men—the only important thing to note here is that as the chain of command ascends to higher altitudes, each successive commanding officer will have greater latitude in the execution of orders that are passed to him.

Theater Commander Originates Orders

The commanding general in the theater may simply order the commanding general of one of his corps to take such and such a city, leaving the battle plan wholly to Corps. Corps in turn will specify that one of its divisions is to proceed to such and such a place and deliver a flank attack, but will leave the details of the attack to the commanding general of the division. The importance of understanding this fact in analyzing the news becomes immediately apparent.

Confusion In Tunis

Towards the end of the Tunisian campaign there was much confusion in the press over the rôle of the American Second Corps. Military analysts in America did not know how much or little autonomy its commanding general had. Was he a bad or timid general, or had he been given insufficient troops, or were his supplies inadequate when he did not cut off Rommel's retreat from the Mareth Line? Without specific knowledge, criticism or praise was pointless. General Alexander commanded Allied ground forces in the theatre, and General Eisenhower, in turn, commanded the theatre which included these ground forces. It was only *after* the battle that General

Eisenhower publicly revealed the limit that he had set on the Second Corps' mission; to guard the supplies which had been stored for the British Eighth Army's present use, and to contain the German Army on the coastal plain while the Eighth Army delivered the main attack. Once this was clear, the campaign could, for the first time, be analyzed.

The limitations and the strength of the American forces were to be judged against the limited objectives that were set for them; the success or failure of individual divisions or of the corps as a whole was then to be measured not by what the people at home dreamed or hoped they might be able to do, but by their effectiveness in carrying out the orders given them.

How To Judge Troops

It is not enough to appraise the achievements of an army with no more knowledge than who its commanders were and what limits were placed on their authority. Put Napoleon in any American general's place, there would still be only so much he could do with his troops the day after he arrived at headquarters and shook hands with the unit commanders he inherited. In fact, the first thing which would make or break him would be his judgment on what his troops were capable of. If he gave them a plan that was beyond their capacity he would lose the battle, no matter how brilliant the plan. And the first important factor in the capacity of his troops would be how much of their energy (and transportation!) they were using up in simply existing at all, and next how much they had left over for mobility, and

only finally, after they had made the effort of feeding and sheltering themselves and the added effort of transporting themselves to where the general ordered them, how much they had left over with which to fight.

Too much of the Tunisian campaign was reported in terms of individual heroism under fire. And too little in appraisal of our effectiveness simply as an army.

SUMMARY

The orders of theater and other high commanders are broad and general. Specific plans and orders are left to the decision of commanders farther down the "chain." Arm-chair strategists, reading only the news, often misinterpret the reasons behind the actions of particular units in the field. They do not know the greater strategy involving many units that is expressed in the orders of the commanding general. The apparent immobility of the American Second Corps in Tunisia caused undue speculation. The vital rôle it played in the whole allied operation was revealed later by General Eisenhower.

How is the chain of command in the army like a pyramid?

What would happen if high command tried to issue specific orders to small units? And what would be the result, on the other hand, if each division commander acted entirely independently?

Why should military critics wait until an operation is ended before attempting to analyze it?

As a machine built to deliver men in the field properly armed and equipped to meet the enemy face to face, the army is not the product of the present commanders at all, but several

generations of planners, whose plans had to include the whole industrial economy of the nation.

Army Planning Goes Back 10 To 20 Years

On the wisdom of forgotten men and forgotten officers in the War Department and Congress in the 'twenties and 'thirties the dependence of our army begins. Hitler's mad inspiration may have given the Reichswehr a quality it did not have before. But not Hitler or even Rommel made the Afrika Korps. What made the Afrika Korps was a little group of experts in Berlin's war office in continuous existence through victory, defeat, revolution and counter-revolution. And these are the men who chose and standardized the equipment of the individual soldier.

The American soldier is first identified by his uniform, his pack and his rations. All three are amazingly efficient. To understand the importance of the planning, remember what was so quickly passed over above: that the army, not the individual soldier, is responsible for his welfare. He doesn't plan his uniform as a civilian chooses his clothes, nor does he raise or shop for his food.

Every Need Covered

Every necessity of his life is planned for him years in advance. The fundamental of the plan is that his clothes, food and shelter must keep him healthy and self-sufficient without the help of civilian facilities. The plan had to start with providing for the soldier's well-being alone on a desert with neither barracks nor canteen nor any place to get into when it rains.

Line troops—roughly: troops qualified to take their place in a firing-line—are self-sufficient neither at home nor in the field. Huge military organizations

serve them. These, too, must be understood.

First there is the monster store that is known as the Quartermaster Corps. The Quartermaster Corps is a gigantic department store with thousands and thousands of branches, and the component units of the army are its customers. The Quartermaster Corps designs and manufactures or buys these stores and the component units draw what they need, paying in signed requisitions instead of money.

Duties Of Branches

To another semi-autonomous organization is entrusted all communications within the army. This is the Signal Corps.

The Corps of Engineers builds (and demolishes) for the army, provides the maps and the water.

The Transportation Corps is responsible for all transportation the army cannot do on its own feet or in its own trucks or by calling on the Navy.

The Medical Department is a similar semi-autonomous body. So is the Ordnance Department, which manufactures, issues and maintains the army's weapons, its motors and other mechanical equipment.

Linked, They Form Army Service Forces

These great service corps, each with its own field of responsibility, are joined together in what until a few months ago was called "The Service of Supplies." Recently, its name in the United States was changed to the "Army Service Forces."

The three-star general, General Brehon B. Somervell, commands the Army Service Forces. Since his mission includes the supplying of the whole army, his interest in how production for the army is planned

and administered is natural and inevitable.

In theory, a unit of ground forces could exist simply by drawing its supplies from the Quartermaster Corps, having the engineers build barracks for it and the Signal Corps install the telephones—without the ground force ever being more intimate with the service force than you are with Macy's and the telephone company. In practice, what happens is this:

Each major unit of the army has units from the service forces permanently assigned to it. It is as if, we might say, you are so big a customer that the A. & P. opened a special branch for you in a room in your apartment house, and, to insure domestic tranquility, made you the boss of the clerks who worked there. Thus, a division may have a company from the Signal Corps assigned, and whole battalions of medics and quartermasters—as well as a platoon from Ordnance and a battalion of engineers.

Commanders All Hold Divisional Staff Jobs

The commanding officers of these detachments are on the special staff of the commanding general of the division. Then, when the commanding general wants something built, instead of writing to the Chief of Engineers in Washington, he simply orders the commanding officer of his engineer troops to do the job. And each day, as the army on the move progresses, its attached signal personnel will see to it that all its units are kept in communication with one another, whether by wire or by wireless or with semaphore flags or by carrier pigeon.

And thus, finally, line troops with their assigned service elements together at last make a self-sustaining, independent community that can exist and

care for itself without benefit of civilian facilities.

Sometimes it confuses even soldiers in one's own branch to learn that the combat engineers, who held the line as infantrymen at Kasserine Pass, came, not from ground forces, but from service organizations. It is this way: the service troops are trained by their respective branches, but are subsequently assigned to and become an organic part of the ground forces or the air forces. Their function in the field is always one of some specialized service, but any of them (except the medical men) are at the disposal of the commanding officer in the field to be used as fighting troops.

Engineers Are Infantry

Except in the direst emergency, the engineers are the only service troops likely to be used as infantrymen. Signal Corps men, for instance, are much too important as specialists, and usually too few. The engineers, however, are intensively trained as infantrymen because their most important function at the front is to keep the infantry moving, and this means that on an advance they must build roads and bridges *in front of* the infantry. In a retreat, they will be the last to leave, for it will be their

mission to impede the enemy's passage by blowing up roads and bridges or by building obstacles. Trained as infantrymen, there has hardly ever been a campaign in which combat engineers were not called on at some time to take over some of the line. The Tunisian campaign was no exception; I believe the engineer regiment that held the gap at Kasserine for thirty-six hours had a higher casualty list than any infantry regiment during the campaign.

My first and clearest impression of the difference between the division at home and the division in the field was an impression of the merging of all these different units into a single working community, with each branch completely and obviously, and pretty happily dependent on every other. Always remember this!

SUMMARY

An army reflects the nation behind it. Its effectiveness is the result of years of planning and preparation. The object is to keep him healthy and self-sufficient—independent of civilian facilities.

Is there a relation between the causes and progress of the war and the amount of advance preparation made by the various belligerent nations?





Preparation

NO time is more important than now to know about our Army. Few officers or men today are able, because of specialization, to secure a wide knowledge of our Army. If we are reasonably good at one small job, we are effective. If we are very good at two jobs we are valuable. Few men know the whole picture thoroughly; those who do are the leaders. In the vast undertaking of which we are an integral part, there is an unceasing need to know, and to know even more. None of us should be complacent; each will be more efficient at his job if he has as much of the total organization in mind as is possible.

Major Ingersoll has written a valuable book; and this article is one of the most valuable parts of that book. In simple language he shows us what an army is and how it works. Most of all he shows why it works the way it does. He says—"the whole effect of the army is as integrated as the shaft and the head and the point of the tip of a spear." Whether your job is in the shaft or head or tip of that spear, it is vital. It must be done. If it is done badly some soldier, some place, must suffer. It doesn't matter whether that job is peeling spuds, walking guard or ducking snipers and shells where the going is plenty rough. We all have to remember that if one GI had not peeled the spuds the other would not be fit to drive the truck or do guard duty. Whatever the job, it is important. That is why it is a good army; and that is why we must believe in it.

In setting up the discussion group the leader should consider himself the chairman. His primary function is to open and then guide the discussion, not to dominate it. At all times he should keep the ball rolling while remaining in the background. He does not need to lecture the men, nor does he need to consider himself as an expert on the topic. He has the important task of stimulating cross-currents of discussion, of securing the answers from the group, and of keeping the trend of talk on the subject. It is an interesting and exacting post.

Because of the broad sweep of the subject, the leader should limit his talk to about five minutes in establishing the "set" of the discussion.

The technique of leading a discussion is one to which every leader will want to give attention. Primarily through his own personal interest and sufficient preparation he must develop the enthusiasm of the group. It can be done by a



good opening talk, by referring to a map, as for example, the one of Europe which has appeared in the past two issues of Yank, and by a careful outline set up on a blackboard. At the close of the talk he can call on one of the men he has "planted." Then he can ask for the answer from some member of the group, and have the second "plant" ready to pick up the rebuttal. In this way he will start his criss-cross of opinion. At all times proper procedure should be followed, and the chairman recognized. It is essential that the leader guide the discussion, and preside over the group without allowing himself to take it over or steal it.

QUESTIONS FOR THE DISCUSSION

Q. Why must an army spend so much time and effort on the business of surviving and moving ? p. 3.

What percentage of a day is given to sleeping, eating, and preparation for battle ? How much of an army is involved in the business of supplying and moving the fighting units ?

Q. How great is the responsibility of a C.O. ? Can he pass the buck on to his junior officers ? p. 4.

Q. What are the divisions of staff functions in the army, and what does each division mean ? p. 5.

Q. What is the difference between S1 and G1 ?

Q. How was the honor of the old French Soldier satisfied ? What did the old man mean by a road block "symbolique" ? p. 10.

Q. What are the definitions of : Line troops ; Quartermaster Corps ; Ordnance Department ; War Production Board ? p. 13.

Q. Does the description of army organization as a great pyramid make clear your ideas on confidence in the command ?

Q. Does the article not increase your understanding of the service, your sense of participation in it and your pride of belonging to it ?

Q. How can the reading of this article extend your knowledge of the progress of the war ? Of the ultimate establishment of the peace ?

