



ARMY
TALKS FOR THE

EIGHTH AIR FORCE



DAY and NIGHT

Vol. 1. No. 2. 10 Feb. 1945

RESTRICTED • ETO • U.S. ARMY


A SINGLE TASK—A SINGLE AIM

Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir Charles F. A. Portal, G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C., sends this message to our Commanding General :

Through three momentous years we have watched the United States Eighth Air Force grow until today it forms with R.A.F. Bomber Command a great two-handed sword cutting from the West at the German capacity to wage war. Never has co-operation in a common task between two Allies been more complete, more harmonious and, above all, more effective. Your heavy, continuous assaults on Germany by day were the essential counterpart of our blows at night, and the way in which your attacks have been pressed home in face of the fiercest opposition has aroused British admiration.

Hardly less gratifying than success in the air has been the spirit of comradeship and mutual helpfulness on the ground. In this respect the two Air Forces have been as one, with a single task and a single aim : all experience, all research has been shared for mutual benefit.

Great efforts have been made from bomber bases in this country in this War and it may not be long before the cumulative effect of our joint air offensive on the enemy's war potential and economy will be demonstrated beyond any shadow of doubt. Towards that achievement the Eighth Air Force has taken an ever-growing part in the past three years, and on the occasion of your third anniversary of activation I would like to extend on behalf of the Royal Air Force our warmest congratulations.



Marshal of the Royal Air Force,
Chief of the Air Staff.



ARMY TALKS

"The purpose of the program is to give the soldier psychological preparation for combat, and a better realization of the import of every phase of his military training. Emphasis will be placed on combat orientation. The mental and physical conditioning of the enemy, and a proper evaluation of the enemy's weapons and fighting qualities will be stressed. A better understanding of the background of the war, and the soldier's responsibilities in the post-war world will also be developed."

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL EISENHOWER.

(Extract from letter ETO. 1 August 1944, AG 352/2 OpSS, Subject: Combat Orientation Program.)

DAY and NIGHT

The Story of Eighth Air Force—RAF Teamwork



THE Flying Fortress was fast losing altitude. Only one of her four engines was running. Six gaping holes had been torn in her frame by 20mm. shells. The navigator and waist gunner were injured. Not long after crossing the Danish coast they were down to 6,000 feet and the pilot decided to ditch and ordered the crew to their stations. The radio operator had confirmed his position from RAF radio stations on the English coast. For ten minutes before the plane hit the water he sent out distress signals to both RAF and US radio stations located in East and South England, getting a "fix" on the plane's course and setting in motion the machinery of Air-Sea Rescue long before the B-17 hit the waves.

With the last surge of power from the one engine, the pilot levelled off the plane over the water and touched down tail first. Landing flaps had been shot away and they were travelling at nearly 100 miles an hour. The tail snapped off and water poured into the waist and radio rooms. The sea was calm and only two of the crew received minor injuries through the impact. The 10 men made their way out through their proper escape routes, the two dinghies were floated, and the crew scrambled aboard. Before the last man was out the water was already chest high in the plane, and she remained afloat for less than a minute.

It was half past four in the afternoon of May 19, 1944. The plane had ditched dangerously close to the enemy coast. The hopes of the crew ran high, although their rescue presented a tough problem as they were about 300 miles from home. Visibility was good, but night closed down on them and they used flares, with which the dinghies were provided, but without results.

LIFEBOAT FROM HEAVEN

Meanwhile, Air-Sea Rescue was on the job. As soon as the plane's distress signals were received, the information was relayed to an RAF Coastal Command airdrome and search planes were dispatched. At the same time, word was sent to a Royal Air Force marine craft unit and high-speed launches headed for the area where the plane was known to have ditched. The search went on without a pause through the night and the next day, until a few minutes after four in the afternoon, when an RAF plane reported that it was circling the dinghies.

At once the RAF dispatched a specially equipped plane and two hours later it had dropped by parachute a lifeboat large enough to hold the 10 men. The lifeboat was provided with two outboard motors which could drive it about 100 miles towards home and away from enemy shores. A message was dropped, giving navigation instructions, and the lifeboat slowly headed west. The circling plane above continued its watchful guard, and with the aid of flare floats dropped during the night, maintained contact with the small craft.

Shortly after midnight the plane reported the riding lights of small vessels, later identified as Danish fishing boats. In the early morning light a relief aircraft observed one of the boats take the crew on board and secure the lifeboat. Twice, when the vessel headed towards the enemy coast, the guardian plane halted her with warning shots across the bows. Meanwhile, Eighth Air Force Air-Sea Rescue Thunderbolts were called upon for protection and aircraft guided two high-speed launches to the spot. With watchful fighter protection overhead, the American airmen were transferred to a launch. A Thunderbolt sank the lifeboat, which could not be towed, as the sea now ran too high. Then the launch headed for home, screened all the way by relays of P-47's.




At the RAF Air-Sea Rescue station, the rescued airmen were given medical attention and all their needs were cared for until they could be returned to their own organization. The recovery of these 10 airmen is typical in many ways of the means by which hundreds of Eighth Air Force flyers have been saved by Air-Sea Rescue from certain death or capture. In the period including March to November of last year, through the combined efforts of this RAF organization and the Eighth Air Force fighter reconnaissance service, no less than 778 Eighth Air Force personnel have been rescued. The crew of this story were favored by calm seas and good visibility. But all through the bombing missions the patient policing goes on in the air and on the water, however rough the sea may be and however foul the weather. The alertness and skill of the patrolling has not only saved hundreds of those who have ditched, but has saved many a plane from having to ditch by giving navigational assistance.

ONE JOB, ONE TEAM

Air-Sea Rescue is a striking example of cooperation between RAF and Eighth Air Force. It is typical of the spirit and the skill which has created teamwork between two vast war machines and two great groups of fighting men. The extent of that cooperation is now so vast that it is easy to overlook the significance of its contribution to the Allied war effort. It is in many ways unique in military history. Without it, the Allied air offensive would not have paved the way for the successful invasion of Europe last summer.

Before our planes could fly their first mission from the UK a great and complex network of ground organization had to be built. The RAF, who had had two and a half years headstart in the present war, made available all types of their own facilities, and undertook a great part of our own construction, supply and maintenance program during our growing pains. RAF cooperation provided the outstanding example of British reciprocal aid—both in size and variety—from the supply of thumbtacks to the supply of fighter escort, and from weather information to training schools.




From the beginning, the policy was laid down that there should be no duplication of effort by the two Air Forces. The Eighth would apply its resources to the jobs which were outside the scope of the RAF, and would receive the assistance of the RAF in the use of facilities which were already established by the latter. As the Eighth has grown to full strength and as it has developed its own procedures and techniques, the degree to which the two organizations overlap has naturally decreased. This has not meant less teamwork; it has meant more. Now the Eighth is able to provide the RAF with direct and indirect help in many ways which were impossible in the early days. Our training schools, technical data, combat experience, new flying instruments and equipment, mechanical developments—all these are of increasing aid to the RAF, and are bringing the scales of mutual assistance closer to a balance. But most valuable by far to the RAF is our sustained daylight assault on the Reich, from which they profit, as we profit by their night bombing. Day and night the enemy gets no rest, and must divide his strength to meet the double attack.

GETTING TO FIRST BASE


The immediate need of the Eighth Bomber Command in the Spring of 1942 was for bases from which to fly its daylight missions over the Continent. Until these were ready for operation the Command was only a paper organization. Although the RAF had abandoned the idea of daylight bombing they gave fullest assistance to the great task of building such a bomber force. Several RAF fields were converted for American use, and under the direction of the British Air Ministry work was started by civilian labor on new fields to be built to US requirements. The building of these bomber stations, a reverse lend-lease arrangement, was a large scale undertaking. All but eleven of the Eighth Air Force's many fields have been built in this way.

After we started operations, RAF fields themselves were placed at our disposal from time to time for special purposes. When the heavies flew to attack sub bases on the Atlantic coast they took off from RAF bases in Southwest England to save distance on the long missions. Today, the three biggest RAF fields in the country are available for planes of the Eighth which have run into trouble and which seek the shelter of those long, wide runways.

When the Eighth Air Force personnel moved into a field constructed for them by the RAF, they found everything ready for occupation and operation. Volumes could be and probably will be written on the subject of all the arrangements which had to be made for living and housekeeping on these bases. All buildings were provided, fully furnished on an equal basis with similar RAF establishments. Complete kitchen and messing facilities were installed together with thousands of items which are necessary to make a base habitable over a long period. Several fine estates were turned over to the various commands of the Eighth for headquarters. At the Eighth headquarters itself a replica was constructed of the RAF Bomber Command's bomb-proof and gas-proof underground operational center.



ONE YEAR ONE THOUSAND MEN FOUR MILLION DOLLARS



AIRFIELD IN THE MAKING

The RAF took on a big job when they helped build and equip the Eighth's bases. The concrete in each airfield would pave fifty miles of two-lane Class A highway. The physical plant of the Eighth is equivalent in size to seventy typical American county seat towns.

The four types of jobs pictured above were frequently performed by RAF personnel until US manpower was available.

A vast network of telephone and teletype communications was provided and is maintained by the British General Post Office System, by arrangements made through the Air Ministry. The RAF and Eighth Air Force draw all their gas and oil, a very large percentage of which is shipped from the United States, from a pool administered and distributed by the British.

The RAF has provided and still does provide many articles and services^s which it is impossible or difficult to obtain from the United States. Oxygen supply, for example, would have been extremely difficult for the Eighth Air Force to handle in sufficient quantities for large scale high altitude flying. The RAF has supplied oxygen and equipment to adapt its use in US planes. Much special flying equipment has come from them—chest type parachutes and individual dinghies, for example.

INTO SCORING POSITION

Before we left the States, many of us had become accustomed to the sight of men in RAF blue in our cities and on our airdromes. The US government trained thousands of RAF flyers when British facilities were taxed to a maximum. When the Eighth was young, the RAF took on two great tasks: they made many of their schools available for the training of our personnel, and they supplied several thousand RAF men and women to fill key jobs with the Eighth before Americans arrived to replace them. Clerks to handle administration, telephone and teletype operators, maintenance personnel, flying control specialists—for more than a year the RAF loaned experienced men and women to the Eighth, and at the peak period of May, 1943, they numbered more than one-fifth of total Eighth Air Force personnel. Although we are today almost "All-American," there are RAF liaison staff and technical specialists who will work with us as long as we remain in England.

For many months the Eighth relied upon the RAF for certain kinds of training schools. Armorers, mechanics, ordnance workers, and flying controllers are among those who were trained by the RAF. RAF schools have been open to our fighter pilots for gunnery instruction, to flyers for training in the use of personal equipment, and to specialists responsible for maintenance of radio, radar, and other instruments. Their experienced instructors have visited our airfields to give instruction as well as to obtain first-hand information on performance of British equipment, and the conditions under which we operate.

Nowhere is the cooperation of the two Air Forces better illustrated than in the field of ordnance. On July 4, 1942, the first Eighth Air Force crews to fly on a mission over the Continent dropped British 500 lb. bombs. In the early missions there were no US incendiary bombs available, so we used RAF types, formulating new bomb tables to suit the Norden sights. By the summer of '42 two large RAF bomb depots had been handed over for storage and distribution of US bombs. The RAF looks to the US for supplies of almost all bombs of less than 4,000 pounds. In turn, the Eighth has made use of RAF pyrotechnics—and RAF ordnance has provided essential vehicles, mostly of the types not readily available from

the States. RAF bomb disposal units are responsible for handling bombs in our crashed planes, and those we are forced to jettison over British soil.

The headquarters of the two Commands have maintained the closest liaison on technical as well as supply problems. Many an informal conference has been held to exchange information and to apply the research and experience of one group to the problems of the other. When the Eighth has had to solve certain problems in a hurry, such as the effectiveness of US $4\frac{1}{2}$ inch rockets, or the functioning of new US fuses under freezing conditions, the RAF handled the necessary research at their experimental stations. The answers were thus provided far quicker than they could have been if the tests had had to be conducted on the other side of the Atlantic. In return, RAF ordnance headaches have been tackled at laboratories and testing grounds back in the States.

The interchange of goods and services is taken care of through lend-lease and reciprocal aid. In that sense it is a regular large scale commercial transaction between Britain and the United States, and British supplies to the Eighth have been more than counterbalanced by the great flood of American material used by the RAF. But anyone who sees no further than that misses the spirit with which the business has been conducted. On many occasions, especially in the early months before the Eighth had grown to strength, emergency calls had to be made for scarce items;




The RAF made their training schools available to us

unforeseen services, or joint action for which no guiding procedure had been established. For months, for example, the RAF Air-Sea Rescue organization gave medical care and food and clothing to rescued Eighth Air Force flyers, to the limit of their capacity and with no financial return. Certainly the three teams of US ordnance enlisted men who offered themselves for RAF tests of the effect of mustard gas on the skin, were not bound by a small idea of the extent to which cooperation should go.

CHERBOURG MERSEBERG

SCHWEINFURT

BERLIN



DAY and



Round the Clock Bombing keeps enemy defenses alerted 24 hours a day while the two Air Forces between them hit all types of targets, from industrial areas to compact plants.

A Ground Defense Force of one million seven hundred thousand has been pinned down on the Western approaches to the targets—a very serious drain on enemy manpower.



German Fighter Strength had to be duplicated for day and night defense and more than half of its total strength maintained in the West, thus easing our Mediterranean and Russian fronts.

Fortress Europe Cracked when the joint air assault whittled down aircraft, oil and other vital war production to give the Allies air superiority and weaken the enemy sufficiently for successful invasion.



SHARING THE SECRETS

In the field of technical research and experiment there have been no jealously guarded secrets between the Eighth and the RAF. It is true that the press of each country has often claimed an important invention or discovery used in air warfare as the sole achievement of that nation. It is also true that Britain and America have pioneered certain secret devices and techniques, to be tested and adopted by their own air forces before they were used by the other. But ever since Pearl Harbor the best brains of both countries have been applied to many common fields of research. British scientists work in laboratories in the United States and vice versa. The RAF and the Eighth Air Force have been the two great testing agencies of new instruments and techniques, for heavy bombardment and in other fields, under combat conditions. Their personnel, like the scientists, have exchanged information and ideas in both formal and informal meetings on the airfields and at headquarters.

The success of this joint research and experiment has been outstanding in the production and use of radio and radar equipment. When the Eighth arrived in the UK, the RAF was already using a well established air-ground organization for aircraft warning and navigation aids; both of them are now using it. In the early stages, Eighth Air Force radio technicians were trained at RAF schools and we are still using a British device for position finding. Some RAF blind bombing radar equipment was used before we produced instruments better adapted for daylight bombing through overcast. Together the Air Forces have worked out devices for jamming and confusing enemy detection and aircraft warning systems.



No jealously guarded secrets

Teamwork on the ground was the prelude to teamwork in the air. RAF Bomber Command was designed for night bombardment of German industrial centers. The Eighth Air Force was designed for precision bombing of compact industrial and military enemy targets. The British Lancasters, Halifaxes and Stirlings were built to handle heavy loads of

explosives and incendiaries to fire large areas. The US Forts and Libs were built for precision bombing of pinpoint targets. The Eighth and the RAF, operating in conjunction, could hit both kinds of targets and so strike a deadly blow at the Nazi war effort. Day and night operations had two other great advantages. First, they made possible nerve destroying round-the-clock bombing. The enemy were in fear of attack at any hour of the day or night. Secondly they forced the enemy to duplicate air defense personnel and fighter strength, since the same crews could not operate day and night.

JOINT MISSION

Such was the pattern of cooperation between the two. Their differences made their teamwork all the more valuable. But it is one thing to lay out the blueprint of future strategy and another to fight through the thousand unforeseen problems of a global war to full scale operations. The fight began in earnest for the Eighth in the Fall of 1942, when Forts and Libs tested out their strength in their small missions over France and the Low Countries. At the Casablanca Conference in January, 1943, the work of Eighth Bomber Command was carefully considered. Although the value of daylight precision bombing was doubted by some authorities, the Eighth had achieved sufficient results to convince the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Eighth would provide a powerful daylight partner to the RAF's night assaults. They defined for the two bomber forces a joint mission—"the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to the point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened." By "fatally weakened" was meant, sufficiently weakened to permit final combined operations on the Continent. It was made clear at Casablanca that the joint strategic bombing of the two forces was to be a major part of the Allied war plan in the European theater in 1943.

Today the heavies of the Eighth are protected by a great screen of their own fighter planes from start to finish of their long missions. At the beginning of their operations, and for more than a year afterwards, they had to depend almost entirely on RAF fighter escort. Spitfires escorted the bombers at the beginning and end of their missions. But the range of the fighters was very limited, as continuous fighter escort was not a part of the RAF night bombing plan. This lack was not so serious for the first months, but with the growing weight of the daylight missions over the Reich in March the Luftwaffe began to increase its fighter attacks upon the heavies. Casualties mounted and large scale air battles became more frequent. It was this growing strength of the German Air Force which was the greatest concern not only of the Eighth Bomber crews, but of the Allied military chiefs in Washington and London. The North African invasion had made it clear that continuous air superiority would be essential for a successful invasion of the Continent.

NUMBER ONE JOB

There were only two ways in which this could be done—by destroying existing enemy planes, and by crippling their aircraft industry. To this task the RAF and the Eighth turned their attention, though the heaviest responsibility fell on the daylight bombers. Following Casablanca, and as the Eighth swung into full stride, a combined Bomber Offensive Plan guided the two Air Forces in the priority and allocation of targets. The RAF struck at the big industrial areas, with their concentrated plants, centers of population and industrial manpower, and sources of transport, lighting and power facilities. The Eighth went after the key industrial plants which were usually placed on the fringes of cities or in the countryside, and therefore often escaped the RAF's area saturation bombing.

From July, 1943, until shortly before D-Day the Eighth, helped by the Fifteenth, sought out the aircraft assembly plants, engine plants, air-frame plants, and the ball bearing factories, bottleneck in aircraft manufacture. RAF Bomber Command pounded adjoining population centers. The joint assault crippled production and forced the Germans to develop their aircraft manufacture away from the cities, and in smaller units.

When oil became a top priority target in the spring of last year, Eighth, Fifteenth, and RAF airmen together hammered at the nerve centers of production and supply. The RAF attacked the synthetic plants situated in the Ruhr, and the Eighth and Fifteenth hit the oil resources further East and South. Together they reduced fuel and lubricant production by more than half. During the invasion days RAF Bomber Command, as well as the Eighth, swung in with the Ninth on the vital tactical tasks to protect our ground and sea forces and to immobilize and whittle down the enemy's supplies and communication lines. While the Eighth hit bridges and fortifications, often within a few hundred yards of our own troops, the RAF heavies pounded forts, marshalling yards, and other targets in more open territory. All through the land operations both forces have hammered at strategic and tactical targets alike, following the pattern of priorities laid down by the Chiefs of Staff and allotted according to the special qualifications of each.



Teamwork

TEAMWORK ON TARGETS

There has only been one large scale combined operation, when the Eighth and the RAF bombers actually flew together to attack the same target. Last August a thousand US and eight hundred British bombers attacked enemy airfields together. Bomber Command is developing increasing numbers of units for day flying, just as the Eighth has been training night bombers, and the two Commands have provided each other with invaluable assistance in such training. But the main pattern of the strategic day and night bombing partnership outlined at Casablanca is more firmly established now than ever before.

In the early months of the Eighth's operations the inevitable sudden changes of plans in both Air Forces frequently led to some confusion.

There were too many last minute requests for attacks on targets, fighter cover, diversionary sweeps and the like. To coordinate activities and provide joint plans for penetration to the targets over the Reich, a RAF-Eighth Air Force Combined Operational Planning Committee, with British and American representatives of bomber and fighter components, was set up in the Summer of 1943. The committee studied the available information collected by both Commands, recommended targets, and advised on the best methods of using their resources to hit the chosen targets hardest. This committee is but one example of the joint planning needed to coordinate the working of the two great forces.

The machinery of cooperation between the Eighth and the RAF begins above the heads of both. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington and London study the data on both the enemy's and our own situations and prepare the broad outline of target priorities and operational strategy.

The US Strategic Air Forces in Europe Headquarters and the British Air Ministry interpret the missions to be accomplished by respective air forces in this theater. Then it is up to the striking forces of the RAF and Eighth to accomplish the knocking out of specific targets in the order of their current priority. Target selection committees on which both Air Forces are represented, are continually sifting intelligence data from photos and reports to determine which plants, depots or railyards are most valuable to the enemy, and therefore the most urgent targets. No target is ever attacked by either Force without the other first being informed of the proposal.



... on Targets

POOLING THE PICS

There is no field in which the sharing of information and resources is greater than in photo reconnaissance. The British and Americans fly separately to take pictures, and the processing is done at different laboratories, but from then on RAF and Eighth Air Force personnel work together on photo interpretation and the handling of the data secured. American officers may work on British photos and vice versa. There are no secrets between the two reconnaissance units. The vast scale US Recon Wing adopted many British ideas from its opposite number in the RAF and uses much British equipment and material. In return, American production methods and facilities have enabled the Eighth to assist the RAF in overcoming technical problems in the reconnaissance field. The RAF uses our Forts for special recon jobs, and the Eighth uses Spitfires in addition to P-38's and Mosquitoes.

One of the most remarkable features of Allied cooperation is the pooling of weather information. The British meteorological teleprinter network serves RAF and Eighth air bases alike, and receives data from the many facilities of both Air Forces as well as from many other more distant sources. The routine weather reconnaissance runs made by Eighth and RAF planes have been carefully coordinated. Joint codes and procedures have been worked out so that operational headquarters can quickly obtain weather forecasts for special targets in addition to the regular teleprinter service.

MUSTANG IS A MODEL

The Mustang, one of the most successful planes used by both Air Forces, well illustrates how successful teamwork has been in the technical sphere. Nearly two years before Pearl Harbor the RAF made known through British Government technical and trade representatives its needs for a certain type of pursuit plane. An American firm, North American, went to work and designed, produced, tested, redesigned and handed over the first production model to the RAF a month before Pearl Harbor. Our own General Doolittle, incidentally, had a part in testing an early model and suggesting modifications. In the early spring Mustangs went into action on low level photo recon missions. It was not until the Dieppe raid in August '42 that the Mustangs proved themselves as excellent low level fighters.


Impressed by British experiments, the North American engineers began equipping the P-51's with 20 mm. cannon for the US forces in North Africa and soon sensational reports of their ground strafing came back. The cannon installation was so successful that the RAF adopted the design principles in their own British aircraft. Soon the RAF Mustangs over the Continent became famous as "train busters." New models with modifications were produced for the US Army Air Forces and production was completed in time for the Mustang to play an important part in the reduction of Pantelleria.

In the late spring of '43 the British supercharged Rolls-Royce Merlin engine was substituted for the original power unit on the American production lines and this new Mustang was delivered to the Eighth in November '43 for its biggest job—escort duty with the heavies high over German territory. Soon, with the Thunderbolts, the P-51's were able to relieve the medium bombers of their role of hitting enemy fighter airfields and of running diversions to protect the Forts and Libs, and the Bostons and Marauders were able to assist the RAF in attacking the flying bomb and rocket sites which presented a serious menace to British cities.

TEAMWORK TELLS

The immediate objective of the joint mission laid down for the two Air Forces at Casablanca has been accomplished. The Nazi war machine was hammered by the Eighth and the RAF, as well as by the Fifteenth, until it was unable to prevent the Allies establishing their forces in France. Together, the two great strategic Air Forces assisted Allied tactical air power in supporting the great advance of the ground forces to the borders of the Reich. To these achievements must be added the relief which the Eighth-RAF air assault afforded the Russian and Mediterranean battle-fronts. The Germans were forced to employ an estimated 1,700,000 of their manpower on ground defense against the air attacks from the West; during 1943 they had to increase their fighter strength on the Western approaches to 60 percent of their total resources, with an accompanying loss of air power on the other fronts.

It is impossible to estimate how much time or how many lives have been saved by the teamwork of the men and women of the two Air Forces on these jobs. It is equally impossible to estimate which of the two has made the greater contribution. The important point is that together they have accomplished what could not have been done separately. The Eighth and the RAF are now two giants grown to full stature, who will continue to work together in a thousand ways because their teamwork will bring V Day immeasurably closer.



"Seems like we have a lot in common"



FOR THE BULL SESSION

YOU won't have to go any farther than your own base to find plenty of examples of Eighth-RAF cooperation. The history of your own field, ops of your own unit, and experiences of flying and ground men alike should be able to illustrate plenty of points. Who has been to a RAF Training School? What RAF equipment do you use every day? (The nearest RAF liaison officer should be able to supply some interesting facts.) Has anyone been hauled out of the drink by Air-Sea Rescue? Who can tell from first hand experience any jobs we have worked on together with the RAF?

There is no need to work up any sentimental feelings on the subject of cooperation, because the facts and figures talk for themselves. No mention has been made of the frictions or misunderstandings which have occurred from time to time. They have been remarkably few, considering the hundreds of thousands of human beings involved, and they are obviously insignificant compared with the great tasks accomplished together.


Cooperation has been of two main varieties—the pooling of material and technical resources of all kinds (in which the RAF have provided the greater share since they were the first in this war and had the facilities on hand); and, secondly, the operational strategy and tactics. Teamwork in this second field has resulted partly from planning and partly from the natural differences of the two partners. (What are they?)

The time factor has been important. No doubt either Air Force could have been developed and adapted to perform all that the two have done together. But how long would it have taken? Would the growing German fighter strength have been checked before it got out of hand? Is it likely that D-Day would have happened in 1944?

Eighth Air Force-RAF teamwork is naturally a part of the whole picture of Allied cooperation. Our heavies which blasted the sub-bases saved British as well as American shipping. When they wrecked flying bomb and rocket sites they saved British lives and cities. Together the RAF and the Eighth drew German fighters from the Eastern front, and so eased the job of Russian troops. You can think of plenty more instances.

The important point is *not* how much *each* Air Force did, but *how much* both did together, and *how* they did it. Would cooperation have worked if it had only been the job of a few big shots? And, if you are interested in chewing on the question, how will cooperation help speed V-Day? Does it have any significance for international relations after the war?

FROM THE EAGLE'S NEST



Cantilever Platform Hoist


455th Sub-Depot has produced a couple of brain-storms. The first is a portable cantilever platform hoist. It can be hauled to any aircraft on the base and is mighty handy for reaching repair work on high places on a plane where you can't climb. It is especially useful for repairs and changes of rudder and vertical stabilizer.

A hand winch that can be operated by one man will raise the platform to a maximum of 14 feet. This platform hoist was manufactured principally of salvaged aircraft material. An I beam is used for the support column and provides a track for the elevating rollers. The track is kept well greased at all times so that the platform can be raised and lowered with ease. The structure is set on five (5) wheels, each wheel with a locking pin to prevent

the platform from rolling while men are at work. A towing bar is bolted to the structure for the purpose of towing the platform hoist with any type of vehicle available.

Mobile Paint Unit

Item No. 2, which looks like a handy platform for making speeches from, is designed for paint jobs in awkward places—marking B-17 vertical stabilizers. It is also used for other paint markings that may be needed on aircraft for identification purposes and the painting over of repair work. The boom mounted on front of the truck has a platform 4 feet by 3 feet affixed on top. The height of the platform can be varied by operation of the truck winch. This unit is mounted on a two and one half (2½) ton 6 x 6 GMC truck. It has a compressor and spraying equipment on the unit at all times. A work bench is built on the truck for the mixing of paints, cleaning and setting up spray guns.



Send us your tips and ideas. Address them to: Army Talks, Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, APO 634, US Army, ETO.

WORDS FROM THE WING WISE

May We Repeat?

Check your oxygen mask every five minutes.

Be sure your A-14 oxygen mask is modified before flying at high altitudes.

All electrically heated clothing *must* go to the drying room.

Don't disconnect electrically heated gloves—leave snaps connected and avoid danger of short circuits.

Always keep your parachute near you.



Some Points on Keeping Plexiglass from Frosting:

Be sure the glass is clean and dry when you take off.

Turn upper and ball turrets to the rear during take-off, so that any mud and moisture blown on to them will be on the rear of the turrets.

Preparations like Killfrost help some, especially if you take along a can of it and swab some on with a rag occasionally.

The best way to prevent turret plexiglass from frosting is to avoid letting the inside of the turret get too warm.

Some Groups drill holes through the plexiglass, for ventilation. Don't let a direct blast of cold air hit you. Some sort of plexiglass deflector should be mounted over the holes to keep the breeze along the glass.

Don't scrape off frost with a metal tool—make yourself a little scraper out of plexiglass if you need one.

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