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AFTER ACTION REPORT

593rd JOINT ASSULT SIGNAL CO.

20 Oct - 10 Nov 45 44

Instructs regarding the Document

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Date _____

Encl - 6 Nov

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593RD JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO #235, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

14 February 1945

SUBJECT: Action against enemy.

TO : THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, Washington 25, D.C. (THRU CHANNELS)

1. In accordance with Par 10, AR 345-105, the following report of action against the enemy is herewith submitted.

2. This organization, the 593rd Joint Assault Signal Company, XXIV Corps troops of Central Pacific, attached to the 96th Infantry Division and loaned with XXIV Corps to SWPA, participated in the initial Amphibious Assault on Leyte Island, P.I. on 20 October 1944. Said operation being King 2.

3. The 593rd Joint Assault Signal Company is an Amphibious Organization consisting of Air Liaison, Naval Gunfire, and Assault Signal Teams. Due to the complexity of its makeup, it is seldom together as a complete unit. Air Liaison, Naval Gunfire, and Signal teams are usually out and attached to various RCT's and BLT's of the Division to which the Joint Assault Signal Company is attached. Remaining personnel consist of a Headquarters Detachment and a Supply Detachment.

4. The mission of this unit is three-fold.

- To provide Air Liaison between Carrier and Land based planes and RCT's.
- To provide close Naval Gunfire support in the initial assault.
- To provide immediate communications laterally on adjoining beaches and inland to each RCT and BLT, using radio and wire.

5. This unit, loaded and embarked from Pearl Harbor, T.H. on 14 September 1944 and sailed for the Stalemate 2 Operation. Enroute to Eniwetok, plans were changed and orders issued from SWPA directing that the units embarked should proceed with plans for the King 2 operation. Embarkation table and team assignments enclosed.

6. Operations carried out by Ground Troops and supporting Air and Naval Forces.

- In the initial assault on Orange and Blue Beaches, all teams #4,5,6,7,8, and 9 were in assault. All teams #1,2,3 were in Reserve and Headquarters RCT 381 teams were in reserve.

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by authority of AC of S, G-2, WDC

RAY M. STROUPE
Capt., Inf

- [REDACTED]
- (1) The Naval Gunfire teams were divided into two parts. One group under a Naval Officer and with an SCR 694 and 2 SCR 536 plus W 130 wire went in with the Battalion Commander; while, the other group, the spotter party, under a Field Artillery Officer and identical radio and wire equipment went in with the Assault Company expected to meet the most resistance. The Field Artillery Officer and the Naval Officer were in communication with each other and the assigned Fire Support Ship.
 - (2) Each Air Liaison team went in with the Battalion Commanding Officer's party. Initial communication was by SCR 284, hand carried in. The Air Liaison $\frac{1}{4}$ ton 4X4 came in 3 waves later. On this $\frac{1}{4}$ ton is mounted an ANVRC 193 and SCR 542 and a radio receiver #312. Air Liaison teams stayed with the Battalion Commanding Officer at all times. Division Air Liaison team, initially aboard GC 3 - U.S.S. Rocky Mount, coordinated RCT Headquarters Air Liaison teams which in turn coordinated BLT Air Liaison teams. The same procedure was followed with the Division and RCT Headquarters Naval Gunfire teams.
 - (3) The assault Signal teams set up wire and radio communications on the beaches on which they landed.

b. Report of the operations of the Naval Gunfire teams follows:

- (1) All teams of RCT 381 were in Army reserve and not committed.
- (2) RCT 382 Headquarters team coordinated fire of BLT teams and secured night illumination for RCT.
- (3) Team #4 was in the reserve BLT of this RCT and was not committed. No Fire Support Ship assigned and none needed.
- (4) Team #5 was in the assault on Blue Beach #2. They secured special fire mission on one of the BLT objectives prior to landing. Upon landing, they fired on enemy artillery positions and laid down starshells the first night. Morning of S plus 1 fired a preparation fire on outer perimeter to pave way for an attack. They secured night illumination for four nights then lost Fire Support Ship to the Fleet.

- [REDACTED]
- (5) Team #6 landed in assault on Blue Beach #2. Provided night illumination only. Encountered sniper, some artillery and mortar fire.
 - (6) RCT 383rd Headquarters team provided night illumination for four nights. Coordinated fire of BLT teams firing area with destructive and harassing fire.
 - (7) Team #7 landed on Orange Beach #1. Encountered mortar fire on the beach. Proceeded with BLT to vicinity of Catmon Hill. Fired 7 missions on pill boxes and caves on Catmon Hill. This team encountered sniper, mortar, and 77 mm fire.
 - (8) Team #8 landed on Orange Beach #2. Encountered slight mortar fire on beach. Proceeded inland with BLT south of Catmon Hill. In early evening of first night, Spotter party discovered enemy artillery positions. Reported location to Field Artillery. Counter-battery fire destroyed target. Spotter could not take this target under fire as he could not get in communication with his Fire Support Ship.
 - (9) Team #9, initially in reserve, landed at Jig Hour plus 60. This team encountered mortar fire upon landing. Proceeded north of San Jose to Libaranan River and took under fire enemy mortar positions on Libaranan Head and Libir Hill. On S plus 1 CA Columbia was assigned this Spotter party. In conjunction with plane from Cruiser, again took under fire mortar positions. Mortar fire at this time was causing confusion with the L.S.T.'s on Orange beaches. Results of firing very good. Mortar fire stopped. On S plus 3, team moved in to BLT CP. No missions requested. No ship available.
 - (10) Division Headquarters team secured ships for RCT and BLT teams and coordinated all fires.

c. Reprt of Air Liaison Teams follows:

- (1) All teams 381st RCT in Reserve and not committed.
 - (2) RCT 382nd Headquarters team coordinated requests from BLT teams.
 - (3) Team #4 was in reserve BLT of 382d RCT. Requested one bombing and strafing mission. This was refused because of the proximity of the target to our own tanks. Team encountered a little sniper fire.
 - (4) Team #5 was in assault on Blue Beach #2. No suitable air targets were encountered in BLT zone while air support was available. While
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

team was with BLT, limited information was furnished to S-2.

- (5) Team #6 was in assault on Blue Beach #1. Moderate opposition throughout. Three strafing and bombing missions were called for and received the first two days. Reconnaissance and Intelligence information was furnished S-2 thru Air Liaison net at all times.
- (6) RCT 383rd Headquarters team coordinated efforts of BLT teams. This team caused supplies consisting of food, ammunition, and water to be dropped to BLT 2 and BLT 3 when those units were to be supplied due to extremely swampy and muddy terrain.
- (7) Air Liaison team #7 landed in assault on Orange Beach #1. This team called for one close support mission which lasted for 2½ hours. This mission was bombing, using 500# bombs, and strafing, using 4.5 rockets. Although not officially acknowledged, this mission was credited by the BLT Commanding Officer with destroying 4 enemy pillboxes and probably one enemy artillery position on the Eastern slope of Catmon Hill. This team had one casualty, a wireman, wounded by shrapnel on A plus 1 during enemy artillery barrage.
- (8) Air Liaison team #8 landed in assault on Orange Beach #2. Two air support missions were accomplished - the first, being a reconnaissance flight observing enemy activity to the front, and the second being a supply drop mission.
- (9) Air Liaison Team #9 was initially in reserve and landed on Orange Beach #2 at J+g plus 60. This team had no missions requested.
- (10) Division Headquarters Air Liaison Team landed with Division Headquarters. Use was made of this team by Headquarters in keeping G-3 informed of missions and in approving missions requested by RCT and BLT teams. This team contributed to the downing of a Zero with the 50 Caliber Machine Gun, mounted on its half track.

d. Report on Signal Teams.

- (1) Signal teams #1, 2, and 3 were in reserve with the 381st RCT. These teams did not come in until S plus 1. A decided waste of men and equipment was noted by this fact, hence, a reorganization of Signal teams was affected for the M-1 operation.
- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- (2) Signal team #4 initially with Reserved BLT 382 landed on Blue Beach #1 and set up beach communications in conjunction with Teams 5 and 6. This team later became part of the Division Shore Party CP Communications. Enemy air raids experienced frequently.
 - (3) Signal team #5 landed in assault on Blue Beach #1. It set up beach communications and maintained same until 10 November 1944. Enemy opposition - air raids.
 - (4) Signal team #6 landed in assault on Blue Beach #2. This team worked with Company "C" of the 173d Engineer Battalion giving them wire and radio communication. It worked in conjunction with Signal team #5 on beach communication. Experienced air raids and mortar fire - a few duds landing in CP. No casualties. Carried on communication until 10 November 1944 when teams rejoined Company Headquarters.
 - (5) Signal team #7 landed in assault on Orange Beach #1 under mortar fire. A mortar shell struck the LCVP in which 1st Lt., Speirs, Allan C., team officer, was landing. He was immediately evacuated and team #7 was taken in control by Team #8 until teams #9 landed at Jig hour plus 60, whereupon Team #9 took control. Team #7 then worked in conjunction with Team #9 in maintaining beach communication with the 170th Engineer Battalion.
 - (6) Signal team #8 landed in assault on Orange Beach #2 under mortar fire. Three men from this team were casualties. This team set up and maintained beach communications until 10 Nov 1944.
 - (7) Signal team #9 initially in reserve with 3rd BLT, 383d RCT, landed on Orange Beach #2 Jig hour plus 60. It's mission was to secure all communications throughout the Beach-head. It worked in conjunction with Signal teams #7 and #8. This team undertook the laying of wire to road blocks and front lines. It was the only Signal team that succeeded in getting wire communication up to the front. It surmounted difficult swamps, hand carrying all equipment. It successfully effected wire communication between BLT 1, of RCT 383d, which was on Catmon Hill, and Orange Beach. Enemy opposition encountered - mortar and sniper fire. Continued to maintain beach communication until relieved on 10 November 1944.
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7. Character of Hostile Opposition.

a. Effect on Air Liaison Teams.

- (1) These teams experienced very little "jamming" by the enemy. Enemy sniper, mortar, and artillery fire did not effect their work at all. There was only one casualty in all of the Air Liaison Team.

b. Effect on Shore Fire Control Teams.

- (1) All Naval Gunfire Shore Fire Control Parties in assault RCT's were initially assigned a Fire Support Ship. These ships performed their assigned functions on the whole in an excellent manner. No enemy jamming was experienced. Communications with firing ships was in general fair. Due to the nature of the terrain, Communication at certain times could not be attained. Due to the enemy fleet action in Phillippine waters around the 23rd of Oct 44, most firing ship were relieved of shore fire work and assigned elsewhere. The absence of fire support ships did not affect the ground troops as RCT Field Artillery was in position and could take under fire all missions requested.

c. Effect on Signal Teams.

- (1) The signal teams did experience some enemy "jamming" of their radio nets. To counteract this, they changed to alternate frequencys, whenever jamming occured on the primary frequency. Due to sniper and machine gun fire in vicinity of road block at San Roque, lines were continually being cut and necessitated constant splicing, and maintaining.

8. Summary of lessons learned.

a. Air Liaison Teams.

- (1) It is valueless and a detriment to the Infantry for the Air Liaison Teams to remain with them when there are no airplanes available for support. If planes become available, teams can easily rejoin their respective RCT's.
- (2) Net discipline must be very strict.
- (3) Unless suitable, provisions are made for transporting heavy radio equipment, enabling Air Liaison teams to stay with the Batallion CP or OP, no adequate performance of duties is possible.
- (4) All units within BLT and RCT must have panels and smoke available at all times with proper instructions for use of same.

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- (5) All maps and pertinent data must be given out in sufficient time to allow Air Liaison teams to brief the units with which they are working on air support available.
- (6) All Air Liaison teams should travel with a minimum amount of personal equipment. Due to the weight of the radio equipment, it is difficult to operate over swamps or muddy terrain if teams are weighted down with excess gear.

b. Naval Gunfire Teams.

- (1) According to T/O and E 11-147S, said T/O and E being the one under which this unit operates, all Naval Gunfire teams have $\frac{1}{2}$ ton 4x4 trucks - one to each Field Artillery Officer and one to each Naval Officer. These vehicles were taken away from this unit at Oahu, T.H. prior to sailing. Due to the absence of these vehicles, Naval Gunfire teams experienced much difficulty in transporting radio equipment through swamps inland. For an operation on terrain such as was experienced on Leyte Island, it is strongly recommended that Naval Gunfire teams be equipped with Carriers, cargo, light - M29C - one per each Naval Gunfire team. Much radio equipment was unavoidably lost in swamps necessitating trips back to the beach for replacement from the Signal Teams. Some of these "weasel" were in operation by S-4 of BLTs and it was noted that they were the only vehicle able to reach the front lines of BLT #2 and BLT #3 of RCT 383rd. It is understood that there is a high priority on these carriers in SWPA. For operations on dry terrain, the $\frac{1}{2}$ ton 4x4 serves admirably for Naval Gunfire work - as proved on the M-1 operation.
- (2) Too much equipment was hand carried in by all teams.
- (3) Use of SCR 536 was limited to a distance of 200 yards, although in one instance, Spotter Party of Team #9 had direct communications with the Firing Ship.
- (4) The laying of W/130 wire was not practical, except at night.
- (5) Team officers should never get separated from the rest of their team. In one case - Team #9 - the man carrying the trans-receiver of the SCR 694 passed out in a swamp and the rest of the team pushed on not realizing they were short

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their most valuable piece of radio equipment. Fortunately for this team, they were able to get excellent communications with the Fire Support Ship on their SCR 536. The man joined the team the next morning.

c. Signal Teams.

- (1) About the most important lesson learned by the Signal teams was the necessity for putting wire, that was laid on the beaches, very high overhead. Due to the great number of amphibious tracked vehicles on the beaches, wire was continually cut up until it was properly put high overhead.
- (2) Wire teams operating in enemy zone of action observed the following precaution. For each wireman up a tree, a guard on the ground covered him. No wireman should go alone on any jungle trail or through high vegetation. One man in each pair should always be alert to fire at anything. Arms found suitable for each wire laying team consisted of 1 M-1 rifle, 3 carbines, and 1 M-3 sub machine gun with each jeep driver.

9. Special or Noteworthy data of Value.

a. Air Liaison Teams.

- (1) The SCR 542, a part of the ANVRC, is not used by the teams and should be discarded. It is useless to carry the set when it is not used for it cuts down on the efficiency of the vehicle. The SCR 694 is still not in its best state. It has considerable transmitter failures and has not proven as reliable as the SCR 284. The SCR 284 carries too much weight for pack carrying in amphibious operations.
- (2) A portable radio is a very necessary part of Air Liaison team equipment. Most of the time, it was impossible for the Air Liaison $\frac{1}{4}$ ton 4x4, with the ANVRC radio mounted, to be at the Battalion CP. Since the Air Liaison team must be with the Battalion Commanding Officer at all times, a suitable portable radio must be available, both when teams are without it's ANVRC, and for the initial assault. Portable radios for Air Liaison teams are not authorized by the existing T/O and E. It is of the utmost importance that these teams have portable radio equipment.

- (3) Air Liaison teams, in order to gain important intelligence information of great help to S-2 should monitor the Support Air Observation Net. Air Liaison teams of this unit furnished S-2's with intelligence information, which was of great value and not immediately available from any other source.

b. Naval Gunfire Teams.

- (1) Air Liaison and Naval Gunfire teams should have an augmentation group of trained personnel to come from within the parent unit. T/O change should be made to increase the personnel to meet these requirements.
- (2) Vehicles for these teams should be given a high priority and should come in either with the team or not later than three waves after the team lands.
- (3) The Spotter party, consisting of one Field Artillery Officer, 5 Enlisted Men, and radio equipment should not come in the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd waves. This party plays a most important part in Naval Gunfire Support. These parties went in with the 2nd wave. During the course of the landing of the first three waves, the confusion existing in the immediate assault is such that close Naval Gunfire Support could not possibly be brought to bear within the first 10 minutes after Jig hour. These parties, with their vehicles, should come in with the fourth wave.
- (4) The maps furnished these teams were most inadequate for Close Supporting Fires.

b. Signal Teams.

- (1) Beach signal teams should be boated as a unit. Splitting up of signal teams in the assault waves tends for confusion upon landing in setting up communications. Also equipment comes in at different times which makes it difficult to get set up.
- (2) Vehicles for Signal teams should have an extremely high priority. Wire and wire laying equipment is on these vehicles and trailers. The necessity of waiting for a shuttle wave to bring in vehicles delays the laying of wire. Wire was the most important means of communication on the beaches at Leyte. Radio played a minor part.

- (3) Beach Signal teams function much more smoothly as a consolidated unit on their respective beaches than setting up as four separate small teams. A reorganization of Signal teams was effected during the closing stages of this unit's work on Leyte. The three teams with the 3 BLT's of each RCT were combined to form one team which would work a Regimental beach. The 3 teams of the reserve RCT to be in reserve. This was the assignment to be used on the next operation.
- (4) Equipment, as called for by the present T/E is far in excess of the actual needs of the various teams. It is recommended that surplus or unessential equipment be turned in for credit to the organization.
- (5) Vehicular equipment as furnished, namely the $\frac{1}{2}$ ton 4x4 truck, is totally inadequate to perform its missions due to faulty or poor traction, even with chains, it cannot successfully carry its radio equipment and trailers. The $\frac{1}{2}$ ton 4x4 truck should be replaced by the carrier, cargo, light, M29C.

REMARKS: It was noted in this operation that amphibious training and methods dealing with a Joint Assault Signal Company were more or less discarded and local decisions made and acted upon in a most satisfactory manner in all phases of operations.

The Officers and men of this organization functioned smoothly and efficiently and should be given credit and commendation for a job well done.

Unit reports that Unit Journal was lost on the M-1 Operation. No Field Orders were issued.

45 AGO
MAR 2 1945
Received

OB-S-1
3 Mar 45

FRANCIS L. DUGGAN
Major, Signal Corps
Commanding

✓ 2 Incls:

- 1 - Embarkation Table and Unit Assignments.
- 1 - Officer Roster and Team Assignment.

593RD JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO #235, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

EMBARKATION TABLE AND UNIT ASSIGNMENTS

Commanding Officer and Company Headquarters Detachment aboard
APA #36 - U.S.S. CAMBRIA.

Executive Officer and Supply Detachment aboard APA #89 -
U.S.S. FREDERICK FUNSTON.

<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>AIR LIAISON</u>	<u>NAVAL GUNFIRE</u>	<u>SIGNAL</u>	<u>SHIP</u>
96 Div Hq	Div Hq Team	Div Hq Team		GC3 USS ROCKY MOUNT
381st RCT	Hq Team	Hq Team		APA 39 USS CLAY
1st BLT	Team #1	Team #1	Team 1	APA 94 USS BAXTER
2nd BLT	Team #2	Team #2	Team 2	APA 25 USS MIDDLETON
3rd BLT	Team #3	Team #3	Team 3	APA 105 USS ELLIOTT
382nd RCT	Hq Team	Hq Team		APA 31 USS MONROVIA
1st BLT	Team #4	Team #4	Team 4	APA 36 USS CAMBRIA
2nd BLT	Team #5	Team #5	Team 5	APA 168 USS WARHAWK
3rd BLT	Team #6	Team #6	Team 6	APA 89 - U.S.S.
			Team 10	FREDERICK FUNSTON
			in res.	
383rd RCT	Hq Team	Hq Team		APA 34 USS BOLIVAR
1st BLT	Team #7	Team #7	Team #7	APA 51 USS SHERIDAN
2nd BLT	Team #8	Team #8	Team #8	APA 166 USS COMET
3rd BLT	Team #9	Team #9	Team #9	APA 34 USS BOLIVAR

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OFFICER ROSTER AND TEAM ASSIGNMENT CONTINUED

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>TEAM ASSIGNMENT</u>
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NAVAL OFFICERS CONTINUED

Ensign	Kern, George T. Jr.	312265	Team #9
Ensign	Manzella, Joseph	163567	Team #5
Ensign	Edmondson, Bobby B.	312012	Team #3
Ensign	Widdup, William K.	312981	Team #2

NOTE: Ensign Edmondson and Ensign Widdup were attached to this unit for the Leyte operation only.

593RD JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO #235, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

OFFICER ROSTER AND TEAM ASSIGNMENT

GRADE	NAME	ASN	TEAM ASSIGNMENT
SIGNAL CORPS			
Major	Duggan, Francis L.	0-319886	Company Commanding Officer
Captain	Woodruff, Charles W.	0-356200	Company Executive Officer
1st Lt	Apnadoc, William F.	0-1644309	Team #4
1st Lt	Argogast, Mead S.	0-1643184	Team #2
1st Lt	Dill, Richard B.	0-1640385	Team #8
1st Lt	Helbert, Clifford L.	0-1646123	Team #5
1st Lt	McCathran, Rodney R. II,	0-1638030	Team #10
1st Lt	Morrison, Charles E.	0-1646439	Team #6
1st Lt	Prest, Eugene S.	0-1643980	Team #3
1st Lt	Quigley, Francis T.	0-395523	Team #9
1st Lt	Speirs, Allen C.	0-1634354	Team #7
1st Lt	Williamson, Isaac B. Jr.	0-442661	Team #1
WOJG	Brown, Ernest	W-2131981	Rear Echelon
Field Artillery			
Captain	Cole, Charles B. Jr.	0-1179041	Team #7
Captain	Krugur, Paul L.	0-391952	Team #1
1st Lt	Comstock, Willie J.	0-1181845	Team #2
1st Lt	Cox, Earl R.	0-1181849	Team #3
1st Lt	DeMersseman, Cleon J.	0-1181581	Team #4
1st Lt	Joyce, Thomas	0-1172101	Team #5
1st Lt	Lusk, George V.	0-1174051	Team #6
1st Lt	Redding, Harry L. Jr.	0-1184932	Team #8
2nd Lt	Clark, Warren M.	0-1183039	Team #9
AIR CORPS			
Captain	Baetjer, Harry N.	0-1165996	Headquarters RCT 382nd
Captain	Crosby, John W.	0-559705	Headquarters RCT 383rd
Captain	McCarthy, Robert C.	0-405230	Division Hq. Team
1st Lt	Blackburn, William R.	0-1314093	Team #7
1st Lt	Downey, Robert E.	0-352110	Team #8
1st Lt	Erickson, Roland W. Jr.	0-574530	Team #1
1st Lt	Freeman, Billie H.	0-561042	Team #9
1st Lt	Frisone, Enrico D.	0-461129	Headquarters 381st
1st Lt	Martinez, Charles C.	0-578527	Team #2
1st Lt	Parker, Joel R.	0-1316322	Team #4
1st Lt	Silverstadt, Arthur	0-1642585	Team #5
1st Lt	Smieszek, Julian P.	0-573392	Team #3
1st Lt	Tupper, William L.	0-1018487	Team #6
NAVAL OFFICERS			
Lt	Rulifson, Erwin C.	183830	Division Hq. Team
Lt	Shanks, Robb L.	193058	Headquarters RCT 383rd
Lt.(jg)	Banning, Robert B.	207581	Headquarters RCT 381st
Lt.(jg)	Borchard, Fred J.	200415	Headquarters RCT 382nd
Lt.(jg)	Carr, Lawrence B.	265893	Team #1
Lt.(jg)	Meisinger, Arthur F.	247731	Team #4
Lt.(jg)	Richardson, Donald L.	267551	Team #7
Lt.(jg)	Walker, Neville E.	240147	Team #6
Ensign	Bowers, David S.	330075	Team #8

HEADQUARTERS 383RD INFANTRY

APO 96, c/o Postmaster,
San Francisco, California,
7 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion of Officers.

TO : Commanding Officer,
593rd JASCo.

1. It is desired that this communication act as a letter of commendation and recommendation for promotion for the following members of your command:

- (a) John W. Crosby, 1st Lieutenant
- (b) Robert E. Downey, 1st Lieutenant
- (c) Billie H. Freeman, 1st Lieutenant
- (d) William R. Blackburn, 2nd Lieutenant.

2. The officers of your command attached to this organization have done an outstanding job. Although air support in the present operation has been below standards through no fault of your unit, your officers are certainly to be commended for their attention to duty, courage and initiative in taking themselves, their men and equipment forward through the swamps, in order to provide constant communications and support, and for their constant interest and enthusiasm in our operation.

3. In view of the above facts, I unhesitatingly recommend their promotion to the next higher grade, and believe that they will continue to discharge their duties in a superior manner.

4. It is further desired to extend to you my appreciation for sending to this organization such splendid officers. Our every contact with them has been most pleasant, and it is with regret we are forced to lose their services.

/s/

EDWIN T. MAY,
Colonel, 383rd Infantry,
Commanding.

THIS IS A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

45 AGO
MAR 2 1945
Received
a13-5

Rodney R. Mc Cathran
RODNEY R. MC CATHRAN, II
1st Lt., Signal Corps
Adjutant, 593d JASCo

Encl #3

200.6 1st Ind.
Hq 96th Inf Div, APO 96, 16 Nov 44.

TO: Commanding Officer, 593d JASCo, APO 235.

I am pleased to transmit this letter of commendation and recommendation for promotion of officers of the 593d JASCo. Such meritorious service reflects great credit, not only on the individuals concerned, but on the Company as a whole.

/s/

J. L. BRADLEY,
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

THIS IS A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

45 AGO
MAR 2 1945
Received
1013-15

Rodney R. Mc Cathran

RODNEY R. MC CATHRAN, II
1st Lt., Signal Corps
Adjutant, 593d JASCo

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