



*The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—The Year of Disasters*

enthusiastic advocate of war. It was probably more than sheer coincidence that Madison changed his mind in 1812 which was a presidential election year. In fact, Forman stated, "At this time there was a great deal of political gossip to the effect that Madison was informed by party leaders that if he wished re-election he must come out for war."<sup>2</sup>

2. *Hull's Disastrous Campaign*

Governor Hull, who was in Washington in the spring of 1812, was commissioned a brigadier general and was ordered to advance to Detroit, reinforce and hold it in anticipation of an invasion of Canada. This expedition was ill-advised from the start. Due to the absence of adequate means of transportation and the lack of a unified plan of operation, in the event of hostilities this force would have to maintain its communications over two hundred miles from Detroit to the nearest source of even the most fundamental supplies. Considering the character of the country and the hostility of the Indians, this was a practical impossibility unless the control of Lake Erie could be maintained. As early as 1799 Wilkinson stressed the necessity for a naval force on Lake Erie in the event of war with Britain. In 1809 Harrison likewise pointed out this need. But no provision was made for an adequate force on the Lake. As Harrison said, "Unfortunately, we began by weighing military expenditures in gold scales; and the experiment proved—as it will never fail to do—that parsimony, always paltry, in war is the most lavish and criminal prodigality." And finally, added Harrison, Hull, said to be a heavy drinker, "had become old and *quite fat*, and had evidently lost the energy as well as the valor, that thirty-three years previous had given him the post of honor with Anthony Wayne in carrying the fortress of Stonypoint."<sup>3</sup>

In April the President requisitioned Governor Meigs of Ohio for twelve hundred militia, which quota was over-volunteered. These volunteers "were gentlemen" "all of the highest respectability" from the eastern and southern sections of the state. The Fourth Regulars, veterans of Tippecanoe, were ordered to join Hull's command. Hull arrived at Cincinnati April 22, and established headquarters there. Colonel James Findlay and his Second Ohio Volunteers accompanied Hull to Dayton, where they arrived May 25. Governor Meigs, accompanied by the First and Third Ohio Volunteers (Colonels McArthur and Cass) met Hull there. Hull assumed command and made a speech that made a favor-

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able impression and filled the men with patriotic zeal. It was planned to proceed by river, but the water was too low. So the army traveled overland to Urbana, where it was joined June 10 by the Fourth Regulars. While at Urbana a council was held with twelve chiefs of the Wyandot, Mingo, and Shawnee Indians by which permission was obtained to cross the Indian territory and to erect blockhouses at intervals to protect the lines of communication. On June first Colonel McArthur was sent ahead to cut a road to the Scioto and construct fortifications there. When the main column arrived there, June 19, they found "Fort McArthur", two blockhouses enclosed by a picket. From here Findlay's regiment cut the roadway to the Blanchard and constructed Fort Findlay there. The main column, caught in a heavy rain in the swamp sixteen miles north of Fort McArthur, was stopped for several days. A blockhouse, "Fort Necessity", was constructed at this point. The sick were left as garrisons for these posts. Cass' regiment cut the road from Fort Findlay to the Maumee rapids, where the whole force arrived June 30 in good health and spirits. Here they saw the first white people and first houses since leaving Urbana. While at the rapids Hull loaded his baggage, muster rolls, correspondence, official orders, and sick aboard the little schooner "Cuyahoga" and dispatched it to Detroit. Although Hull had not received word of the declaration of war, he knew that the break was imminent. This act seems inexcusable. When the ship arrived opposite Fort Malden it was captured by the British. This was only the first of a series of misfortunes. Fort Malden, or Amherstburg, opposite and about 18 miles below Detroit, was the key to British-Indian relations. Being below Detroit, it commanded the approach by water to that place.

On July 3 while on the march near the River Raisin, Hull received word of the declaration of war. The British had received word of the declaration previously, probably through Astor. Detroit was reached and occupied by the Americans the sixth of July. The next day the army crossed into Canada and remained there a month. On July 12, 1812, Hull issued a lofty proclamation to the Canadians. His army participated in a series of futile skirmishes. Had decision and action been prompt, Fort Malden could have been captured easily. Hull had about two thousand three hundred effective troops. Fort Malden was a weak quadrangle surrounded by a picket and a dry ditch. It could not have withstood a siege of any duration. Its garrison at that time was about two hundred sixty Canadian militia, and about sixty Indians. Whether or not Fort Malden could have been retained by the Americans for any length of time

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is problematic, but its capture would have destroyed the allied base of operations and would have given the American expedition at least some chance of ultimate success.<sup>5</sup>

The allied forces blocked the American lines of communication opposite Fort Malden. Major Van Home was sent with a small detachment to re-establish communications. His command encountered a superior force of British and Indians and was defeated. Seventeen lives were lost. This news plus that of the surrender of Fort Michillimackinac apparently caused Hull to decide to return to Detroit. The army recrossed to Detroit during the night of August 7. When orders to move were received the army expected an advance on Fort Malden. When they learned their destination the men felt disgraced. From that time Hull no longer possessed the confidence of his troops. Dissension and suspicion grew. On August 16 Hull surrendered Detroit and all of Michigan Territory without firing a shot in its defense. Contemporary accounts called Hull a traitor, a coward, and an imbecile. Certainly Hull was guilty of delay and indecision, but the real responsibility rested higher up. The expedition was doomed to failure before it started, and the rather vague plan for a simultaneous fourfold invasion via Lake Champlain, Sackett's Harbor, and Niagara as well as Detroit failed to materialize. Hence the British were able to give Hull their undivided attention.<sup>6</sup>

Colonel Hatch, who was acting assistant quartermaster general and who shared in the occupancy of the officers' quarters, stated that Brock's aide was closeted with Hull in the latter's quarters the night of August 13 and that the capitulation was then agreed upon. The inference is that Hull "sold out". Hatch further contended that Brock's act of investing a strong fort garrisoned by one thousand nine hundred forty men, with thirty-eight cannons, plenty of provisions, and a reinforcement of three hundred sixty men in the rear of the enemy, with an opposing force of seven hundred thirty and five small guns could be the result only of lunacy or a previous arrangement and that Brock certainly was not a lunatic.<sup>8</sup>

On the other hand, Brock had intercepted the American dispatches, and he was well aware of the dissension within the garrison. Furthermore, Brock's position was critical. He must strike a blow or lose support of the Indians. And the Indians were necessary to Brock's plans, which were to avoid a decisive battle and to prolong the conflict. He believed

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*A protracted resistance upon this Frontier will be sure to embarrass their plans materially. They will not come prepared to meet it, and their Troops, or volunteer Corps, without scarcely any discipline—as far at least as Control is in question—will soon tire under disappointment—The difficulty which they will experience in sending provisions, will involve them into expenses under which their Government will soon become impatient.<sup>9</sup>*

Apparently the British advance on Detroit was a desperate bid for Indian support, and its very boldness insured its success. As a result of the surrender of Detroit, Indians flocked to the British standard. This movement was accelerated by the death of Little Turtle, chief of the Miami. This leader of the confederated Indians against Wayne at Fallen Timbers, had been convinced of the futility of resistance to the Americans, and had kept the Miamis neutral against the wishes of the braves. His death, July 14, 1812 (*The War*, Sept. 5, 1812, p. 47), was the signal for the Miamis also to join the British. (McAfee, *History of the Late War*, p. 117). The American border was pushed back to northwestern Ohio, and the whole frontier was exposed to Indian raids. The West became grimly determined to wipe out the disgrace. Recruiting flourished.<sup>10</sup>

*3. Premature Plans for Retaliation*

In the meantime James Winchester of Tennessee, had been commissioned a brigadier general and had been ordered to the Northwest to reinforce Hull. His command was to consist of twelve hundred Ohio volunteers under General Edward Tupper; fifteen hundred Kentucky volunteers commanded by General Paye (three regiments, Colonels Allen, Lewis, and Scott); the 17th U. S. Regulars under Colonel Samuel Wells; and some independent units.<sup>11</sup>

Harrison, who possessed "military knowledge and instincts" and was the highest authority on matters connected with the Indians of the Northwest, had been passed over. Anticipating Hull's defeat, he had determined to head the relief expedition. He wrote the Secretary of War hinting for a commission. He was in Kentucky conferring with Governor Scott about troops to defend the Indiana-Illinois region when word came of Hull's critical situation. Troops were assembling, but Winchester had not arrived. Immediate action was necessary. Harrison's land

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policy when a delegate to Congress, his acquisitions of Indian land, and his victory at Tippecanoe made him popular in Kentucky, so he was the natural choice to lead the Kentucky troops. A constitutional difficulty arose, however. Harrison was not a resident of Kentucky and thus was ineligible for a Kentucky commission. In view of the emergency, Governor Scott consulted with Henry Clay and Governor-elect Shelby. Red tape was cut, and Harrison was brevetted major general of Kentucky militia and was given command of all forces then assembled. While en route news was received of Hull's surrender and also that Fort Wayne was invested. Harrison hastened to the relief of Fort Wayne. On September 2 a messenger arrived with Harrison's appointment as brigadier general and orders to protect the frontier of Indiana and Illinois and to co-operate with Hull (already surrendered) and Governor Howard of Missouri Territory. This would have subordinated Harrison to Winchester and probably would have removed the former from the scene of the principal action. Therefore, Harrison did not accept at once, waiting until the administration had an opportunity to learn of his present capacity. The march to Fort Wayne continued. The Indians there fled on Harrison's approach. Detachments destroyed several Indian villages in the vicinity. Harrison was ordered to relinquish command of this army to Winchester. When Winchester arrived at Fort Wayne Harrison relinquished command with "apparent good grace". Harrison returned to St. Marys where a new division was assembling. This force consisted of Kentucky regiments under Colonels Barbee, Poague, and Jennings; three companies of mounted Kentucky riflemen; and a corps of Ohio mounted volunteers under Findlay. Winchester, with two thousand two hundred effectives, left Fort Wayne September 23 for Defiance.<sup>12</sup>

Through pressure brought to bear by Clay, Shelby, and other influential Kentuckians, Harrison was appointed commander in chief of the Northwestern Army. He was given a force nominally totaling ten thousand and was ordered to protect the frontier, retake Detroit, and penetrate Upper Canada. Later orders gave Harrison broad discretionary powers and placed the entire responsibility of a winter campaign, or the lack of it, directly on him.<sup>13</sup>

Harrison was caught on the horns of a dilemma. A month had been lost between Hull's surrender and Harrison's appointment as commander in chief. The troops were not assembled. Those that were, were poorly armed and equipped; they were raw and undisciplined; the men had only summer clothing and not much of that; blankets and shoes were almost

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non-existent; food and ammunition were scarce; artillery and camp equipment were lacking. There was confusion in the arrangements for supplying the needs of the army. Three different methods were to be used. There was a commissary agent; a quartermaster general—part of the time there were two quartermasters of equal rank and seniority, so that neither knew which had the authority; one civilian contractor was to furnish supplies for the district south of the forty-first parallel and another was to serve for the territory north of forty-one—and part of the time there was no contractor at all. The contractors were branded as rascals and thieves by Harrison. Samuel Tupper, the agent for Orr and Greely, one of the contractors, refused to deliver supplies because, he said, Hull had surrendered the supplies previously furnished by them; that the posts to be supplied were surrounded by wilderness; and that the contractors' inability to use Lake Erie for transporting the supplies rendered the cost greater than they had anticipated. There was no co-ordination of these separate agencies, and the system—or lack of system—broke down completely. Adequate means of transportation were lacking; the season of the autumn rains was approaching, and they would render all transportation practically impossible.<sup>14</sup>

Harrison had been schooled in the Wayne method of frontier warfare. He understood the value of thorough preliminary preparations, of accumulating sufficient supplies, securing his communications by a series of forts, and—above all—of drilling the raw troops until they could meet an enemy on something like even terms. His "military knowledge and instincts" surely dictated suspension of operations until spring or summer.<sup>15</sup>

But other considerations were present. The three-months militia, a large part of the force, could not be held until spring for preparation and drill. They must have action or else they would leave at the expiration of their terms. If the militiamen returned without tasting action, recruiting would suffer, and the replacements that did come would be just as raw. Furthermore, the West, alarmed at the prospect of Indian depredations throughout the winter, wanted action. Harrison realized that unless he assumed the offensive his popularity and prestige would suffer. Swept forward, against his better judgment, by this bid for popularity, Harrison decided to take the offensive as soon as possible.<sup>16</sup>

His plan was to organize three columns, each to proceed to the rendezvous at the Maumee rapids by a separate route. The Left, composed

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of regulars and Kentucky militia commanded by Winchester (who had been asked by Harrison to remain in the service after Harrison had superseded him) was to proceed from Defiance via the Maumee valley. The Center, composed of Ohio Volunteers assembled at Urbana, was to follow Hull's trail. The Right, composed of a levy of Virginia and Pennsylvania troops, was to proceed from Wooster via Upper Sandusky and Fremont. Principal supply bases at Fort Barbee (St. Marys), Fort McArthur (Kenton), and Fort Feree (Upper Sandusky), and secondary bases at Defiance and Fremont were to be established for the purpose of forwarding supplies to the base of operations at the Maumee rapids. Roads and a chain of forts to protect them were to be constructed along each route. This plan was condemned by Armstrong, as was everything else done by Harrison. Colonel Eleazar P. Wood, chief of engineers and one of the first graduates of West Point, approved the plan, because it would facilitate transportation and protect more country against the Indians.

About the first of October Harrison expected to be able to assemble his troops and supplies at the Maumee rapids in about two weeks. His preparations were interrupted by the necessity of forming a relief expedition to go to Defiance. Winchester was thrown into a panic by reports of the proximity of a British and Indian force destined for Fort Wayne. This proved to be a wild goose chase, for the enemy had already fled.<sup>17</sup>

Meanwhile heavy rains set in, and the weather turned cold. Overland transportation was disrupted. Said Harrison concerning his supplies:

*To get them forward through a swampy Wilderness of nearly two hundred miles in Waggon's or on Pack-horses which are to carry their own Provender is absolutely impossible . . . Since it would require at least two Waggon's with forage for each one that is loaded with provisions and other articles.*

Boats and canoes were ordered constructed, but before they could be used the rivers froze over. With transportation at a standstill, supplies ran low in the camps. The soldiers were

*. . . sometimes without beef—at other times without flour: and worst of all, entirely without salt, which has been much against the*

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*health of the men . . . some without shoes, others without socks, blankets, & C. All the clothes they have are linen . . .*

At one time the only food for eleven days was fresh pork and no salt. Another time "poor beef and hickory roots were their principal subsistence". Ague was prevalent. Typhus broke out. The daily sick list of the Left Wing was from three to four hundred. Restlessness and dissatisfaction grew; mutiny was narrowly averted.<sup>18</sup>

While the preparations for the advance to Detroit were being made, a cavalry detachment under General Edward Tupper had a spirited encounter on November 4 with the enemy at the Maumee rapids. Both forces had come there to forage. The Indians were well armed with pistols and holsters and rode good horses. The allies were finally forced to retreat. Expected provisions from Winchester's base at Defiance did not arrive, so Tupper was forced to retire to Fort McArthur for supplies. Minor offensive movements into the Indian country about the upper Maumee and Wabash valleys also netted a small measure of success.<sup>19</sup>

Although the rains upset Harrison's plans, he still expected to be able to advance after the swamps and the margin of the Lake froze over. So he continued his preparations. Once more the weather was against him. After an early and severe autumn, the winter was comparatively mild. There was deep snow but no general freeze of any duration. With the coming of snow, Winchester's force constructed sleds, and the men pulled the sleds to the Maumee rapids, arriving there January 10 with eleven hundred effectives—half of the original force. A fortified camp was established on the left bank near Wayne's battlefield.<sup>20</sup>

4. *The Raisin River Disaster*

Two days after Winchester's arrival, messengers came from Frenchtown (now Monroe, Michigan) begging protection against the British and Indians. More emissaries arrived on following days. A council of war called by Winchester decided to advance to the relief of Frenchtown. A force of five hundred fifty under Colonel Lewis, later reinforced by one hundred ten under Colonel Allen, left January 17; reached the River Raisin and occupied Frenchtown after a sharp battle. The American losses were 12 killed and 55 wounded. The allies' losses are

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unknown, but are supposed to have been heavy. The allied force was estimated at 100 British and 400 Indians. When Winchester head of the engagement, he set out with two hundred reinforcements (January 19).<sup>21</sup>

Harrison, now thoroughly convinced of the futility of further winter campaigning, attempted to force the Secretary of War to assume responsibility for deciding whether or not to continue it. He explained that the occupation of Detroit would be a strategic error without possession of Fort Malden or the control of Lake Erie. He stressed the necessity for a fleet on the Lake. Monroe, who had become acting Secretary of War, answered Harrison sharply. Harrison was reminded of his orders to take Detroit. His lack of success was complained of, and all responsibility was placed in his hands. Harrison wrote again that the advance would have been feasible before the rains, but there were no supplies or artillery available then. He again objected to holding Detroit without control of Fort Malden. The need for and the economy for a navy were also brought to the attention of the administration. Harrison contended that the cheapest way to recapture Detroit and strike Canada was by control of Lake Erie and the transportation of supplies via that route.<sup>22</sup>

Harrison was at Upper Sandusky looking after the advancement of artillery. He did not learn of Winchester's arrival at the Maumee rapids until January 16. The same letter spoke vaguely of the intended expedition to the Raisin. Harrison was alarmed, because this was quite contrary to his plans. Leaving orders for a relief expedition to be sent, Harrison set out. He rode from Upper Sandusky to Fremont (about forty miles) in seven and a half hours, a remarkable feat considering the conditions. Arriving at the Maumee rapids the morning of January 20, Harrison found that Winchester had already left. Harrison waited until the reinforcements arrived. The relief column had advanced only a short distance below the rapids when word reached them of the total defeat of Winchester's force. A council of war held in the saddle decided that the relief force was too small to advance. Turning back, the force stopped at Winchester's camp on the Maumee and burned the stores and then continued the retreat to the Portage (near the present site of Pemberville).<sup>23</sup>

The defeat at Frenchtown, or the River Raisin, was the direct result of Winchester's lack of discipline and caution. The total American casualties were about 290 killed, wounded, and missing, and about 500-600 captured. The extreme bitterness over the Raisin affair was not the

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battle itself, but the cold blooded murder of prisoners afterward by the Indians.<sup>24</sup> It is notable that Tecumseh was absent at the time of the murder of prisoners. "Remember the Raisin" became the rallying cry and this was the first of the notable series of "remember" slogans which later included "Remember the Alamo", "Remember the Maine", and "Remember Pearl Harbor".

Harrison has been severely scored for his part in the Raisin affair. Goebel, Harrison's sympathetic biographer, states that the ultimate responsibility for Winchester's advance—and especially for the failure to retrieve the disaster—belongs to Harrison. McAfee quoted Colonel Wood, probably the best strategist of the Northwestern Army, to the effect that Harrison was unable to prevent the disaster and that any attempt to advance the relief force after the battle would have been too hazardous.<sup>25</sup>

The Raisin affair wrecked Harrison's plans and ended the winter campaign—defeated by cold weather and the breakdown of transportation in "the swampy wilderness in the northwestern parts of Ohio." Harrison was finally promised a fleet for Lake Erie, and was instructed to use only regulars when the terms of the present militiamen expired. He garrisoned the several posts and took the remainder of his men, about seventeen hundred later reinforced to about nineteen hundred, to the Maumee rapids where a fort was started.<sup>26</sup>

The net results of two campaigns in the Northwest was the loss of two armies; untold suffering and hardship; heavy expenditures, the amount of which is unknown; strengthening of the Indian attachment to the British; the realization that a winter campaign was not feasible; and the decision to build a fleet on Lake Erie.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Wilkinson, *Memoirs*, I, 359-360; Benton, *Western Reserve Tracts*, IV, Intro., 32; Curtin, *History of the Late War*, 45; Adams, *History*, VI, 81; Babcock, *Rise of American Nationality*, 87, 96-97; *Annals*, 12 Cong., 1 sess., 34-84, 107-110; Harrison to Eustis, Apr. 29, 1812 in Esarey, (ed.), *Messager and Letters*, II, 43.
2. Fish, *The Development of American Nationality*, 109, 119-120; Muggey, *History of the American People*, 209; Wilkinson, *Memoirs*, I, 363; McAfee, *History of the Late War*, 447-452; *Western Reserve Tracts*, No. 3, p. 1; Adams, *History of United States*, VIII, 81; Babcock, *Rise of American Nationality*, 96-97. Practically the entire first volume of Armstrong's *Notices* is devoted to a condemnation of Harrison and his activities. (See especially pp. 52-96); Forman, *Advanced American History*, 227 (note).

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3. McAfee, *History of the Late War*, 62, 63; Hatch, *History of the War of 1812*, 17, 19. Harrison anticipated Hull's surrender. See Harrison to Eustis, July 28, 1812 in Esarey, (ed.), *Messages and Letters*, II, 78-80; same to same, Aug. 12, 1812 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, II, 85-86; same to same, July 5, 1809 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, I, 351; same to same, Oct. 22, 1812 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, II, 183; same to same, Dec. 12, 1812 in *Loc. cit.*, II, 242; Harrison to Monroe, Jan. 4, 1813 in *Loc. cit.*, II, 295-296. See Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812*, 169; Wilkinson, *Memoirs*, I, 446. Armstrong, *Notices*, I, 51; Western Reserve Tract No. 36, p. 3.
4. Hatch, *History of the War of 1812*, 16, 21; McAfee, *History of the Late War*, 61-69; Armstrong, *Notices*, I, 16-17; Brock to Prevost, July 20, 1812 in Mich. Pioneer and Hist. Soc. Coll., XV, 115.
5. Hatch, *op. cit.*, 21-25, 30, 36; *The War*, Aug. 8, 1812, p. 30; Richardson, *War of 1812*, 8, 20.
6. *The War*, Oct. 3, 1812, p. 65; Hatch, *op. cit.*, 32-35, 56; Williams, *Two Western Campaigns*, 27; Western Reserve Tracts, No. 17, pp. 3, 4; No. 28, p. 2; No. 36, p. 3; *Tramp of Fame*, Sept. 9, 1812, reprinted in Ohio Arch. and Hist. Soc. Pub., XXVII, 319. Niles' Register, Sept. 12, 1812, III, 26; Sept. 19, 1812, III, 44-45; *The War*, Sept. 5, 1812, suggested the disaster was probably due to the negligence of the Secretary of War (p. 47)—one of the few contemporary accounts to express this view.
7. Major General Sir Isaac Brock, K. B., lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada and commander of the British-Canadian forces in that province, was an officer of considerable ability. He had seen service in Europe and in India. While in Canada he was energetic in preparing for the impending war. The Americans respected and admired him. Had he lived the border warfare might not have become so savage in character. One American soldier described him as "six feet-three . . . big-framed . . . lame . . . one-eyed . . . of ugly appearance, but a gentleman". (Statement of George Sanderson, Western Reserve Tract, No. 36, p. 3.) Hatch stated that Brock and Tecumseh were the only British officers in the Northwest "who possessed talent and honorable conduct." Hatch, *History of the War of 1812*, 115-116. Brock was knighted in recognition of his capture of Detroit. He was killed in action at Queenstown Heights, on the Niagara frontier, October 13, 1812.
8. Hatch, *op. cit.*, 44-45; Richardson placed the number, including militia, at 750. (Richardson, *War of 1812*, 52.) There were about 300 Indians also.
9. Hatch, *op. cit.*, 73; Brock to Prevost, Dec. 2, 1811 in Mich. Pioneer and Hist. Soc. Coll., XV, 57; same to same, May 15, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, 86; same to same, Dec. 2, 1811 in *loc. cit.*, 59.
10. Richardson, *op. cit.*, 53; *The War*, Sept. 5, 1812, p. 47; McAfee, *History of the Late War*, 117; Madison's Annual Message, Nov. 4, 1812 in *Amer. St. Pap., For. Rel.*, I, 80. See Niles' Register, Sept. 5, 1812, III, 14; Sept. 12, 1812, III, 25-26; Sept. 19, 1812, III, 45.
11. Ingersoll stated that Andrew Jackson wanted his command, but the administration gave it to Winchester, because otherwise the latter might have run for Congress. (Ingersoll, *Historical Sketch of the Second War*, I, 133.) McAfee, *History of the Late War*, 117, 118; Atherton, *Narrative*, 5; Darnell, *Journal*, 6-7. The total Kentucky force, including Regulars, was 2200.
12. Adams, *History*, VII, 69, 73; Babcock, *Rise of American Nationality*, 97; McAfee, *op. cit.*, 122, 124, 129, 137, 150; Winchester, *Historical Details*, 10-13, Append., 65. See Niles' Register, Jan. 2, 1813, II, 282. Harrison to Eustis, July 28, 1812 in Esarey, (ed.), *Messages and Letters*, II, 78-80; same to same, Aug. 12, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 84-86; same to same, August 22, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 91-92; same to same, Aug. 28, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 98-99; same to same, Sept. 3, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 108; Harrison to Gov. Shelby (Ky.), Sept. 18, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 138; Eustis, Secretary of War, to Harri-

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- son, Sept. 1, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 105-106; Harrison to Winchester, Sept. 19, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 141.
15. Gov. Shelby to Eustis, Sept. 5, 1812 in Esarey, (ed.), *Messages and Letters*, II, 112, 115; Eustis to Harrison, Sept. 17, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 136-137; same to same, Sept. 23, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 148. See Goebel, William Henry Harrison, 142.
14. Harrison to Eustis, Sept. 11, 1812 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, II, 130; same to same, Sept. 27, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 157; Harrison to the people of Kentucky, (Oct.) 1812; *loc. cit.*, II, 159-160; Harrison to Eustis, Sept. 6, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 118; Harrison to Winchester, Sept. 19, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, 140-141; Harrison to Eustis, Oct. 22, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 184-185; S. Tupper to Harrison, Nov. 9, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 202-203. Western Reserve Tracts, IV, 84-85. Harrison's correspondence is full of condemnation of and charges against the contractors. (See Esarey, *op. cit.*, II, 140-141, 184, 214, 424-425, 455-457, etc.) The contract system was partially aired in an investigation of Harrison's conduct. (See *Amer. St. Pap., Military Aff.*, I, 644-658.) The ration contracted for, but frequently missing, was: 1¼ lbs. of beef or ¾ lb. of salt pork, 18 oz. of bread or flour, 1 gill of rum, whisky, or brandy; plus 2 qts. of salt, 4 qts. of vinegar, 4 lbs. of soap, and 1½ lbs. of candles for every 100 rations. (See *Amer. St. Pap., Military Aff.*, I, 647.)
15. Harrison to Eustis, Secretary of War, Sept. 24, 1812. Esarey, *op. cit.*, II, 149-151; same to same, Sept. 26, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 155; same to same, Sept. 27, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 156-158; same to same, Nov. 18, 1811 in *loc. cit.*, I, 618.
16. Harrison to Eustis, Aug. 12, 1812 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, II, 86; Goebel, *William Henry Harrison*, 146; Adams, *History*, VII, 73-74. See McAfee, *History of the Late War*, 263-264, for what is, apparently, Harrison's explanation.
17. Harrison to Winchester, Sept. 25, 1812 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, II, 152; same to same, Oct. 4, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 160-161. Harrison to Eustis, Sept. 27, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 156; same to same, Oct. 13, 1812 in *loc. cit.*, II, 174; McAfee, *op. cit.*, 159, 160, 161, 163, 165, 170; Armstrong, *Notices*, I, 52-96.
18. Harrison to Eustis, Secretary of War, Oct. 22, 1812 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, II, 183-184. For other correspondence on the same subject, see pp. 189, 204, 214, 227, 238, 239, 240, etc. See Atherton, *Narrative*, 12-14, 18, 19, 24. See Darnell, *Journal*, 25, 26, 27, 29, 38, 39, 41. McAfee, *History of the Late War*, 164-165, 202-205; Yost, "Robt' Yost his Book", Ohio Arch. and Hist. Soc. Pub., XXIII, 154-155; Winchester, *Historical Details*, 14-16.
19. Edw. Tupper to Harrison, Nov. 10, 1812 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, II, 216-221; McAfee, *History of the Late War*, 187-190; Palmer, *Historical Register*, II, 34-35. There were about 658 Americans and about 75 British with 300-400 Indians engaged.
20. Harrison to Eustis, Oct. 22, 1812. Esarey, *op. cit.*, II, 183; Winchester, *Historical Details*, 19-22; McAfee, *op. cit.*, 221.
21. Winchester, *op. cit.*, 25; McAfee, *op. cit.*, 223, 224; Atherton, *Narrative*, 32; Darnell, *Journal*, 46.
22. Harrison to Eustis, Dec. 12, 1812. Esarey, *op. cit.*, II, 242. Harrison to Monroe, Jan. 4, 1813 in *op. cit.*, II, 293-296. *Ibid.*, 258; same to same, Jan. 6, 1813 in *loc. cit.*, II, 302.
23. Harrison to Winchester, Jan. 16, 1813 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, II, 311-312; Harrison to Monroe, Jan. 4, 1813 in *op. cit.*, II, 296-297; same to same, Jan. 24, 1813 in *loc. cit.*, II, 330; same to same, Jan. 26, 1813 in *loc. cit.*, II, 335-338; Darnell, *Journal*, 46; Richardson, *War of 1812*, 147; see McAfee, 229. Keeler, "The Sandusky River". Ohio Arch. of Hist. Soc. Pub., XIII, 214.

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24. Darrell, *Journal*, 50-51, 58-62; McAfee, *History of the Late War*, 242; *Amer. St. Pap., Military Aff.*, I, 367-373; *For Rel.*, I, 82-83; *Barbarism of the Enemy*, 97-124; Atherton, *Narrative*, 61-67; *Historical Details*, II, Append. 191-199.
25. Armstrong, *Notices*, I, 85H; Goebel *William Henry Harrison*, 161. McAfee, *op. cit.*, 248-252.
26. McAfee, *History of the Late War*, 262; Monroe to Harrison, Jan. 17, 1813 in *Esarey, op. cit.*, II, 313; Harrison to Gov. Shelby, Jan. (?), 1813, *op. cit.*, II, 341.

## The President's Page

## PETITION OF RIGHT

1628

AT the time the colonists were first settling in America, the struggle in England between the monarch and the Parliament as representative of the people also commenced. This struggle occupied most of the seventeenth century and produced a series of great documents that became the predecessors of the American principles of freedom. The first of the series was the Petition of Right, which was a statement of grievances in the form of a petition to which the House of Commons demanded the assent of Charles I previous to the grant of supplies. As in the Magna Carta, the petition was essentially a demand for recognition of rights previously established and then disregarded. With no intention of acting in accordance with its principles, the King was forced to assent on July 7, 1628.

It is interesting to review the items set forth in the petition in the light of subsequent events in the colonies:

I. *Your Subjects have inherited this Freedom, that they should not be compelled to contribute to any Tax, Tollage, Aid, or other like Charge not set by Common Consent in Parliament . . .*

III. *By the Great Charter of the Liberties of England, it is declared and enacted, That no Freeman may be taken or imprisoned \* \* \* but by the lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land.*

IV. *That no Man of what Estate of Condition that he be, should be put out of his Land or Tenements, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disberited (sic), nor put to Death, without being brought to answer by Due Process of Law.*

VI. *Inhabitants against their Wills have been compelled to receive great Companies of Soldiers and Mariners into their Homes, and there to suffer them to sojourn, against the Laws and Customs of this Realm, and to the Great Grievance and vexation of the People . . .*

VIII. *Trial of offenders according to the Justice of Martial Law, by Pretext whereof some of your Majesty's Subjects have been put to Death, when and where, if by the Laws and the Statutes of the Land they had deserved Death, by the same Laws and Statutes also they might, and by no other ought to have been adjudged and executed.*