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 The War of 1812 In Northwestern Ohio
 Background and Causes

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1. *Northwestern Ohio in 1812*

The term "Northwestern Ohio", as used in this essay, means that portion of the State west of the "Firelands" and the "Congress Lands" of 1799-1804 and north of the fortieth parallel. This includes approximately one fourth of the area of Ohio. The Greenville Treaty line divided this region, setting off as Indian territory that portion lying north of the line.¹

The surface of this region varies gradually from low and flat along Lake Erie to gently rolling in the southern part. The low watershed, scarcely discernible, that separates the basins of Lake Erie and the Ohio River runs an irregular course north of the Greenville line. To the south of the divide the Scioto, Mad, and Great Miami rivers and their tributaries rise and start their courses toward the Ohio. The northern section is crossed by two large rivers, the Sandusky and Maumee, with the shallow Portage about midway between them. The Maumee in 1812 was navigable to ships of any size to the foot of the rapids, some twelve miles above its mouth—opposite the present villages of Perrysburg and Maumee. These rapids continue for about nine miles, above which the river is again navigable for small craft. The Maumee and its principal tributary, the Auglaize, formed one of the principal routes of travel. Thus the portage around the rapids became a place of strategic value.²

The Sandusky was navigable to the foot of the lower rapids, the present site of Fremont. Above the rapids small boats could continue without interruption to the upper rapids, where Upper Sandusky is now located. With portages at the two sets of rapids canoes could travel the Sandusky and Little Sandusky to within three-fourths of a mile of the headwaters of the Scioto. Since the Sandusky reaches farther south than any other river in the entire Great Lakes system, and since the portage between the Sandusky and Scioto was the shortest and easiest, this route was the principal one used by the Indians and French.³

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

Waterways are always valuable as means of travel in a frontier country, but in this region they assumed an additional importance, because a part of northwestern Ohio was then swampy. There were many of these boggy places, but the most noted of all was the "Black Swamp" which lay between the Sandusky and Maumee. It was about thirty-five to forty miles wide and from a hundred to one hundred twenty miles long. These swamps were passable with reasonable ease only late in dry summers before the autumn rains set in or in mid-winter when frozen over. Thus most travel was, of necessity, by water.⁴

When the War of 1812 opened there was not a single mile of road in northwestern Ohio. The nearest approach to roads were the Indian trails, of which there were a number. Wherever possible these trails followed such high ground as there was, for the higher places were less boggy in summertime and less likely to have deep drifted snow in wintertime. Thus the north-south trails followed the river courses along the low ridges that usually formed the rims of the flood plains. Near Lake Erie the east-west trails followed the low, sandy ridges roughly paralleling the shore line. These ridges had been left by the retreat of the ancient glacial lake of that region. The principal east-west route was the "Great Trail" from Pittsburgh to Detroit via the lower rapids of the Sandusky and the Maumee rapids. The Sandusky-Scioto trail from Lake Erie to the Ohio River was the most important north-south route. It followed the courses of the rivers indicated by its name.⁵

Northwestern Ohio was almost wholly uninhabited by white people in 1812. There were a few scattered settlements south of the Greenville line. North of this line there were only two centers of settlement. One was about the mouth of the Maumee, the present site of Toledo. This was described as a flourishing settlement of perhaps three score families, who were mostly French. The other settlement was at Sandusky, now Fremont, at the foot of the lower rapids of the Sandusky River and at the intersection of the Sandusky-Scioto and "Great" trails. This settlement consisted of a French Catholic mission with two priests, a United States Government fur trading post, and a few cabins. Scattered survivors of the earlier French settlement there occupied various places along the lower Sandusky valley. There were also a few white traders around Defiance and at other points along the Maumee and Auglaize. These few white people residing north of the Greenville line were within Indian territory and hence had no representation in the State Legislature.⁶

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

The Indian population of the territory north of the Greenville line was estimated at about three thousand, capable of raising about six or seven hundred warriors. They belonged to many tribes, chiefly of Algonquin stock except the Wyandots and Senecas who were Iroquoian. Practically all of them were comparative newcomers to this region, having been dislodged from their original homes by inter-tribal wars or by pressure from white settlement. The one exception to this were the Miamis who inhabited a portion of their ancestral hunting grounds about the Maumee and Wabash in Ohio and Indiana. Some of the fierce Shawnees were settled about the headwaters of the St. Mary's and Auglaize. Their principal village was Wapakoneta. Harrison characterized them as honest and upright. Tecumseh and his brother, The Prophet, belonged to this group, although the principal scene of their activities was in the Wabash country. Ottawas lived near the lower stretches of the Auglaize and Blanchard rivers. Delawares were located about the upper Scioto and Olentangy. A part of the Seneca Nation had moved from western New York to the Sandusky valley a few years previous to the War. Their principal village, Seneca Town, was on the present site of the village of Old Fort. They settled on lands belonging to the Wyandots.⁷

There were two branches or divisions of the Wyandots, one in Michigan inhabiting a series of villages stretching some twenty miles between Detroit and Brownstown on the Huron River. Walk-in-the-Water was their principal chief, and Roundhead was their war leader. The other, or "neutral", branch inhabited the Sandusky valley. This tribe was not numerous, but it was the most powerful and influential of the Ohio Indians. They were described as the boldest, strongest, and most intelligent of all the northern Indians. They were fierce in war; in fact it was frequently stated that they were the only Indians of the Northwest who considered it a disgrace to retreat from battle. Yet they were merciful and humane to prisoners. They kept the grand calumet which was the symbol of authority throughout the Northwest. Their principal village was at "Sandusky", now Fremont. They carried on a flourishing agriculture, partly by the use of Negro slaves. The principal chief of the Sandusky Wyandots was Tarhe, "The Crane", "a venerable, intelligent, and upright man." Shetroe, an authority on the subject, rates Tarhe as the greatest chieftain of Ohio. This is indeed an outstanding tribute, for the list of Ohio Indians includes the Delaware Prophet, Pontiac, Leatherlips, Logan, Little Turtle, Corn Planter, the Half-King, Tecumseh, the

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

Shawnee Prophet, Seneca John, and numerous others well known to white men.⁸

There were also a few scattered remnants of other tribes. A group of Muncies, relatives of the Delawares, lived along the Sandusky below the principal Wyandot village, and the site of their settlement is still known locally as "Muncie Hollow". Small bands of Mohawks, Mohicans, Mingoes, and Cayugas were present also. Eventually they attached themselves to the Senecas, and this group was known collectively as the "Sandusky Senecas."

2. *Public Opinion in Ohio*

In order to understand the frontiersmen's reactions to the events that led to the War of 1812, it is necessary to examine briefly the background of public opinion and some of the factors molding it. Since northwestern Ohio was almost uninhabited by white settlers, it is necessary to look to the more settled parts of the State for these reactions.

The first wave of migration into the Ohio country followed the Revolutionary War. These first settlers were generally men who had spent their prime in the Revolution, or were the sons of Revolutionary patriots whose fortunes were crushed in that struggle. They retired to the wilderness to conceal their poverty—to get a new start in the hope of improving their conditions. To these were added a number of adventure seekers. Economic difficulties, instead of being removed, were multiplied, once these people became established on the frontier. At first the government sold land in large blocks to land companies who in turn sold it to the settlers, usually on credit. Increasing difficulties rendered many of the buyers unable to meet the payments. Burnet estimated that fully ninety per cent of those who bought land on credit stood to lose their holdings. This caused fear that a system of landlordism, instead of individual holdings, would result, and this condition was intolerable to these independent frontiersmen. A violent wave of dissatisfaction with the government spread rapidly. A new land policy was demanded. While Harrison served as territorial delegate to Congress he successfully urged the sale of land to actual settlers in smaller parcels on easy terms. Although the cause was removed, the fear, insecurity, and bitterness had to wear off gradually.⁹

The Mississippi was the natural outlet for saleable products from the

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

Ohio country. The solicitude over closing the Mississippi—which further increased their economic problems—caused anger not only against Spain but also against the East. In addition to the problem of the navigation of the Mississippi, Spain was charged with inciting the Indians to attacks on the frontier. Immediate war was urged in the West. When the National Government attempted to untangle the problem by diplomatic means rather than by force and restrained the proposed expedition against New Orleans, it was charged that the East had entered into a conspiracy to deprive the West of its rights. The West felt isolated, abandoned, and thwarted. Secession was threatened. Then the difficulties with France following the ratification of Jay's Treaty made France temporarily assume the role of villain. A new enemy appeared on the scene, and more excitement stirred the frontier. The cessation of hostilities with France and the subsequent purchase of Louisiana removed these sources of irritation, but the bitterness and suspicion were not assuaged immediately.¹⁰

The British held a group of American posts in violation of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris and even constructed a new fort at the Maumee rapids. This was not only evidence of unfriendliness on the part of the British, but it put them in a position of influence with the Indians and permitted British traders to dominate the valuable fur trade. The restlessness of the Indians and their determination to resist further encroachments of the Americans was thus laid at the door of the British. It was far easier to blame the British for this trouble than to see it as the inevitable result of their own expansion and the activities of "unprincipled, wandering traders, wholly unconnected with the pioneer settlers" who sold liquor to the Indians and systematically robbed them. It is certain, however, that the British were in sympathy with the Indians' determination to resist the "designs of this persevering rapacious and ambitious people", and there is evidence that the British supplied not only arms and ammunition but also white auxiliaries who participated in the Battle of Fallen Timbers. It was charged that the British did not intend to give up the Northwest. Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers and Jay's Treaty temporarily removed the British and Indian threat, but again the fear and hatred remained.¹¹

The Republican party—that is, the then Republican or Jeffersonian party—found warm support in the West. The Federalists were considered aristocrats. The frontiersmen, with their democratic spirit and economic difficulties, could brook no pretensions of aristocracy. The

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

opposition to the Federalists was increased by the dissatisfaction with the government. The members of the territorial administration were Federalists, appointees of Washington and Adams. The Republicans, unable to secure control of the territorial government, and further irritated by Governor St. Clair's arbitrary acts, launched a demand for statehood. This was vigorously opposed by the members of the territorial administration, their friends, and political satellites. Political differences were brought to fever heat; prejudices, passions, suspicions, and enmity were aroused that continued for years.¹²

Still another factor was the activity of Aaron Burr. The general public did not know definitely what Burr's plans and objects were, but the Ohio settler believed he intended to detach a portion of the Mississippi Valley,

... wickedly devising and intending the peace and tranquility of the said United States to disturb and stir, move, and excite insurrection, rebellion and war against the said United States . . .

The suspicion that Burr was connected with British agents increased the resentments. Contemporary travelers reported that Burr was the chief topic of conversation in the West. The reaction of the frontier to the Burr episode was additional anger against Great Britain and the spread of a wave of blatant nationalism.¹³

From the foregoing it is evident that the people of Ohio were in a chronic state of excitement, difficulty, fear, irritation, anger, frustration and resentment. This explains the violence of their reaction to the Indian—Canadian situation.

3. The Indian Problem

The Indian problem in the Northwest during the decade preceding the War of 1812 was neither new nor difficult to account for. The War was the final chapter in a long history of conflict in the Northwest that was the inevitable result of the impact of two races so different in mode of life, economy, culture, tradition, and conception of land tenure.

The Indian population of the Northwest at this time was perhaps less than fifteen thousand, capable of raising somewhat less than three thousand warriors. They belonged to several tribes, among the more important of which were Kickapoos, Delawares, Shawnees, Pottawottamies,

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

Wyandots, Ottawas, Sacs and Foxes, Chippewas, Winnebagoes, and Miamis. There were also Weas, Eel Rivers, and Piankeshaws, who were really branches of the Miamis.¹⁴

These Indians closest to the white settlements and most accessible to the traders were in a sorry plight. They were crowded, especially in Indiana, and that meant less hunting ground. As the wave of white settlement advanced the supply of game decreased rapidly, for "one white hunter will destroy more game than five of the common Indians." As game became scarce hunger and even starvation became prevalent. Unprincipled, greedy traders found these Indians easy prey, especially when a plentiful supply of liquor was at hand, for . . .

whiskey was an all important factor in the fur trade. Not only did a drunken Indian lose all sense of value but once reduced to a stupor it was easy to short-weight him.

Harrison stated that six thousand gallons of whiskey were brought annually to the Indians of the Wabash Valley, who numbered probably six hundred warriors. White men's diseases, once introduced among the Indians, took a terrific toll.¹⁵

The Indians of the more distant tribes of the Northwest had not yet been contaminated by the march of "civilization". They were "generally well clothed, healthy and vigorous." But those close to the borders of settlement were "half-naked, filthy and enfeebled with intoxication." They were abused and plundered with impunity. Their health and birth rate declined. Above all, they lost their self-respect and dignity.¹⁶

President Jefferson was as land-hungry as any frontiersman. Throughout his administration he pursued a policy of extinguishing Indian claims as rapidly as possible. Harrison, ever anxious to please his patron, executed the policy with avidity. Within a period of two and a half years eight distinct treaties were made with the Northwestern Indians.¹⁷

Despite Harrison's conscientious efforts to ameliorate the Indians' condition by prohibiting the sale or gift of liquor to them, by forbidding traders to follow the Indians on hunting expeditions, and by long reports deploring conditions; despite Jefferson's rosy outlook that

they are becoming sensible that the earth yields subsistence with less labor and more certainty than the forest, and find it to their in-

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

terest from time to time to dispose of parts of their surplus and waste lands for the means of improving those they occupy and of subsisting their families while they are preparing their farms

this land policy and the manifestation of it in the series of treaties caused a growing restlessness that was apparent by 1805 or 1806.¹⁸

It has been said that the War of 1812 centers around three Indians: Tecumseh, the Prophet, and Tache. Certainly all played important parts. Tecumseh and Elskwatawa, his brother, better known as "The Prophet", were Shawnees born about 1768-70 near the present site of Springfield, Ohio. Tecumseh was ten or twelve years old when his village was destroyed by an expedition led by George Rogers Clark. Randall stated that this act, which Tecumseh witnessed, made an indelible impression on the youth, and that he vowed eternal opposition to the further advance of white settlers.¹⁹

The Prophet came into prominence earlier (about 1804) than did Tecumseh. The Prophet's aims originally were neither political nor military, but were religious, ethical, and economic and grew out of the realization of the bad influence of the impact of the whites on the Indians. The policy sounded simple. It was to stop drinking liquor, forsake the ways of the white man, and re-adopt their ancestral mode of life. This is strongly reminiscent of the doctrines of the Delaware Prophet of the period 1760-63. This is not strange, for the Indians were superstitious, and "prophets" appeared among them from time to time. The Shawnee Prophet gained many adherents, and they actually practiced at least a part of his teachings.²⁰

But Tecumseh, smarting under the land sessions of 1803-05, decided that more direct action was necessary. He planned a general confederacy of all Indians to stop forever the encroachments of the white race. He proposed to establish the Ohio River as a permanent boundary between the races and that land sales must be made by the consent of all Indians rather than by individual tribes. Tecumseh traveled from the Great Lakes to Florida urging the Indians to join the proposed confederacy.²¹

Throughout the period 1805-1811 Tecumseh and Harrison played a game of diplomatic tag. Harrison was alternately alarmed and reassured; he was striving conscientiously to avert a break when he received instructions to acquire more land. It is doubtful whether Jefferson real-

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

ized the consequences of such a step at that time, for he was apparently sincere in his professions of a desire for peace. Harrison, striving to please, negotiated a treaty at Fort Wayne by which Indian claims were extinguished to two million nine hundred thousand acres. Another with the Kickapoos followed shortly. Meanwhile Governor Hull negotiated treaties at Detroit and Brownstown.²²

This new series of land acquisitions was considered by Tecumseh to be a direct challenge, and he accepted it as such. His cause was strengthened considerably. Some of the younger braves demanded war at once, but Tecumseh held them in check. He wanted to wait until his confederacy could be completed. Meanwhile he was indefatigable in collecting warriors, perfecting this confederacy scheme, and generally preparing for war. A great drought and premature frost in 1811 made crops short and game scarce. Hunger increased the restlessness of the Indians.²³

While Tecumseh was on a mission to the southern Indians the impending conflict materialized at Tippecanoe, November 7, 1811. In so far as Indian relations were concerned, this was really the first battle of the War of 1812. It was the immediate and direct result of the land acquisitions of Harrison and Hull. While usually regarded as an American victory, Tippecanoe was not an overwhelming one. It did not crush the Indian opposition. It did, however, seriously interfere with Tecumseh's plans. From his point of view the conflict had been premature. The Prophet's influence was greatly weakened by his part in the battle.²⁴

4. The Hand of Great Britain

During these troubled relations with the Indians of the Northwest the pioneer saw or suspected the hand of Great Britain behind the scenes. Great Britain was naturally a villain to the frontiersmen and the experiences of the 1790's had not been forgotten. Harrison's correspondence is full of charges that British agents were fomenting trouble, and that the Prophet was in constant communication with the British at Fort Malden. William Wells wrote to him in 1807:

*It is my opinion that the British are at the bottom of all this Business and depend on it that if we have war with them that many of the Indian tribes will take an active part against us . . .*²⁵

In the spring of 1808 Harrison reported that the Delawares had received a communication from the British stating that hostilities against

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

the United States were anticipated and asking the Delawares to join with them. The Delawares refused. In the autumn of the same year Harrison reported the presence of British traders, who were without licenses. They were insolent and were well supplied with whiskey. By 1810 Harrison stated that no frontiersman

*will hesitate to believe that the Prophet is a tool of British fears or British avarice, designed for the purpose of forming a combination of the Indians, which in case of war between that power and the United States may assist them in the defense of Canada, or as a means of keeping back our settlements . . .*²⁶

Harrison was not alone in attributing the Indians' unrest to the British. Governors Hull and Clark were sending in similar reports from Michigan and Missouri. Soon not only the whole frontier, but also official Washington was stirred by these statements.²⁷

5. The Demand for Canada

As early as 1807 war with Great Britain was anticipated, but defensive measures only were then considered. But when the Twelfth Congress convened in the late fall of 1811, a new note was struck. The conquest of Canada was boldly and insistently demanded.²⁸

The demand for Canada was a complex matter of long, slow growth. In 1778 Washington said of the acquisition of Canada:

It is much to be wished . . . Because of its intercourse and connexion with the numerous tribes of western Indians, its communion with them by water and other local advantages, it will be at least a troublesome if not a dangerous neighbor to us; and ought, at all events, to be in the same interest and politics, as the other States.

The belief in the ultimate annexation of Canada had a continuous existence from the Revolution to the War of 1812, but until about 1810 such annexation was thought of as a matter for the indefinite future, the United States having neither the strength nor motive for immediate conquest.²⁹

The crystallization of sentiment for the immediate conquest of Canada about 1810-1812 was the result of the interaction of several factors. First the trouble with Spain over the West Florida question made war with that power imminent. Because of the alliance between Spain and Great Britain, it was generally felt that war with the former would in-

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

volve the latter also.⁵⁰ A second factor was the jealousy by Americans of the British for their domination of the Indian fur trade.⁵¹

A third factor was manifest destiny. This is usually supposed to have had its origin some two decades later. This belief and activating principle that the American people were ordained to acquire and occupy more and more of North America was itself a complex matter resulting from the interaction of many factors: social, economic, patriotic, political, psychological, philosophical, and perhaps evangelical. To touch briefly on only some of these factors, let us look first at certain economic forces. The steadily increasing population of the United States plus its expanding economy demanded an abundance of cheap land. Also the wasteful, unscientific use of land along the Atlantic seaboard and the Piedmont regions soon exhausted the fertility of the soil and added increased pressure for cheap virgin acres. Then, too, the typical pioneer was a restless fellow, driven by hunger, ever on the move and ever searching for new and more productive fields. In short, the people of the United States wanted more land, and in as advantageous locations as possible. The frontiersman of that period was accustomed to build his cabin of logs, to fence his clearings with rails split from logs, and to use wood for fuel. Hence the sparsely timbered prairies to the west did not appeal to him. Also, the prairie region was then too far from established markets to provide feasible outlets for his produce. The East was already settled and over-crowded in the point of view of the pioneer. The western prairies did not appeal to him. Therefore expansion at that time necessarily meant going north or south. To the north lay Canada, and south lay Florida.⁵²

It is notable that in practically all cases the project of the annexation of Canada was inseparably linked with that of the acquisition of the Floridas. Sectionalism was a strong force, and the principle of a balance of power between the North and South was already well established. There is some evidence that the expansionists made a "deal" whereby each section was to gain in approximately equal proportion and thus not disturb the balance of power. In other words, the annexation of the Floridas—potential slave territory and eventual slave state or states—was to be balanced by the acquisition of Canada—potential free territory and eventual free state or states with their representation in Congress and particularly in the United States Senate where each State regardless of size or population is entitled to two Senators. Henry Clay of Kentucky was prob-

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

ably the most influential advocate and certainly the most articulate and eloquent in promoting this dual expansion. He declared

*But I must be permitted to conclude by declaring my hope to see, ere long, the new United States—if you will allow me the expression—embracing not only the old thirteen States, but the entire country east of the Mississippi, including East Florida, and some of the territories to the north of us also.*⁵³

When the Twelfth Congress convened just three days before Tippecanoe a group of new, relatively young members principally from the Carolinas, Kentucky and Tennessee gained control of the House of Representatives and elected Clay Speaker. This group soon came to be known as the "War Hawks"; they wanted war against Great Britain and boldly demanded immediate conquest of Canada.⁵⁴

Probably most important factor of all promoting the desire for Canada was the strong conviction that the British had entered into an unholy alliance with the savages and that the British were responsible for all the Indian difficulties in the Northwest, and more particularly the activities of Tecumseh and the Prophet. The belief became strong that the only way to pacify the frontier and to permit unrestrained expansion into the Northwest was to strike a decisive blow at Canada—to paralyze the nerve center of Indian opposition.

The following quotation from the *Democratic Press* as printed in *The War*, a New York weekly, for July 18, 1812 seems to express the general sentiment:

"We do not want Canada" say some . . . Granted . . . A man might not want to cudgel that which was uplifted to strike him . . . but would he not therefore endeavor to wrest it from his adversary? Liston, the British minister, once declared, in an official dispatch, that Britain "held Canada as a rod over the United States".

Expressions of similar sentiments are numerous. An editorial in the same issue of *The War* stated that "evidence of British activities among the Indians is so presumptive, that even the advocates of Britain do not venture longer to deny it" and that possession of Canada was necessary to our peace. The issue of July 4 contained an editorial stating that "a peace that would leave Britain in possession of Canada would be worse than war." *The National Intelligencer*, (Washington) carried an account of Canada in the issue of November 23, 1811, and stated that the account would be continued, the next installment dealing with "water,

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

soil, and production of Canadas—the population and character of the inhabitants—their military strength, and their importance to the United States." The same paper carried a contribution, in the issue of February 22, 1812, by someone signing himself "Common Sense" reading, "All agree that Canada must be ours; and it is, perhaps, essential to the future security and happiness of the United States that Canada should become a part of them." The *Fredonian*, a newspaper published at Circleville, Ohio, stated in the issue of May 2, 1812, "They (the British) must be for ever driven from all their possessions in America, and their good and faithful allies must be limited to the country beyond the Mississippi, before we can expect to enjoy the blessings of peace."

Finally, it was believed that the conquest of Canada would be easy at that time, as Britain was involved in the Napoleonic wars. Little resistance from the Canadians was anticipated. In fact, it was confidently hoped that many Canadians would flock to the American standard once the invasion were started. The Americans overlooked the fact that a considerable portion of the English-speaking Canadians were Loyalists or their descendants—refugees from the American Revolution with small love for the United States.³⁸

Into this explosive sentiment on the frontier and in Congress came the news of Tippecanoe. The whole country was agitated. Committees of public safety were organized along the frontier settlements, and Congress was petitioned for protection. The British were blamed for the outbreak, and war fever rose to a critical point.³⁹

FOOTNOTES

1. There were certain exceptions to this—specified tracts were reserved for various purposes by the Treaty of Greenville and subsequent treaties. *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 562, 747, 757.
2. William Gregory and W. B. Guileau, *History and Geography of Ohio*, 104, 106. In 1812 the Miami was called "Miami" or "Miami of the Lakes" to distinguish it from the Miamis of the Ohio Valley. The Auglaize was then variously known as "Au Glaize," "Grand Glaize," "Glaize" and "Ottawa."
3. N. O. Winter, *History of Northwest Ohio*, I, 132; Keeler, "The Sandusky River," *Ohio Arch. and Hist. Soc. Pub.*, XIII, 193; John Melish, *Travels Through the United States of America in 1806, 1807, 1809, 1810 & 1811* (Philadelphia, 1818) p. 461.
4. *The War; Being a Faithful Record of the Transactions of the War between the United States . . . and the United Kingdom*, 2 vols. (N. Y., 1813, S. Woodworth and Company), Aug. 22, Dec. 12, 1812, pp. 40, 105; Melish, *op. cit.*, 461; R. B. McAfee, *History of the Late War in the Western Country* (1919 edition), p. 66. Harrison reported that all of western Ohio north of forty degrees was one continuous swamp. Harrison to Eustis, Sec. of War, Nov. 15, 1812 in Logan Esarey, (ed.), *Messages and Letters of William Henry*

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

- Harrison, II, 214; Samuel Williams, *Two Western Campaigns in the War of 1812-13* (Cincinnati, 1870), 20-21. Henry Adams called the swamp a barrier as effectual as the Andes. Adams, *History of the United States*, VI, 79. Harrison reported the Black Swamp "half-leg deep" in July, 1813. Harrison to Armstrong, Secretary of War, July 23, 1813 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, II, 495.
5. T. H. Palmer, ed., *Historical Register of the United States* (Philadelphia, 1814), II, 4; Williams, *Two Western Campaigns*, 18; H. C. Shetrone, "The Indian in Ohio," *Ohio Arch. and Hist. Soc. Pub.*, XXVII, 307-308; Keeler, "The Sandusky River," *loc. cit.*, XII, 198-199.
 6. Palmer, *Historical Register*, II, 4; *The War*, Aug. 22, 1812, p. 40; Winter, *History of Northwest Ohio*, I, 99, 187. Considerable confusion has arisen because of the prevalence of the name "Sandusky" in this region. The word itself is of Wyandot origin and is variously translated as "clear water," "at the cold water," "cold water within pools," and "deep water within pools." The Wyandots applied this name to the river and its valley which they inhabited and also to each of their villages. Thus there was a "Sandusky" at the lower rapids, another at the upper rapids, and still another about four miles below the upper rapids. In order to distinguish these places the white travelers and settlers prefixed the terms "Lower," "Upper," and "Old" respectively. At the time of the War of 1812 the settlement at the lower rapids was officially called "Sandusky," while it was known locally as "Lower Sandusky." This was the "Sandusky" of the French, of Pontiac's conspiracy, Bradstreet's expedition, Boone's captivity, Revolutionary activities, Wayne's references, the U. S. fur trading post, etc. The present city of Sandusky was not settled until 1817. It was originally known as "Ogontz's Place," later as "Portland," and still later as "Sandusky City." It did not adopt the name "Sandusky" until two decades after the War of 1812. (See Keeler, "The Sandusky River," *Ohio Arch. and Hist. Soc. Pub.*, XIII, 193, 209; Martin, "Origin of Ohio Place Names," *loc. cit.*, XVI, 277.) In order to avoid confusion present place names are used here. B. J. Lossing, *Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812* (N. Y. 1869), 49. *Amer. State Pap., Ind. Aff.*, I, 793; C. E. Stocum, *The Ohio Country*, (N. Y., 1919) 180-181.
 7. In 1816 a census of Indians in northwest Ohio placed the number at 2600. Winter, *op. cit.*, I, 189. John Johnston, Indian agent, reported the number at 2000. (*Nile's Register*, Mar. 14, 1813, II, 32.) This is apparently too low, as it does not include several fragments of tribes then residing in northwestern Ohio. Shetrone, "The Indian in Ohio," *Ohio Arch. and Hist. Soc. Pub.*, XXVII, 317; Harrison to Armstrong, Secretary of War, Mar. 22, 1814 in Esarey, (ed.) *Messages and Letters*, II, 636, 637.
 8. According to Wyandot tradition the Sandusky or "neutral" branch, tired of the long warfare with the Iroquois Confederacy, declared and maintained their neutrality between the Confederacy and the branch of the Wyandots which continued the struggle. Harrison to Armstrong, Secretary of War, Mar. 22, 1814 in Esarey, (ed.) *Messages and Letters*, II, 636, 637; Winter, *History of Northwest Ohio*, I, 175-176. Tarhe was variously spelled Ta-he, Ta-ke, Tarke, and Tarhe. The nickname "The Crane" was applied to him by the French because of his tall, angular build. Tarhe was originally a minor chieftain and war leader, but he was the only one of thirteen Wyandot chieftains to survive the battle of Fallen Timbers and thus became both war chief and principal chief. Shetrone, "The Indian in Ohio," *Ohio Arch. and Hist. Soc. Pub.*, XXVII, 319.
 9. Jacob Burnet, *Notes on the Early Settlement of the North-Western Territory* (Cincinnati, 1847), 42, 45-46, 450-452; *Annals of Congress*, 6 Cong., I, 209-210, 527, 557-538, 625, 650-652, 681, 683, etc.
 10. *Amer. St. Pap., For. Rel.*, I, 280-283; Burnet, *Notes*, 164, 295, 445-446; John H. Latane, *American Foreign Policy* (Garden City, N. Y., 1927), 56, 95-98.
 11. *Amer. St. Pap., For. Rel.*, I, 44, 461-463; Col. McKee to Lt. Gov. Simcoe, July 26, 1794, MS. (copy), Hayes Memorial; *Annals of Congress*, 4 Cong.,

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

- I, 1389; Burnet, *Notes*, 58, 175, 471; Slocum, *The Ohio Country*, 182, 183; Mich. Pioneer and Hist. Soc. Coll., XX, 226, 351; Report of J. G. Simcoe, Lt. Gov. of Upper Canada, Apr. 11, 1794. MS. (copy), Hayes Memorial.
12. Burnet, *Notes*, 298, 341, 342, 347-349. See McClintock, "Ohio's Birth Struggle", Ohio Arch. and Hist. Soc. Pub., XI, 44-70; Bartlett, "The Struggle for Statehood in Ohio," *loc. cit.*, XXXII, 472-503.
13. Burr's indictment in *Annals of Congress*, 6 Cong., I, Append., 385. Append., pp. 385-758 contain the proceedings of Burr's trial. See Jefferson's message to Congress, Jan. 22, 1807. James D. Richardson, (ed.), *Messages and Papers*, I, 412-414. See also James Wilkinson, *Memoirs of My Own Times*, II, *Annals*, 10 Cong., II, 1988. Harrison stated that Burr received money from the British minister. See Harrison to Jefferson, July 16, 1808 in Esarey, (ed.) *Messages and Letters*, I, 298. Melish, *Travels*, 350-351; C. Schultz, *Travels On An Inland Voyage . . . 1807 and 1808* (New York, 1810), 165; John Lambert, *Travels Through Canada and the United States . . . 1806, 1807, 1808* (London, 1813), 405-406.
14. The latest official estimate of the Indian population of the Northwest Territory prior to 1812 was made in 1789. It placed the number of warriors at five thousand. (*Amer. St. Pap., Ind. Aff.*, I, 13.) That would make the total about twenty to twenty-five thousand. In the Wabash valley the Indians decreased from the estimated total of two thousand in 1789 to six hundred in 1801. (*Amer. St. Pap., Ind. Aff.*, I, 13; Harrison to Dearborn, Secretary of War, July 15, 1801 in Esarey, (ed.), *Messages and Letters*, I, 29.) In the more remote sections this decrease was not so rapid, or there was no decrease at all. Hence the estimate of about fifteen thousand is reasonably accurate. See also *Amer. St. Pap., Ind. Aff.*, I, 687-696; Harrison to Armstrong, Secretary of War, Mar. 22, 1814 in Esarey, *Message and Letters*, II, 637.
15. Harrison to Dearborn, Secretary of War, July 15, 1801 in *ibid.*, I, 27, 29; Burnet, *Notes*, 390; George Creel, "From Ashdour to Astor", *Elks Magazine*, Feb., 1932, p. 9.
16. Harrison to Dearborn, July 15, 1801, *loc. cit.*, I, 29; Burnet, *Notes*, 324, 390-391.
17. Jefferson to Harrison, Dec. 22, 1808 in Esarey, (ed.), *Messages and Letters*, I, 322-323. Harrison to Armstrong, Secretary of War, Mar. 22, 1814 in *loc. cit.*, II, 638. See Dorothy B. Goebel, *William Henry Harrison*, 94-104; Adams, *History*, VI, 74. Treaty at Fort Wayne, June 7, 1803, with the Kickapoos, Eel Rivers, Piankeshaws and Kaskaskias, Delawares, Shawnees, Pottawottamies, and Miamis. (*Amer. St. Pap., Ind. Aff.*, I, 688.) About 1,152,000 acres were ceded by this one treaty. (Goebel, *William Henry Harrison*, 104.) At Vincennes, Aug. 13, 1803, with the Kaskaskias. (*Amer. St. Pap., Ind. Aff.*, I, 687.) At Vincennes, Aug. 18, 1804, with the Delawares. (*Ibid.*, 689-690.) At Vincennes, Aug. 27, 1804, with the Piankeshaws. (*Ibid.*, 690.) At St. Louis, Nov. 3, 1804, with the Sacs and Foxes. (*Ibid.*, 694.) At Fort Industry, July 4, 1805, with the Wyandots, Ottawas, Chippewas, Muncies and Delawares, Shawnees, and Pottawottamies. (*Ibid.*, 695.) At Grouseland, Aug. 21, 1805, with the Delawares, Pottawottamies, Miamis, Eel Rivers and Weas. (*Ibid.*, 696-697.) At Vincennes, December 30, 1805, with the Piankeshaws. (*Ibid.*, 704-705.)
18. Harrison's proclamation, July 20, 1801 in Esarey, (ed.), *Messages and Letters*, I, 31, 32. Harrison to Dearborn, July 15, 1801, in *ibid.*, I, 25-31; Same to same, Mar. 3, 1803 in *ibid.*, 76-84. Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 3, 1805 in Richardson, (ed.) *Message and Papers*, I, 386-387. Harrison to Jefferson, July 5, 1806 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, I, 195; Harrison's message to the Indiana Terr. Legis., Nov. 3, 1806 in *ibid.*, 199.
19. Shetrone, "The Indian in Ohio", Ohio Arch. and Hist. Soc. Pub., XXVII, 429. Tecumseh means "one who passes across intervening space, from one point to another", i. e. a meteor. (Shetrone, *op. cit.*, 435.) Elskwatava

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

- means "open door". *Ibid.*, 430. Hatch explained that a part of Tecumseh and the Prophet's influence came through supernatural powers being ascribed to them because they were two of a set of triplets. He stated that Simon Kenton told him that he (Kenton) had heard this many times from Shawnees whose veracity he could not doubt. (Hatch, *History of the War of 1812*, 88.) McMaster agreed with this statement. (McMaster, *History*, III, 529.) The third member of the trio is said to have achieved no distinction. Shetrone, on the contrary, stated that the Prophet was younger than Tecumseh. (Shetrone, "The Indian in Ohio", Ohio Arch. and Hist. Soc. Pub., XXVII, 430.) Randall stated that after exhaustive research he determined definitely that Tecumseh was born in 1768, that he was older than the Prophet, and that the latter was a twin. (Randall, "Tecumseh, the Shawnee Chief", Ohio Arch. and Hist. Soc. Pub., XV, 428, 495-496.) There is, however, some evidence that Tecumseh was born in 1770. See also Randall, *op. cit.*, 431 and Shetrone, *op. cit.*, 382.
20. McAfee, *History of the Late War*, 18. Harrison specifically mentioned the Prophet for the first time early in 1806. Harrison's speech to the Delawares in Esarey, (ed.), *Messages and Letters*, I, 183-184. Shetrone, *op. cit.*, 437. The Prophet to Harrison, Aug. 1, 1808 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, I, 299-300. Francis Parkman, *The Conspiracy of Pontiac* (Boston, 1913), I, 179. Capt. William Wells to Harrison, Aug. 20, 1807 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, I, 239. A new village, Tippecanoe, was established in the upper Wabash valley. Harrison reported that the inhabitants had stopped drinking whiskey and were tilling the soil. (Harrison to Dearborn, Secretary of War, July 12, 1808 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, I, 295-296.)
 21. Harrison to Eustis, Secretary of War, June 14, 1810 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, I, 423. Same to same, Aug. 22, 1810 in *ibid.*, I, 463. Brock to Lord Liverpool, Aug. 29, 1812 in *ibid.*, II, 102. See Hatch, *History of the War of 1812*, 11, 13; McAfee, *History of the Late War*, 21, 23.
 22. For this correspondence see Esarey, (ed.), *Messages and Letters*, I, especially pp. 180-490. Jefferson to Harrison, Dec. 22, 1808 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, I, 322-323. *Amer. St. Pap., Ind. Aff.*, I, 747, 757, 761, 762-763. Harrison to Eustis, Secretary of War, Nov. 15, 1809 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, I, 393. It is estimated that the treaties of 1803-1805 and 1808-09 reduced the hunting grounds of the Indiana-Illinois Indians to one fifth their former size. See Goebel, *William Henry Harrison*, 93.
 23. Esarey, *op. cit.*, I, 423. Lt. Col. St. George, unaddressed memorandum, Mar. 9, 1812. Mich. Pioneer and Hist. Soc. Coll., XV, 81.
 24. See Harrison's report of the battle, *Amer. St. Pap., Ind. Aff.*, I, 776-779; Hatch, *History of the War of 1812*, 15; Adams, *History*, VI, 67; McMaster, *History*, III, 529, 535; Goebel, *William Henry Harrison*, 115; Elliott to Brock, Jan. 12, 1812 in Mich. Pioneer and Hist. Soc. Coll., XV, 67; Shetrone, "The Indian in Ohio", Ohio Arch. and Hist. Soc. Pub., XXVII, 436.
 25. McAfee, *History of the Late War*, 21, 23, 24; Hatch, *History of the War of 1812*, 8-11; McMaster, *op. cit.*, III, 530; Harrison to Dearborn, Secretary of War, Feb. 19, 1802 in Esarey, (ed.), *Messages and Letters*, I, 37-38; Wells to Harrison, Aug. 20, 1807 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, I, 242. William Wells was a scout of ability, an accurate observer, and well versed in Indian matters. He was the son-in-law of Little Turtle and hence was supposed to have had "underground" access to vital information concerning Indian plans. See also Wells to Harrison, Aug. 20, 1807 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, I, 242.
 26. Harrison to Dearborn, Secretary of War, Apr. 14, 1808 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, I, 289; Same to same, Oct. 11, 1808 in Esarey, *op. cit.*, I, 312. See also Esarey, *op. cit.*, I, 490. For other letters and messages on the same subject, see Esarey, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 243, 290, 344, 349-355, 381, 418, 421, 425, 459, 663, etc.
 27. The British denied that they had incited the Indians against the United States. (See *Amer. St. Pap., For. Rel.*, III, 453, 462.) They pointed to their

The War of 1812 in Northwestern Ohio—Background and Causes

- archives to prove that they actually withheld arms and ammunition from the Northwest Indians and advised them to maintain peace. (E. g., Brock to Prevost, Feb. 25, 1812, Mich. Pioneer and Hist. Soc. Coll., XV, 79.) This was probably due, however, to the British desire to delay hostilities until Tecumseh's confederacy could be perfected. (See Adams, *History*, VI, 85.) A school of historians of the past generation maintained that the British did not instigate the Indians—at least not directly. (E. g.: McLaughlin, "The Western Posts and the British Debts", American Historical Association Report, 1894, p. 435; E. Cruikshank, "The Employment of the Indians in the War of 1812", A. H. A. Report, 1895, p. 322; A. H. Abel, "The History of Events Resulting in Indian Consolidation West of the Mississippi", A. H. A. Report, 1906, pp. 260-269.) A study of the evidence now available renders this view unsound. But regardless of the truth or falsity, justice or injustice, of the charge that the British stirred the Indians to trouble, the result was the same, for the frontiersmen believed that the British did so. See Amer. St. Pap., Ind. Aff., I, 745-748, especially 746. See report of the House Committee on Foreign Relations, re: British influence on the Indians *Ibid.*, I, 797. See also extracts of letters transmitted to Congress by the Secretary of War in *ibid.*, I, 796-811. *Annals*, 10 Cong., 1 sess., II, 1625, 1915, 1987-1988, 2017; 12 Cong., 2 sess., 582, 584-585; 12 Cong., II, 56. See Niles' Register, Sept. 28, 1811, I, 72; Mar. 7, 1812, II, 5-7.
28. Hull to Dearborn, Secretary of War, Nov. 24, 1807 in Amer. St. Pap., Ind. Aff., I, 746; Harrison to Dearborn, Aug. 29, 1807 in Esarey, (ed.), *Messengers and Letters*, I, 244; *Annals*, 10 Cong., 1 sess., II, 1521, 1522, 1625, 2017; 11 Cong., I, 580; 12 Cong., 1 sess., I, 325-326, 416, 426, 427, 457, 597-598, 603, 640, 657; II, 1185, 1551; J. W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812* (New York, 1925), 29.
29. Washington to Landon Carter, May 30, 1778 in Sparks, (ed.), *The Writings of Washington*, V, 389; Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812*, 11.
30. *Annals*, 10 Cong., 1 sess., II, 1918; 11 Cong., 3 sess., 63; 13 Cong., 1 sess., I, 528.
31. *Annals*, 10 Cong., 1 sess., II, 1625; 2 sess., 584; 11 Cong., I, 580; 12 Cong., 1 sess., I, 457.
32. *The National Intelligencer*, a newspaper published at Washington, D. C., carried an account of the Western Country in the issue of January 12, 1812, and concluded that the then West was not suited to settlement. This is in sharp contrast to the favorable views concerning Canada. For the best treatment of these factors, see L. M. Hacker, "Western Land Hunger and the War of 1812: A Conjecture," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, X, (1923-24), 365-395, especially pp. 370-372 and 389-392.
33. *Annals*, 11 Cong., 3 sess., 63-64; 12 Cong., 1 sess., I, 426-427; 13 Cong., 1 sess., I, 528-529; Amer. St. Pap., For. Rel., III, 407, 464; See Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812*, 11, 12-13, 124, 125, 140.
34. *Annals*, 12 Cong., 1 sess., I, 416, 426, 427, 457, 533, 597-598, 657, 943, 1060.
35. There is some difference of opinion regarding the relative weight and importance of manifest destiny and removal of the British influence over the Indians as factors in causing the demand for the conquest of Canada. Hacker believes that manifest destiny was foremost, and he minimizes the Indian threat. (Hacker, "Western Land Hunger and the War of 1812", *Miss Valley Hist. Rev.*, X, pp. 365-395.) Pratt, after a detailed examination of manifest destiny, concludes that the Indian factor was more important. (Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812*, 58.) Goebel arrives at a similar conclusion. (Goebel, *William Henry Harrison*, 129). Undoubtedly both factors were important. See *Annals*, 11 Cong., 1 sess., I, 580; 3 sess., 63-64; 12 Cong., 1 sess., I, 426, 457, 503-501, 640, 1551; 12 Cong., 2 sess., 56.
36. *Annals*, 12 Cong., I, 580, 603. See Hull's proclamation, July 12, 1812 in *The War*, Aug. 8, 1812, p. 30.
37. Amer. St. Pap., Ind. Aff., I, 780-782; *Annals*, 12 Cong., 1 sess., II, 1185.

The Story of Camp Perry

Based on an interview with Col. Harry Harold Kerr

BY RANDOLPH C. DOWNES

Camp Perry's story really begins with the lessons learned from the Spanish American War of 1898. That conflict was not very skillfully fought by either side. Although the new American Navy conducted itself fairly well, a great many flaws were revealed in the military and naval set up of the United States. One of these flaws was poor gunnery and marksmanship. The long American tradition of accuracy with firearms, resulting from pioneer experience at hunting and Indian fighting, was wearing off. The result was that keenness of the average marksman's eye was being dulled by inaction. In a naval respect this defect received world-wide notoriety in the battle of Santiago when no serious hits were registered on the Spanish cruisers. That the American fleet won the battle was due to the fact that the enemy vessels, being made of wood, caught fire. One of those that escaped the American gunfire had to surrender because its coal supply ran out.

It was natural that naval and military men should feel the sting of this humiliation most keenly, and that they should propose to do something about it. One of these was Brigadier General Ammon B. Critchfield, Adjutant General of Ohio from 1904 to 1908. It became General Critchfield's main objective as Adjutant General and commander of the Ohio National Guard to improve the marksmanship of Ohio's soldiers. In his 1904 report to Governor Myron T. Herrick, Critchfield said, "It is my purpose to encourage, as far as possible, the qualifications in marksmanship which, it seems to me, is the highest attainment of a good soldier." In his 1905 report he pointed out that the figure of merit for the Ohio National Guard team in the National Rifle Association matches for 1904 was thirteen. "This," said the General, "seems almost humiliating." But he hastened to add, "It was better than that of many states."

As an aid to improvement of the situation, there was passed by Congress in 1903 the so-called "Dick Law," named after its author, Senator Charles Dick of Ohio. This law sought to remedy two defects revealed in the Spanish-American War: one was the complete lack of coordination between the militia of the several states; the other was the complete lack of integration and subordination of the militia to the reg-